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*MODERN SPAIN*

1815 - 1898


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# Cambridge Historical Series.

EDITED BY G. W. PROTHERO, LITT.D.

HONORARY FELLOW OF KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

## MODERN SPAIN

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# MODERN SPAIN

1815—1898

BY

H. BUTLER CLARKE, M.A.

late Fereday Fellow of St John's College, and sometime Taylorian  
Teacher of Spanish, in the University of Oxford

WITH A MEMOIR BY

the Rev. W. H. HUTTON, B.D.

Fellow and Tutor of St John's College, Oxford;  
Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Rochester

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## GENERAL PREFACE.

*The aim of this series is to sketch the history of Modern Europe, with that of its chief colonies and conquests, from about the end of the fifteenth century down to the present time. In one or two cases the story commences at an earlier date: in the case of the colonies it generally begins later. The histories of the different countries are described, as a rule, separately; for it is believed that, except in epochs like that of the French Revolution and Napoleon I, the connection of events will thus be better understood and the continuity of historical development more clearly displayed.*

*The series is intended for the use of all persons anxious to understand the nature of existing political conditions. "The roots of the present lie deep in the past"; and the real significance of contemporary events cannot be grasped unless the historical causes which have led to them are known. The plan adopted makes it possible to treat the history of the last four centuries in considerable detail, and to embody the most important results of modern research. It is hoped therefore that the series will be useful not only to beginners but to students who have already acquired some general knowledge of European History. For those who wish to carry their studies further, the bibliography appended to each volume will act as a guide to original sources of information and works more detailed and authoritative.*

*Considerable attention is paid to political geography, and each volume is furnished with such maps and plans as may be requisite for the illustration of the text.*

G. W. PROTHERO.



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## MEMOIR.

WHEN this book, to which the author had devoted several years of study and of revision, was completed, and there remained nothing else to write but the preface, it seemed that there were many years of life and work before him. But this was not to be; and the sad task is left to me of introducing the work by a few words in memory of one of the truest of friends and the best of men.

Henry Butler Clarke was born at Marchington, Staffordshire, of which parish his father was at that time incumbent, on November 9, 1863. He was the eldest son of the Rev. Henry Clarke and Helen his wife, daughter of John Leech of Etwall, near Derby. Much of his boyhood was spent in the beautiful parish of Rokeby, by the Greta and the Tees, where his father was for some years rector. He delighted in the country and the people, and would often talk of them with intimate knowledge in later years. It was there too that he made what was to be the chief friendship of his life, with Mr E. N. Bennett, now Fellow of Hertford College at Oxford and M.P. for Mid-Oxon, who was a boy of his own age.

Though he was always fond of out-of-door life, and became an active sportsman in later years, a fair shot, a keen fisherman, a zealous ornithologist—with an unusual knowledge of the bird-life of many lands—and a botanist too, he was always of delicate health and of a temperament which could never bear a strain. He was educated privately, and was much abroad as a boy, living for some time at St Jean de Luz,

where his father became chaplain and where he was later to make his home. There he was for a time taught by the Rev. Wentworth Webster, the eminent Spanish scholar, who became his life-long friend; and there too he made the acquaintance of Mr Lilburn, to whose wife, a Spanish lady, he expressed his indebtedness when he wrote his history of Spanish literature. He began to know things Spanish as quite a young man, was often resident in Madrid, where he came to be well known in the best society of the capital, travelled all over the country, and was as familiar with the peasants as with the old noble class. He spent some time also in Germany.

As he grew stronger, he determined to go to Oxford. "In 1885 (says Mr Bennett) we went up to Wadham, and became firm friends at once. His linguistic ability was astonishing. When he matriculated at Wadham he knew very little of Greek beyond the alphabet; yet in the Honour Moderations list of 1887 he secured one of the best seconds, gaining six 'firsts' on his papers. After Moderations he became deeply interested in the philosophical work for Literae Humaniores, and he would have almost certainly been placed in the First Class had he not been compelled to relinquish the hard work of the Final Schools by one of those terrible attacks of neurasthenia which marred the happiness of his life. Such attacks came upon him at considerable intervals and, in most cases, without any warning: he might spend a pleasant evening with a few friends and be in full health and good spirits when we parted, yet on the following day his whole nervous system would be shattered and reduced to utter prostration. On such occasions he would come round to me, and tell me of the frightful suffering he experienced."

This terrible illness, which was to be the cause of his early death, obliged him to give up the Honours course. He was for some time absent from Oxford, but he took an ordinary Pass degree at the end of 1889, when I first made his acquaintance by being one of his examiners, an experience over

which we often laughed when we became friends. He had kept up his Spanish studies, and in 1888 he won the Taylorian Scholarship in that language. Mrs Humphry Ward, who was one of the examiners on that occasion, wrote sixteen years later: "I well remember the impression made upon Señor Lucena [then Taylorian Teacher of Spanish] and myself by Mr Clarke's work. The field that year, though small, was a very good one, much better than on a previous occasion when I was also examiner. But Mr Clarke's work stood out from the rest as already scholarly and mature, and showing a wonderfully all-round knowledge of his subject." It was this interest in Spanish literature which gained him the acquaintance, through his old friend Mr H. W. Greene, Fellow of Magdalen, of Mr A. E. Cowley, now Fellow of Magdalen and Sub-Librarian of the Bodleian, who returned to Oxford in 1890.

From that time onward a triple friendship formed one of the chief pleasures of Butler Clarke's life. Bennett, Cowley and he formed a sort of private club, dining together once a week during his residence and spending a week or more together out of Oxford each year, generally just before the beginning of the October term. "He would sit and talk," says one of the survivors, "till any hour, and would talk his best. Even when the other two talked of fishing and shooting I was interested in listening. I often think of those long evenings, when the conversation ranged with absolutely no restraint over everything in heaven and earth. It was never frivolous. It was generally very much in earnest but full of humour, and always illuminated by his unusual powers of observation and his wide reading and clear thinking. He had, of course, seen a good deal, known many cities and ways of men; but what made his experiences so much more interesting than those of the ordinary man was that he seemed to have got to the bottom of things, and it was of no use to question his judgment—and there was generally some half-humorous quotation from Juvenal or Homer, his two favourite

classical authors, to illustrate it. It was when we strayed into theological or philosophical topics, as we always did sooner or later, that his peculiar acuteness of mind struck one most. Though he had read a good deal of philosophy, he never expressed himself, except with an apology, in the ordinary formulae. It was as if he had a first-hand acquaintance with truth and reality."

His subsequent life seemed to fall into four divisions—the times he spent with his own family, at Oxford, at St Jean de Luz, and in travel. I must be content to give a few words to each. Of the first, I will only say that he had a devoted father and returned his affection to the full. He always stayed some part of the year at Torquay, where his father lived from 1894, or travelled with him abroad or in England, or they stayed together at St Jean de Luz. With his brother too he often stayed, and frequently went on shooting or fishing expeditions to Scotland or elsewhere. One of his chief inducements to visit India in 1900 was to see his sister, Mrs Angus Macdonald, who then lived at Alwar.

At Oxford, though he stayed there little in later years, he achieved a reputation that was in its way unique. In 1890, having, I think, previously refused the post, he was chosen Taylorian Teacher of Spanish. He held the office only a short time, as it interfered with his residence at St Jean de Luz, to which he was becoming more and more attached. He was elected in 1894, after an examination for which many able men entered, to a Fereday Fellowship at St John's, and from that time spent some weeks each year in the College. He was not a man who made many friends; but, as one who first knew him at this time wrote after his death, "every one who knew him must really have loved him."

If he did not care to make many friends, he was extraordinarily generous to those whom he did make. He was beloved by them, and they touched his interests on many sides, linguistic, philosophic, and historical. He was one of

those whom Mr E. A. Freeman found most congenial. The Fellows of his old College were always his friends: Mr Alfred Stowe, with whom he had Spanish interests in common; Mr Herbert Richards, with whom he had studied philosophy; Mr Joseph Wells, also his tutor and friend; and the present Warden, whose companionship on the voyage to India in 1900 added much to his pleasure. During his residence in Oxford, which was not seldom interrupted by illness, he would study and write, walk for exercise, and spend as much time as possible with his intimates. After he gave up his post as Taylorian Teacher, he now and then lectured or read papers to societies in Oxford. In 1898 he delivered the annual Taylorian Lecture, choosing for subject the Spanish Rogue-Story (*Novela de Pícaros*), and showing not only an intimate acquaintance with a wide and curious literature, but also a style which reflected the charm of his personality. In later years he read, at St John's, papers of much interest on Spanish life.

But he was never really at home in Oxford. The climate and the life of hurried strain always told on him after a few weeks; and he returned to the place that he best loved. He had bought a small property at St Jean de Luz, and built on it a house overlooking the bay, which he called "Aice-Errota"—Basque for the windmill that formerly stood there. He bought land round it, so that he might always have space, and in the last year added to the house so that he might be able to entertain a guest or two. A faithful Basque servant waited on him, and an old woman came in daily to cook. He spent much of his time in his garden, the progress of which he would watch and report with zest; and he was a constant visitor at the house of the friends of his childhood. His illness seemed to pass away from him when he was at home. "My much-loved solitude," he wrote to me, "is the only cure in which I have any faith."

"He loved St Jean de Luz very dearly," writes Mr Bennett. "There, in the little villa he had built on the hill of Aice-

Errota, he spent much of his happy and contented life ; and he always returned to his French home with unfeigned delight after his visits to Oxford or our journeys together in foreign countries. How often have I sat with him on his cool verandah ! The blue waters of the curving bay met our eyes in front ; on our left the mighty mass of La Rune raised itself towards the sky ; and, behind us, the peaks of the Pyrenean mountains stretched far away to the East. Butler had bought a plot of ground next to that on which Aice-Errota was built, and he hoped that when we grew old together, I should also build a little house next door, so that we might see each other continually and preserve our mutual affection to the close. We always quoted Horace's words of this delectable home on the hill above the sea—

ille terrarum mihi praeter omnes  
angulus ridet."

It was at St Jean de Luz that most of his literary work was done. He devoted himself seriously to the study of Spanish literature and history. He was for some time a contributor to the *Manchester Guardian* on these subjects. He published, as Taylorian Teacher, a Spanish Reader in 1891, a Spanish Grammar in 1892, and a History of Spanish Literature in 1893. He was never satisfied with the Grammar, which had to conform to a plan of the publishers of which he did not wholly approve ; but his History of Spanish Literature was a remarkable book, not only from the intimate knowledge it showed of so large a field, but from its power and originality in criticism and appreciation. In 1897 he published a Life of the Cid Campeador (Heroes of the Nations Series), which was his first purely historical study. It was based on a thorough investigation of all the original sources, Spanish, Latin, and Arabic, and showed that he had the making of an accurate and sympathetic historian. In the same year he issued a scholarly reprint in Spanish, *Lazarillo de Tormes conforme á*



*la Edición de 1554*, from the unique copy at Chatsworth. Later, he contributed a chapter to the first volume of the Cambridge Modern History on "The Catholic Kings" of Spain (Ferdinand and Isabella), in which he was the first to make English readers acquainted with the results of modern Spanish research. For all these he studied closely, and took extraordinary pains. He learned Arabic, and spent at least two years working at it alone, till he became—in the judgment of an expert—"thoroughly master of it." He collected a large library of books, many of them very rare, which he selected with great care for the purpose of future study.

For a time he turned away from the investigation of medieval history to write the volume which is now published. The bibliography which is given shows how thoroughly he worked up the authorities of his subject; and almost all the books mentioned were in his own library; but he had also an intimate knowledge, almost unique for a foreigner who was not a professional diplomatist, of modern Spanish politics, and he was personally acquainted with not a few of the men who were prominent in the years of revolution from the times of Isabella to those of the regent Cristina. Cánovas de Castillo, of whom he has so much to say in his book, proposed him for the high distinction of corresponding membership of the Royal Academy of History, which he greatly valued. He was also elected a member of the Royal Economic Society of Madrid; and his work became well known among Spanish scholars, who spoke of the notable position he had won amongst writers on Spanish history and literary criticism, of his erudition and zeal for learning, of his knowledge of Spanish mss., and his "perfect mastery"—as that distinguished scholar, the Marquis de Laurencin, wrote—"of the structure, inflection, and orthography of our ancient Spanish language, which indeed cannot be attained without long and diligent study of our national literature and our classics." English scholars, as well as Spaniards and Frenchmen, recognised the excellence of his

work. I have before me letters of Mr James Bryce, Professor Bury, and Mr Edward Armstrong, which show how warmly his work was praised by those who knew it.

On the book which is now published he had bestowed very special pains. "Five minutes ago," he wrote to me, on May 3, 1904, "I finished the last chapter of my miserable little History. I laugh when I consider the work it has cost me." Though he undervalued his work, he could not really be forgetful at times of its excellence: "I think my present book will be good, but nobody but you and one or two others will know it." When it was finished, he turned to what he intended to be the great work of his life. After completing an edition of the *Spanish Gypsy* of Middleton (not yet published), on which he had spent much time and which had interested him greatly, for a series edited by Professor Gayley of the University of California, he refused several offers for other work on Spanish subjects, especially a new translation of *Don Quixôte* and other books of Cervantes, and determined to devote himself to a study of Spanish civilisation between the fall of the Roman Empire and the establishment of Spanish power in America. He intended to study widely and deeply, and take a long time—perhaps twenty years—over the work; but he approached it with enthusiasm and determination. "I am full of enjoyment in my new book: it really will allow me to write about the subjects on which I have read," was his modest way of putting it.

He set seriously to work. I have some note-books in which he had begun to take extracts from Arabic, Latin, and early Spanish writers; and the kindness of his family has allowed me to present to St John's College Library a large number of rare and valuable books which he had bought for the purpose of his work. He had begun to study with minute care the difficult problems of early racial and constitutional history; and he neglected no light which social, ecclesiastical, or economic history could throw on his main subject. He

had the continued assistance of his learned friend, Mr Wentworth Webster, who took the keenest interest in his work, and whom, as his neighbour at Sare—only a few miles from St Jean de Luz—he was able frequently to consult. But it was not from books and scholars only that he learned. He turned his Arabic to practical use, and could talk to the Syrians in their tongue when he was in the East, and to the Jews of Asia Minor and Palestine in their own sacred Andalusian dialect. Mr Webster says that Clarke, addressing them thus in Spanish, was more than once asked if he were a Jew. And I remember that on our way to India, at Aden, he had interesting conversations with Spanish Jews.

This kind of first-hand knowledge was to be used for his great study of Spanish civilisation. Mr Webster says: "His knowledge of Spain and of things Spanish was far wider than that of most of those who write about the subject. Some of his most intimate friends were Spaniards. He was welcome in Madrid society; but he did not make the mistake of taking Madrid for Spain. He had travelled through many of the provinces; he had friends in almost all. Except for a few miles on the border of Catalonia, he knew the Spanish slopes of the Pyrenees from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. He journeyed on foot, or on mule; at one time with *contrabandistas*, at another with shepherds, or with *carabineros*; and this, not for the romance of the thing, but to know the people thoroughly, to get at the real facts of the political and administrative corruption of Spain. Knowing this, his sympathy could go out not only to the *contrabandistas*, and to the peasantry, but even to the *carabineros*, whom necessity forced to the oppression they often loathed. Thus equipped, and with the materials which he had collected for further study, the result would have been of rare value."

In one at least of his journeys about Spain, that in which he visited the scenes connected with the life of the Cid, where "in the Sierra Nevada the rich, warm valleys nestle unsuspected

beneath the snowy peaks," he had the company of the distinguished Spanish artist, Don Santiago Arcos, whose drawings enriched his biography of the national hero. Other journeys were made with his intimate friends. Mr Cowley says: "Two trips I particularly remember. One to the south of France, when we stayed with him for a week at St Jean de Luz and sat every evening in the verandah overlooking the bay in the moonlight. Then we went on for a week to Cambo and played like children on the river. The other trip he and I took alone; and it was the last. We went up the Moselle, and I don't care to talk of it even now. We had made another plan which fell through, and I feel sure he proposed this so as not to disappoint me. That was the sort of thing that was typical of him. He loved nothing so much as doing little kindnesses—or great ones—to his friends chiefly, but also to all sorts of uninteresting people. He would take infinite trouble about such things."

Mr Bennett, his oldest friend, writes as follows: "We journeyed together to Palestine in 1898—an experience full of happiness to us both—and to the Lofoden Islands, and repeatedly to the south of France and his beloved Pyrenees. In the Lofodens we lived together in a small wooden house in the midst of the mountains, and in the last letter he ever wrote to me—two days before his death—he begged me to take the lease of the island (Langö) again, as he wished to revisit it with me in 1905. Clarke was delighted with our open-air life amid the exquisite scenery of the Lofodens—I never saw him enjoy life more thoroughly. He was an excellent fisherman and cast a beautiful line: he would sally out after breakfast and fish all day, while I either joined him at the lake or went ryper-shooting. He was a fair shot, but, on humanitarian grounds, as the years went on, he grew more and more to dislike shooting. "One year we went together high up the Pyrenees after the izard—the Pyrenean chamois—and slept at night on beds of dry leaves in a small shepherd's hut, from which we were

ultimately driven down to the plains by a heavy fall of snow. During this expedition we were on one occasion exposed to the full fury of a thunderstorm; and Butler Clarke was partially stunned by the close proximity of a lightning flash. On several occasions we stayed at Cambo, of which place he was exceedingly fond; and he and I drove over the mountains to the Monastery of Roncevalles. He delighted in these Pyrenean forests, and sometimes set off with a muleteer as his sole companion for a three weeks' ride along the slopes of the mountains."

It was as a reminiscence of this and other journeys that he wrote the two extremely interesting and vivid papers on Andorra which I induced him to publish in the *Guardian* (July 23 and 30, 1902). They show a remarkable descriptive power, as well as an intimate and minute knowledge of districts which are very little known to any except those who dwell in them. He had planned many other journeys with Mr Bennett, especially two—a visit to Abyssinia and another journey down the Jordan valley.

I find a letter of his, very characteristic, written to me in the last year of his life, which says, "Bennett wants me to go with him at Christmas to the forests behind Mogador. I know he will be knocked on the head some day, and I wish if possible not to be present. Still it is tempting." In another, written after a short visit to Italy, he says, "I will not write to you about Italy. If I did, the letter would be intolerably long—an unskilful analysis of my own moods. I meditate more journeys before I get too old. I wonder if you will ever set out with me again. Where should we go? Tunis and Morocco? But you hate heathens and I hate towns. Still I would attempt to acquire some degree of 'urbanity' if you would compromise with 'heathenesse.'" A delightful letter, too, I have from Norway, written just a year before his death, telling of the happy open-air life he was living and of his health and enjoyment.

It was with me that he made what I suppose was the longest journey of his life. We went together to India, starting in December, 1900, and returning in the following March. In the previous winter he had had a serious return of his illness, but now he was very well and very happy. He enjoyed the long journeys and the wonderful sights of places so different as Budh-Gaya, Agra, Ahmedabad, Delhi, Gwalior, the ancient Portuguese city of Goa, and the country life of Rajputana, where he went for a few days into camp with his brother-in-law, Mr Angus Macdonald. Greatly though he enjoyed the native life and character that he saw in the great centres of Hindu and Muhammadan civilisation, he was certainly happiest at Darjiling. He fled from Calcutta to stay there a few days before I went; and, when I joined him, he showed me how much he had learnt in the short time, the talks he had had with men of different race, the valuable curios he had picked up—he had a wonderful eye for rare objects of art—and the out-of-the-way knowledge he had acquired. Then we took together the romantic walk to Tiger Hill, in a vain hope to see Mount Everest, and watched at dawn the sun colour the eternal snows of Kinchinjunga. Of the happiness of those days, of the voyage, the travel, the sights which we enjoyed together, the long talks, I cannot speak. He was, as every one knew who travelled with him, unselfish, generous, always keen to enjoy and to share others' enjoyment. He certainly enjoyed India to the full, and looked back on it with delight, as when he wrote to me of "Kim"—of which we afterwards often talked together—"It is wonderful how vividly it brings up before one's mind half-forgotten glimpses of roadside and bazaar scenes," and wondered what it meant for "those who have never seen Indian ce-rows and te-rains."

But he did not neglect his own country. He was familiar with many parts of the kingdom, from Devonshire and Cornwall to Skye, where his last journey was taken with his brother, only a month before his death. Sometimes his interest in



these home journeys was fishing, sometimes natural history, especially ornithology, sometimes sketching, of which he became very fond and for which he showed considerable ability, sometimes the sight of unfamiliar districts, but always most of all the companionship of his friends. Side by side with the interest in places and people grew the interest in sides of literature that were new to him. He began when he was with me to read two authors of whom I was always talking—Peacock and Meredith—and we delighted to talk of them together. English literature widened his knowledge of England. In the last years of his life he came to be greatly interested in the Cotswolds. He stayed many times with me at Burford, and we often wandered together on foot or bicycle over the unfrequented ways.

Our last journey together, in July, 1904, was over the confines of Oxfordshire and Warwickshire and ended at Malvern. He had come, ill and over-worked, from the book he had finished and the new study he had begun; but he seemed entirely to recover in the bracing air, and he was never more full of interest in men and things and books. We parted with many plans of soon meeting again; and, on August 6, 1904, he wrote in a book of mine lines he was fond of quoting from the *Poema de Roncesvalles*, and applying to my house:

Porta patet omnibus, sacris et profanis,  
Non solum Catholicis, verum et paganis,  
Judaeis, haereticis, otiosis, vanis.

In the bitter August of that year, and at Skye in the worst of weather, his health failed again. He went to Torquay, hoping soon to go back to France and recover. But the terrible illness which had dogged his life returned upon him. He struggled against it, and concealed from his family, in his intense desire to save others pain, how much he suffered. He had during the last year known several instances of mental decay among those with whom he was acquainted, and had indeed helped the sufferers with extraordinary self-denial and

sympathy. But the experience had afflicted him with a terrible dread of a similar fate. At last and very suddenly his brain gave way, and he died by his own hand on September 10, 1904. Three days later his body was laid to rest, and one whose greatest happiness had been in his friendship read the last words over his grave.

His personality was an extremely striking one. I shall always remember how Professor York Powell, who had a very high opinion of his ability and his wide knowledge, and with whom he often had long talks far into the night, whenever he spoke of him to me—and that always with admiration—would add, “and such a handsome fellow too!” He was of moderate height and well built, with an air of distinction that no one could help noticing, a striking face, fine eyes, and a mass of thick dark hair, which made him look very unlike an ordinary Englishman. A sketch of him as a young man, which used to hang in his rooms at Wadham and which he afterwards gave to me, made by Mrs Lilburn, with a few touches from Henri de Neuville, shows something of what he was. His face was certainly one that could not be forgotten.

His work, not great in bulk, but rich both in achievement and promise, yet does not give a full picture of the richness of his mental endowments, the charm of his personality, or the beauty and depth of his character. Of him it might indeed truly be said that he had a genius for friendship. To knowledge and taste and sympathy he added a boyish love of fun and a delightful “humanity”; but in the deepest things he thought and felt most deeply. If he would not have expressed himself in such things in a conventional or orthodox way, the oldest of his friends, Mr Wentworth Webster, said with perfect truth, “he was a truly religious man, and thought deeply and earnestly on religion; and of late years,” he added, “I enjoyed our conversations on it, more almost than on literature and Spanish. But the reticence which he observed on this point should, I think, follow him in death.” His deepest thoughts were

well known to those who knew him best, and, with the charm of his society, his beautiful mind, his lovingkindness and his generosity, will never be forgotten by those whose chief happiness in life it was to be his friends. 'There are many who will echo the words of one very near to him: "He was the best man I have ever known, or ever shall know."'

W. H. HUTTON.

#### EDITORIAL NOTE.

Shortly before his death Mr Butler Clarke sent to the Editor the complete manuscript of this book, including the bibliography, which he had deliberately confined to books whose value, entirely apart from their reputation, he was himself ready to attest. The manuscript was left ready for the press; but it is hardly necessary to say that an author's revision of a work in proof is really indispensable. It is almost inevitable that mistakes, printers' errors and other, will have crept into the text or been allowed to stand, which the author's eye would have detected had he been spared to complete his work. His friends have done the best they could.

Mr W. H. Hutton has read the book in manuscript and in proof, and corrected one or two obvious slips. Another of the author's friends, Señor Don F. de Arteaga y Pereira, Taylorian Teacher of Spanish in the University of Oxford, has read and corrected all the proofs. Mr James Fitzmaurice Kelly has also kindly read the proofs, and supplied foot-notes on some passages containing statements or expressing views which appeared to be disputable. In deference to his criticism as to matters of fact, one short sentence has been omitted, and

two or three others slightly corrected. The same distinguished scholar has added a few items to the bibliography; and the Editor has inserted a few more. Otherwise the book remains practically as it was written. To the three gentlemen above-mentioned the Editor desires to return his hearty thanks.

*September, 1906.*

## CHAPTER I.

### INTRODUCTORY.

SHELTERED behind the barrier of the Pyrenees from the revolutionary storm that was overthrowing the thrones of Europe, and seemingly uninfluenced by the current of ideas that produced it, Spain at the beginning of the nineteenth century differed but little from the Spain of one hundred years before. Repeated attempts to play a leading part in the affairs of Europe had brought upon her discredit and loss; her vast American dependencies, weary of the rigid colonial system, and looking to the example of their more fortunate neighbours, were eager to assert their independence. Yet she was still unwilling to acknowledge, she was in fact unaware, that for two centuries the life had been ebbing from her mighty empire. Her thoughts were fixed on the past, her ideals were those of an age long gone by, her temper was harshly conservative.

A single generation had sufficed to naturalise the Bourbon dynasty that came in with Philip V (1700). It had taken up, and in some respects accentuated, the policy of its predecessors. True it is that, when the elder branch of the royal family died out and the younger was imported from Naples, its first representative, Charles III, was so little acquainted with the temper of his subjects that he rashly bade them change for something more like the habit of other lands the broad-brimmed slouch hats and ample trailing cloaks that gave an air of murderous gloom to Spanish towns. His attempts at reform

in other matters had been met with contemptuous wonder only; interference with the time-honoured dress, handed down from the heroes of the sixteenth century "cloak and sword" plays, well-nigh cost the meddlesome monarch his throne. Innovators and reformers indeed like this same King and his minister Aranda succeeded at most in enlisting a small number of enthusiastic followers; their spirit failed to penetrate the inert, self-satisfied mass of the nation. So soon as the effort ceased, things fell back into their old state; and another was added to the long list of examples whereby the Spaniard demonstrated that the ways of his grandfather were even better than those of his father.

Thus Aranda and Charles III had dreamed of breaking down the barrier laboriously built by ancestral wisdom to keep the Chosen People of Spain from contamination by the modern spirit of enquiry. But Charles III could not change by decree the ingrained habits of centuries. During his lifetime his work failed of any perceptible effect; his son and successor, Charles IV, swept away all trace of it as far as might be. The importation of any foreign book was punished by very severe penalties. The only periodicals of Spain (1791) were the *Madrid Gazette*, a tiny official sheet, and the police list of *Lost and Found*. The Inquisition still existed; but public opinion now enforced rigid conformity both in Church and State, and was ready unbidden to avenge the slightest deviation from it. It is true that the once vast powers of the Inquisition had been limited and defined; it was bloodthirsty only during its early years, but almost all the leading statesmen of the "libertine" school of the eighteenth century were arraigned before it. It reviewed the conduct of Aranda, Campomanes, Jovellanos, and Florida-Blanca, and censured as it thought fit their public and private lives. Not even men so powerful as these dared to question its authority. To have done so would have been to stamp themselves as unfit to rule over Christian people.

The old liberties and partially developed representative

systems of the former kingdoms of Castille, of Aragon, and of Navarre had been abolished for the most part, or had fallen into disuse. Those of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia were formally suppressed early in the eighteenth century in punishment for the part taken by these provinces in the War of Succession. The Parliaments of Navarre and of the three Basque Provinces still controlled local affairs, and, watching jealously over their dearly prized liberties (*fueros*), had hitherto resisted the encroaching policy of the Crown. The Cortes of Castille, once the powerful protector of the rights of the commons, had sunk to the lowest depths of degradation.

The revolt of the Comuneros against the foreign ministers of Charles V was an ill-judged attempt to wrest from a young and a stranger sovereign confirmation of immemorial usages, and to extend vastly the powers of the commons in Parliament. Its overthrow at Villalar (1523) so firmly established the absolute authority of the Crown that for nearly three centuries it was not even questioned. The Parliament that had controlled supplies, granted and taken back the Crown at will, and addressed the Emperor himself as "our hireling," became the humble instrument of the royal will. Henceforward its claims were scornfully disregarded; and rights accumulated by centuries of active vigilance were ruthlessly overridden. Not only did kings legislate, substituting for the consent of Parliament the formula "valid as though promulgated in Cortes"—for this strong kings had done before Villalar—but they overstepped undoubted constitutional boundaries in repealing by decree laws regularly passed and sanctioned. They prescribed the exact form of mandate or commission to be granted to proctors, thus rendering them unable to defend opposition to the Crown by plea of obedience to instructions. They asserted the right to limit discussion to matters propounded in the royal summons. They insisted on the secrecy of deliberation; they nominated President and Assessors. Finally, when the Cortes had been reduced to unquestioning subservience, the kings ceased



to summon them except for the formal purpose of hearing the royal will with regard to the succession to the throne. During the eighteenth century the Cortes of Castille met only six times. Exempt from direct taxation, the nobility and clergy had long ceased to attend. So little importance was attached to Parliament that Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia bore a century of disfranchisement without protest. The forms of Cortes observed were unsuited to the actual condition of the realm. Only thirty-eight cities and towns had the right of representation. These rights, with only one or two exceptions, dated from the fifteenth century. Toro, hardly more than a village, had a vote in the Cortes; great cities of Andalusia had none. At last even the right of petition was denied to the now merely formal assembly. When the Cortes, summoned to transact the King's business with regard to succession, sought to be allowed to lay their views before him, Campomanes replied in his master's name that after dissolution the King would consent to receive such petitions as the several members might wish to present. The Cortes of 1789, the only Parliament summoned during the reign of Charles IV, were ordered to petition the King that he would confirm as laws his decrees already in force. They humbly obeyed. As to supply, the Cortes had lost all control over it. The amount and the incidence of taxation, saving only the privileges of the nobles and clergy, were determined by the King. Even so far back as 1579 the proctors had adopted the formula of offering "on their knees" the sums wrung from them by bribery or intimidation.

Having got rid of his Parliament, the King was in fact entirely irresponsible. He was assisted, when he required assistance, by a Council of sixteen members, chosen by himself. The Council of Castille was generally made up of members of the royal family, ecclesiastics, great nobles, and a few lawyers. A kind of Inner or Privy Council nominated from among the Councillors of Castille was called the Royal Chamber (*Cámara Real*). It included the Secretaries of State, generally five in

number and attached severally to the departments of Foreign Affairs, War, Justice, Marine, and Finance. These secretaries or ministers were popularly known as *corachuelistas* or cave-dwellers, owing to the fact that their offices were situated in the vaults of the palace. They were thus immediately under the hands of the master to whom alone they were responsible. Appointed and dismissed with as little ceremony as officers of the Household or other servants, they had no legal standing; they were merely machines to prepare business for the King's decision. This in turn was often swayed by a *camarilla* or "little chamber," the favourites and associates of the King, a motley assemblage of persons, male and female, lay and ecclesiastical, high and low, bishops and buffoons. The whole executive and judicial magistracy was appointed directly by royal warrant, often from among the creatures of the *camarilla*. The *corregidor*—originally, as the name implies, a magistrate ruling in conjunction with the municipal body—and the captain-general exercised the royal authority in city and province; they had grasped the whole powers of the once independent municipal and provincial assemblies. Wherever the court lodged, all local authority was for the time superseded by that of the Household judges (*alcaldes de casa y corte*). The almost anarchical charters and privileges that had been granted, as conditions of the reconquest of the land from the Saracens, lasted in their entirety only until the reconquest was complete. Then one by one they were taken back, until the whole land, with the exception of the Basque Provinces and Navarre, was subjected to a centralisation so harsh that no power save that of the Church was left to balance that of the King.

The Church and the great rulers still exercised separate jurisdiction over their own vassals. Their large estates, held in mortmain or entail, had since the fifteenth century been a source of anxiety, irritation, and envy, to kings and commons alike. Three-fourths of the land enjoyed partial exemption

from taxation because of the noble or ecclesiastical status of its owners. The remaining fourth was burdened with two-thirds of the whole direct taxation. The revenues of the Church were more than double those of the Crown. Throughout the eighteenth century repeated efforts were made to set free, or at any rate to check addition to, the enormous inert mass of property. Partial measures were occasionally approved by the Curia. For a time property left in mortmain or entail was taxed by the State fifteen per cent. For a time the law forbade the transmission of estates subject to these legal restrictions. In 1807, when Spain had assumed the attitude of champion of the Pope against Napoleon, permission was granted to convert to secular uses one-seventh of the landed estates of the Church. The French invasion prevented the execution of the measure. The number of those who lived on Church revenue and claimed ecclesiastical privilege was reckoned, at the end of the eighteenth century, at nearly two per cent. in a population of about ten millions. Ecclesiastical courts claimed jurisdiction in all cases connected even remotely with the interests of the Church. The very memory of old liberties, and of the boldness of the commons of a former age in resisting encroachments by Crown or Church had become hateful to the ruling classes. In 1806 the laws of Spain were recodified in the *Novísima Recopilación*. The reformed code contained no mention of existing but obsolete laws, concerning the necessity of the consent of the Cortes to the validity of legislation, the statutory limitation of the powers of the Inquisition, and the long disregarded principle that supply can be raised only with consent of Parliament and for valid cause.

Spain's mighty colonial empire had been handed down with hardly any loss since the time of its acquisition in the sixteenth century. From California and Florida to the Antarctic Ocean her dominions were broken only by the Portuguese possession of Brazil. This huge region was divided into four viceroyalties, Mexico or New Spain, New Granada, Peru, and Buenos Ayres.

Guatemala, Caracas, and Chile were ruled by captains-general, inferior but not subject to the viceroys. The Indies, as they were still called, contributed from their surplus about two million pounds a year, one-fourth of the total revenue, to the Spanish treasury. Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands were still a source of expense. The viceroys and captains-general exercised in their several provinces the absolute powers of the King whom they represented, and were assisted by deliberative councils modelled on the Council of Castille. The relations between Church and State were much the same abroad as at home, except that the kings maintained the right of nominating to all benefices in the regions where their ancestors had planted the Faith. The colonies were, in fact, Greater Spain. During the centuries that had elapsed since they were peopled from various provinces of the Peninsula, the predominance of one or other of the ethnological elements included under the common name of Spaniard, widely varying environment, and greater or less intercourse with native American or imported African populations, had produced well-marked differences of type, differences which still distinguish the Peruvian (for instance) from the Venezuelan, and the latter from the Cuban. For nearly three centuries the whole trade of the Indies had been restricted not merely to Spain and Spaniards, but to certain privileged ports and to holders of the royal licence. Charles III took off some of the more irksome restrictions while endeavouring still to confine the trade to Spaniards and Spanish ports. But Spain had lost the power of effectually defending her rights. The privateers, English, French, or Dutch, hung on the flank of the treasure fleet as it sailed periodically from Vera Cruz; the smuggler haunted the creeks of the vast coast-line, and at times turned pirate and preyed upon a population long unused to initiative in self-defence. The battle of Trafalgar finally ended the exclusive Spanish colonial system, and broke down the bridge between Spain and America.

In spite of bad government and disastrous wars, the eighteenth century was for the most part a period of peace and prosperity. The Bourbon kings before Charles IV were prudent rulers. At the end of the reign of Charles III the national debt amounted only to about twenty million pounds, or two and a half years' revenue. The exchequer bills (*vales reales*) found ready acceptance at par. Before the end of the next reign the debt had quadrupled and the national credit declined owing to the war with England and the extravagance of a madcap favourite. But Spain was still feeling, economically and socially, the exhaustion of past efforts and losses. She had lavished her strength as champion of the Church in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The most energetic part of her population had quitted her to spread the Spanish race and Spanish civilisation in America. The expulsion of Jews and Saracens had indeed added religious to political unity, but it had deprived the land of most important trading, industrial, and agricultural classes. These evils were aggravated by a false economic policy. The floods of gold and silver poured from America had raised prices in the Peninsula to a level far above that of other European countries. Every effort was made to retain the precious metals within the borders of Spain, in the belief that a country full of gold and silver is a rich country. The export of gold or silver was forbidden under the severest penalties. The Spaniards were now too rich as well as too proud to work. Industry sank to the lowest ebb consistent with the degree of civilisation then attained. To seek gold abroad, or to starve at home, was profitable or honourable: to engage in commerce or manufacture was to forfeit all claims for generations to the highly prized distinction of noble blood. Trade too was fettered by innumerable vexatious restrictions, monopolies, and privileges; by awkward and oppressive fiscal arrangements; and by arbitrary interference to check the continual rise of prices in obedience to economic law. Smuggling was more profitable,

and hardly more risky, than manufacturing. The country population flocked to the towns ; bread was fearfully dear ; the Government sought the remedy in fixing its price at such a figure that it was impossible to produce it with profit. Agriculture, Spain's one important industry, languished. Vast tracts once rich in corn, wine, and oil had fallen out of cultivation ; and the great *despoblados* had been formed. So unsafe was the country that the tillers of the soil lived—nay, still live—huddled in large walled villages miles distant from their fields. Free grants of land failed to keep the peasantry on the soil which had once supported thousands. The poor, proud gentry of the country starved in their homes, but made no effort to improve their lot ; the lean, brown ploughman suffered want in the midst of possible abundance.

The social tyranny under which the nation laboured was worse even than the political. The influence of the clergy suppressed the natural manifestation of innocent gaiety. Religious observances varied by love intrigue were the only occupations of the leisured class. Of religion itself the gentler aspects were thrust into the background. The natural gravity and austerity of the national character had degenerated into gloomy harshness. The Spaniards were the Puritans<sup>1</sup> of Catholicism. The despotism, religious, political, and social, that had overspread the land, was acquiesced in by the people. Spain desired no other lot than that which she enjoyed under her Bourbon kings. When the foreign invader set her free she cast him forth from her boundaries by an heroic effort ; then she carefully sought out the broken links of her old chain and rivetted them again upon her limbs. The dreary stagnation of national life extended to the arts. The voice of poetry was hushed or had sunk to a feeble piping. Quintana, who afterwards sounded the trumpet note that roused the land

<sup>1</sup> A disputable statement. The Jansenists in France were the real Puritans of Catholicism ; the Spaniards were the Terrorists. [J. F.-K.]



against the French, found his first and freshest inspiration in a compliment to Godoy<sup>1</sup>. Books were rare and for the most part trivial. Trivial also were the subjects of the sister arts. Goya, the painter, and Ramón de la Cruz, the playwright, have portrayed to perfection the low life of the capital, the picturesque *manolos* and *manolas*. Their works, the best of their age, are most valuable to the social historian. They are as good as their theme admits. The courtly grace and rich fantasy of Velazquez and Lope de Vega, the deep spirituality and refinement of Calderon and Murillo, seemed to have perished out of the land of their birth. The very handicrafts, such as those of goldsmith, potter, and weaver, once unerring in skill and in taste, now produced for a coarser age only the coarsest wares.

Spain was the last of the continental nations to fall under the grip of Napoleon. Not until 1808 did he find leisure to undertake to implant in the Peninsula the principles of the French Revolution. Thanks to the folly and baseness of her rulers she was easy to seize; thanks to the heroic spirit of her people she was impossible to hold. Before the great struggle her nominal ruler was Charles IV, a good-natured man of mean abilities, dominated by his wife, a headstrong and sensual woman. The King's interests were divided between the pompous ceremonies of religion, the pleasures of hunting, and the humble crafts of the locksmith and clockmaker. The cares of government were left to Manuel Godoy, an ex-lifeguardsman, who owed to a handsome figure, a dashing manner, and a certain plausible audacity the unbounded confidence of the King as well as the criminal attachment of the Queen. He was the most trusted counsellor in matters affecting the nation or the royal family—universal minister, high admiral, commander-in-chief, and

<sup>1</sup> Strictly speaking this is not the case. Quintana's first volume of poems was published in 1788, when he was 15. His ode on the Peace was written in 1795; and the compliment to Godoy is indirect. [J. F.-K.]



grandee. The "Prince of the Peace" owed his strange-sounding title to his successful negotiation of the Peace of Basel terminating the war with France (1795). Without a rival at court, without principles to control or wit to guide him, Godoy in all the recklessness of ignorance had set his hand to statecraft. He gave himself out as a Liberal and a man of enlightened mind, and undertook reforms social, legal, educational, and military. Fifteen years of undeserved and uninterrupted good fortune so swelled his overweening conceit that at last he ventured to pit his brains against Napoleon's.

Wishing to strike at Portugal, England's ally, the Emperor entered into negotiation with Godoy in order to secure the right of passage through Spain for his troops. The Treaty of Fontainebleau (October 27, 1807) granted the required permission. It contained a secret clause promising to the Spanish upstart an independent principality in return for his good offices. At the same time a family quarrel gave the Emperor the position of arbiter in the Spanish royal family. Ferdinand, the heir-apparent, resenting the favourite's insolence, his father's folly, and his mother's shame, headed a palace plot to compass the downfall of Godoy. The plot being discovered, Ferdinand was charged with conspiracy against his father's throne and his mother's life. He was proved to have written to the Emperor begging his protection and the hand of a Princess of the Imperial family. His humiliation was complete when he found himself forced to cringe to Godoy in order to obtain pardon from his infatuated father. He proved penitence by an abject attitude, and by cynical betrayal of accomplices.

These scandals strengthened the hands of the party pledged to overthrow the Prince of the Peace. The outcome of his policy brought popular hatred upon him. The French armies had not even awaited the signature of the Treaty of Fontainebleau in order to cross the frontier. As they passed through Spain they seized the strong places in their line of march. Their menacing attitude was at first regarded with

amazement, soon with indignation and terror. When the news reached Aranjuez, the spring residence of the court, the eyes of the foolish trio were opened; and Godoy resolved to flee secretly with the King and Queen to America. The secret leaked out; consternation seized the citizens; the partisans of the Infant Ferdinand led the mob against Godoy, author of the mischief. For thirty hours the courtly and gallant youth of Quintana's panegyric, now grown somewhat pursy, lay concealed in the garret of his own house rolled in a mat. Thirst compelled him to surrender to the soldiers, who now openly sided with the mob. He was now in the power of the Infant, and his life was in danger. In order to save it, his deluded master abdicated (March 19, 1808). Ferdinand, a surly and suspicious young man, already a master of dissimulation, was King of Spain.

Events now followed with startling rapidity. Before the end of April, King Ferdinand was on his way to renew his suit to the Emperor, whom he still considered as his protector. By the end of the month Godoy too had come to the lure, and had led Charles IV and his Queen into the net cunningly spread at Bayonne. A few days later it was announced that Ferdinand had given back the crown to his father, who in turn had conferred it on the Emperor. Ferdinand and his brother formally renounced in the Emperor's favour their right of succession. In June the crown of Spain was once more bandied from hand to hand. This time it was placed by Napoleon on the head of his brother Joseph. The Spanish royal family were kept in honourable confinement in France. Godoy, still the delight and consolation of his master, bore them company. It remained but for the Spanish people to acquiesce in the results of their political jugglery.

The French troops had been welcomed as their friends and allies. The seizure of the fortresses had hardly dispelled belief in the Emperor's good faith. The sudden news that the Infant Ferdinand was a prisoner in France disclosed at

once the situation of the royal family and of the nation. Independence, personal and national, and hatred of foreign interference, are the Spaniard's leading passions. Ferdinand, the enemy of the hated favourite, was the darling of the mob. The citizens of Madrid, seizing such weapons as lay ready to hand, fiercely attacked the French garrison that occupied their suburbs (May 2). The slaughter inflicted upon them by Murat, first in self-defence and then in retaliation, fired the whole country. From Asturias to Andalusia, from Aragon to Extremadura, the people rushed to arms; and the War of Independence had begun. Ten weeks later England had renewed the ancient friendship that bound her to Spain; and Castaños and his levies by their victory at Bailen (July 19) were encouraged to match their untaught valour against trained battalions.

The Peninsular War, or War of Independence, the series of stubborn or brilliant campaigns extending over five years, whereby the invaders were finally thrust beyond the frontier, does not come within the scope of this book. It is, however, absolutely necessary, in order to understand what befell later, to follow closely the action of Spain when the sudden withdrawal of the King's authority left her, unused to govern, face to face with mortal peril. It must be remembered that, with the exception of the Church, the King was the only authority that had existed for centuries. All power had been centred in his hand; he was something more than the mere head of a graduated scale of magistrates; he was the State.

Not all educated Spaniards belonged to the popular and patriotic party which declared war to the knife on the invader and usurper, refused all compromise, and called in the help of England. Napoleon's attitude had from the first been as conciliatory as the execution of his designs allowed. His gigantic figure had fascinated a number of the most enlightened Spaniards; even beyond the Pyrenees the great Revolution had made converts; and a minority, by no means entirely

made up of contemptible or interested persons, looked to the conqueror to establish a better order. Their hopes were defrauded; they cast their lot with the unpopular and losing side, their memory has been handed down to contempt under the name of *afrancesados* (Frenchified).

The Emperor made a show of consulting Spain as to her fate. He summoned to Bayonne one hundred and fifty Spanish notables, bishops, inquisitors, grandees, members of the Councils of State, ministers, and magistrates. A large number evaded his invitation; some refused it with contumely and became at once popular heroes. Ninety-one assembled (June 15, 1808), and submissively received a new sovereign and a constitution modelled upon the French Constitution. Intended to attract to King Joseph's party the friends of liberty, it created a Parliament of three Estates to meet every third year. To a Senate of limited number it gave very wide powers, and entrusted the guardianship of the liberties of the individual and of the Press. It abolished torture, and provided for reduction of the number of convents and of the mass of property held in mortmain and in entail. Impartially considered, it was a great step in the way of good and responsible government; none of its provisions were *à priori* unworkable, or, save for her utter lack of political education, unsuited to Spain.

But the Spanish people cared nothing for its merits or defects; had it been the best in the world they would have rejected it. Everything connected with the invaders was hideous in their eyes. Joseph Bonaparte was really an able and well-meaning man, of fine presence and affable manners. In order to conciliate his new subjects he surrounded himself with Spaniards, and took as his advisers those who would accept his livery from among the ministers of Charles IV. But the Spaniards always believed him to be a deformed, squinting drunkard, malignant when not ridiculous. Force and flattery availed little with men who refused to believe the

testimony of their own eyes in favour of the hated "Intruder." Moreover they had started a government after their own heart.

Three centuries of disuse had not completely atrophied the faculty for self-government once so developed in the cities and provinces. Whilst Napoleon was deliberating how Spain should be ruled, Asturias, Galicia, Valencia, Murcia, Badajoz, and Granada had appointed representative assemblies or Juntas. The time-honoured Council of Castille had at first attempted to pick up the power that had fallen from the hands of the Bourbon kings; it might have headed the struggle with the invader. But it lost all authority because some of its members were suspected of sympathy with the French, and because it opposed the claims of local Juntas. These, whilst intensely democratic in the south, were enthusiastically loyal. The place held by their unworthy King in their affection was second only to that held by their country. So great was their earnestness that the local jealousies, which had ever hindered organised resistance to the encroachments of the Crown, were held in abeyance. Seville fell into rank beside the other cities when the claim of its Junta to precedence was set aside. All sent their representatives to the "Supreme Central Junta of Government of the Kingdom," which met first at Aranjuez on September 25.

By this time the battle of Bailen had been fought and won; the Intruder had fled from Madrid; alliance with England was assured; the heroic citizens of Gerona and Saragossa had beaten off their besiegers; and patriotic hopes were at their highest. The Central Junta, legislative and executive combined, consisted at first of twenty-four and later of thirty-five members. Though democratic in origin and form, it was frankly conservative in spirit. The President was the aged Count of Floridablanca, once minister of the Crown, an ex-Liberal converted by the excesses of the French Revolution. Among its most distinguished members were Gaspar Melchior de Jovellanos, the economist and reformer; Quintana, the poet, who acted as its secretary; and the Marquis of Astorga,

who became its President on the death of Floridablanca during the first month of its existence.

Under the Marquis of Astorga the Junta became somewhat more Liberal; but Floridablanca's influence had been marked by abolition of many of the tentative reforms of Charles III, the recall of the Jesuits whom he had banished, and the appointment of a new Inquisitor-General. In some respects, however, the Central Junta was a bold innovator. The name "Cortes" was not at that time, as it afterwards became, the bugbear of the absolutist conservative and Church party. Palafox, the defender of Saragossa, a staunch Royalist, had summoned in the King's name the ancient Parliament of Aragon to aid in the struggle on the King's behalf. Encouraged by his example and by the vague wording of a message sent by Ferdinand from France, the Junta decreed (May, 1809) the reestablishment of the Cortes, and their assembly in the following year. The motive for this step was in part at least the desire of the Junta to obtain a legal basis for its own authority. For years all initiative had come from the King. As soon as he was removed it became questionable what should take his place. One party in the Junta declared that a Regency was necessary; another was in favour of returning to the traditional and obsolete Cortes, giving to the people a share in the government. The false views of history held by their party were destined to have a far-reaching effect.

The summons to Parliament might well be considered an innovation; but much more so, and without historical precedent, was the extension of the summons to the American Colonies. Wishing to bind them to the fatherland and to secure help in the great struggle from their abundant riches, the Junta (January, 1809) declared the oversea possessions of Spain an integral part of the monarchy, with rights to representation in the Junta. This recognition of citizenship entailed a right of representation in the Cortes also. It failed to confirm the tottering loyalty of certain of the colonies; nor were the sums contributed by



America to the national defence proportionate to her wealth. The viceroys were busy maintaining their own authority in their provinces. The legal status of the Junta and its power to grant discharge in the King's name were questionable.

In spite of the energy of the Junta, and its efforts to sustain the patriotic spirit and terrify rich waverers by threats of confiscation and banishment, the results of the first eighteen months of the struggle might well have brought despair to the hearts of the most stubborn patriots. The hopes of Bailen had been crushed at Ocaña (November, 1809). The Intruder was back in Madrid, seemingly firmly seated on the throne. Saragossa and Gerona had fallen, in spite of their heroism. Catalonia, held down by the firm grip of the prudent Suchet, was spared, it is true, the horrors of war, but was compelled to witness, whilst powerless to relieve, the agony of her sister provinces. The treaty with England guaranteed indeed that Spain should cede no territory, but its fruits were as yet hardly seen. The promised army had reached Portugal, but it was not till 1812 that the allies gained a firm footing in Spain by the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. The approach of the French had obliged the Junta to quit Aranjuez for Seville. In January, 1810, the enemy was pouring over the passes; and, in spite of the protest of the Sevillians against abandonment, the Junta had once more to flee. This time it took refuge on the one remaining plot of Spanish ground that could guarantee its safety. The Isla de Leon, near Cadiz, might be, and was later, blockaded by land; but it was safe and free on the sea side, thanks to the fleets of England and Spain. Here the flying Junta assembled for the last time: its prestige and authority had left it; failure had made it anxious to be rid of responsibility. It resigned its powers into the hands of a Council of Regency composed of Castaños, the victor of Bailen; Saavedra, President of the Junta of Seville; Antonio Escaño, a distinguished sailor; and Lardizabal, a Mexican of Royalist views, supposed to represent the colonies. The fifth



member and President was the Bishop of Orense, who had become suddenly popular owing to his spirited refusal to obey Napoleon's summons to Bayonne.

The new Government had taken over the powers of the Junta at a moment of the utmost difficulty and danger. To military disaster was added lack of men and money. The expenditure was more than four times the nominal revenue. The greater part of taxable Spain was in the hands of the enemy. Nevertheless the country again responded to the call upon its energies. An army had to be improvised; conscription provided 80,000 soldiers; loan, confiscation, and ruinous taxation produced sufficient funds for carrying on the war. Amid these patriotic efforts the Regency found time to abolish the moderate reforms introduced by Jovellanos and his followers in the late Junta, and to persecute and banish its more Liberal members.

But the most difficult problem bequeathed by the Junta to the Regents was that of the Cortes. Whilst sitting at Seville the Junta had summoned for March, 1810, a Parliament to meet at Cadiz, not of three Estates, as tradition demanded, but of two Houses—dignitaries or notables (*dignidades*), and proctors (*procuradores*). To the Regents, who shortly afterwards took up the government, the time seemed ill-chosen for experiments with an assembly of undefined powers and unknown tendencies. For the Cortes as summoned by the Junta was a quite new institution, having nothing in common with the old Cortes of Castille save the name. Of the old Cortes much less was known then than now, but all were aware that no Cortes of all Spain had ever been held, much less of Spain and her colonies as was now projected. The Regents, in fact, had good cause to dread the enthusiasm of the young Liberals, who, under pretence of a revival, dreamed of a representative body that should combine the virtues of the French revolutionary Assembly, the British House of Commons, and the sixteenth century Cortes of Aragon or Castille.

Crowded together with the Regency into Cadiz and the Isla de Leon, these Liberals were able to bring to bear upon it an amount of pressure quite out of proportion to their numbers and importance in the country. The Regents put every possible obstacle in the way of the proposed Assembly; they postponed its date, but at last they were obliged to renew the summons (June, 1810). This time Cortes were called for the autumn. But already, since the beginning of the year, important alterations had been made by the committee appointed by the Junta to regulate the form of the Assembly. The projected Cortes now consisted of a single elective Chamber, made up (1) of representatives of the cities and towns possessing the traditional right of a vote; (2) of representatives of the provincial Juntas; (3) of representatives of each group of 50,000 souls; (4) of representatives of the colonies. Four processes were necessary for the election of a deputy. The parish elected its Junta, which in turn sent representatives to the district Junta; the district Junta chose the provincial Junta; and the deputy was elected from among the members of the provincial Junta. The franchise in the first degree belonged to all Spaniards who were householders over 25 years of age. Even in a well-ordered country and in time of peace the carrying out of so complicated a system for the first time would be difficult. In Spain not only was the vast majority of the inhabitants ignorant of the nature of a vote, but the civil power was in abeyance, and three-fourths of the land were occupied by the invader. The election therefore was managed by a few enthusiasts and a large number of busybodies, who, without going outside Cadiz, elected themselves. For, since no show of election was possible in the districts and cities held by the French, and since it was impossible for the deputies summoned from America to arrive in time, it was decided that at first the places of the missing deputies should be occupied by natives of the otherwise unrepresented constituencies who chanced to be present in Cadiz.

The haphazard Assembly thus formed met first on September 24, 1810. So far as it represented anything beyond the private opinions of its members, it represented the views of the seaboard towns which had elected it, as opposed to those of the interior. The former were radical, progressive and industrial; they are now hotbeds of socialism of a crude type; the latter, agricultural and conservative, would to-day welcome Don Carlos and his programme<sup>1</sup>. But the radical tendency of the Cortes of 1810 was not at first apparent. The Regents succeeded in putting one or two matters at least beyond question, while the deputies were still an assembly of units of undefined opinions. Thus they swore to maintain the Catholic religion, to preserve the integrity of Spanish territory, and to deliver from his captivity Ferdinand, son of Charles IV, whom, in spite of the series of abdications and surrenders of the crown that had taken place, they held to be the rightful King. No notice was taken of the retraction of the act of abdication wrung from Charles IV at Aranjuez. After this the Cortes proceeded to define their own position. They reserved for themselves legislative power, and handed over the executive and judicature to the Regents. Their next act was much more far-reaching; they declared that in the absence of the King the sovereignty belonged to the Cortes, and they called upon the Regents to recognise this principle. Though his colleagues submitted, the Bishop of Orense, President of the Council of Regency, protested. Perhaps he knew something of Ferdinand's real character, and the ruthless account he would demand of those who allowed the royal prerogative to be diminished. The Bishop's protest was discussed and overruled. The Cortes passed measures to secure their members against bribery and undue influence, and then, with a levity ill-befitting their situation within hearing of the artillery of

<sup>1</sup> A doubtful statement. Carlism *seems* dead; but in politics, especially Spanish politics, a prophet tempts Providence. [J. F.-K.]

their besiegers, they took for themselves the title of “Majesty,” and conferred on the Regency that of “Highness.”

Within a month of this first meeting, the two opposite tendencies which at first had been kept in the background declared themselves. The occasion was a measure for relieving the Press of censorship previous to publication. Such a measure was intensely repugnant to a large number of the deputies. It seemed to them to open the floodgates of atheism and anarchy. During this controversy was heard for the first time the now universal word “liberal,” opposed, in this instance, to “servile,” the epithet applied by opponents to those whose views were still limited by the formula “Church and King.” Finally secular books were set free, but the Cortes decided by seventy votes against thirty that books on religious subjects must receive the *imprimatur* of a bishop before publication. By this measure the Cortes had rebutted the charge of libertinism; but the Regents were not satisfied with the degree of respect shown for the royal authority. They refused to sanction the acts of the Cortes, and resigned (October 27, 1810). They were replaced by a new Council of Regency, consisting of three members nominated by the Cortes. Two of the three were absent, and their places were filled by substitutes. They were persons of no great authority; the Cortes that had appointed might dismiss them at will; they were the creatures of the progressive party.

This party had now control of the Assembly; its views were every day more defined; and it was clear they could not be carried out so long as the old forms of an absolute monarchy were maintained. The whole situation of the Cortes was painfully irregular: their claim to sovereignty rested on no foundation and was hotly contested. The pretended origin of their revolutionary aspirations in the crude theories of the *Comuneros* must be formulated or abandoned; and these aspirations must be embodied in a Constitution. A commission of fourteen deputies was engaged during eight

months in drawing up a project to be submitted to the Cortes.

During this time, the earlier part of the year 1811, the Cortes and the Regency struggled manfully to meet their now growing difficulties. The national debt had risen to £70,000,000, and credit was exhausted: the annual expenditure was £12,000,000, the revenue about a fifth of this amount. The deficit was supplied, but the sympathies of the rich and the Church were alienated by a huge war tax on property and on the salaries of public officers, by appropriation of the income of vacant benefices, sale of Church plate, and the institution of State lotteries. Some money was obtained, too, by the sale of estates confiscated from the disloyal and of parts of the royal domains. But few had money to buy, and fewer still would spend it upon property the title to which was sure to be contested as soon as a change of government took place.

Against the consequences of such a change the Cortes now began to try to guard themselves and their work, for they felt that they were drifting further from the King and from the system they had been intended to represent. They decided that all the acts of the King whilst in captivity and all agreements entered into by him were invalid (Jan. 1811). They formally excluded members of the royal family from the Council of the Regency. They decreed that no terms should be made with the enemy unless they secured the complete freedom of Spain and Portugal. The object of these measures was to guard against concessions wrung from a King in the power of the enemy, but by them the King's right to dispose of his dominions according to his will was set aside. Greater and bolder innovations were at hand.

On March 19, 1812, in the presence of the Papal Nuncio and the British and Portuguese ambassadors, the new Constitution was promulgated at Cadiz. Fidelity to it was sworn by the Cortes, its creators, the Regency, their creatures, and

the small part of the Spanish nation that understood or accepted its aims. Supporting revolutionary innovations by appeals to an imaginary past, and to the thirteenth century code of Alfonso the Learned, it in fact cut off the new Spain from all connexion with the old, and deprived the Crown of all real authority in the land where loyalty to the King had ever been reckoned as second only to loyalty to the Church. Most of its provisions had already been rejected by the Spaniards when offered by Napoleon at Bayonne. They refused to receive them at the hand of a stranger; they refused no less when the offer came from Cadiz. Eighteen months after its promulgation, the Restoration swept away the Constitution and all connected with it. It had never been put to the test of practice: the Liberals had not yet realised how fatal to its success was its complicated system of election, its prohibition of reelection to successive Parliaments, and its exclusion of ministers from the deliberations of the Chamber. But it demands examination because of the disastrous attempt to realise its dreams in 1820, because it is the prototype of a long series of somewhat similar constitutions, and because it inspired fanatical devotion and produced martyrs among its friends and was hated to the death by its enemies. Whilst their authority did not extend so far as the view from the blockaded walls of Cadiz, the Cortes of 1810 handled and altered every department of public life, purposing to create politically a new heaven and a new earth.

The first article of the Constitution declared that "the Spanish nation is made up of all Spaniards in both hemispheres," and went on to assert that "this nation is free and independent, and cannot be the patrimony of any family or person." The third article laid down the principle of democracy: "sovereignty is vested essentially in the nation, and for this reason the nation alone has the right to establish its fundamental laws." As yet religious liberty is not attempted: "the religion of the Spanish nation is and ever shall



be the Catholic Apostolic Roman, the one true faith. The nation defends it by wise and just laws forbidding the exercise of any other." The system of government chosen is a "moderate hereditary monarchy." The King at the head of the executive is irresponsible. He names the ministers: his decrees are valid only if countersigned by a responsible minister. The right of making laws is vested in Cortes, consisting of a single Chamber, together with the King. Each sixty thousand souls shall be represented by a deputy. The franchise, together with full rights of citizenship, is conferred on all Spaniards aged twenty-five years and over; all electors, however, will, after 1830, be required to be able to write and read. The election of a deputy involves four separate processes. Firstly the voters of each parish name eleven commissioners. Secondly these commissioners elect a parochial deputy. Thirdly this assembly of parochial deputies elects a district deputy. Fourthly the district deputies elect a deputy to the Cortes. A property qualification is imposed on electors in the third and fourth degrees. The commission or mandate given by his electors to the deputy must include "full powers .....to decide and resolve all that he shall perceive to be for the good of the Spanish nation within the limits of the Constitution." No deputy may hold office under the Crown; none may be reelected unless after the interval of at least one Parliament. Parliament must sit three months in each year, and be renewed every second year. When not sitting, its place is taken by a Permanent Commission, the duties of which are to watch over the observance of the laws, and, if necessary, to reassemble Parliament. The power of taxation belongs to Parliament, the power of veto to the King; but the veto is set aside when the measure concerned has been thrice approved by Parliament. A Council of State is instituted. Its forty members are chosen by the King from a list of treble the number prepared by Parliament. The heads of the administration directly responsible to Parliament are the six



Secretaries of State in the departments of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Colonies, Justice, Finance, and War. The obligation of obedience ceases when the King violates the law. Military service is obligatory. Provision is made for a national militia and for municipal government under popular control. Any alteration in the Constitution is solemnly forbidden until after the lapse of eight years.

This Constitution was not approved by the Cortes of 1810 until the legality of the Cortes themselves and each one of the great principles on which their code was founded had been fiercely attacked. The debates lasted six months. For refusing to acknowledge the sovereignty of the people the Council of Castille was suspended. The Opposition included a majority of the members of the Supreme Junta, and of the Regents past and present. Opposition was overridden by enthusiasm and by persecution. But no sooner was the Constitution promulgated than the reaction set in. The *serviles*, as the event showed, were those who best understood the temper of their countrymen and of their King. They kept up communications with him in his exile and spared no effort to bring about the dissolution of the Constituent Cortes. Their term was fixed by an article of the Constitution enjoining a periodical general election; their work ended in the autumn of 1812; their successors were summoned for October. Meanwhile the old Cortes resolved to watch over their work and to support the new *régime*. They underwent however some modification, for, as the provinces were liberated and elected their deputies, and as the colonial representatives arrived, it was found that their opinions had been entirely misrepresented by the demagogues who had temporarily supplied their places. The Progressives had still a majority, but they were opposed with increasing confidence by a party whose avowed object was to reestablish everything as it was before the French invasion.

This party won ground with every step the invaders were driven back. It welcomed the name of *serviles* and sighed no

less to be rid of the Constitution than to be rid of the French, so that the King should have his own again. It included almost the whole of the clergy; the great quarrel between the Church and Liberal ideas, after being held in abeyance by fear of subjection to the foreigner, had broken out. The Bishop of Orense had been banished for resisting innovations; the clerical members of the Cortes had one by one been joining the Opposition. The temper of the Liberals was getting more imperious. A new set of Regents was chosen when those in power refused to support the majority of Cortes for interfering with Church affairs (March, 1813). The Nuncio was expelled for protesting in the name of the Holy See against a law suppressing religious houses of less than twelve members, and prohibiting the existence of more than one convent of the same order in one place. An ecclesiastical tax called the *Voto de Santiago* was suppressed; finally, by a majority of thirty in a house of one hundred and fifty members, the Inquisition was abolished and its property confiscated. At the same time the monuments by which its sentences were recorded in churches and many honourable families branded with shame were swept away (February, 1813). Religion, however, was held to be still in need of the protection of the law; and the place of the suppressed Holy Office was taken by the tribunal of Defenders of the Faith. The Cortes were drifting further and further from the wishes of the nation they affected to represent. As the Liberal majority became smaller it became more bitter; its danger spoiled its temper.

After the battle of Salamanca (June 12, 1812) the Intruder fled from Madrid. Cadiz was relieved of the blockade; Andalusia was free. The Constitution was proclaimed in the famine-stricken capital, where Wellington and the famous *guerrillero* El Empecinado had been rapturously welcomed as deliverers. The seat of the usurping Government, Madrid, had long been isolated from the rest of Spain. The patriotic naturally shunned it. Those whose business affairs made it impossible for them

to quit the city were forced to bear almost the whole of the burden laid upon Spain by the hated foreigner. The collection of taxes in King Joseph's name in country districts was not to be attempted, so Cabarrús, the Minister of Finance, and his agents, turned their whole attention to the citizens. Monopolies, new taxes on property, rent, and food, exhausted the hoards of patriots and *afrancesados* alike. The latter indeed were in a worse position than the former, for, while they could not refuse to contribute to the support of the usurping Government, their property was ruthlessly confiscated whenever the patriots could lay hands on it. The few existing banks had been ruined by exactions under the name of loans and by the forced circulation of *cédulas hipotecarias*, bonds after the fashion of *assignats*. The war had hindered agriculture and extinguished commerce. So scanty was the food brought into Madrid and so high its price that twenty thousand inhabitants perished by hunger.

The rejoicings of the famished mob over their supposed deliverance were of short duration. Once more the French wave surged southward; and Wellington was obliged to seek shelter behind the guns of Ciudad Rodrigo. In November, 1812, King Joseph was back in Madrid. His stay lasted six months, whilst the fate of France was decided among the Russian snows. The news of the disaster of the Grand Army brought out the allied forces, British, Spanish, and Portuguese, to complete their six years' work. Wellington, now generalissimo of the allied armies, was able to organise the campaign unhindered by the unruly spirit of the *guerrilleros*, and the sulkiness with which Spanish generals sometimes met his ill-concealed contempt. As he approached, the Intruder and his force took their way northward, escorting a huge convoy of plunder torn from the churches and palaces of Spain. With the French went the unhappy train of those who had followed their fortunes through conviction, timidity, or interest. They dared not remain in liberated Spain to meet the reckoning of the grim and half-starved patriots. The battle of Vittoria (June 21, 1813)

turned the retreat into a rout. Before the autumn all Spain was rid of the invaders except the north-east corner and a few strong places in the Cantabrian region. Even Soult's furious campaign failed to save them. In April, 1814, Wellington and Suchet signed the capitulation and Spanish soil was free again.

It was not only the *afrancesados* whose fears got the upper hand as the invaders were thrust back. The Constituent Cortes dissolved (September 24, 1813). The Permanent Commission appointed by them according to the directions of the Constitution had but few days in which to exercise its authority. The ordinary Cortes met on October 1. The single Chamber still contained a majority of Liberals, but only a small one. In it appeared for the first time many of the men who became famous during the revolutionary period that followed, Isturiz, Martinez de la Rosa, and Canga Argüelles. The Constitution forbade reelection; but a good many of the deputies to the famous Cortes of 1810 reappeared as substitutes representing districts that had been unable or unwilling to obey the summons. The new Cortes continued to debate at Cadiz, while no man heeded them, for it was clear even to the most short-sighted that their day was nearing its end. The capital, since its deliverance, had claimed the presence of the Government. Thither the Cortes took their way (January, 1814). Amid the joyful preparations made by their most bitter enemies to welcome the King, the full extent of their danger seems to have presented itself to them. Some of their last acts were to prescribe the route to be followed by the King on his return, to prohibit the exercise of his powers until he had sworn to observe the Constitution, and to forbid him to enter Spain accompanied by troops or by foreigners.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE RESTORATION (1814—1820).

It has been said that old Spain fell with the French invasion, undermined by the reforms of Charles III. But in fact it was immediately after the invasion that old Spain gave proof of most vigorous life by sweeping away as far as possible all innovations. Old Spain under able leaders fought for the upper hand throughout the nineteenth century. The Carlists, its champions, nearly carried the day; even now continual vigilance and constant compromise are necessary to prevent its resurrection. The change that had really taken place was the rise of the Liberal party, an opposition to the all-powerful Crown and *camarilla*. The War of Independence had been fought by the people. A large number of the nobles and clergy, fearful of confiscation of estates or benefices, had been guilty of making terms with the foreigners, or of despairing of the national cause. Mina, El Empecinado, and the other *guerrilleros*, who had begun the struggle in obscure corners of Spain, were at its end leaders of a democratic army. Their sympathies were with the humble class in which they were born. A return to the old order meant, for them, a return to obscurity; they became Liberals.

Again, the abolition of the old administration, and the refusal of the Spaniards to obey magistrates appointed by aliens, had led to the formation of Juntas. The Juntas had stood between the people and anarchy; the people of the cities

had learned to rule themselves. The seaboard towns at any rate valued self-government, and were unwilling to return to the old system of exclusion and repression. The barriers of class had broken down, whilst Spain was engaged in a death-struggle. No claim of a nobleman to exemption from taxation could be recognised when money was sorely needed for the patriotic cause; no private jurisdiction could be allowed to interfere with that of the Junta. In formally abolishing the privileges of the nobility the Junta sanctioned actual practice. But the Juntas had no wish to persecute the former owners of privileges. Class distinction indeed had never been insisted on in Spain in such a way as to produce irritation. Rank meets with ready recognition, but does not claim it. Moreover the dividing lines between political parties have happily never coincided with those between class and class, rich and poor. The Radical parties have always contained some of Spain's noblest blood.

The country folk cared nothing for the brand-new franchise. Once they were rid of the invader and had got back their King, they demanded nothing better than to live as their fathers had lived. They took no share in politics until they were roused by the cry that the Church and the King were in danger. But all over the land the regular habits of agricultural and industrial life had been lost during the war; barriers had been broken down, and free thought now jostled bigotry, political and theological, where for centuries the smallest deviation from accepted formulas had been most harshly repressed. The attempt to implant the extreme doctrines of an untried Liberalism in so unfavourable a climate could not be successful. The declaration of abstract principles by the Cortes of Cadiz fell frigidly on ears dulled by the din of arms. But a spirit of unrest was abroad; it was working in the army, which, at the end of the war, numbered 180,000 men. Among its leaders none had won a position sufficiently commanding to enable him to decide which path Spain should take now that she stood at the parting of the ways. So it came about that the



restored King, with hardly an effort, by help of the clergy and the mob, overthrew the democracy that had saved his throne.

His subjects knew nothing of his real character. The brief public appearance of the pupil of Canon Escoiquiz as plotter against his father was forgotten. Ferdinand, the exiled prince, had become the symbol of the national ideal, the name round which patriotic, loyal, and religious feelings were grouped. It would not have been possible to convince those who adored it that Ferdinand had basely fawned upon Napoleon, had expressed his thankfulness for captivity and insult, and had actually congratulated the usurper, Joseph, on his accession to the throne of Spain, and the Emperor on his victories over the Spanish patriots.

At the end of the year 1813, Napoleon, anxious to withdraw his soldiers from Spain, obtained Ferdinand's signature to the secret treaty of Valençay. Ferdinand, in return for recognition as King of Spain and the Indies, promised that "the Spaniards who had helped" the Intruder "should suffer no persecution." The Emperor pledged himself to surrender the fortresses held by his troops simultaneously with the withdrawal of the British. But Ferdinand's signature alone was not considered sufficient to pledge the Spanish Government. Accordingly he sent his friend and confidant, the Duke of San Carlos, to Madrid to obtain from the Regency ratification of the treaty which would set him free. In this negotiation San Carlos failed, for Spain had agreed not to come to terms without the consent of England. Ferdinand's speedy release, even without treaty, was now assured; the Regents were content to await the inevitable result of a situation favourable to all their hopes.

But San Carlos made use of his visit to Madrid to group and organise all the forces of reaction. The Liberal element in the new Cortes was, as has been said, much smaller than in the former ones. The law forbidding reelection had excluded many of the most able Liberals. The tendencies shown by



the late Cortes during the last few months of their existence had alienated the nobility and clergy. Among the newly elected deputies were many agents of these malcontents. Moreover, in view of the impending change, all but the boldest found cause to conceal sympathy with the reforming party. The Cortes, however, before adjourning (February 15), whilst ordering public rejoicings and thanksgivings to celebrate the King's return, had gravely set up their paper barrier against the great wave of popular feeling, and had ordered—in accordance with Article 173 of their Constitution—that Ferdinand should not regain his rights as King until he had sworn to obey the rules laid down by his dutiful subjects for his conduct. As well might they bid a free man be still until duly bound.

Unconditionally set free on March 7, 1814, Ferdinand at once began to negotiate with the Regency. He did not at first declare his intention, but temporised until he felt his position assured. Thus, immediately after his liberation, he wrote: "As for the reestablishment of Cortes, and all measures useful to the kingdom which have been taken in my absence, they shall have my approval in so far as they conform to my royal purpose." The wording of this message was purposely vague; Ferdinand intended by it to evade the obligation of swearing to obey the Constitution. The deputies, however, welcomed it with a *Te Deum* as an informal recognition of their authority and their work; they prescribed the manner of welcome to be given to the returning King, and the route to be followed by him.

Ferdinand reentered his kingdom by the frontier of Catalonia (March 22, 1814); and the wild enthusiasm with which he was greeted by his people at once assured him that all necessity for subterfuge was at an end. The return of *the Wellbeloved*, *the Long-wished-for*, was to the Spaniards the visible guarantee of their victory in the long struggle, a pledge that their land would soon be free of the invaders, and of the allies whom

they hated hardly less. Regardless of the arrangements made for him, Ferdinand turned aside from the route prescribed, to visit the loyal citizens of Saragossa. At Valencia the Regents met him; and, after receiving from the garrison an oath to maintain him "in the fulness of his rights," he proceeded to make use of the absolute power thrust by their glad subjects into his hands. On May 4 he signed the famous Declaration of Valencia, his answer to the claims of the Liberal party. "Not only do I refuse to swear to observe the Constitution, or to recognise any decrees of the Cortes, ordinary or extraordinary... but I declare Constitution and decrees alike null and void to-day and for ever, as though they had never been, and could be blotted out from time." How literally Ferdinand intended to execute his threat of "bringing back all things into the state in which they were in 1808" was not at first realised. For in this same decree he promised that he himself would summon the Cortes. He formally guaranteed the freedom of the individual and of the Press, and went on to declare, "I hate and abhor despotism. The intelligence and culture of Europe no longer suffer it. Never were the kings of Spain despots, nor do her good laws and polity give them such warrant."

On the night before the publication of this proclamation in Madrid (May 10), a foretaste was given of the *régime* it was meant to inaugurate, and the King's regard for the liberty of his subjects. All prominent Liberals present in the capital were arrested in their beds, and haled off to prison amid the jeers of a frantic mob that yelled, "Long live the absolute King! Long live the Inquisition! Down with the freemasons!" Among those who thus fell into the net were two ex-Regents, several Secretaries of State, and a large number of deputies. Before Ferdinand's spies and troops reached Madrid, he had been enabled to distinguish between the deputies who would aid to reestablish absolutism and those who would not. The former had sent him a special and significantly worded address

of welcome, beginning pedantically, "It was the custom of the ancient Persians." Hence they are known in Spanish history as *Persas*. On the other hand the King had coldly dismissed his cousin the Cardinal de Bourbon, President of the Regency, and had flatly refused to receive a deputation of the Cortes.

Whilst the people showed the scant esteem in which they held those who had so freely used their name by tearing up from the street the stones commemorative of the Constitution, this hatred was gratified in yet another direction by a wholesale proscription of the *afrancesados* or *Josefinos*. By decree dated May 30 twelve thousand of them were sentenced to perpetual banishment. Their numbers included, together with some who had sought to profit by the misfortunes of their country, not a few who had been blinded to the claims of patriotism by vague and splendid visions of universal brotherhood.

The King had now nothing more to fear from those whom he had marked as his enemies. The army, the Church, the nobility, and the mob supported him; but his rancour, ingratitude, and narrow Conservatism had alienated a large number of moderate men. Unwilling to see the royal power curtailed to a mere form by a constitution unsuited to the national character and tradition, these nevertheless saw with regret the exact reestablishment of each detail of the old complicated and ineffectual system.

The Councils of State and of Castille reassumed their former authority; the five secretaries took the place of the seven ministers; ecclesiastical and entailed property that had changed hands during the war was returned to its former owners, no compensation being given to buyers. Local and private jurisdiction, and the seigniorial rights that weighed heavily on twenty-five thousand villages of Spain, were revived. The Inquisition was reestablished; it was harmless, but its very name was still capable of rousing the fiercest passion. Municipal and provincial assemblies established by the Cortes were of course abolished with the rest of their work; and

the captain-general again became the real instrument of government.

As Secretaries of State, Ferdinand chose those who had signalised themselves by zeal against Liberals, either during their tenure of power or after their downfall; San Carlos, who had arranged the Royalist revolution; Eguia, the fierce soldier who had given at Valencia the first assurance that the King could count on the army, and also later had filled the prisons of Madrid with Liberals; Lardizabal, the Mexican Royalist, the most retrograde member of the first Regency. Under these the proscription ran its course. Delation was encouraged; military tribunals, making no pretence to impartiality, summarily condemned suspected Liberals to imprisonment or banishment to African penal settlements. One man was condemned to death because he had been elected president of a club at which the murder of the King had been discussed; in vain he pleaded and proved that he had refused the position. Another was actually executed for having organised and led the applause during the public sessions of the Cortes. Conviction of suspected persons was obtained on ridiculously inadequate evidence. Those in power, fearing delation, sought to prove their zeal in the King's cause by harshest severity to Liberals. The King, through the eyes of his spies, looked into the sentences of his judges, and at times revised them, convicting where they had acquitted. Such affairs as he did not decide personally were referred to the Council of Castille, which regulated questions of succession to the throne and granted permission for village markets, acted as high court of appeal and censor of the Press, and fixed the price of bread.

Meanwhile Ferdinand himself and his *camarilla*, the inner tribunal or counter-ministry, discussed laws and love affairs, *manolas* and ministers, with equal freedom in the coarsest of language over their cigars. The Duke of Alagón, captain of the King's guards and companion of his nightly flittings, shared the royal favour with Chamorro, the ex-water-carrier

and low buffoon. These and men of the same accommodating nature were his associates. But Ferdinand, with his father's disgraceful situation ever before his eyes, never fell under the influence of a favourite. He never concealed his contempt for his chosen friends: he never raised them to high office in the State. When he was pleased with them he showed his approval by presents of cigars and sweetmeats; when he was angry he treated them with cynical cruelty and injustice, banishing them with a jeer to distant provinces to starve in some tiny ill-paid office. The treatment he bestowed on his *camarilla* he extended to his secretaries or ministers. None was ever safe; it was noticed that when the King's manner was peculiarly affectionate he was most dangerous. Though there were only five secretaryships, thirty secretaries came and went between 1814 and 1820. Their dismissal generally involved imprisonment or banishment; Ferdinand often gave his opinion of the person concerned and the reason for his dismissal in the plainest of language. Thus he characterised one as "purblind," another as "inept," another as "too clever." He himself, by an early morning visit, surprised his Minister of Justice, Macanaz, in bed, and banished him after a summary examination of the papers lying loose on his writing-desk. The newspapers were all suppressed with the exception of the harmless *Diary of Madrid* and the official *Gazette* (April, 1815). Only by strong political influence was permission obtained to publish an inoffensive *Guide to Madrid*. Foreign books were seized as far as possible at the frontier; but they were nevertheless passed secretly from hand to hand, and the most violently subversive of them found most favour. A new generation was growing up, schooled by harsh oppression to a fanaticism in the cause of liberty as exaggerated as that of their opponents in the cause of absolutism. Their mental food was the political Utopias of revolutionary doctrinaires, and the early ravings of the ultra-romantic school. They had of course no experience of public life; their crude ideas



could not even be put to the test of debate, for spies swarmed everywhere.

Abroad Spain stood alone. Her conduct after her delivery had forfeited the respect and sympathy of her late allies. Great Britain made diplomatic protest against the harsh treatment of the Liberals; the Duke of Wellington, little as he liked their cause, interceded for them. The only answer given to such appeals was a surly assurance that no blood would be shed. At the Congress of Vienna Spain was openly flouted. She was refused the position and vote of a first-class Power. No support was given to the claim of a member of the royal family to the Duchy of Parma. The district and fortress of Olivenza, near Badajoz, was assigned to Portugal despite Spain's assertion of right. The slave-trade, on which the prosperity of a large part of her colonies depended, was abolished. The small and shabby contingent under Castaños which she sent to France during the crisis of the Hundred Days was scornfully sent back to its own side of the frontier. Indeed the army, like the rest of the public departments, was starved; and discontent was spreading in its ranks at home, whilst in America it maintained a hopeless struggle to repress the young nations there springing into life. Serious representations had little or no weight with the King. Appeals to his sardonic humour were at times more effective. General Castaños appeared before him one winter's day in the white duck trousers of the summer uniform. The King asked the reason for so unseasonable a dress. "Sir," answered Castaños, "I have just got my July pay and my July clothes." So shrunk and feeble was the navy that the Dutch were paid for protecting the coast against the Barbary corsairs. In civil life matters were no better. Seville, Cadiz, and other great cities were full of merchants ruined by the revolt of the colonies and the breakdown of the old system of protection. War had been followed, as usual, by famine; and the roads swarmed with disbanded soldiers, half beggars and half



brigands. Even this condition of affairs seemed to the majority of Spaniards preferable to the new order which the Liberals had tried to bring in.

But the Liberals, both those at home and those in banishment, as soon as they had recovered from the first shock of their dispersion, began to plot a return to power by force of arms. They found supporters in the *guerrillero* leaders of the War of Independence; but these men, who had roused the peasantry against the French, had lost their power so soon as they dropped the cry of Church and King. When Espoz y Mina attempted to seize the citadel of Pamplona, the attitude of his Navarrese fellow-countrymen obliged him to escape to France. A little later (Sept. 1815) Don Juan Porlier, a brother-in-law of the Count of Toreno, on coming out of the prison to which he had been condemned for his Liberal opinions, proclaimed the Constitution at Corunna. He met with some degree of support in this Liberal seaboard town; but the neighbouring cathedral city was entirely under Conservative and clerical influences. The garrison marched out against him: Porlier's band dispersed, and left him to be dragged off by the sergeants, whom he had often led against the French, to the prison of the Inquisition at Santiago. He suffered death as a felon.

The news of this revolt, headed by a member of a family well known for its Liberal opinions but distinguished hitherto by moderation, caused Ferdinand to review his position and the state to which the country had been reduced. His so-called friends were everywhere gratifying old grudges under plea of zeal for his service; his own popularity was rapidly waning; the prisons were full of Liberals, who for nearly two years now had been awaiting trial. Ferdinand broke loose from those under whose advice he had acted since his restoration; he banished Canon Escoiquiz, the guide of his youth, the deviser of the Aranjuez plot, and the companion of his exile. Ostolaza, leader of the Royalist opposition in the Cortes,

followed Escoiquiz. The ministry of police, a special office created for the punishment of the Liberals, was suppressed. The King himself took in hand the matter of the political prisoners. The attempt to obtain conviction for treason having failed in more than one court, he roughly divided them into categories and on his own authority pronounced sentence upon a batch of fifty of them. Agustín Argüelles and Martínez de la Rosa were sent for eight years to the wretched penal colonies on the north African coast; their banishment from the capital and neighbourhood of royal residences was perpetual. The Count of Toreno was sentenced in absence to death. The Liberal ecclesiastics who had sat in the Cortes were confined in their convents or in fortresses. On this occasion again (Dec. 15, 1815) Ferdinand published his decree only after it had been executed, and when the untried prisoners were already on the way to their places of punishment.

This high-handed proceeding brought protests from Great Britain and from France. To these Ferdinand, having got his own way, showed some outward deference. At the beginning of the next year (1816) he appointed a slightly less anti-Liberal ministry and decreed (Jan. 26) that all political trials should be concluded within six months. He abolished the military commissions which had superseded the civil courts as less likely to be restrained by scruples from fulfilling the royal will. He solemnly forbade the use of the words *liberal* and *servile* as calculated to rouse rancour and evil memories. This slackening of the bonds was not long maintained; Ferdinand was driven to further severities by the discovery of a masonic plot against his life. The Conspiracy of the Triangle, as it was called, was hatched in the south, where the freemasons swarmed and where all public men, except of the clerical party, were affiliated to the lodges. They formed a kind of lay opposition to the Inquisition. The freemasons were no less ready to undergo martyrdom than the clericals. On this occasion, though one of the sect had betrayed the plot, the

utmost severity failed to trace its ramifications. On another occasion an imprisoned freemason, pretending that he had an important revelation to make, was led into the royal presence. Instead of betraying a plot, as had been expected, he poured out a startling description of the condition of Spain, a glowing eulogy of the virtues and powers of the brotherhood, and an exhortation to Ferdinand to join it. He was handed over to the Inquisition.

Concerned for his safety, the King again transferred his confidence from the less strict to the harshest representatives of the ultra-Royalist party. General Eguía became Minister for War (June, 1817); Don Carlos de España was sent as captain-general to Catalonia, General Elio to Valencia. Again a Liberal revolt was headed by a veteran of the war. This time it was Luis de Lacy, ex-captain-general of Galicia, who, deceived as to the feeling of the army, put himself at the head of an ill-prepared rising in Catalonia. But the people proved indifferent to the cry of Liberty; and the army, in spite of neglect, was still Royalist. De Lacy was captured by his friend and companion in arms Castaños. Not daring to execute him on the mainland, where his popularity was very great, the magistrates transferred him to Majorca.

The requirements of an expensive though sordid court, and the necessity for sending reinforcements to America, created a pressing need for money. None was forthcoming; and Ministers of Finance resigned one after another, appalled at the state of the Treasury. The exhausted state of the country after the war allowed of no further taxation. The Government of the Restoration, determined to revert in all things to traditional practice, had abandoned the new sources of revenue impiously tapped by the Cortes. It was hoped that one vigorous military effort might open up again the choked springs of wealth by reestablishing the authority of the viceroys in the revolted colonies. Some fiscal reform was urgent; there was but one man to whom it could be entrusted

with hope of success. The King's need for money proved stronger than the King's dislike of the financier's politics. Martin de Garay was made Minister of Finance (December, 1816). Devoting all his ability to the task, he issued in the following year his report upon the situation. It showed a revenue of £6,000,000 and an expenditure of nearly one-half more. Of this expenditure nearly two millions were absorbed by interest on loans contracted for the most part during the War of Independence. The Royal Household cost about half a million. The most ruinous charge, however, was the War Budget. Notwithstanding the notorious inefficiency of the department, it claimed about two-thirds of the total revenue. Garay proposed, by suspending payment of interest on part of the debt, and by reductions on the budgets of the departments of State, to cut down expenditure to a little over six millions, and to raise an additional million of revenue, one-third by a tax on the revenues of the highest officers of State and of the richest sees and prebends, two-thirds by direct taxation. His project included a most useful measure—repurchase from the farmers of the ruinous and vexatious *alcabalas* or *gabelas*, taxes levied on all sales. For a moment these measures gave some relief to the Treasury; but the money so hardly wrung from the country was spent in buying from Ferdinand's patron and protector, the 'Tsar, a fleet of eight ships of war to convoy the army collecting for service in America. When the ships reached Spain, they were found to be so rotten as to be unseaworthy. The great expedition that was to win back the colonies was put off. Garay's beneficial reforms never had a fair trial. Not even his skill and devotion could save him from the King's suspicion and caprice. Without warning and without explanation he was torn from his bed and sent into exile, together with his fellow-ministers Pizarro and Figueras (September, 1818). He was the ninth Minister of Finance in two and a half years.

Such senseless tyranny made even moderate men long for

change; and signs were not wanting that such a change was preparing. At Valencia the Liberals conspired to seize their scourge and tormentor, the cruel but able and energetic Elio (January, 1819). He saved himself by his vigilance and resolution; and Vidal, the leader of the conspiracy, together with twelve of his accomplices, paid with their lives the penalty of failure. At this time the death of his second wife, a woman of lofty views and lovable character, removed one of the few good influences about the King. Little more than two years before (September, 1816), amid great popular rejoicings, he and his brother Don Carlos had married sisters, their nieces, Princesses of Portugal. For a time Queen Isabel succeeded in detaching her husband from his low associates and debauchery. The Liberals founded great hopes upon her gentle influence, but it waned before her death. The King was a widower for the second time and childless. Again the heir-apparent was his brother, whose wife had borne him a son (Carlos Luis, born 1818). Don Carlos was rightly regarded as the staunchest champion of the Church and of absolutism. He and his able wife, Doña Francisca, gathered round them all the devotees of these causes, and exercised an ever-growing influence in the Palace. This influence was hardly interrupted by the King's third marriage, which followed ten months after the death of his second wife. Maria Amalia, daughter of Maximilian of Saxony, was a shadowy creature of delicate tastes. She had no influence over her husband; she bore him no children; her life was embittered by his coarseness and brutality. She found her consolation in gentle piety.

## CHAPTER III.

### THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD (1820—1823).

THE downfall of Garay and the death of Queen Isabel of Braganza were followed by a corresponding increase of absolutist influence at court. It culminated in the appointment to the Ministry of Justice (Nov. 1, 1819) of the Marquis of Mataflorida. He owed his title to the energy wherewith he had upheld the King's prerogative at Cadiz, and to the part he played in all Royalist plots against representative government. The Liberals had cause to fear from him a renewal of the proscriptions of four years earlier. Mataflorida had good cause for severity; in five years five revolutionary attempts to overthrow the Government had been made. The spies of the Minister of Justice swarmed everywhere, even in the masonic lodges where the plots were hatched. Spies, however, were useless when disaffection reached the army.

In the summer of 1819 an army of 22,000 men lay round Cadiz awaiting embarkation for America. The ships bought in Russia to convey the transports proved useless; and the soldiers passed their days in idleness and growing discontent. Many had served their time; their discharge was due; they were wrongfully detained to be sent abroad to an unpopular and inglorious war. Their private grievance brought forcibly home to their minds the evils of absolute government. They remembered the declaration of freedom and of the rights of the individual, which Cadiz had heard eight years earlier.



Moreover it was felt that the war in America was no ordinary one, but a hopeless endeavour of a few regiments to maintain an obsolete rule over young nations entitled to freedom. This idea and the general discontent were carefully fostered by agents from America. Among the officers, numerous out of all proportion to their men, and in the non-commissioned ranks, freemasonry was general. Cadiz was ever the stronghold of Liberals; and the Liberal agents were men as able and active as Antonio Alcalá Galiano and Juan Alvarez Mendizabal, both afterwards famous.

The general in command was Enrique O'Donnell, Count of la Bisbal; General Sarsfield, also a veteran of the War of Independence, was present in the camp. These, when sounded by agents of the malcontents, both expressed sympathy and gave it to be understood that they would cooperate when the time for action should come. So far had negotiations gone that the Count had already been put in possession of the names of the principal persons implicated, when he suddenly denounced those who had been led to consider themselves his associates in disaffection (July 17, 1819). He received the cross of a military order from the grateful King, but neither he nor Sarsfield quite escaped suspicion. They were removed from their command, and the Cadiz army was placed under the Count of Calderon. An ex-viceroy of Mexico, grown old and careless, Calderon was quite out of place in the hornet's nest he had been sent to rule. The conspiracy spread among the soldiers fostered by the civilians of Cadiz and Seville. The plot was ripening when, in the autumn, yellow fever fell upon the army, and it was dispersed in small detachments in the villages of the district. This dispersal prevented the perfection of arrangements for combined action, but it did not delay the meditated rising.

On New Year's Day (1820), in the village of Cabezas de San Juan, the Constitution of Cadiz was proclaimed by a subordinate officer, Don Rafael Riego, commander or major of the Asturian

Regiment. He harangued his men, explained the cause in which their aid was sought, and at their head surprised and captured the Count of Calderon and his staff. Riego had acted on his own responsibility. The leader chosen by the conspirator was Colonel Quiroga, who, when his subordinate mutinied, was lying in prison for the share he had taken in the former plot. Next day Quiroga was free, and presented himself at the gate of Cadiz, hoping to be received with open arms by his former associates. But Luis Fernandez de Córdova, a young officer, shut himself up in the citadel with a small body of loyal troops, and refused all dealings with the mutineers.

Rebellion spread, however, among the other regiments; and Quiroga soon found himself surrounded by 5000 men. To say that he commanded them would be to libel the independent spirit befitting a revolutionary army. The general explosion that had been expected to follow the first sparks of revolt failed; the cities of Andalusia remained indifferent; and Quiroga in turn was blockaded in the Isla de Leon just outside Cadiz. At the end of the month Riego, making up in audacity what he lacked in intellect, started inland with a flying column of 1500 men to seek for the support without which the movement must speedily come to an end. He failed utterly; the cities saw him hurry through and heard without enthusiasm his ravings about liberty. On March 11 only forty-five soldiers still held with him; and he was hotly pursued by the royal troops on the border of Extremadura. A few days more and Quiroga's capture would have sealed his fate, and all would have been at an end, when suddenly news came that, at the other end of Spain, Corunna had proclaimed the Constitution and elected a Junta under the Liberal ex-Regent Pedro Agar (February 21). Vigo, Ferrol and Oviedo followed suit; next Saragossa, then Barcelona. March was not yet half over before half Spain was in a ferment. The success of the revolution was assured when the Count of la Bisbal, commanding the troops sent to hold the important strategic position

of Ocaña at the junction of roads to Madrid, Valencia, and Andalusia, proclaimed the Constitution at the head of his regiment. Eight months earlier he had broken up the plans of the revolutionaries and handed them over to punishment; his treachery this time left the Royalists defenceless.

At Madrid it was realised that resistance was hopeless; Ferdinand bowed to the storm. His policy was to grant piecemeal and grudgingly the reforms demanded, and to trust to the rallying of the Conservative parties to restore his power. On hearing of the defection of the northern towns (March 3), he ordered the Council to prepare a list of suggested reforms. Three days later, when the danger had become greater, he announced his intention of summoning the Cortes, but without mentioning date or place. Partial concessions and promises were however now of no avail to save him from what he dreaded and hated; but he waited till the troops in the capital were already breaking out into mutiny and the palace was in danger from the mob before he declared himself willing to swear to observe the Constitution. The *Gazette* of March 6, promising the immediate assembly of the Cortes, was followed by an extraordinary number publishing the complete surrender of the King. "In order to avoid delays that might arise through questions in Council with regard to the execution of my decree of yesterday ordering the immediate convocation of the Cortes, and seeing that it is the general will of my people, I have determined to take the oath to the Constitution promulgated by the General and Extraordinary Cortes of 1812." This announcement, wrung from Ferdinand only by urgent representation of his trusted adviser, General Ballesteros, was received with the wildest rejoicings and with a gratitude unwarranted by the fashion in which the surrender had been made. A crowd surged up to the palace and shouted and cheered till Ferdinand came to a balcony. The sight of the least worthy of the kings of Spain produced transports of delight; it seemed as if the quarrel between him and his people

were over. The crowd that cheered and blessed him for his grudging act represented the middle classes of the citizens, for to the common folk the words Liberal and Constitutional had as yet no meaning; their loyalty had not learnt to distinguish, it consisted merely in obeying the King; and this the Liberals felt when the reaction overtook them.

So soon as they found the King tractable, the revolutionary leaders appointed six delegates to negotiate with him. The demands imposed were: first that the King should sanction the restoration of the Town Council of Madrid with the same members it had contained when swept away at his restoration, and that he should take an oath to observe the Constitution in its presence; secondly, that he should accept the advice of a provisional consultative Junta until the Cortes should meet; thirdly, that the Inquisition should be abolished. Ferdinand had no choice but to accept. His cousin, the Cardinal de Bourbon, Archbishop of Toledo, and late President of the Regency, was appointed President of the Provisional Junta. With regard to the Inquisition, the zealots of Madrid had already taken the matter into their own hands, and had broken into its prisons in order to set free the martyrs for religious and political liberty whom they supposed to be there. The vaults contained vats and casks that smelt of wine: the ceilings were set with hooks not for torture but for the hanging of hams and sausages. The only prisoner was a French priest whose extravagant royalism had culminated in a crazy mysticism. He was comfortably lodged in an attic. Indeed the Tribunal had ceased to be formidable except as a party cry.

Pleased with their bloodless victory, the Liberals rushed off to the Plaza Mayor hard by, to replace in the position it had once occupied the stone of the Constitution. But, since the original one had been hacked in pieces at the Restoration, another was found to take its place under the supercilious gaze of the huge equestrian statue of Philip IV; and the Liberals betook themselves to their fantastic gambols around it.

Next day these candid enthusiasts, who professed to represent the nation, witnessed a still more pleasing show. The King took the oath administered by the Archbishop of Toledo in the presence of the Municipal Council and the Provisional Junta. After the ceremony he appeared on the balcony of his palace accompanied by his family, and greeted the wildly cheering crowds with many signs of good-humour and satisfaction. Then, signalling for silence, he said, in the half-sneering, half-jocular tone habitual to him, "Well, now you've got what you want; I have just sworn to the Constitution and I shall be sure to respect my oath." This redoubled the enthusiasm of the crowd, but in obedience to a few words recommending calm it at once dispersed. The *Gazette* of March 10 summed up the events of the last few days in words which only the King himself would have dared to use. "The wishes of the people and of the army having come to my notice, I have heard their prayers, and like a tender father have granted that which my children consider conducive to their happiness. I have sworn to observe the Constitution, for which you were sighing, and I shall ever be its stoutest prop. Let us step out boldly, I at your head, along the constitutional path!" The King's brother, friend, and adviser, Don Carlos, was only less enthusiastic; the peroration of his general order to the army, dated March 14, ran, "Soldiers of all ranks, let there be but one voice among us, as there is but one feeling; and in every danger, in every situation, let us rally round the throne to the noble cry, Long live the King! Long live the Nation! Long live the Constitution!"

Only men blinded by enthusiasm and drunk with unexpected good fortune could have been misled by such protestations coming from such lips. Not even the most fervid Radical was shocked to find that Don Carlos put the King before the nation and the Constitution in his proclamation. Indeed nowhere has loyalty survived so many death-blows as in Spain. The Liberals of 1820, like the *Comuneros* three hundred years



before, were Royalists; they cried, "Hurrah for the King and Liberty," just as the *Comuneros* cried, "Long live the King, and down with bad ministers and foreigners." Their favourite symbol was a picture of Ferdinand hand in hand with a stout female who was supposed to typify the Constitution. All parties had felt and resented the senseless and petty despotism exercised in the King's name by even the most insignificant public servant; all had felt the galling necessity for conformity, real or feigned, with the prescriptions of the ultra-religious party. Thus the Liberal group, which six years before had been so easily broken up and thrust aside, had greatly increased its numbers. But it was no longer homogeneous; it now contained a faction much more radical and rash than the moderate monarchical group on which Ferdinand's anger had fallen in 1814. These latter had taken up the burden of government when their country was kingless and in the hands of the invader; their ideas were crude, but they were unselfish; their leaders were men of high character with whom a compromise would have been possible. But the revolutionaries of 1820, who brought back the constitution-makers from their prisons and their exile, were conspirators; they had obtained power by means of a mutiny, the first of a series of *pronunciamientos* that for fifty years cursed their country, and of which the tradition, alas, is not yet extinct. They in turn proved intolerant and persecutors. It was not possible that the two wings of the Liberal party should act together for long.

From March till July, when the Cortes met, Spain was ruled by the Provisional Junta. One of its first measures was to recommend to the King the choice of a ministry from among the Liberal leaders of 1812, the *doceañistas*, so called from the date, and in order to distinguish them from the new and violent faction of the *exaltados* or young Liberals. Ferdinand's view of his own position in his kingdom is best expressed by his homely metaphor, "Spain is a bottle of beer, I am the cork. Without me it would all go off in froth."



His policy was, in moments of unusual fermentation, so to order himself as to relieve pressure by letting out dangerous gases, whilst waiting for the eruptive forces to work themselves out. He now accepted with the best grace a ministry made up of those whom he had ruthlessly persecuted, his "gaol-birds" (*presidarios*) as he used to call them. But these were not the real leaders of the revolutionary party; they were regarded as little better than retrograde and apostate by the fanatical *exaltados*, who aired their fantastic theories, mistranslated from the French, in the political clubs.

Nevertheless the ministry obtained the nominal submission of the army and of the local Juntas that had everywhere cropped up. They sent too a conciliatory message to the revolted colonies, but without definite promises of redress of grievances. The old Councils of State and of Castille were again abolished and their places taken by a new Council made up of friends of the new order. The *Josefinos* and *afrancesados* were invited to return from exile, and their confiscated property was restored. Persons imprisoned for participation in Liberal risings, like that of Mina, were of course released. All this was right, or at all events natural; but a less pleasing spirit was shown by the persecution of those members of the former Cortes who had openly favoured Ferdinand's resumption of absolute power. These *Persas*, to the number of 70, were stripped of their ill-won titles and decorations and confined in convents under plea that they needed protection from mob violence. The national militia, a violently Liberal body in the towns, was made the guardian of the Constitution. The whole influence of the extremists, indeed, was directed to forcing the ministry to reproduce the situation of 1814, just as the Royalists on their return to power had sought to restore that of 1808. Their influence in secular matters was bad; in ecclesiastical matters it was disastrous. That they again expelled the Jesuits was merely symptomatic of their Liberalism; Charles III had done the same before; that they revived the

project for secularising Church property was natural, though it shocked many. But they rendered themselves hateful and intolerable to the majority of Spaniards when they ordered the oath of fidelity to the Constitution to be exacted from individuals, and made banishment and confiscation the penalty for refusal, protest, or mental reservation. Still worse was the establishment of Chairs of the Constitution in seminaries, and the ordinance that the Constitution should be read from all pulpits, "with explanation of the advantages it brings to all classes in the State, and refutation of the calumnious accusations whereby ignorance and malignity have sought to discredit it."

Before resigning its powers into the hands of the Cortes the Junta presented a report setting forth in the strongest terms the miserable state of the country, the emptiness of the treasury, the lack of a fleet, anarchy, starvation, and brigandage at home, abroad the revolted colonies and a hostile Europe. It was ominous that the minister of the United States was the only one of the diplomatic body who had offered his congratulations to the new Government. The monarchical powers regarded with disfavour and alarm this fresh outbreak of the forces that had shaken the world in the Great Revolution. In the Parliament that opened on July 9, 1820, the moderate or *doceañista* party had a slight majority. This moderate tendency was shown by the election of the Archbishop of Seville, deputy for Catalonia, to the Presidency of its single Chamber. Thirty substitutes to represent the American colonies were chosen by the colonists present in Spain. Even Buenos Ayres had its deputy, though for ten years it had been practically independent. At the inaugural session, as was now usual on all great occasions, the King was led out to swear to the Constitution. Ferdinand had become quite hardened to the ceremony. This time it was carried out with the utmost solemnity before the ambassadors of the Powers, and the magistrates and public bodies of the capital. The speech he

pronounced at the bidding of his ministry declared that "his most ardent longings had been fulfilled with the dawn of the day that saw him surrounded by the representatives of the heroic and generous Spanish nation, and witnessed the oath that bound his interests and those of his family to those of his people." Yet it was only a few hours before that Ferdinand's relations and friends had plotted to carry him off out of the power of his tormentors; the courage of his bodyguard had however failed at the moment of danger.

In return for these more than benevolent expressions, the Cortes solemnly voted that a statue of King Ferdinand, with civic crown on head, and the roll of the Constitution in hand, should be erected in the capital. They granted him the title of "the Great"; an amendment to substitute "the Constitutional" was defeated. Their good-will was not confined to words alone; they granted a liberal civil list to the King and his relatives. Moreover they released from prison his zealous friends the *Persas*, though without restoring the titles won by betrayal of the cause of liberty.

But Cortes and ministry had still to meet the daily more urgent difficulty of the situation. They had to reckon with their creator, Riego; to show whether he or they were to be master. Already titles, honours, and promotion had been lavished upon the army of Andalusia; and the fatal precedent had been set of rewarding successful mutiny. Riego was now general in command, and *aide-de-camp* to the King. Quiroga, the other ringleader, was Vice-President of the Cortes. Riego's weak head had been turned by flattery. He gave himself the airs of dictator and father of his country. Nobody could doubt the Liberalism of such ministers as the two Argüelles, Canga and Agustin; they had been first to recognise how much the Revolution owed to the army of Cadiz; but they were no less convinced that the disbandment of the army was necessary. When their intention became known, the Governor, the Provincial Deputation, and the Municipality of Cadiz

protested. The ministers hesitated; for they feared that Riego would refuse obedience to a direct order. He yielded to flattery, and was induced to quit his army by anxiety to lay his views before the ministry, by the belief that the King was desirous of making his acquaintance, and by the expressed wish of the people of Galicia to secure so suitable a patriot to rule over them as captain-general. On reaching the capital the hare-brained enthusiast who had raised the devil at Cabezas de San Juan fell into the hands of the most extravagant of his admirers, the members of the masonic and Liberal clubs. He had entered Madrid almost unnoticed; he was sent outside the gates again to return in triumph (Aug. 31) to the Town Hall, where he was solemnly elected President of the Municipality. He interviewed the ministers, and treated them with cool insolence as his creatures; he had an audience of the King, and outraged etiquette by reporting the royal words. So utterly did he and his associates lack humour and dignity that, in response to cheers in the theatre, they rose in their places and sang the Hymn to Liberty to which Riego's name was attached. His speeches had shown the weakness, vulgarity, and childish vanity of the man to all but the violent and ignorant democrats. But these, filled with all-consuming zeal, were getting out of hand, and daily becoming more dangerous as well as more ridiculous. Cheers for Liberty were succeeded by curses and insults heaped on all who were known for moderation. The Hymn of Riego was replaced by the outrageous *Trágala, perro* (Swallow it, dog) in allusion to forcing the Constitution upon opponents. The country was falling into the hands of the mob whilst the supposed leaders of the Radical party, Toreno and Calatrava, were carrying on a philosophic correspondence with Jeremy Bentham as to the abstract principles to be embodied in the forthcoming criminal code. The intolerable nuisance forced them to act. The political clubs had grown accustomed, when discontented with the ministry, to send it imperious orders to

resign. The Government tardily asserted authority by closing the clubs, checking the right of association, depriving their hero, Riego, of his promised captaincy of Galicia, and sending him off to garrison duty in his native Asturias. The Cortes, by a majority of two-thirds, supported the necessary show of firmness. The friends of liberty, self-styled, attempted to impeach the ministry for illegal treatment of Riego; but the noisy meetings in the streets ceased and the wordy protests died away after a crushing defeat of the *exaltados* in Congress. A few radically worded resolutions of the House appeased the outside mob.

But the seeming unanimity of the earlier sessions of the Cortes was at an end. There were now three parties almost equally balanced. The centre, moderate Liberal, or *doceañista*, and conciliatory party was daily losing some of its small majority. It was banned and hotly beset by the young Liberals, the men who would have penalised any omission of the word "constitutional" from the phrase "Long live the King." At the other extreme stood the daily increasing absolutist and clerical party, profiting by the bitter strife of the Liberals to organise a counter-revolution. The cry that the Church was persecuted rallied that large section of the people which regards political considerations as nothing when balanced against religious ones. Nor was the cry without justification. The refusal of the clergy to defend the Constitution had been generally approved, but had been followed by measures for reducing the number of convents and for subjecting priests to ordinary courts. The abolition of entail, mortmain, and fiscal exemptions affected the wealthy, lay as well as clerical. In obedience to a letter from the Pope, the King had vetoed the expulsion of the religious orders. Although in so doing he was making use of a power conferred by the Constitution, he was terrorised by an organised riot into assent. He renewed his protest, however, each time a decree affecting the Church was submitted for his signature; com-



pulsion adorned him with the aureole of a Confessor in the eyes of the party which about the time began to be known as "apostolic." Working at Madrid to deliver the King from his impious oppressors, the *Junta Apostólica* soon had agencies all over Spain, and for a time it acted in conjunction with the extreme Radical party to overthrow the moderate centre. Its leader Fray Cirilo de la Alameda, General of the Franciscans, was in communication with Alcalá Galiano, head of the free-masons. Within eight months of the revolution, Morales, the *guerrillero*, was holding the mountains of Ávila in the name of the Absolute King; whilst in Saragossa, Corunna, and Madrid itself the Royalists had given unmistakeable signs of impatience.

So rapidly did events seem tending to change that Ferdinand attempted a *coup d'état*. He had refused to preside over the closing session of the Cortes, preferring to remain sulkily at the Escorial, away from the importunities of his "gaol-bird" ministry, and the hardly less distasteful cheers of the mob. His own party was growing; the ministry, by its well-meant attempt to check the extravagance of the clubs, had disappointed the most energetic, who were at the same time the most turbulent of its supporters. But Ferdinand, impatient to be rid of his tormentors, overrated the weakness of the Moderates when (November 16) he sent autograph orders to the captain-general of New Castille to hand over his command to the King's nominee. General Vigodet refused to take his dismissal; and the King had to endure a scolding for having, by issuing an order without endorsement of a minister, infringed Article 225 of the hated Constitution. Worse still, the news produced a riot in Madrid. Ferdinand was forced to face the howling mob, who held up before his eyes Lacy's orphan child and pressed to their hearts with wild gesticulations copies of their idol, the Constitution. He was obliged to come out on the well-known balcony and to smile in return for their execrations. For the first time in history the Spaniards had lost respect for the royal person. The King's confessor, his



friends and supposed advisers, were banished from court by order of the Permanent Commission of Parliament.

Provoked by these events, and by the discovery of other premature plots to free the King, the hot fit of the constitutional fever came over the country again, making the *exaltados* masters of the situation. The patriotic clubs were reopened; the captaincy of Aragon was given to the egregious Riego, the captaincies of Navarre, Extremadura, and Málaga to his revolutionary friends. After yielding thus far, the irresolute Government was forced once more to retrace its steps and check growing anarchy. The strategic positions of the capital were held by soldiers, whilst the patriotic clubs were again closed. On the other hand bishops were exiled for publicly and violently calumniating the new order. They withdrew, volleying excommunications, mostly to the French frontier, where Quesada and other Royalists were plotting with the connivance of Ferdinand, and under the hardly concealed protection of the French Government. The crowds that daily assembled before the palace to cheer the Constitution now did so in order to insult the King. When the bodyguard ventured to interfere, it was blockaded in its barracks by the mob, disarmed, and dissolved. The situation was becoming intolerable; the King complained to the Council of State that the ministry encouraged demonstrations against him. A month later (March, 1821), the Cortes prorogued in the autumn reassembled; and Ferdinand, by order of his ministry, read before it a speech breathing ardent Liberalism. At the end of it, however, he added a paragraph of his own complaining that he was not defended against the mob. After thus arraigning them before Parliament, he formally dismissed the ministers, who were already hastening to abandon an untenable position. He then carried still further his cunning plan of dividing parties by requesting the Cortes to nominate a new ministry, and pronounced a panegyric on the retiring "gaol-birds." The Cortes refused the invidious task and referred

the King to the Council of State. By praising them, the Cortes censured the King; but, by failing to support them or to nominate their successors, the Cortes abdicated its power. The Council of State chose a colourless Cabinet, that showed its apprehension of coming change by making death the penalty for conspiracy against the Constitution, the King, or the Catholic faith.

The Spanish Revolution of 1820 had been followed by revolutions in Naples, in Portugal, and in Piedmont. The events foreseen by the Holy Alliance (September, 1815) had come to pass. It only remained to decide in what manner Russia, Prussia, and Austria should interfere and suppress, as they had bound themselves to do, the ill-regulated Liberalism of the extreme west. The Tsar's plan of marching through France to the rescue of King Ferdinand raised insuperable difficulties. But, when the plenipotentiaries of the Alliance met at Verona (October, 1822), the Congress, under the influence of Metternich, decided upon intervention. At first France hung back, fearing to place herself in opposition to Great Britain. But the revolutionary Government on the other side of the Pyrenees was a menace to her own restored dynasty. She accepted the position of mandatory of the Powers in the cause of monarchy and legitimacy, hoping that a campaign, if necessary, would attach her army to the fleur-de-lys and make it forget the republican and imperial tricolour. Lord Castlereagh refused the aid of Great Britain in compelling Spain to moderate her Liberalism. Canning, his successor, lodged a formal protest against the proposed action of the Powers, declared that the British guarantee to protect Spain referred to territory and not to any form of government, and from that time became the peaceful friend of the moderate Spanish Liberals.

Long before details as to the form of intervention were decided, the fact that it would come sooner or later was assured; and this knowledge still further embittered the party

struggle in Spain. The constitutionals, knowing that their time was short, became persecutors, and banished those who were suspected of intriguing abroad, chiefly officers and ecclesiastics. Some of the Royalists had not waited for foreign help. In the spring of 1821 El Empecinado had to fight a regular battle at Salvatierra against the soldier-priest Merino, leader of the Catholics and absolutists of the north. In Madrid the mob, directed by the clubs, endeavoured not so much to check reaction, or to prevent reconciliation between the Liberal factions, as to make government impossible. A half-mad priest named Vinuesa, a scurrilous adversary of Liberalism, had been condemned to ten years' penal servitude. The sentence, though severe, did not satisfy the mob. They tore him from his prison, tried him in a mock court in the Puerta del Sol, the most public place in the capital, and put him to death with brutal outrage. The spread of anarchy was after this momentarily checked by the appointment of General Morillo to the captaincy of New Castille. Morillo's impartiality was as well known as the courage he had shown in the struggle to retain Venezuela for Spain. But affairs moved in a vicious circle; each excess of the extremists necessarily provoked repressive measures from the responsible ministers; each time repressive measures were used, the extremists grew more violent, alleging that the conquests of the Revolution were being taken back piecemeal by its pretended friends.

The Cortes were prorogued on June 30, after voting the thanks of the nation and additional pensions to Riego and Quiroga. They passed also an elaborate law on public education, primary, secondary, and university, but set aside no funds for its realisation. Indeed their chief preoccupation had been the daily more desperate financial condition of the country. Lack of money made necessary the reduction of the army, which consumed more than half the revenue. A Liberal national militia, three for each four hundred souls, would, it was hoped, supply the place of the conscripts. Garay's proposal of a

direct tax to produce nearly two million pounds a year was adopted. A large amount of land in mortmain was secularised, as also was half the tithe, amounting to about a quarter of a million yearly, and belonging in part to laymen. A French army was waiting fully prepared by the passes of the Pyrenees; called at first a *cordon sanitaire*, it became, when yellow fever died out of Catalonia, a corps of observation. Its presence emboldened the militant Royalists in Spain, and those who from their headquarters at Bayonne were in secret communication with the King. He on his side created every possible difficulty for his well-meaning ministry. Again he tried the effect of making an appointment on his own responsibility, this time to the all-important Ministry for War. He was induced to desist by a threat that the Cabinet would resign, leaving him in the hands of the *exaltados*, who now intrigued with the French revolutionaries just as the Royalists intrigued with their opponents. When their idol, Riego, by outrageous vapouring, incurred deprivation of his command in Aragon, they provoked in Madrid the riot known as the battle of Las Platerias (September 18, 1821). Its issue was indecisive, and signs grew more threatening as St Rafael's Day<sup>1</sup> (October 24) drew near. Radical demonstrations, prepared in all the large towns, were forbidden by the Government and prevented in the capital by show of force. But the governors of Seville and Cadiz allowed them; and Corunna, Valencia, and Cartagena nearly broke out in rebellion. Once more the ministry was reluctantly obliged to assert its wavering authority. The disobedient governors were recalled, but they refused to obey and appealed to the mob and to the Cortes, assembled (September 24) for an extraordinary autumn session. A Commission of Enquiry censured the governors for their disobedience, and the ministry for its weakness in dealing with

<sup>1</sup> Because Rafael was the Christian name of Riego; and his "name-day" was looked forward to as likely to be a time of tumult. [W. H. H.]

them. The vote was adopted by a majority of two to one in the Cortes. The King, acting on the advice of the Council, accepted the resignation of the Cabinet, and put a temporary one in office pending the approaching general election.

The victory of the extremists at the polls was now assured ; it involved King, ministry, and even the deputies excluded by the Constitution from reelection, in a common danger. No moderate men were left to succeed the *doceañistas* when the period fixed by law for the dissolution of the Cortes of 1820 approached. Dreading the coming of Riego and his friends, King and ministers made such preparation as they might for the evil day. They passed laws to check the licence of the Press, and to prevent abuse of the constitutional right of petition. They proposed to close once more the political clubs, but their scheme was rejected by the Cortes. It had the effect of bringing the hatred of the mob on its authors, Martinez de la Rosa and the Count of Toreno. Their houses were wrecked and their lives in danger from their former friends. Ten days later (February 14, 1822) the Cortes were dissolved. They left an enduring mark on Spain by dividing it into fifty-two provinces or departments after the French fashion.

The new Cortes, elected amidst the fiercest party strife, were different from any that Spain had hitherto seen. Not a single bishop was among the deputies ; few were men of title. The majority were lawyers and journalists. They showed their principles by taking Riego for their President, and making his hymn the national anthem. The *doceañistas* had disappeared from the Cortes ; they reappeared in the ministry. The Constitution forbade reelection ; it forbade also the selection of ministers from among the dignitaries ; so the "gaol-birds" were ready to the King's hand when he sought a President of the Council. His choice fell upon the one for whom he professed a half-contemptuous regard, Martinez de la Rosa, "little Rose the sweet-stuff maker," as he jocosely called that honest but



somewhat wearisome reformer. The Cabinet undertook the impossible task of governing without a majority in the Cortes. The Constitution forbade the presence of the ministers in Congress. Their spokesman was the somewhat faded patriot Argüelles; the leaders of the Opposition were Alcalá Galiano and the young Liberal group under Ángel de Saavedra. Under such inspiration the Cortes voted statutes to the *Comuneros* and to the champions of the liberties of Aragon, whom they considered their political forefathers. Fearing bribery and corruption, they made it penal for a deputy to enter any building in which a Government office was situated. They ordered the bishops to demonstrate in pastorals the conformity of the Constitution to Holy Writ, and to report monthly to the governors of provinces on the political attitude of individual priests. Oppressive as were some of these laws, they were not so violent as had been feared from the composition of the Cortes that framed them. The newspapers too that sprang up, so soon as repressive measures were removed, were mostly moderate in tone. There was, however, a minority of ever-changing extremist publications, all short-lived, some witty, some scurrilous, which by pouring out foul abuse and attributing the worst of motives did much to corrupt the people and embitter the future. The absolutists and clericals had no Press. To have expressed their views and intentions would have brought on them the speedy vengeance of the *exaltados*. They plotted in secret and in silence.

In Congress the rules of procedure produced a fierce wrangle; and a heated contest took place over a motion to free property from mortmain and entail. When passed, it was vetoed by the King; but it nevertheless finally became law by being returned three times from the House as the Constitution demanded. By it the accumulation of property by mortmain was made illegal: half of all entailed estates became the property of the actual holder and the other half was freed to his successor. An attempt was made to put in practice the elaborate rules laid down for self-government by the Depu-



tation in the provinces and the Municipalities in the communes.

The King had for the moment abandoned his attempts to fulfil his wishes by a *coup d'état*. He had taken up an attitude of passive resistance, protesting as far as was safe when he considered the interests of the Church to be affected. Of his devotion to the cause of the Church there can be no doubt. Even as a stroke of policy, the combination of the causes of Catholicism and Absolutism was masterly. He represented himself to the Holy Alliance as a martyr to the cause of monarchy. His agents represented to Louis XVIII that he sought only to govern with a moderate Constitution like the French *Charte*. In support of their contention they were able to point to the fact that Liberals like Toreno and Martinez de la Rosa supported him against the extremists. The programme of these Moderates was now indeed reactionary, including, as it did, an aristocratic senate, removal of all restrictions on the King's right of veto, abolition of the Permanent Commission of Cortes, and imposition of curbs on the Press and the political clubs. But those whom Ferdinand himself regarded as his true friends were Eguía and the ultra-Royalists plotting and negotiating at Bayonne, and the armed bands which swarmed over the provinces bordering on the Pyrenees, and had appeared even in Castille and La Mancha. Whilst the Cortes protested to the King against "the slow progress of the constitutional system" (March 24, 1822), it was lack of combination rather than lack of zeal that prevented the Spanish Royalists from effecting without foreign aid his "liberation." At Aranjuez and at Valencia attempts at revolt were suppressed by the militia (May 30, 1822). A little later (June 21) the Apostolic Army of the Faith, commanded by a Trappist monk, seized the fortified city of La Seo de Urgel, near the frontier of French Cerdagne. The religious title of their force was not meant to conceal its political mission; the cause of Church and King were thoroughly identified. La Seo formed the

rallying point of the scattered Royalist bands in Catalonia and of the Apostolic Junta of the north. Here, under the protection of France, a Regency was established, consisting of the Marquis of Mataflorida, the Archbishop of Tarragona, and Baron Eroles (August 15). It received from King Ferdinand authority to rescue the altar and the throne. It followed precedent by declaring null and void all laws and decrees promulgated since the rebellion of 1820.

Immediately after the capture of Urgel by the Royalists, six battalions of the Royal Guard mutinied at Madrid and held the Plaza de Oriente, the square in front of the palace. Then, leaving two battalions to guard the King and ministers, the rest of the guards marched off to the royal shooting lodge of El Pardo, about six miles distant. The King could barely conceal his delight. When his blockaded ministers tendered their resignation, he not only refused to accept it but threatened to hold them personally responsible for events which he chose to attribute to their fault. Meanwhile the energetic Liberals prepared to resist the attempt of a single corps to impose their will on Madrid and on Spain. The Liberals could count upon the support of some line regiments as well as that of the militia and the volunteers under Evaristo de San Miguel. All these were under arms when, on July 7, the guards from El Pardo tried to surprise the capital. A skirmish in the streets ended in complete victory for the Liberals; the guards were cut down, or captured whilst trying to escape to the open country.

Far from showing any desire for vengeance on the King, who had in all probability encouraged the mutiny, the Liberals laid down their arms at his bidding. They insisted, however, that the Moderate ministry should give place to a more frankly constitutional one. Accordingly the resignation of Martinez de la Rosa was accepted when tendered for the tenth time, and his place was taken by Evaristo de San Miguel. The Ministry "of the Seven Patriots" removed from court the friends and

associates of the King; they also refused to allow him to leave Madrid, knowing that his visits to the Escorial, San Ildefonso, or Aranjuez, were spent in plotting. The Municipal Council of Madrid warned the King that his Household was "believed to be made up of unwearying conspirators against liberty." The Council of Castille urged upon him the necessity for publicly disavowing the rash attempt of the guards; and this he did, for he never scrupled to sacrifice his friends. Even Riego was listened to with perfidious good grace when he forced his most unwelcome good advice upon the King. The Liberals triumphed noisily: they held a mighty banquet; they celebrated a public funeral over those who had fallen in defending Madrid; and they limited their vengeance to the execution of two soldiers of the guard convicted of murdering a Liberal officer. The constitutionalists of Valencia however seized the opportunity of putting to death as a felon their late governor, General Elio. The charges brought against him were absurdly weak, and supported by fabricated evidence. His real crime was his Royalist convictions, his share in the overthrow of the Liberals in 1814, and his harsh severity to opponents. He died with a lofty resignation which shamed even his enemies.

The situation was now clear. The Moderate party, weary of being treated with distrust and contempt by both Royalists and *exaltados*, withdrew from the struggle on the resignation of Martinez de la Rosa. The two extremes were immediately face to face. The *exaltados* held the seals of office and controlled the royal person. The Royalist and Apostolic party in arms had established an opposition government at Urgel. The Powers had threatened to avenge lack of respect towards the King. After a great effort, the Royalist regency was dislodged from its stronghold by the brave *guerrillero* Espoz y Mina. His presence gave heart to the Liberal troops, his approach terrified the Regents; they withdrew to France (Nov. 28, 1822), and in their absence Urgel was captured. But, in order to

furnish Mina's little army, great districts had been stripped of troops. Merino the priest harried the plains of Castille; Bessières, another Royalist free lance, threatened first Saragossa and then Madrid. At Brihuega (Jan. 24, 1823) he defeated the troops sent against him, and captured their artillery. The capital was panic-stricken by the prospect of falling into the hands of the ruthless Royalist volunteers.

Meanwhile the fate of Spain was being decided at the Conference of Verona (October, 1822). The French representatives, Montmorency and Chateaubriand, obeying their private convictions rather than instructions, insisted on the necessity for intervention. The Duke of Wellington failed to take up a decided attitude, but dropped hints as to the way in which the military occupation of Spain might be most easily effected. After a proposal for corporate action had been dropped, commission was given to crush the revolution in Spain (November, 1822). The Powers agreed to withdraw their ambassadors simultaneously and to lend moral support. Great Britain declared her neutrality and vainly offered arbitration.

At the beginning of the new year (Jan. 6, 1823) identical notes from Russia, Prussia, and Austria ordered Spain to change her Constitution, threatening punishment in case of refusal. The French message was less harshly peremptory, but its meaning was no less clear. In reply to the northern Powers, the Spanish Government haughtily denied their right to interfere in Spain's domestic affairs. To France it protested against the open encouragement given to a faction bent on overthrowing the established system. For a moment France hesitated; the Left did its best to prevent war, but the Right under Chateaubriand triumphed, for the French middle class was Spain's creditor for many million francs, and was eager to insure her stable government.

Ten days after delivering their notes, the ambassadors demanded their passports; and on January 25 King Louis

announced to the French Chambers that "a hundred thousand soldiers under the command of the Duke of Angoulême were about to march, invoking God and St Louis, to save the throne of Spain to the descendants of Henri IV, and to bring that fine kingdom into agreement with Europe." In vain Canning disputed the right of one nation to make its political example a rule for another. In vain he protested that kinship between reigning families was insufficient ground for intervention. His advice was disregarded; he abstained from threats, for the ideas of the Spanish Liberals were as yet too wild and their tenure of power too insecure to warrant alliance with them. Moreover, England's interests and sympathies were with the young nations forming in America; and these regarded the Spanish Liberals as hardly less their enemies than the Royalists. The United States had already recognised the Spanish-American Republics. The Monroe Doctrine was published in the President's Message, Dec. 2, 1823.

The news of coming invasion was greeted in Madrid by a theatrical and hysterical reconciliation between the Liberal leaders, moderate and extremist. So great an opportunity for orations on patriotism and national independence was not wasted by Alcalá Galiano, Saavedra, and Argüelles. Then, turning to material concerns, the Cortes approved a loan of £1,500,000 and conscription of thirty thousand men. They divided Spain into five military districts, appointing Mina to command in Catalonia, Ballesteros in Navarre, Morillo in Galicia, Villacampa in Andalusia, and La Bisbal in the Madrid district. Generals, as usual, abounded; troops and money were scarce.

That the Government had but little faith in these most inadequate preparations was shown by its request to the Cortes for permission to quit Madrid in case of necessity. The Cortes agreed; not so the King. With his liberators now near at hand, he would not accept a measure that prolonged his captivity in the hands of the Seven Patriots. He also refused to take part



in the ceremony of prorogation of the Cortes (February 19), and when, in view of his obstinacy, the ministry sent in its resignation, he accepted it. But a dangerous spirit was aroused by the evident resolve of the King to hinder any measures that might be taken to defend the country against the invaders. The news of the resignation of San Miguel and his colleagues produced cries of "Death to the Tyrant!" and clamours for a Regency. The Cabinet consented to remain in office, and once more to face the insoluble problem.

Still Ferdinand exhausted every device in order to be allowed to await his deliverers in Madrid. He pretended illness; he fomented mutiny; and his agents provoked riots. But the ministers were inexorable; and at last (March 20) he set out for Seville accompanied by the great officers of State and the Permanent Commission of the Cortes. Hardly was the Government established in its new quarters when (April 7) the overwhelming and splendidly equipped French army crossed the Bidassoa, on what they considered a military promenade rather than a campaign. Saragossa, the heroic city of the great siege, fell with hardly a struggle; and in May the Duke of Angoulême entered Madrid. It was a rude awakening for the more ignorant Spaniards. For a legend had grown up around the great War of Independence. The younger generation had come to believe that their fathers had beaten the great Emperor, invincible until he set foot in Spain. They chose to forget the help lent by England and Portugal against a part merely of the armies of France. Against Napoleon, Spain, if not united, was at least less rent by faction. But now the Spanish refugees under Eroles, Eguia, O'Donnell, Quesada, and the Count of España, marched with the Duke; and, when he reached the interior, he was joined by Royalist irregulars under Merino and Bessières.

The Liberal generals, with one exception, were overawed or turned traitors. Ballesteros made no attempt to dispute the passage of the Pyrenees. The French marched past San



Sebastian and Pamplona, leaving small detachments to block these fortresses in accordance with the hints let fall by the Duke of Wellington at Verona. La Bisbal, instead of defending the gorges of Guadarrama, published a political manifesto, and, when deprived of his command by his subordinates, gladly hurried out of Spain. The main body of his troops withdrew into Extremadura, but before doing so they humanely left behind sufficient force to keep off the Royalist *guerrilleros* from the capital until the arrival of the French. Thanks to fear of native champions of the Faith and of absolutism, the Duke was welcomed with open arms. One of his first cares was to post French guards over the houses of known constitutionalists. The Royalists, baffled of vengeance for a time, turned their fury upon the stones of the Constitution and hacked them in pieces.

One Spanish city, Corunna, defended itself; but its patriots disgraced their cause by a brutal massacre of Royalist prisoners. One Spanish general, Mina, did his duty. The troops he commanded could not meet the French in pitched battle, so the old *guerrillero* betook himself once more to the tactics with which he had often baffled armies. Once he actually crossed the frontier into Cerdagne, but little by little he was driven back from the mountains until at last he was shut up in Barcelona. Here he held out until he obtained honourable terms for his men, and for himself opportunity to withdraw to England (November 7). A month or more before Mina's surrender, the French had completed their mission.

Before leaving Madrid for the south, the Duke of Angoulême, whose action throughout was wise and conciliatory, called upon the Council of Castille, the highest traditional authority, to appoint a Regency to govern in the King's name until he should be free. The Regency gave a foretaste of what might be expected from its party when restored to power by disbanding and blotting from the army list the two regiments that had ventured to protect Madrid from the half-wild followers of

Bessières. At the same time it enrolled as royal volunteers all the irregular bands levied by the King's men, dissolved the Liberal national militia and declared its members incapable of holding any public office. The Regency refused to recognise anything that had happened since March, 1820, and as far as possible reconstituted the circumstances of that date.

Whilst this was going on in the capital, the Liberal Government at Seville passed its time in bickerings and recriminations; and ministries rose and fell almost daily. Soon the news that the French were pouring into Andalusia through the pass of Despeñaperros obliged those about the King to seek a fresh place of refuge. They chose Cadiz, the home of Liberalism, with the open sea at its back. But the King refused to quit Seville; no representations could overcome his obstinacy; and at last the difficulty had to be met by the most dangerous constitutional make-believe. On the proposal of Alcalá Galiano the ministry and the Permanent Commission decided that the King, by refusing to take measures to avoid falling into the hands of his enemies, had shown himself to be in a state of incapacity. But for incapable kings the Constitution provided that a Regency should act. Accordingly a Regency was appointed and carried off the King by force to Cadiz (June 15). Their departure was followed by yells of *Viva la Religion!* and *Viva el Rey Absoluto!* and Seville welcomed the French in all gladness as they passed by on their way to Cadiz.

Three days after its appointment, having conveyed the King to a place of comparative safety, the Regency restored to him the limited powers he possessed under the Constitution, declaring him to be now again in a fit state to exercise them. On August 16 the Duke of Angoulême arrived before Cadiz: the glory of setting free the King had been reserved by his courtly officers for him. The siege was not a long one: strong as was its position, the Spanish garrison was no match for the French force backed by the sympathies of most of Spain

and conscious of fighting under the eyes of Europe. Still, something had to be done to save honour; and done it was. Once more the conscript fathers of Spain deliberated within hearing of cannon. The Trocadero fort fell, but still the city held out. But at the end of September the whole fiction of a nation in arms defending its King against heated invaders in the last corner of its territory was suddenly abandoned; and Ferdinand received from the Permanent Commission leave to go where he would. The populace, however, knowing the temper of their "beloved King," refused to let him join "the enemies of his country" until he had promised to pardon such of his own subjects as were guilty of holding Liberal opinions; to recognise public debts contracted in his name; to maintain all officers of the army in the rank they had attained under the constitutional *régime*; and to allow the national militia to disperse unmolested to their homes. Ferdinand, in his haste to be out, promised all that was asked of him: on October 1, 1823, he accepted the formal resignation of the ministry, and joined his cousin Angoulême at Puerto de Santa Maria.

From the moment of its appointment, the Regency of Madrid had lent its aid to the self-constituted "Juntas of Purification" in sweeping away the last traces of Liberalism or non-conformity. That it should condemn to death the deputies who had momentarily deposed the King was to be expected as a token of its zeal. But the banishments and imprisonments intended to prepare the way for Ferdinand's return reached such a number that the French prince felt bound in honour to interfere. He gave orders (Aug. 8, 1823) that all unconvicted prisoners should be set at liberty, and that no further arrests should be made without the consent of the French military authorities. But their interference with national independence—supported by foreign bayonets—caused such an uproar among the Spanish patriots that the order was withdrawn, and the Liberals abandoned to their fate. Then Ferdinand himself came to join in the work of "vengeance." Forgetful of his

flowery phrases about leading his people in constitutional paths, he declared himself absolute King as soon as he set foot on shore at Puerto de Santa Maria. Forgetful of his promise given a few hours before at Cadiz, he sentenced to death the Regents who for three days usurped his power and by dragging him to Cadiz added nearly four months to his weary captivity. He banished for ever from the capital and from the neighbourhood of the royal residences all members of the late administrations, and all who had been enrolled in the national militia. Following the bad example of the Radicals, he sought to use the pulpit as a means of political propaganda; but now the majority of the clergy welcomed the missions whose duty it was to expose the wickedness and error of Liberalism.

The Duke of Angoulême left Spain in disgust. Thanks to his connivance, the members of the three days' Regency were already beyond the reach of the King's vengeance. It fell, however, upon the wretched Rafael Riego, the vain puppet of the revolution who fancied himself its leader. He had escaped from Cadiz during the blockade, and had started in pursuit of a gigantic scheme for rallying Spain to arms in the rear of the invaders. But the officers to whom he applied either saw the impracticability of his plan or, bound by the capitulations they had agreed to, refused to listen to him. His Royalist fellow-countrymen hunted him through La Mancha, arrested him in the Sierra Morena, and forwarded him to Madrid to be dealt with by the Regents. A complete recantation failed to save him. He died begging the pardon of the Church, the King, and all Spaniards for the crimes and excesses of his life. His execution early in November prepared the way for the King's triumphal return to his capital.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE DAYS OF CALOMARDE (1823—1833).

WHEN released, Ferdinand made his confessor, Saez, universal minister. A month later he appointed a more regular ministry. Its first President died shortly after appointment. His place was taken (Jan., 1824) by the Count de Ofalia. It was under Ofalia that Francisco Tadeo Calomarde became Minister of Justice. Calomarde's hated name has become attached to the whole of the ten years that passed between the French intervention and Ferdinand's death; it is called the Calomardean epoch, and remembered as a time of persecution and proscription, of spy-rule and reckless tyranny. Ferdinand never forgave the insults which the Liberals had inflicted on him; he was constitutionally insensible to pity. Calomarde was the zealous executor of his vengeance. As though the facts were not dark enough, a legend has grown up round the dreaded minister; and incredible stories are told of his hypocrisy, cynicism, and baseness. Calomarde was an upstart; it was said that he had been a footman. The truth is that he was the son of an Aragonese peasant-farmer, and had been sent to the university by charity. He became an advocate and settled in Madrid. He sought election to the Cortes of 1810, but, failing to secure it, he became secretary to Lardizabal, the ultra-Royalist Minister of Justice of the first Regency. As a *Persa* he welcomed the King's return, and he suffered persecution from the Liberals during their brief rule. At its end he came out of hiding, and his ill-omened figure reappeared behind the

French bayonets. He was employed as secretary to the Regency during the French occupation of Madrid. His zeal against the fallen Liberals was so marked as to attract the attention of the King; he was recognised as a man after Ferdinand's own heart, and for ten years occupied to his master's satisfaction the Ministry of Justice, exercising a tyranny so harsh as to make that which preceded the Revolution seem light by comparison. The Royalists sought to exterminate the Liberals. They drove into exile all who were able to flee the country, they massacred many at their first onslaught, and they deliberately hunted down the rest.

When the Russian and French ambassadors protested against the ruthless and senseless cruelty the work was already half done. Satisfied momentarily with the punishment inflicted upon his late tormentors, Ferdinand published a decree misnamed an amnesty (May 20, 1824). Most of those who had taken part in the revolutionary Government found themselves in one or another of the fifteen categories of exclusions from its benefits—that is to say, those who were still alive, for the previous autumn had seen one hundred and twelve executions in eighteen days, and since then the work of destruction had been going on. Calomarde it was who, working in conjunction with the ferocious courts-martial, superseding civil justice, inflicted death as the penalty for subversive cries, for possession of a portrait of Riego, for defacing an inscription “Long live the Absolute King!”, for any matter, however trivial, that might serve to show that the accused had Liberal leanings. Suspected persons had to clear themselves by the process known as “purification.” Summoned before a tribunal that did not even pretend to be unprejudiced, they were called upon to account for and justify their acts during the time the King's authority was in abeyance. All who held or sought public employment had to undergo purification unless they belonged to the purifiers; from professors of the university to militia-men, none of those whom delators chose to name escaped.



The moderate Royalists, Zea Bermudez and Luis Fernandez de Córdova, at length petitioned for abolition of the courts-martial, "which daily assume more and more the character of instruments of fierce and hideous vengeance." To representations such as these Calomarde replied by decrees such as that of October, 1824, expressing the determination "to stamp out for ever from Spanish soil the last and faintest trace of the idea that sovereignty can reside elsewhere than in the Royal Person." He called upon all public servants expressly to deny "the absurd principle that the people has a right to change the established form of government."

But at last Ferdinand was obliged to give ear to the repeated remonstrances of his own subjects, backed by the representations of the diplomatic body. The courts-martial were closed, and General Aymerich, their ferocious president, was dismissed from the Ministry for War (June 13, 1825). By this time the process of undoing and blotting out the past had gone so far that university degrees and licences to practise obtained under the Constitutional Government were revoked, and advocates, doctors, and even veterinary surgeons were called upon to undergo purification and reexamination.

But each time the rigour of persecution was relaxed the discovery, or pretended discovery, of some plot served as a sufficient excuse for those whose interest it was to bring back the Terror. Ofalia had been succeeded (July, 1824) by the more moderate Zea Bermudez, and the so-called Ten Years' Ministry, but Calomarde stood as high in the royal favour as before, and watched with exquisite care over his master's safety. It was guaranteed by the Royalist volunteers, and by the French troops, who continued in receipt of Spanish pay, to occupy the fortresses of the Peninsula. The greater part of the regular army had been disbanded, partly because economy was urgent, and partly because many of its officers were suspected and feared. Even those of the Royal Guard were replaced by boys so young that a wit posted a notice: "Wanted. A few wet-

nurses to finish off the officers of the Royal Guard." Special rigour was shown towards the *guerrillero* leaders of the War of Independence, Liberals for the most part as springing from the people, but guiltless of plotting, and guileless as they were brave. Mina was safe in France, but the hardly less famous Juan Martin (el Empecinado) fell an easy prey to the delators. He died hideously, fighting with the hangman after an almost superhuman effort to escape (Aug., 1825). The universities, and all clubs, political and social, were closed, as hatching-grounds of plots or centres of bewildering false enlightenment. Yet they were for the most part harmless enough. The University of Cervera began its loyal address with the words "Far from us the dangerous novelty of thinking!"

Indeed, the Liberals were, for the moment, utterly crushed. The danger now came from the other side, from the Catholic and Royalist extremists. Ferdinand's "amnesty" had seemed to impartial observers to deserve rather the name of proscription-list, but it gave the greatest dissatisfaction to those who had brought about his liberation. His refusal to reestablish the Inquisition caused horror and alarm. Was the King then an atheist as well as a Liberal? Those who had been his obedient servants, so long as the word was "Kill and plunder," mutinied so soon as they were bidden to hold their hands. The King had established the Secret Junta of State to enquire into the conduct of suspects; his faithful subjects, headed by the Bishop of Osma, went beyond his zeal. They founded and spread all over the country the "Society of the Exterminating Angel," the very name of which is sufficient explanation of its objects. When he grew weary and refused to sanction their frantic excesses, they began to look to his brother Don Carlos as the representative of true religion and sound policy. Most dangerous among the malcontents were the officers deprived of their commissions by the reduction of the army. Some of them had been among the most determined enemies of Liberalism, and had headed revolts to rescue the King; they

now considered themselves entitled to every kind of favour by reason of their uncompromising and loudly expressed views on political and religious questions. Their disappointment culminated in rebellion in the neighbourhood of the capital (Aug., 1825). Their leader was Georges Bessières, a Frenchman by birth and sometime a republican, who had distinguished himself as the first to rise against the Constitution in 1820. Now again the plea of the rebels was that the palace was ruled by freemasons, and that the Constitution was about to be proclaimed. Only a few Royalist volunteers chose to believe it and to take arms. They were captured among the pinewoods of Cuenca; Bessières himself, with seven others, was shot by the King's order. Ferdinand, delighting to make himself the instrument of the irony of fate, had entrusted the congenial task of hunting down and destroying his so-called friends to the Count of España, the harshest and most unbending of Royalists. Not long afterwards the King was able to show his impartiality by repressing with equal severity a Liberal rebellion at Alicante headed by the brothers Bazán.

From this time forward, indeed, there were two revolutionary parties in the State, the Constitutionals and the Absolutists; and Ferdinand's policy was to keep a midway position between the two. It was not without justification that he represented to the French ambassador that in upholding absolutism of the most uncompromising kind he was in agreement with the majority of his subjects, and that only with difficulty had he been able to prevent the restoration of the Inquisition. The discontent expressed by Bessières' revolt spread after his death. Complaining that the process of purification was incomplete, and the Avenging Angel stayed half-way on his course, the self-styled pure Royalists, the Apostolic party, again attempted to make the King the instrument of their schemes. From Manresa, the famous Jesuit shrine in Catalonia, the secret organisation of a vast conspiracy extended to Valencia on the one hand, and to Logroño on the other.

The priests and bishops who constituted the Superior Junta of the Principality addressed the King in threatening tones demanding further proofs of submission to the Church. The "aggrieved," who gave their name to the revolt, alleged that men of sound views and recognised services to the good cause were turned away to make place for Liberal renegades. The real grievance was, as before, that Ferdinand had shown himself independent of the party which sought to use him as a tool, and after restoring his authority, sought to govern in his name to their own advantage. The action of the Junta amounted to flat rebellion; and as such Ferdinand regarded it. With his usual cunning he cut the ground from under it by disproving all the assumptions whereby it sought to justify itself and gain adherents. Again the Count of España, purest of Royalists and Catholics, was sent to bring to order those who sought to give lessons in churchmanship to the clergy and in absolutism to the King. He himself visited Catalonia, accompanied by his Minister of Justice. When he was seen going whither he would in the company of the pious Calomarde, the plea that he was not a free agent and that men of sound opinions could not get a hearing at court broke down. The Count of España, a fierce martinet and half-insane tyrant even in his own family, entered on the congenial task of punishment with characteristic thoroughness and severity. He terrorised the whole province. Any papers that fell into his hands sufficed to prove complicity in plots either ultra-Royalist or ultra-Liberal. Such papers were at times fabricated and put in his way. The fortress of Monjuich and the other prisons were filled; the prisoners were tortured; and suicides of the most shocking character were provoked. The death sentence was pronounced by courts-martial summarily, but the executions were carried out with more care. The Count kept the condemned in prison until he had collected a dozen or so, he then had them shot all together. The sight was supposed to strike terror into evil-doers; it filled the Count with insane delight

His severity relaxed on such occasions; he sometimes even danced in glee. It was perhaps not by accident that the enquiry into the rebellion and its punishment had been entrusted to a madman. It was whispered that many persons were put to death in order to suppress evidence against others occupying positions of trust about the King. It is certain that the amnesty whereby many submissions were obtained was shamelessly violated.

But however deeply involved the party henceforward styled Carlists may have been in this and other like plots, it is certain that the prince whose name they had taken was guiltless of them all. The distinguishing features of his character were uncompromising frankness and straightforward honesty. He lived on terms of the most intimate confidence and affection with his brother. He never concealed his sympathy with the aspirations of the Apostolic and Absolutist party, but he never countenanced their methods. Nobody doubted in 1827 that he would succeed to the throne; but he refrained from all participation in public affairs until the necessity for asserting his claim obliged him to protest. He then did so boldly and publicly.

Ferdinand passed the winter (1827-8) in Barcelona. In the spring his campaign became a royal progress through the northern half of his kingdom. Travelling slowly by way of Aragon, Navarre, and Biscay, he was everywhere welcomed. He did not reach Madrid till August, when he made his entry in triumph. It was, as has been remarked, the fourth of his victories over his own subjects (1808, 1814, 1823, 1828).

Ballesteros, Minister of Finance, enjoyed like Calomarde the King's favour during the Ten Years' Ministry. But, unlike Calomarde, he owed his position to valuable services to the State as well as to the King. He drew up a code of commercial law, appointed consuls to represent Spain abroad, founded an Exchange, and promoted the first exhibition of Spanish industries (1828). Ballesteros, too, was the first to



present a complete statement of the financial position in the form of a budget. It showed a disastrous state of affairs. Not only had the old, complicated, vexatious, and inadequate system of taxation been brought back with the monarchical revival, but national credit had been almost annihilated by the King's refusal to recognise the debts incurred by the Constitutional Government. Spain, long used to look to her colonies to provide a considerable share of her revenue, was left to her own resources. It was only with the utmost difficulty that Ballesteros raised a loan to meet immediate demands. The Royalists sought popularity by keeping down the taxes; their administration was cheap. The court was not rashly extravagant, though Ferdinand had laid by in foreign banks about five million pounds, and accepted readily from his ministers large sums called surpluses, but in reality wrung out by starvation of the departments of State. The total revenue was nearly four million pounds; the army alone, though reduced, demanded more than three millions, chiefly in pensions. The whole expenditure amounted to about seven millions, including more than a million and a half for interest on the debt, now swelled by a large war indemnity due to France for the services of her army. By careful handling of existing taxation Ballesteros raised the revenue to five millions and a half. The deficit of a million and a half was met by extraordinary taxation. Before the public need the immunities of the clergy and of the Basque Provinces gave way, but their pride was safeguarded by the observance of immemorial forms; thus contributions of these Provinces were a free gift to the Lord of Biscay. Whilst all public departments suffered from neglect, the navy, suspected of Liberal leanings, was purposely weakened so that it nearly disappeared. Smuggling was almost unchecked, whilst ruinously high import-duties strangled commerce without providing a sufficient revenue. Nevertheless the country was recovering from the exhaustion of the War of Independence; and prosperity was followed by contentment.



Bad as was the government, it suited the majority of those who lived under it. Those who revolted were a generous and enthusiastic minority.

The French Revolution of 1830 encouraged Liberals all over the world, especially the twenty thousand Spaniards exiled in France and England. Whereas France had hitherto protected the Spanish Bourbon King, the French legitimists now began to look to Spain for help. The French Government, on the other hand, protected the Liberal exiles; and the great bankers holding the bonds of the Constitutional Government favoured the party pledged to recognise them. Directed by Alcalá Galiano, Mendizabal, Isturiz, and Mina, the Liberals began to gather on the frontier. Ferdinand took fright, and by recognising Louis Philippe's Government induced him to refuse asylum to the would-be revolutionaries. The result was a series of ill-planned, ill-timed, and abortive expeditions, in which brave men, deceived by promises of support in Spain, lost their lives. Thus Mina, Valdés, and Chapalangarra, who crossed the frontier in arms at the Atlantic end, were easily beaten off (October, 1830). The like befell San Miguel and Gurrea in Catalonia. Then Gibraltar became the hatchery of plot and counter-plot. General Torrijos was inveigled by agents of the Crown, and chiefly by the military governor of Málaga, into the belief that his landing would be followed by the revolt of the garrisons of the coast. Finding themselves betrayed, he and his fifty-two comrades surrendered. They met their deaths heroically (December, 1831); but so wholesale a slaughter in cold blood, and the treachery employed, shocked and grieved good Spaniards. The result of these rash attempts was a partial renewal of the terror of 1824. Plot-hunting became a craze. Almost any accusation was sufficient foundation for a death sentence. A sempstress was executed at Granáda (May, 1831) for embroidering on a banner the words Law, Liberty, Equality. At Madrid a wretched cobbler suffered death for exclaiming "Liberty, where

art thou that thou tarriest so long?" A judge who refused to confirm the atrocious sentence was banished.

Torrijos' attempt at revolution was the last important one of the reign. The Liberals had now a hope that the evil days were coming to an end. In May, 1829, died Ferdinand's third wife, Maria Amalia, a gentle creature, entirely without political influence, unable even to check the coarse pleasures and brutal associations of her husband. Ferdinand now fell under the influence of his niece, Doña Carlota, the wife of his brother, Francisco de Paula. The clever Neapolitan, ambitious of power, so worked upon the imagination of her jaded and prematurely old brother-in-law that within nine months of the Queen's death he married Doña Carlota's sister. Maria Cristina, aged 23 at the time of her marriage to her elderly uncle, was gay and dashing, as well as beautiful. It was whispered that she held Liberal opinions; it is certain that she used her influence to mitigate the harsh intolerance of her husband's policy and to disperse the black bands of clerics who were closing in round his last years. The gloomy and debauched court became brighter; the change was welcomed by the King and by all in whom sour sanctimoniousness had not become second nature. Poets and statesmen alike—and the two professions were often united—hailed with delight the advent of gentler influences. The Apostolic party, on the other hand, were filled with indignation when balls succeeded religious pomps. Their indignation was followed by alarm for the future when it was known that Queen Cristina was about to become a mother. Hitherto they had felt assured that time—a few months perhaps, a few years at the most—would give Ferdinand's crown to one more worthy. Even this had not restrained their impatient zeal; they had plotted and rebelled despite the commands of Don Carlos. But now it was no longer merely a question of waiting till Ferdinand's death. The birth of a princess, the future Queen Isabel (October 10, 1830), and of her sister a year later, unsettled

hopes that had come to be looked upon as vested interests. The party that had fomented rebellion in 1824, 1825, and 1827, in order to give the Catholic and Absolute King lessons in Catholicism and Absolutism, now maintained that Don Carlos was still heir to the crown in spite of the birth of females in the direct line. Ferdinand wished to leave his kingdom to his daughter, but in view of the resolute though respectful attitude of his brother he wavered.

The legal and constitutional rights of the question are still disputed. Though immaterial to those who refuse to admit Divine Right, they must here be stated; for Don Carlos' claims thrice devastated Spain with civil war, and till lately divided her into two hostile camps. Associated as they are with religion and tradition, they even now, at times of national weakness and discouragement, shake the land with their appeal to deep-seated feelings and their eloquent counsel of despair.

As soon as Ferdinand was assured that a child was about to be born to him, he took measures to secure the succession of females in the direct line. Immemorial usage, confirmed by the great code of the *Partidas*, recognised the right of females to the throne of Castille and Leon in default of males of equally near degree of consanguinity. In fact females are more privileged in Spain than elsewhere. They inherit grandeeships and titles in preference to collaterals, and transmit them to their husbands as well as to their children. Isabel the Catholic stands brightest among the nation's glories; her daughter Juana inherited her mother's throne unquestioned. But Philip V introduced by decree (May 10, 1713) the Salic Law as accepted in the Bourbon family. His decree was sanctioned by the Council of State and of Castille. Nothing more was required to make it valid, for the consent of the Cortes was by this time habitually dispensed with.

In 1789 Charles IV took measures to set aside the Bourbon Salic Law of succession. His reasons are unknown; he had four sons alive. At the bidding of his minister, Campomanes,

the Cortes, assembled for the purpose and acting under oath of secrecy, besought him to reestablish the old Spanish law of the *Partidas*, thus abrogating the "Act" of Philip V. The submissive Cortes made the petition as ordered; and the King replied that he would direct the Council to prepare a decree in accordance with their resolution. This was done, and only promulgation was lacking to the complete validity of the Pragmatic Sanction. But it was never promulgated; for more than forty years its very existence remained unknown save to a few. Moreover, at the time of its enactment Don Carlos was already born. It is on the mystery surrounding this transaction, on the fact that the decree was never promulgated, and that the right it sought to set aside already existed, that the claim of the elder branch of the Bourbon family is based. The supporters question the genuineness of the Pragmatic Sanction, and deny that its effect, if legal, could be retrospective. The Constitution of 1812 reverted to the law of *Partidas*; but, as it was abolished at the Restoration, no argument can be founded upon it.

In March, 1830, more than six months before the birth of his elder daughter, Ferdinand promulgated the Pragmatic Sanction of Charles IV. In June of the same year he made a will bequeathing his crown to the child—son or daughter—about to be born. In doing so he was establishing no new precedent; the last of the Spanish Habsburgs had willed Spain to the first of the Bourbons after the death of the Bavarian prince whom he had first chosen to succeed. But Don Carlos publicly protested, and expressed his determination to assert his right when the time should come. He refused to take action, as his followers urged him to do, during his brother's lifetime. His wife, however, and his masterful sister-in-law, the Princess of Beira, exerted themselves on his behalf. No sooner was the Infanta Isabel born than these Portuguese princesses set to work to undermine the influence of the Neapolitans, the Queen and her sister. The court was

unevenly divided between the two factions. The Portuguese Carlists had with them the whole vast influence of the clergy and had also a most powerful ally in Calomarde. Ferdinand himself was apathetic, irresolute, and ill.

As his sickness increased, he fell more than ever under the influence of the dominant court faction. Ferdinand had tried to bind his brother to the cause of his infant daughter; but Don Carlos would not hear of compromise, and refused to share the Regency with Queen Cristina after the King's death. Anxious as he was to gratify his brother, the prince declared that his conscience forbade him to forgo his regret. Even the French and Neapolitan ambassadors, the representatives of her near relatives, refused to help Cristina, regarding the question as one to be settled by the Bourbon family law. The King's most trusted councillors, Calomarde, the Bishop of Leon, and Count de Alcudia, the Prime Minister, were all attached to the Carlist cause. Whilst the courtiers openly saluted Don Carlos and his wife as the coming sovereigns, priests, women, and statesmen so worked upon the King that, believing his end to be near, he revoked the Pragmatic Sanction (Sept. 18, 1832). It seemed as if the Carlist cause was gained; the Queen, abandoned at her husband's bedside, had given up the struggle; the King was supposed to be dead; only confirmation of the news was awaited for the proclamation of his brother. The Carlists' plans were complete; the seals of office, the fortresses, the centres of civil and military authority, were in their hands. But palace intrigues were rudely broken up, and the situation suddenly changed, by the unexpected arrival of the Queen's sister at La Granja where the King lay sick (September 22). Doña Carlota forced her way to the King's bedside; Calomarde stood in her path; she boxed his ears, and he stood aside with the half-cringing and half-gallant retort, "White hands do no dishonour<sup>1</sup>." She gave new courage to Cristina, she rated

<sup>1</sup> "Las manos blancas no ofenden" is the title of one of Calderón's most famous plays. [J. F.-K.]



Ferdinand for his weakness, and she tore up the codicil revoking the Pragmatic Sanction.

Then to the astonishment of all Ferdinand rallied, and, finding that the Carlist revolt he had been taught to dread had not followed the news of his death, he revoked his latest act, and returned to the purpose of securing the throne for his daughter. Before an assembly of ministers, foreign ambassadors, nobles, and generals he solemnly declared (Dec. 31, 1832) that in the agonies of sickness he had yielded to treachery and surprise. Calomarde, irrevocably committed to the Carlist cause, was banished from court. Cristina was made Regent for the time of the King's illness, with Zea Bermudez, a firm supporter of the claims of the infant princess, as first minister. Then, one by one, the Cabinet nominees, promoted by careful intrigue to the most responsible positions, were replaced by the leaders of the opposite party. It was clear, however, that the struggle was only postponed, and must be renewed on the King's death.

The Apostolic and Absolutist faction had taken its stand on the Carlist side; it behoved the Queen's friends, the *Cristinos* as they are henceforth called, to gain the alliance of the moderate Liberals. Already Calomarde's removal was taken as an augury of better days. The Regency began with the reopening of the universities after a two years' closure, and an amnesty. In its preamble Cristina expressed regret that she had been unable to extend its benefits even to those who nine years before had momentarily deposed her husband and to those who had borne arms against him. Whilst nearly 10,000 Liberals returned from banishment, Calomarde quitted Spain; the autocratic Bishop of Leon withdrew, fulminating threats temporal and spiritual, to his see; and the Count of España, the tyrant of Catalonia, was superseded by General Llauder.

Thanks to the unflinching loyalty of Don Carlos, the changes in high command were effected without serious disturbance. In Leon, in parts of Catalonia, and in Madrid,



some few Royalist volunteers attempted riot. They were checked without difficulty; and the palace revolution was complete. The middle class, and the army as a whole, welcomed the new order of things and were satisfied. The great body of moderate men had as little liking for the extreme Radicals as for the Absolutists. Carlist opinions found support chiefly among the nobility, the higher clergy, and the peasantry. The town mob, as will be seen, took first one side and then another, and always ferociously.

At the beginning of the next year (Jan. 4, 1833) Ferdinand was sufficiently recovered to reassume his powers. He published in the *Gazette* his thanks to the Queen for her able administration, approved of all she had done, and appointed her to a seat in the Royal Council. Zea Bermudez remained at the head of the ministry; concessions to public opinion if made must be regarded as effects of the King's bounty; there must be no talk of rights. Already he had been alarmed by the tumultuous joy that greeted the downfall of Calomarde. In Cristina's name, Zea Bermudez issued (Nov. 15, 1832) a warning to those who might be disposed to add a qualification, such as "limited" or "constitutional," to the word monarchy; the sovereign authority must be maintained pure and simple, "even as Ferdinand had inherited it." This idea of enlightened despotism pleased the King. He was not unwilling to see his people happy, provided they would accept unquestioningly the exact kind of happiness he offered. Even innovations were not so distasteful to him now. He sanctioned the creation of a new ministry, that of *Fomento* (literally, encouragement), including commerce, public works, and education (Nov. 5, 1832). His most pressing care, however, and the one that partly united him to his people during his last days, was that of the succession. In view of his brother's attitude, he sought to obtain the recognition of his daughter by the princes of the blood and the Estates of the realm. Accordingly he summoned the commons, the nobles, and the clergy in traditional

form to swear fidelity to the heir-apparent. The summons contained the long-forbidden name of Cortes, though it pointedly asserted "the rights of sovereignty in their immemorial fulness, to the right and left of which are only abysses."

The ceremony of the oath was carried out with the magnificence habitual to the Spanish court in the Church of San Jerónimo del Prado at Madrid (June 20, 1833). Thirty-eight privileged cities and towns (p. 4) sent each two deputies. The clergy were represented by bishops and by the generals of the regular orders; the nobility by grandees, princes of the blood and titled persons generally, for no mention of qualification or number had been contained in the summons. The King's two younger brothers, Don Francisco de Paula, and Don Sebastian, took the oath as future subjects of their niece. Don Carlos, pointedly refusing to be present, had retired with the King's permission to Portugal. When called upon by the Spanish ambassador to pledge himself to recognise the right of his niece, he wrote affectionately and dutifully to his brother, but declared that conscience and honour forbade him to take the oath. This letter he published both in Spain and abroad. Ferdinand replied in the same friendly spirit, but forbade Don Carlos to return to Spain. The two parties that awaited the King's death as the signal for battle were now clearly marked off. Those who had refused or evaded the oath of allegiance to Isabel were Carlists.

Whilst Ferdinand by slight and tardy concessions to Liberalism was endeavouring to secure the Spanish crown for his daughter, he was supporting in Portugal the cause of an uncle against his niece, Conservative against Liberal. Indeed, at this time, the dynastic position of the two countries was strangely alike. King John of Portugal, dying in 1826, left two sons, of whom the elder, Pedro, could not succeed, for Pedro was Emperor of Brazil. The second, Miguel, claimed the throne of Portugal against Maria de la Gloria, the infant

daughter of his elder brother. Miguel, as champion of the absolutist and clerical party, was recognised by his mother, the Queen-dowager, by her brother, Ferdinand of Spain, and by the Conservative party generally. The Regent of Portugal, the Princess Isabel, rallied round the throne of the child-Queen the Portuguese Liberals by confirming their Constitution. In so doing she secured the powerful protection of the British Government, but brought upon herself the wrath of the Holy Alliance. Ferdinand, when he found Metternich on his side, intervened in Portugal on Miguel's behalf, just as Louis of France had intervened in Spain in 1823. But the Holy Alliance no longer controlled the policy of all Europe in the interests of absolute monarchy. France rejected Ferdinand's claim to act as arbitrator. Great Britain by landing an army in the Tagus (December, 1826) made the Queen's party for the time masters of the situation. The Liberals of the whole Peninsula fixed their hopes on Great Britain, whilst Ferdinand sulkily withdrew the army he had gathered on his western frontier.

But the *Miguelistas* were only momentarily crushed. Their prince, nominated as Regent by the Queen's father, needed no plea for interference. He made use of his position to strengthen his party, and then with Ferdinand's connivance tore up the Constitution, drove out Maria de la Gloria, and declared himself absolute King. As a refugee, and as a symbol of Liberalism, Maria de la Gloria found sympathy in England; while Don Miguel's frantic persecutions of the constitutionalists twice drew down upon him the humiliation of foreign interference. London and the Azores were the asylums and rallying places of the Portuguese Liberals. In London they met the Spanish exiles and prepared to restore their Queen by force of arms. Don Pedro abdicated the throne of Brazil in order to fight as a soldier for his daughter's right. Mendizabal, the cunning financier, and Mina, as well as other Spaniards, were with him when he landed in Portugal (July 8, 1832).

They were welcomed by such few Liberals as had survived the proscription; but their courage was greater than their resources, and soon they were closely blockaded in Oporto. But the whole situation suddenly and dramatically changed when Sir Charles Napier, commanding the ships fitted out in England by the exiles, captured Don Miguel's vastly stronger squadron. The discomfited Miguelistas, taken in the rear by an expedition prepared in the Algarve, abandoned Lisbon; and Maria de la Gloria was proclaimed (September, 1833). Don Carlos was with his nephew, Don Miguel, at Coimbra; their causes were so much alike as to be almost identical. Both relied for help on the traditionalist and clerical party. In vain Ferdinand and Zea Bermudez sought to prevent an alliance imposed by circumstances. They sent the trusted Royalist, Luis Fernandez de Córdova, as ambassador to Portugal. His mission was to induce Don Miguel by promises of Spanish help to mitigate the rigour of his policy, and thus to alienate extremists like his uncle. But Don Miguel recognised in a policy like that of "the Exterminating Angel" (p. 75) his one hope of success. The bait was rejected; Miguel and Carlos made common cause.

In the summer (1833) a Carlist rising took place in Catalonia; all the leaders of the movement of 1827 were again involved. At Madrid a plot was discovered; the conspirators were banished. These signs and the King's rapidly sinking health showed that the struggle was imminent, but Ferdinand and Zea Bermudez still feared their would-be friends more than their open enemies. When the moderate Liberals began to arm and organise in order to meet the coming storm they were disbanded and broken up.

Ferdinand's death (Sept. 29, 1833) removed, according to his own figure of speech, the cork from the fermenting and surcharged bottle of Spain. That he injured his country by setting against its political evolution the traditional virtues of loyalty to Church and King is certain. That he did so out of fiendish malice is absurd. His nature was coarse and un-

sympathetic, his intelligence narrow. He had been soured and warped in his youth by deceit, humiliation, and suffering. Though he shrank from no dissimulation, it can hardly be doubted that a brutal frankness better expressed his nature. Nobody knew better than he what would be said when, after closing the universities as seats of dangerous learning, he endowed a school of bull-fighting at Seville. He dreaded and disliked superior persons, but he carefully guarded against rogues who sought to influence him. Though cruel, he seldom bore malice. It was with a tavern jest upon his lips that he sentenced an enemy or checked harshly an over-zealous friend. He took a malicious delight in defeating the intrigues of his associates. The footing on which he treated them is illustrated by an anecdote. Through the influence of the housekeeper of the President of the Council a certain priest was nominated for a bishopric. Ferdinand substituted another name in the letters patent, and wrote on their margin, "The mitre of — is for Don — ; and Doña Inés must forgive us for once."

Thirty years ago it would have been necessary to protest in the name of truth against the inhuman monster painted by Liberals, and entitled Ferdinand VII. Now it is no less necessary to be on guard lest traditionalists make him pass as the unselfish and well-nigh heroic defender of the institutions that made Spain glorious in days gone by. Yet so plainly is the man's character written in his acts that mistake seems impossible, and even this short paragraph superfluous.

## CHAPTER V.

### QUEEN CRISTINA AND THE ROYAL STATUTE. THE CARLIST WAR (1833—1836).

QUEEN CRISTINA was aged 27 when by her husband's will she became Regent for her daughter. Surrounded by enemies, she could trust neither her own nor her late husband's kin. The party that had strangled the revolution, and had hitherto been the mainstay of the monarchy, was alienated by Ferdinand's refusal to accept their extreme views on the question of altar and throne. Part was gathering round Don Carlos, part sulkily awaited events. Fate and the Queen's cleverness made Ferdinand's "gaol-birds," the proscribed and harried Liberals, the staunchest supporters of his daughter's right.

Before the King's death was announced, Zea Bermudez called together the great officers of State, the magistrates of the capital, and the generals in high command. All had been carefully selected in view of the crisis; they readily renewed their pledges of fidelity to the young Queen. Then the capital and the province were told that Ferdinand, the desired, as he had once been, was dead. The expected result followed; within four days the Carlists were in arms at Talavera. The attempt was quickly crushed; it was not sanctioned by the Pretender. In a manifesto issued on October 1 he chose to assume that his right would not be questioned, and acting as King *de facto*, confirmed Zea Bermudez and his colleagues in their offices. This was accepted by the Cristinos as a challenge; on October 17 Don Carlos was outlawed and his



property confiscated. On November 4 he issued his call to arms, the call his followers so eagerly awaited, withheld till now by their prince's strict sense of political and paternal duty. Even before it came, revolt in the Basque Provinces, in Catalonia, and in Valencia, had answered revolt in Castille. Within three months a small but admirably efficient army was firmly established in the Biscay mountains. Don Carlos was still in Portugal.

The Blacks, or Cristinos, were slow in gathering their strength; for, while the Carlists, or Whites, were homogeneous, the Blacks included the whole range, from Conservatives as strict as Zea Bermudez, to Radicals of the most pronounced type. As yet there were no republicans. The Blacks however held the seals of office and the capital, specially important under so centralised a system of government. They could count upon the army, amounting nominally to 50,000 regulars and double that number of reserves. There were, besides, 12,000 carbineers or frontier guards, and 3000 sailors, with one ship of war, three frigates, four brigs, and a few sloops, all in bad condition.

The declaration of policy published in the name of the Queen Regent on assuming the powers bestowed by Ferdinand's will shows the hesitating and timorous bearing of her minister towards his Liberal allies. Zea Bermudez had made his way as a slave to business of the old cave-dweller type (p. 5). He loved business for its own sake, while he despised its rewards. An unselfish and laborious hermit, more interested in methods than results, his plain coat was unadorned by the stars and crosses which his inferiors flaunted in the palace. But he was entirely of the old school; he held that the duty of a minister was to his master alone, to act as the mouthpiece of authority. He denied to the people both the right and the skill to share in the direction of government. Therefore the manifesto of October 4, 1833, ran, "I will maintain scrupulously the form and fundamental laws of the

monarchy, admitting none of the dangerous innovations of which we already know too well the cost. The best form of government for a country is that to which it is accustomed."

It was fortunate for the infant Queen that the majority of the Council of Government nominated by Ferdinand's will better realised the situation of Spain than did the Prime Minister. Thanks to its influence and to that of Cristina's wisest friend, the Marquis of Miraflores, the Liberals still remaining in exile were amnestied. Thus Argüelles, Mina, Isturiz, Alcalá Galiano, and Ángel Saavedra returned, whilst the Royalist volunteers, the terror of the country, were disbanded, and the heavy tax that had maintained them was suppressed. A great wrong was righted by revalidation of the sales of ecclesiastical, public, or vinculated property carried out during the constitutional period (pp. 59, 61). In many other matters too the dawn of liberty brought public ills to light; and the demands for wide reforms grew daily louder.

Reforms were impossible so long as Zea Bermudez remained in power; but only after receiving unmistakeable warning did the Regent dismiss the minister to whose firmness at the time of the King's death she owed so much. The Marquis of Miraflores, General Luis Fernandez de Córdova, and other trusted Royalists had already pointed to the necessity for change, when the captains-general of Old Castille and Catalonia reported that it would be impossible to maintain the struggle against the Carlists unless the Cortes were called and a frankly Liberal policy adopted. Enlightened despotism could win no friends to the Queen's side. General Llauder's manifesto, though not amounting to what was later known as a *pronunciamiento*, contained the echo of a threat. General Quesada's more diplomatic representation was drawn up by Salustiano de Olózaga, a clever young demagogue, whose name frequently recurs in these pages; his merits and defects are still debated in Spain, but to foreign eyes he seems one of the most unpleasant products of a turbulent and self-seeking age.

Zea Bermudez recognised that his ideas were out of date, and gladly retired. His place was taken (January, 1834) by Martinez de la Rosa, chosen as the representative of the moderate Liberals. The policy of enlightened despotism was definitively abandoned; and Martinez de la Rosa, at the Queen's command, set his hand to the task of embodying in a charter a compromise between absolute monarchy and the republican Constitution of 1812. The romantic age feared nothing. Martinez de la Rosa, half way through an eventful life, was still an enthusiast. In 1812 he had been a deputy at Cadiz. He came back from the consequent period of banishment somewhat sobered and became President of the Constitutional Ministry (1822). After a vain attempt to hold a midway course, he left Ferdinand to fight alone against the Radicals. He quitted Spain at the time of the French invasion led by the Duke of Angoulême, and, like many others of the Spanish refugees, gained for a time his living by his pen. But even Calomarde recognised that he was no plotter. He was allowed to live in retirement at Granáda, until Ferdinand's death recalled him to public life. A conscientious and versatile man, tolerant, despite his large remaining stock of illusions, he proved a good transition minister. His appointment was well received by the Moderates. It was rightly considered to amend the manifesto of October 4. All men knew that the grant of certain liberties would follow; the older Liberals no longer demanded that their former idol, the Constitution of 1812, should be restored to them in its entirety.

Martinez de la Rosa more than fulfilled the expectations of his friends. Following the all-embracing inspiration of that romantic age, his fertile brain produced simultaneously (April, 1834) a tragedy (*La Conjuración de Venecia*) and the Constitution known as the Royal Statute. Both drama and political code were slavish copies of French models. The statute was little more than a translation of the French *Charte* of 1814, a formal grant of individual liberty about which in free countries there

had never been any doubt. It did not mention the sovereignty of the people. The Parliament created by it represented only the rich and the middle class, and was so fenced round with safeguards of the royal authority as to be almost powerless. The Parliament was divided into two Chambers, called *Estamentos*, for the old-fashioned Castilian words would not fit the new-fangled institutions. The upper Chamber, that of the Nobles (*Próceres*), consisted of the grandes together with an unlimited number of ecclesiastics, magistrates, soldiers, and others nominated by the Crown. The lower Chamber, that of the Proctors (*Procuradores*), was elective. The precise method of election was entrusted to Parliament itself; but the rules for the first formation of the Chamber directed that in each district a junta of notables should nominate two commissioners. The commissioners assembled in the capital of the province elect a proctor or deputy, over thirty years old, possessing an income of one hundred and fifty pounds, and qualified either by two years' residence in the province, or by owning in it property to the value of sixty pounds annually. The duration of a Parliament was fixed at three years; reelection of proctors was not forbidden. The Crown chose the meeting-place, nominated President and Vice-President from a list of five names, summoned, prorogued, and dissolved the *Estamentos* at will. A year, however, must not pass without meeting of Parliament. Debate was limited to subjects proposed by the Crown, taxes were voted on its suggestion. Agreement between the two Chambers and the Crown was necessary to the validity of Acts.

This colourless document created much disappointment among real Liberals. Instead of the generous measure of political freedom they had expected, they found solemn commonplaces about civil rights which they already possessed. The only concession was a representative system so complicated as to be valueless, and, even so, restricted to a small class. The privilege of the few possessors of the franchise was rendered

illusory by the creation of a Chamber of Crown nominees to revise the decisions of the Proctors. The popular contempt for the Statute was expressed by Mariano José Larra, the humourist, in the words: "Our statesmen, in order to end the eternal struggle between People and Kings, attempt a half-measure which shall give us simile-Kings and simile-Peoples, Chambers mildly representative, and Tyrants tinged with democracy."

Hitherto Liberal feeling had been confined to the upper, middle, and lower middle classes; the crowd had always been ready at the bidding of agitation to acclaim the Inquisition, Religion, and the Absolute King, and to execute vengeance upon so-called freemasons, heretics, and atheists. But now, in the great towns at least—for the country is to this day as it ever was—a change had taken place. The floods of oratory poured out in the political clubs had overflowed into the streets; and the untethered mob had conceived a notion of its political importance and rights not the less lofty because political tradition and point of comparison were utterly lacking. The mob, and with it to some degree the rank and file of the army, from being the tool of the retrograde faction became the tool of the extreme Radicals.

The first manifestation of this change was characteristically brutal and hideous. The political outlook was gloomy; civil war had been followed by dearth; then cholera fell upon Madrid. The friars hinted that these ills were punishments of Heaven for impious questioning of the authority of Church and King, and specially for the coercive measures to which religious associations had been subjected on account of their Carlist propaganda. But the friars no longer obtained a hearing; on the contrary it was believed that they had brought the plague by poisoning the wells. At Midsummer their convents were broken into by rioters half mad with fear and rage; and nearly a hundred Jesuits and other regulars were cruelly done to death (July 17, 1834). A few ringleaders of

the brutal mob were executed; the captain-general, who had done his best but with insufficient forces, was replaced; but public confidence was sorely shaken, and numbers of peaceable citizens quitted Madrid. This befell on the eve of the first Parliament assembled under the Royal Statute. Hopes founded on the cautious half-measure of the Moderates fell lower than ever.

The Chambers met (July 24, 1834) and proved less homogeneous than had been expected. Martinez de la Rosa and his lieutenant Count Toreno had indeed a majority at first; but, even in the carefully guarded Upper House, Ángel Saavedra, the romantic poet, preached democracy. The Lower House contained a certain number of extreme Radicals, the *exaltados* of 1820, and a large body of deputies of undecided attitude. These soon took their stand in the ranks of the Liberals, and, dissatisfied with the Royal Statute, took the name of Progressives. They were led by Lopez, the brilliant orator and fiery debater, supported by the well-known Liberals, Argüelles and Alcalá Galiano. Neither of these would have been eligible had not their constituents provided the income required by the law. This fact alone was sufficient to show the insufficiency of the Statute to satisfy Liberal opinion. Martinez and Toreno soon saw that they commanded no well-drilled and trustworthy majority, but they boldly undertook to govern, relying on the article of the Statute that limited discussion to matters proposed by the Crown. The whole efforts of the Opposition were directed to the evasion of this restriction.

After formally and unanimously excluding Don Carlos and his descendants from the succession, the Chambers debated at great length a Petition of Rights, the counterpart of the French Declaration of 1789. This question, still unsettled, was succeeded by the no less contentious one of the militia, distinguished hitherto alternately as tool and scourge of the two extreme parties, according as it was called "National" or "Royalist." Again the name was changed; and "Urban" became



for a time the official title of the militia reestablished by a law the effect of which was deferred. Further and still more bitter dissensions broke out over the proposals of Count Toreno, Minister of Finance. Even as Ferdinand had refused to recognise debts contracted by the Constitutional Government, so now a number of Radicals sought to repudiate the loans contracted by the Regency of Urgel (see p. 64) and spent on overthrowing Liberalism by means of French soldiers and Royalist volunteers. Such a proposal of course shook the national credit, already at a low ebb. Toreno's policy extinguished it altogether. A commission had been appointed to examine the whole financial position and arrange for the consolidation of the outstanding debts. The situation revealed was most serious, but nevertheless the majority of the commission voted for bravely facing it, and maintaining the national credit by recognising and trying to pay interest upon the whole. Toreno however sided with the minority, and had his way. Regardless of the future, and of the needs of a country at the beginning of a civil war, he sacrificed everything to immediate reduction of expenditure. His proposal to "defer interest upon" meant really to repudiate. It affected the whole of the Interior and one-half of the Exterior Debt. The Spanish Five per Cent. Bonds, which had been quoted in London and Paris at 84, sank to half that price. Spain was deservedly treated as a fraudulent bankrupt.

Soon military rivalries, the curse of the country for fifty years, were added to the other troubles. A civil war and a weak Government had put all power into the hands of the generals. When General Llauder was appointed Minister for War, his rival, Quesada, considering himself slighted, began to conspire with the Radicals. Rumour had it that Llauder owed his appointment to the Queen Regent, and that she was plotting with his help the restoration of absolutism. In order to counteract and defeat this supposed scheme, the Liberals joined the military malcontents; and a vast counterplot was

organised, having its roots in the army. Martinez de la Rosa was utterly unfit to control the forces of disorder; a single battalion under a lieutenant was able to dictate terms to him in the capital. Cardero was the name of the bold subaltern who (Jan. 18, 1835), emulating Riego, aspired to oblige the Government to adopt a more Liberal policy. At the head of his men he seized the Post Office near the Puerta del Sol, murdered the captain-general who ventured to remind them of their duty, and held out until they had received assurance that no punishment would follow their efforts on behalf of freedom. The attempt to shift responsibility and to make a scapegoat of General Llauder failed to deceive the public. It was well known that the Minister for War did not lack determination or energy. He was however forced to resign. Quesada succeeded him in the favour of the Palace party, and Valdés at the Ministry for War. Disturbances at Saragossa, Málaga, and Murcia followed the mutiny at Madrid; only lack of organisation hindered their success. The feebleness of the Government became daily more apparent. Martinez de la Rosa was utterly discredited; the Royal Statute was treated as a sham. Even the Queen's popularity, once so great, had been worn out by continual bickerings, suspicions, and the ever-approaching danger from the north. For, whilst the two sections of the Liberal party were recklessly appealing to mob-violence and intrigue, the Carlists were daily gaining ground, and threatened to proscribe the very name of Liberal without question of more or less.

The Carlist War was a confused struggle, carried on generally in guerrilla fashion by small bodies. It was characterised by much heroism and much brutal ferocity. Small local, and even personal, jealousies often overshadowed the great principles to which appeal was ostensibly made. Only at great length can the incoherent military movement, the small and indecisive actions, the petty rivalries, and often treacherous intrigues which make up the history of the contest be intelligibly

described. From this tangle it is difficult to pick out main threads. To follow them without attention to minor threads is to receive a false impression. All that can here be done is to set down the chief events in the order of their happening.

The war may be divided into two main periods—before and after the first siege of Bilbao (June 18, 1835). It was centred in two districts, both mountainous, the one comprising the three Basque Provinces, Biscay, Álava and Guipúzcoa together with Navarre, the other comprising parts of Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon.

Although sufficient warning had been given long before Ferdinand's death, and some preparations had been made to meet the expected outbreak, a small and energetic minority under a leader of exceptional skill and ability came near imposing its will on Spain before the scattered forces of the opposite party were gathered to resist it. The Basques, through their deputies, assembled at the sacred oak of Guernica, had recognised Isabel as heir to her father's throne at the time of the great solemnity at Madrid (see p. 87). The Parliament of Biscay was sitting when news of the King's death reached Bilbao. Carlist agents had carefully fostered the belief that Liberalism would be unfavourable to the immemorial liberties of the provinces. Nevertheless the deputies were divided; the towns, and even the large villages, were Liberal or Cristino, the country districts enthusiastically Carlist. The Royalist volunteers mustered under their recognised chiefs Valdespina and Zabala. A junta was elected, a fund of £30,000 collected; and the Carlist deputies and volunteers marched out to rally their partisans in the capitals of the sister provinces. Vitoria was divided between Carlists and Cristinos. San Sebastian, frankly Liberal, sent offers of help to Madrid, but men trooped out from the villages and the isolated farms to defend their privileges, fighting under the banner inscribed "God, Country, King." The most hardy and stubborn race of the Peninsula had declared for the Pretender. The question

had to be fought out in a mountain region most difficult for military movements against men to whom each by-path was familiar and each farm-house a safe hiding-place.

At Logroño, on the border of Castille, a body of Carlists was raised by Don Santos Ladron. It entered Navarre, seeking to seize some strong point as a rallying point for the scattered bands that had taken the field independently. Santos Ladron's party was dispersed; he himself was captured and shot; but Ferdinand had been dead little more than a month when, with the exception of Pamplona and the other towns, all Navarre was overrun by Carlists. Here too, as in Biscay, it was in defence of their semi-independence, as well as of the Church and youthful King, that the people rose in revolt. The leader needed to coordinate and unite the scattered forces and efforts appeared in Navarre. Tomás Zumalacárregui, a lieutenant-colonel in the army, had sacrificed his commission to his political and religious faith. Reserved, stern, disinterested, brave, and energetic, he was a fine specimen of the noble Basque race. Birth and character alike fitted him to command, where local patriotism, distrust of strangers, and an almost anarchical standard of individual independence are deeply rooted. At Estella (14 Nov., 1833) the Navarrese junta elected him to command the Carlists of his native province. His masterful will at once enforced respect and discipline; he ventured to reduce the pay rashly promised to the volunteers at the same time as he introduced among them a harsh military code. More important still was his creation of a regular administration under the junta, levying taxes in the name of King Charles V. In this respect the example of Navarre was imitated by the other revolted provinces. The Carlist treasury was supplied by (1) the contributions of the provinces imposed by their local Parliaments, (2) fines levied on Liberal families or villages, (3) customs dues collected on the French frontier, (4) gifts from sovereigns, and from private persons, in sympathy with the cause.

Very different from Zumalacárregui was the leader of the Carlists of Castille. Merino the priest, freebooter, and *guerrillero* of the War of Independence, received a canonry of Valencia as his reward for services rendered to the cause of absolutism. But the chapter readily dispensed with the obligation of residence; and Merino lived in his native Castille on the revenues of his canonry till 1820, when he again betook himself to the *guerrillero's* life and fought against the Liberals, at first alone and then in cooperation with the French army. He was now aged sixty-four, but his temper had not cooled, and continual hunting had kept him as active and hardy as ever. He was among the first to revolt; his very name was a war-cry; thousands of Royalist volunteers marched with him to join the gathering army at Logroño (November, 1833). The Carlists of Catalonia, Valencia, Aragon, and Murcia were prevented at first from concentrating by the activity of General Llauder, captain-general of the first-named province. Later they found a stronghold in Morella and a leader almost equal to Zumalacárregui in Ramon Cabrera, the seminarist, ready to do or suffer anything in the cause. Here, as elsewhere, the Carlists predominated in the mountains only: the coast region, the plains, and the great cities, like Barcelona, were Liberal. In La Mancha, Extremadura, and Andalusia, small Carlist bands led a half-brigand life among the remote villages.

The first to take command against the Carlists of the north was Sarsfield, general of the army of observation posted on the Portuguese frontier. Advancing cautiously by way of Salamanca towards the Ebro, the boundary of the revolted provinces, he dispersed Merino's hungry horde in Castille. Their leader fled to join Don Carlos in Portugal. Next, Sarsfield garrisoned the line of the river from Miranda to Logroño, joined hands with the Cristino troops occupying Pamplona, and marched to the relief of the Liberals of Álava and Biscay. At Vitoria he was met by the Provincial Government with protestations of loyalty to the Government of the



Regency; before the end of November he entered Bilbao unopposed. The Carlist bands had withdrawn into Navarre. With them went the juntas. The necessity for united Carlist action became apparent; and in December Zumalacárregui was appointed to the chief command in the three Basque Provinces as well as in Navarre.

Whilst the Carlists secured unity of plan by concentrating command in a single hand, the Regency, on the contrary, divided authority, appointing General Valdés to lead the main body of the army, whilst Sarsfield held independently the viceroyalty of Navarre. Valdés found an able lieutenant in Baldomero Espartero, an officer who had seen much service in Peru. Espartero put Bilbao into a state of defence, and organised the town militia into an efficient force. The means at the disposal of the Cristino generals were inadequate to the task set them. Valdés, when he had occupied the chief strategic points within his command, had only about nine thousand men left with whom to operate over a vast extent of almost impassable and violently hostile country. He began, however, prudently to hedge in with a line of *firli* the Carlist stronghold, the mountain valley of Amescoa, situated on the watershed between the Atlantic and Mediterranean, in the neighbourhood of Estella, and distant only some six leagues from Vitoria. From Amescoa the Carlists could threaten the communications with Pamplona, harry the plain of Álava, and, if necessary, escape by the mountains of Guipúzcoa and Navarre to the main chain of the Pyrenees by paths impracticable to regular troops. From Amescoa Zumalacárregui slipped easily through the meshes of Valdés' half-spread net. He seized the Government foundry of Orbaiceta on the frontier near Roncesvalles (January 27, 1834), and, after a foray eastward towards Aragon, returned stronger than before. He led now an army of about eight thousand picked men, fairly equipped and thoroughly trustworthy. These at the word of command would disperse, leaving, where an army had stood, a seemingly peace-



able country thinly peopled by shepherds and peasants. None failed to reassemble when the roll was called, days, hours, or weeks after, it might be fifty miles away across the hills. Their hardihood was proverbial, the length of their marches well-nigh incredible. They fought in the neighbourhood of their homes; and, when the life of the camp became irksome to their independent spirit, they were allowed to pass a few days with their families in the upland farms, in order "to change their shirts," as they called it. Their officers were patriarchs among them; and their country was ruled, as it had been from time immemorial, by the local juntas.

The Government at Madrid, not grasping the difficulty of the military situation, grew impatient of Valdés' plan of blockade, and, listening to the representations of his military rivals, replaced him in the chief command by General Quesada, an intriguer and Liberal neophyte, converted rather by jealousy than conviction from the service of the palace. Quesada first tried to obtain the submission of the revolted provinces by negotiation. But the Carlist creed is by nature rigid, admitting of no compromise; moreover the hopes of the faction were good. Zumalacárregui refused to consider any proposal for peace; and the war went on. Soon the Cristinos were reduced to the defensive; and Quesada sought to make up for military failure by reckless cruelty and insult. He confirmed the bad practice of treating the Carlists as rebels and outlaws. He addressed their general in a proclamation as "leader of highwaymen and bandits"; he declared all Carlists in arms liable to the death penalty; and he threatened retaliation even upon women convicted of aiding the cause (April 29, 1834). The Carlists responded with equal severity and hardly less brutality. To seize a rich village and to torture the town council became a favourite sport, as well as a useful way of obtaining supplies.

The Powers took sides in the dynastic quarrel in Spain, as in the similar one between uncle and niece, Liberalism and Absolutism, in Portugal. Great Britain recognised from the

first the Liberal Governments of Isabel and Maria de la Gloria. France, however, anticipated her in recognising the Regency. The British ambassador was accredited to Queen Isabel; the French to Queen Cristina. Louis Philippe's own claim to a Bourbon throne came through a female. Cristina, nearly related to the House of Orleans, showed herself anxious to unite her fortunes with those of the monarchy of July. Friendship with Spain was an axiom of French foreign policy. Above all, the common enemy was the claim of Divine Right binding together Carlists, Miguelists, and Legitimists. The United States of America, Sweden, and Denmark followed France and Great Britain; but the old Holy Alliance, Russia, Prussia, and Austria encouraged Don Carlos to hope for their support so soon as he should win a firm footing in Spain. Sardinia and Naples protested against the succession of a female to a Bourbon throne. The Portuguese Miguelists were, of course, also Carlists. Whilst the friends of Don Carlos abroad hung back, those of Isabel drew together. It was agreed that Don Pedro and Queen Cristina should cooperate to drive out Don Miguel and Don Carlos; that England should lend a fleet and France an army if necessary. The treaty of the Quadruple Alliance was signed in London (April 22, 1834) by Palmerston, Talleyrand, the Marquis of Miraflores, and the Portuguese envoy.

Already the Spanish army under Rodil, lying prepared along the western frontier, had entered Portugal in order to capture the Pretender (April 6). Escaping from the blockade of Almeida, Don Carlos joined Don Miguel at Evora. But before the end of May the two princes were so hard pressed that Don Miguel signed the Treaty of Evora Montes, agreeing to renounce his claim to a throne in consideration of a pension. Don Carlos was made of sterner stuff. He refused to negotiate, and leaving his little force to make such terms as it could, embarked on a British man-of-war for England.

In Madrid public opinion, thoroughly alarmed by Quesada's

failures, demanded that his place should be taken by an abler general. The choice fell upon General Rodil, famous for his defence of Callao against the Chilian insurgents, and now recently returned from his successful incursion into Portugal. Bringing with him some reinforcements, and the even more sorely needed supplies, he infused for the moment a better spirit into the discouraged Army of the North. But at the same time the enthusiasm of the Carlists was raised to an almost heroic pitch by the presence of their prince among them (July, 1834). Don Carlos had secretly left England as soon as possible after his arrival, and, crossing France in disguise, presented himself to his delighted followers at Elizondo in the Baztan valley.

Rodil, at the head of forty-five thousand men, began his campaign by invading the valley of Amescoa. Zumalacárregui abandoned it on his approach, withdrawing, as was his habit, the grain and cattle. The Cristinos suffered severely from privations, and from the harassing tactics of an almost intangible enemy. This plan having failed to make any impression on the Carlists, Rodil next fitted out light columns to pursue the prince. But in this the mountaineers had every advantage. The famous guide known as "the King's donkey" (*el Burro del Rey*) carried the prince, on his back when necessary, into inaccessible places. The Carlists were kept informed of all movements of the enemy by the watchful peasantry; the Cristinos were continually baffled by false intelligence, surprised by those they believed themselves to be pursuing, and harassed without being able to retaliate. Rodil in despair issued a ferocious proclamation condemning all Carlists and their abettors to death (August, 1834); he then betook himself to the slow and cruel expedient of starving the country. He burnt the watermills that ground the home-grown maize; he forbade the introduction of food and its transit through the country; and he fortified Elizondo so as to command the head of the rich Baztan valley. The only result

was to irritate still further the Basque villages. No quarter was now asked or granted by either side.

Again a change was made, and General Osma took command of the Cristinos pending the arrival of Espoz y Mina. Before this took place they were twice heavily defeated at Alegria in the plains of Álava. More than a thousand men were killed and wounded; more than double that number saved their lives by taking service with the enemy (October, 1834).

Mina was now pitted against Zumalacárregui, Navarrese against Navarrese. But Mina took command of a beaten and discouraged army, whilst his opponent was in the full tide of success. Moreover age, wounds, and infirmities had put it out of the power of the famous *guerrillero* to lead in person a winter campaign among the mountains. His spirit, however, was still unbroken. He fortified and garrisoned the Navarrese villages in order to interrupt the communication of the enemy, whilst affording rallying places for his friends. He imitated the policy of the Carlists by ruthlessly levying contributions on all who did not show zeal in the Cristino cause. Seeing that the Carlists obtained all kinds of supplies from France, he arranged for the more effectual guarding of the frontier. A notable improvement followed; the Cristinos of the north could hold up their heads even outside the towns. Zumalacárregui felt the pressure of the Cristino posts, and the curtailment of his supplies from Bayonne. Finding that even the slightest fortification could successfully resist him so long as he had no artillery, he turned his attention to founding small cannon among the hills. Mina had obliged him to abandon the kind of warfare to which his startling successes were due.

But Mina's plan required time, and no time was given him. He wished to drive the Carlists to the plains, where regular troops with cavalry might have the advantage of them. But the ministers, fearful above all things of an invasion of Castille, insisted chiefly on the importance of holding the line of the

Ebro. Meanwhile the Radicals, Mina's political friends, were urging him to do something brilliant, so that his success might serve as an arm against the Moderates. He refused to alter his cautious policy, but pressure was too strong for him. Sick in body and at heart with the jealousy or apathy that denied him even the most necessary supplies, he handed over his authority to General Valdés, who thus for the second time commanded against Zumalacárregui.

The commission of the new commander included instructions to aid the envoy of the British Government, Lord Elliot, to bring about an agreement which should secure prisoners of war from murder, and mitigate the ferocity of the struggle. For Zumalacárregui had answered Rodil's proclamation by ordering all prisoners of whatever grade to be shot (November, 1834); and civilisation stood appalled at the devastation that had overtaken one of earth's most lovely regions. The Elliot treaty was signed (April 27, 1835); and outrages to humanity ceased for a time in the Basque country.

Valdés had also been charged to report upon the advisability of demanding foreign aid under the terms of the Quadruple Alliance. Before deciding on this point he undertook in overwhelming force the relief of Estella in the heart of the Carlist country. He succeeded, but only after such difficulties and losses as to amount virtually to a defeat. He had now convinced himself that the Cristino armies alone would never be able to reconquer the northern provinces; his opinion was confirmed by his divisional commanders; and he sent Luis Fernandez de Córdova to report it at Madrid.

Meanwhile the Carlists, relieved of the presence of Mina, whom they greatly dreaded, and grown bold by the acknowledged discomfiture of Valdés, redoubled their activity. They seized the fortified posts in the Baztan and round Amescoa. They entered Estella, abandoned by the Cristinos, and made it their headquarters, the seat of their court (May, 1835). They cut the high-road between Logroño and the French frontier, and



they threatened Villafranca. Valdés called out the garrisons of Pamplona, San Sebastian, and Bilbao to restore his communications. But Espartero, as soon as he left the shelter of the walls of Bilbao, was defeated and lost 2000 men at Descarga (June 2, 1835). He wisely abandoned all further attempt to break through, and retired to defend his headquarters, the capital of Biscay. The result of the failure of Valdés' attempt was the abandonment of everything within the enemy's country save Pamplona, Bilbao and San Sebastian. The Carlists now held possession of the high-road. Villafranca, Tolosa, and Vergara fell into their hands. Valdés withdrew to the southern bank of the Ebro and resigned his command.

While general after general returned defeated to Madrid, Moderates and Radicals devoted their whole energy to their own quarrel. The Radicals had carried their point with regard to the reestablishment of the national guard under the name of Urban Militia, but they had been forced to submit to see the "patriotic" force placed under the command of officers of the regular army, and consequently beyond the easy reach of civilian demagogues. Dissatisfied with their partial victory, they used every means of harassing the ministry in its thankless task. Fermin Caballero, distinguished as a writer on political economy, proposed a vote of censure contrary to the rules of procedure established by the Statute. The President refused to put it to the House. An uproar followed; and the Radicals appealed to the mob, excited by reckless calumny and by the news of Carlist victories. The state of the capital made military precautions necessary; but Lopez, the demagogue, arose, and in a fervid and tragic oration denounced the ministry for attempting to overawe with soldiers the representatives of the nation. The troops were withdrawn and the mob triumphed noisily. Next Argüelles (known as "the Divine") asked for details of the agreement negotiated by Lord Elliot for the more humane conduct of the war. He insinuated that the ministers were bent on betraying the national cause by coming



to terms with the Carlists. It was known that Martinez de la Rosa was looking abroad for help; the Radicals feared that France would again intervene and give to the Regent and her ministers victory over both Carlists and Radicals. Martinez de la Rosa refused to give details of the agreement between Valdés and Zumalacárregui. The House by a majority of four insisted; it was a Radical victory. The mob showed its delight by besetting and half murdering the unpopular ministers. The attack in the House was renewed; and Martinez de la Rosa, no longer able to resist, read out the harmless document over which so much uproar had been made (May 27, 1835). To continue the stormy session would have been to court further defeat. Parliament was prorogued on May 29.

So discouraging were the results of the first attempt to govern by the Royal Statute that Martinez de la Rosa, its author, resigned (June 7, 1835), giving as his reason differences of opinion among his colleagues as to the necessity for calling in foreign aid against the Carlists. The rest of the Cabinet followed him, with the exception of Toreno, the historian of the War of Independence and correspondent of Jeremy Bentham, who undertook to form a ministry. Luis Fernandez de Córdova had just brought Valdés' report of the insufficiency of his army to resist the Carlists. Immediately afterwards came news of Espartero's defeat at Descarga. Consternation fell on the capital, but did not abate the animosities of its politicians.

It was at this point that the Carlists, in the full tide of success, abandoned the tactics to which they owed their victories and attacked Bilbao. They urgently needed a sea-port through which to obtain supplies; they had reason to believe that Austria, Prussia, and Russia would send them help if once they could obtain recognition as belligerents. Possession of a place of the importance of Bilbao would enforce this recognition, improve their position in the eyes of the world, and establish their credit in the money-market.

Zumalacárregui was not the author of the fatal plan. He was no longer Don Carlos' sole adviser. When he sought to enforce his views he met with opposition in the prince's court. His haughty temper was galled by the preference shown at Estella for the advice of new-comers, flatterers, and intriguers; he resigned his command. He resumed it, however, in obedience to his prince's orders; and the siege of Bilbao began on June 10. The Carlist artillery was inadequate; their leaders knew nothing of sieges. The townsfolk of Bilbao, having no cause to fear treachery within their walls since the Carlists were all outside, were confident of their power to resist. On the fifth day of the siege Zumalacárregui was wounded in the leg by a musket-ball; nine days later he died owing to the unskilful treatment of a village quack.

It was the turning-point of the Carlist fortunes; with Zumalacárregui all unity of plan and authority was lost. Jealousy and intrigue ruled court and camp alike. The officers trained in the school of Zumalacárregui were passed over, and Don Carlos, acting on the advice of his new ministry, gave the chief command to Gonzalez Moreno, a man particularly hated by the Liberals because of the perfidy whereby he had captured Torrijos four years before (see p. 80). Blunder succeeded blunder; the siege of Bilbao was abandoned; and Moreno himself was crushingly defeated by Luis Fernandez de Córdova at Mendigorria on the river Arga (July 16, 1835).

In Sir Robert Peel's ministry, the Duke of Wellington directed Great Britain's policy with regard to Spanish affairs. The Duke did not love the Spanish Liberals; but Martinez de la Rosa had wisely sent as ambassador to London General Álava, who had won the great soldier's esteem during the Peninsular campaigns. Álava succeeded in interesting him in the war, with the purpose of preventing needless suffering; the result was Lord Elliot's mission. In France, Thiers advocated armed intervention, but Louis Philippe preferred indirect to direct methods of dealing with the Spaniards. "I know them,"

he said, "they are neither to be conquered nor governed by strangers. To-day they are begging us to come; as soon as we are there they will hate us and put every hindrance in our way" (Guizot). Nevertheless, when Martinez de la Rosa formally claimed the help promised by the Quadruple Alliance, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs enquired whether, in the event of the opposition of the Eastern Powers to France's intervention, France might rely on the support of Great Britain. Lord Melbourne was now in power; and Palmerston held the British Foreign Office. He refused to pledge his Government, but recommended the concentration of French troops on the frontier, and more careful insistence on the neutrality of French territory. The hint was taken; and the supplies which the Carlists had hitherto obtained from the Department of the Basses Pyrénées were cut off (June 3, 1835).

Toreno was more successful than Martinez de la Rosa in his negotiation with the Allies. His ambassador, Mendizabal, by skilful management of the finances of the Portuguese Liberals, had won a great reputation on the London Exchange, and considerable influence among British politicians. Seeing that both France and Great Britain sought to undertake the protectorship of the Liberal-Cristino party, and that each feared to give the other the advantage of single-handed intervention, he successfully stimulated their rivalry until they agreed that each should lend a force to be paid by Spain. A French contingent, taken from the Foreign Legion, rendered good service by keeping in check the Carlists of the north-eastern provinces. A British Volunteer Legion, under Sir de Lacy Evans, helped to relieve Bilbao, now again threatened (September), whilst a British squadron blockaded the Carlist coast.

The long war had undermined the popularity of the Regency. The Royal Statute was now regarded as a worthless compromise and make-believe. Martinez de la Rosa's fate had shown the impossibility of holding a middle course; the struggle was between the Carlists on the one hand and the Radicals on the

other ; there was no place for the old-fashioned Moderates. Queen Cristina yielded ; Toreno's ministry was a step towards conciliating the Liberals, or Progressives, the advocates of a constitutional monarchy. The clergy, and specially the regulars, were Carlist ; even the Moderates had found them bitter and uncompromising opponents. Toreno, immediately upon taking office, declared war upon the Church by expelling the Jesuits and confiscating the estates of the Society (July 4, 1835). This step was taken in obedience to a financial as well as to a political necessity.

Toreno had chosen as Minister of Finance Mendizabal, whose Basque name, it was whispered, concealed a Jewish origin. He certainly professed no great respect for the Church. Long residence in London had broadened his views. He saw Spain bleeding to death for lack of money wherewith to carry on the civil war, while the vast estates of the Church lay idle, seemingly within his grasp. It seemed simple enough to devote these riches to public purposes and to make other provision for the maintenance of the clergy. But this question of the secularisation of ecclesiastical property had been for long a battle-ground, and was still to cost Spain much agitation and suffering.

In laying hands on the wealth of the Church, Toreno and Mendizabal were not acting without precedent. Not to go so far back as the well-nigh sainted Philip II, or to quote as authority a Government of such ill-repute among Catholics as that of 1820, Charles IV had not only applied the goods of the banished Jesuits to reducing the debt, but had expropriated charitable institutions, religious guilds, pious foundations, and benefices under lay patronage, giving in exchange Government bonds. The assent of the Pope was obtained only after the deed was done. Later the same King received permission from the Holy See to sell Church property to the amount of sixty-four thousand pounds annual revenue ; some forty million pounds worth of real estate, supposed to represent one-seventh of the

goods of the Church, was allotted to private persons; its owners received Treasury bonds in compensation. The large sales of Church property carried out under Joseph Bonaparte were rescinded at the Restoration; the buyers, left without compensation for their capital outlay, were obliged to repay the income or profits received. The wealth of the secular clergy was still untouched. It was left for the Liberals of 1820 to suppress half the tithe and to levy a heavy fine on the remaining half. The Pope withdrew his Nuncio; and from this time forward the Church became the determined enemy of Liberalism.

As soon as it was known that Toreno and Mendizabal had broken with the Church, and had decreed the suppression of all religious houses of less than twelve persons (July 20, 1835), the Radicals led the mob to the assault on the convents, and ecclesiastics were massacred at Saragossa and at Reus. At Barcelona the agitation, beginning in anti-religious riots, soon became revolutionary. The captain-general was away fighting the Carlists; and the city fell for some days into the power of the most violent Radical faction. The military governor was murdered; the agitation spread to the neighbouring towns. Abandoned by the central Government, the burgesses undertook to restore order. The tradesmen, manufacturers, landowners, and officers of the militia elected a junta representative of all Catalonia. It declared itself loyal to the throne of Isabel II but opposed to the Royal Statute; and it demanded the immediate assembly of Cortes to revise the Statute and fulfil the aspirations of the Progressive party. The junta demanded also a large measure of self-government for the provinces, the right to administer local revenue and expenditure, the suppression of the regular and the reform of the secular clergy. In Aragon, Valencia, and Murcia the revolutionary programme found many adherents. Toreno stood at the parting of the ways. The British ambassador, Sir George Villiers, afterwards Lord Clarendon, advised concession and a frankly Liberal policy. The alternative was



repression, and a further attempt to combat from a half-way position the extremes, Radical and Carlist. Toreno inclined to the latter. He summoned the ministers, the members of the Councils of the Regency and of State, the provincial governors, and the great magistrates, to a conference under the presidency of Queen Cristina (Aug. 14, 1835); the majority voted against concession. As soon as the decision was known, riots broke out in Madrid. The Government was still strong enough to repress them, but the danger had been imminent. Had not General Quesada deserted Olózaga and his fellow-conspirators at the last moment, the Progressives and the national militia would have imposed a Liberal policy by force of arms. Martial law was proclaimed, the mutinous militia was disbanded, the Progressive leaders prosecuted, and their newspaper, the *Eco del Comercio*, suppressed.

But there was nobody left to carry out a policy of repression in the provinces: the whole army was fully engaged in the north; and the revolution ran riot. After Catalonia, the cities of Castille, Valladolid, and Salamanca declared against the Royal Statute and in favour of a more Liberal Constitution. Andalusia and Galicia followed. Even remote and backward Extremadura was moved to interest, for Mendizabal, the man designated by public opinion to lead the Progressives, was at Badajoz.

Toreno had been in office little more than three months. Just as he, the most Liberal member of the preceding Cabinet, had succeeded Martinez de la Rosa, so now Mendizabal, his Progressive ally and Minister of Finance, succeeded him (Sept. 14, 1855). Mendizabal had a great advantage over his predecessors in that he was a convinced Liberal, whereas they had merely made grudging concessions to ideas naturally distasteful to them. His ideal was material prosperity and commercial activity, his bugbear the clergy. His self-confidence was overweening: he counted on the support of the whole Progressive party, and of the British ambassador, whose



influence was great among them. He promised recklessly reconciliation of the whole Cristino party, Moderate and Progressive; the successful conclusion of the war without further help from abroad or increase of taxation; a new and satisfactory settlement of the relations between Church and State; and the reestablishment of public credit. First of all the submission of the local juntas had to be obtained. It was done by flattery, concession, and promises. Captains-general of pronounced Liberal views were appointed. Mina pacified Catalonia. Olózaga, so lately a conspirator, became civil governor of Madrid. Provincial Assemblies for the administration of local affairs were instituted by decree. The juntas were sanctioned as committees of national defence, pending the election of the Provincial Assemblies. In Spain and abroad it was believed that Mendizabal had the means as well as the will to establish a broad Liberal policy, and to finish the civil war.

The end of October saw the dissolution of the last of the juntas and the dispersal of the armed mobs through which they exercised their authority. An amnesty covered the past; and the Cortes were summoned for November to revise the Royal Statute, devise a wider electoral system, and deliberate on matters touching public credit. Before they met, a decree had suppressed all monasteries that did not teach, or tend the sick. All Spaniards between the ages of eighteen and forty were declared liable to military service. The payment for exemption was fixed at forty pounds. Numbers availed themselves of this means of escape from facing the dreaded Carlists; and the Treasury profited accordingly. One hundred thousand conscripts, too poor or too patriotic for the subterfuge, were added to the army. The urban militia became once more "national" in official documents.

The Estamentos (or Houses) met (Nov. 16, 1835) amid the greatest popular enthusiasm. For Mendizabal, as even his contemporaries observed, while pretending to lead, had "merely

made himself the instrument for good or evil of the most democratic and revolutionary of Spanish parties." But for the moment even the nobility and middle class as represented in the Upper House seemed to approve his programme. The whole financial question was left to his vaunted skill. He was granted unlimited powers to deal with and alter the system as he would, to raise and expend as he thought fit the money necessary to end the war, giving an account of his administration during a future session. Then discussion opened on the electoral law, suffrage, and representative government generally. Direct and indirect voting, property qualifications for voters and deputies, the extent of electoral districts were hotly debated or referred to commissions that disagreed. Parties began to group themselves on the well-known lines; an unexpected Opposition was developed; and Mendizabal found it necessary to dissolve the Cortes in order to carry out his promises by decree (January 27, 1836). But by this time the reaction had set in. The Moderates did not oppose, if they did not encourage, the campaign of libel carried on against the Jew. He was accused of being in the pay of England, and pledged to impose a ruinous commercial treaty on Spain. The Progressives, whom he called upon to strengthen his Cabinet, refused to join a ministry that had promised so much and seemed likely to fulfil so little. The Queen Regent was anxious to be rid of a minister of whose loyalty she was not convinced, and who had offended her royal temper by half-drunken insolence.

Nevertheless Mendizabal struggled on. His real interest lay in finance; his great secret was still untried. For, since he took office, the *Gazette* had announced that without new taxes Spanish credit would shortly be raised to the level of that of the most prosperous countries. So great was the confidence in Mendizabal's abilities that, regardless of the vagueness and vastness of his promises, bankers speculated for a rise in Spanish funds. Meanwhile he was driven to the hand-to-mouth expedients of his predecessors. By issuing paper to

the amount of £500,000 he realised about half that sum. He mortgaged the tobacco and customs revenues and the quicksilver mines of Almaden for a million. Worse still, he suppressed interest on a part of the debt left untouched by Toreno, and sold on his own authority bonds to the value of three and a half million pounds that had been issued in furtherance of Toreno's scheme of conversion. Then the great secret was revealed. The whole estates of the Church and the communes were to be declared national property, and were to be sold by auction, their price being paid in certificates of the national debt.

The Spanish funds were at this time about eighty per cent. below par; the whole debt was supposed to amount to about one hundred and forty millions. Mendizabal's scheme was not new. Even so far back as 1814 a better thought-out plan on the same lines had been published by Florez Estrada. Mendizabal himself experimented on a large scale before submitting his plan to Parliament. He suppressed further convents, of nuns as well as monks, and offered their property for sale. He announced that ecclesiastical claims on private estate might be discharged at a fixed rate, and payment made in State paper. The result was vast gains to a few bold speculators, scanty profit to the State, huge frauds at the sales, worse confusion in the financial departments, and the creation of titles to real estate which were sure to be called in question. The reaction set in; Mendizabal's evident leaning towards Great Britain offended France; the French veteran legion which was fitting out against the Carlists was dispersed. The man who had promised to end the war without burdening the nation had proved unable to supply General Fernandez de Córdova's inadequate army.

The Cortes met on March 22. A new House of Proctors had been elected to support the ministry. It was enthusiastically Progressive. Madrid had chosen Olózaga, the scourge of the convents. The House of Notables was Conservative as before

and determined to undo Mendizabal's work. On the proposal of Ángel de Saavedra, now Duke of Rivas, it ordered the ministry to suspend execution of its unauthorised decrees with regard to the expulsion of the regulars and confiscation of their goods. In the Lower House unanimity was only apparent; some who called themselves Progressives were far less Radical than others. These, offended by Mendizabal's dictatorial airs, gathered round Isturiz and Galiano. During the debate on the Address, Isturiz sought to make the ministry responsible for the foulest crime of the Carlist War, the murder of Cabrera's mother (see p. 125). Then he went further, and hinted at maladversion by the President of the Council. Mendizabal so far forgot his dignity as to fight a duel with his former friend (April 15, 1836).

The Queen Regent did not conceal her dislike for the policy and person of the Prime Minister: her conscience was offended by his treatment of the Church. She began to give public audiences; it was a means of hearing public opinion otherwise than through the ministers and of communicating with her Conservative friends. The Radical ministers held themselves slighted; they were anxious to have the Regent at their mercy, a mere tool in their hands. Through Rodil, their Minister for War, they ordered her to dismiss Generals San Roman, commander of the militia, and Quesada, captain-general of New Castille, accused by rumour of leanings towards absolutism. Queen Cristina refused to remove her friends. To have done so would have been to deliver herself bound to Mendizabal and the mob. She could rely on San Roman and Quesada to defend her. Moreover, both were friends of General Luis Fernandez de Córdova, who now held the chief command in the north (June, 1835—August, 1836). Córdova might interpret the dismissal of his friends as an attack upon himself; he had taken the Cristino side and was loyal to it, but he was no Liberal; if forced to choose between Carlism and a party that persecuted the Church, and insulted and browbeat the

Queen, he might still choose the former. If he did so, Isabel's cause was lost ; for Córdoba could take with him the majority of the army.

Mendizabal was no less eager to escape from the impossible situation into which he had thrust himself than the Regent to be rid of him. Nothing had come of all his vast schemes and promises, the deficit in the budget was greater, the national credit was lower than ever. Accordingly, when Cristina refused to appoint Mendizabal's creatures to what was, in fact, the guard of her person, he made the difference of opinion between himself and the Regent the excuse for resignation (May 15, 1836). His successor was his late adversary in the field, Isturiz.

No great effort and no great skill in statecraft had been required in order to overthrow Mendizabal's Radical ministry and to show the hollowness of all its sounding promises. But to reduce to order the confusion it left behind was utterly beyond the power of his successor. Isturiz refused all compromise and alliance with the supporters of the late ministry. Taking as colleagues the leaders of the *Moderado* party, the Duke of Rivas and Galiano, he promised revision of the Constitution and the termination of the civil war by means of French help. Now that Spain was no longer ruled by the violent Radical faction, M. Thiers lent a ready ear to the appeal of its Government. The opportunity for intervention on behalf of a dynasty closely allied to the House of Orleans and governing in accordance with a moderate Constitution was a favourable one ; and a French legion intended to take the Carlists in the rear began to gather on the frontier. The proposed revision of the Constitution was a more difficult matter. The Lower House, or Estamento, elected three months before to support Mendizabal, contained a strong Radical majority which utterly refused to believe in the sudden conversion of the *Moderados* to more Liberal views. The Radicals wished for nothing less than the revival of the Constitution of 1812, and



decided that the ministry should stand or fall according as it proved submissive or rebellious on the matter. Questions were asked as to its attitude towards the legislation of 1820-25 abolishing tithes, entails, mortmain, and private jurisdiction; and, when the ministers sought to evade them by vague and pompous phrases, a thoroughly Radical resolution was passed, the members of the late Cabinet voting with the majority.

Military and financial proposals met with no better success. The demagogue, Lopez, roused the ever-vigilant national jealousy by representing that the acceptance of the intervention of France would make a foreign country arbiter of the destinies of Spain. Seven days after undertaking office, Isturiz' ministry suffered a crushing defeat; only 29 members supported it against 79 on the question of confidence. The choice now lay between dissolution or recall of the Radicals. The two courses seemed almost equally dangerous; dissolution was decided upon. At once the agitation, which had till now been confined to Parliament, spread to the country. The Queen Regent was attacked for having set a *Moderado* ministry over a Progressive Chamber, and having flouted the expressed will of the nation by a dissolution, meant to secure a majority submissive to the will of the court. She still further compromised her own position and united her fate with that of Isturiz' Cabinet by signing a decree of dissolution (May 22, 1836), which was really a manifesto against the Progressive party. It spoke of the "blind fury" of the Opposition, and ascribed its action "not to the love of justice but to the hatred of persons." Such policy was calculated to cause the immediate explosion of the threatened revolution; but the civilians waited upon the army, whose attitude was still undecided.

August 24 had been fixed for the assembling of a new Parliament, elected to undertake the promised revision of the Constitution. But even there lay dangers. The late elective Chamber had approved a new electoral law to take the place of Martinez de la Rosa's decree previous to the passing of the



Royal Statute. The new law extended the franchise by lowering the property qualification of electors, and increased the numbers of the Lower House from 157 to 258; but it had not been passed by the Upper House, and was therefore technically void. To revert to the old restrictive decree was clearly impossible; and the ministry decided to waive the question of strict legality, hoping thereby to prove their good intentions to the Radicals. But the Radicals had decided that nothing less than a revolution would rid them of the last shreds of the Royal Statute; and they refused to be bound by anything that might be done by a Parliament illegally constituted.

Terror of the Carlists was added to other causes of discomfort. Toreno, on coming into power, had given the chief command against them to General Luis Fernandez de Córdova. His first task was the easy one of pursuing the dispirited army on its retreat from Bilbao. Overtaking them at Mendigorria he inflicted upon them a loss of 2000 men (July 16, 1835). But he was called off from his victorious march by a second attack on Bilbao, designed by Maroto, in order to create a diversion. Bilbao was relieved for the second time (Sept. 7) by Espeleta, Córdova's general of division, acting in conjunction with Espartero's brigade from San Sebastian, and the British Legion under De Lacy Evans, recently landed at Portugalete. Only after desperate fighting at Arriggoriaga (Sept. 11) was Espartero able to rejoin his chief in command. The whole campaign was indecisive; in the autumn the two armies again faced each other from opposite banks of the Ebro. Córdova's troops, with four-fifths of Spain behind them, were worse supplied than were the Carlists from the resources of their few poor provinces.

After Zumalacárregui's death, the most able commander left to the Carlists was Ramon Cabrera, the sometime seminarist. When, in the spring of 1835, he paid a visit to the little court of Estella, his proved devotion to the cause and the authority he had already gained in the north-eastern provinces marked him

for high command. His cold severity accorded well with Don Carlos' temper; and he returned with a commission to organise the Carlist bands in the mountain region where the captains-general of Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia meet. Constant success, due to skilful leading, made the men of Cabrera's command every day bolder. They supplied stores and treasury by holding to ransom rich provincial towns like Segorbe. By systematic cruelty and faithlessness they sought to cow and terrify the Liberal troops, and particularly the national militia, which everywhere hindered their movements and bravely disputed the mastery of the region between the river Guadalquivir and the lower course of the Ebro. The story of their ferocity is an appalling one. Quarter was rarely given, even to those who surrendered under promise that their lives should be spared. At Rubielos, after the regular troops captured in the town had been enrolled among the Carlists, seventy-five of the volunteer defenders were stripped and ridden down by lancers (Sept., 1835). The Queen's soldiers were hardly less ferocious. Knowing the fate that awaited them, and rightly distrusting promises however solemn, they defended their walls to the last. Families and communes responsible for having furnished recruits to the Carlist ranks were ruined by fines or massacred. When Mendizabal came into power, Cabrera was raiding unchecked in the province of Cuenca; and even Madrid was hardly safe from his bold enterprise.

In October Don Carlos replaced the incapable Gonzalez Moreno, Zumalacárregui's successor in the Basque Provinces and Navarre, by the Count of Casa Eguia, an old officer of King Ferdinand. The results of the change were soon seen. All along their blockading line on the Ebro, the Cristinos were kept restless by the continual threats of an active foe striking from the centre of their half-circle. The pass of Arbalan on the high-road to Guipúzcoa and Bayonne was fortified; and a great effort was made to open communications along the Pyrenees between the Carlists of Navarre and those of Catalonia.

Bilbao, Guetaria, and San Sebastian were blockaded. Córdoba was forced by public opinion to abandon his lines and advance to attack Arbalan in mid-winter in order to save them from being utterly cut off (Jan., 1836). Thanks to the courage of his French battalions and his generals of division, Narvaez and Espartero, he broke through; and, refusing to allow himself to be distracted from his purpose by Canon Batanero's raid into the heart of Castille, he fortified in the rear of the Carlists a line of Navarrese villages from Roncesvalles to Pamplona. He also armed Liberal households along the frontier, so as to enable them to resist Carlist exactions. The presence of the British Brigade allowed Córdoba freedom to come to the rescue of Balmaseda, where his lines had been broken. The successful sortie of the auxiliaries and dispersal of the Carlist forces gathering round San Sebastian (May 5, 1836) gave new spirit to the Liberal population of the northern towns. And indeed it was needed, for their defenders were rapidly degenerating into a ragged mob of half-starved marauders more terrible to friends than to foes.

To no purpose did Córdoba repeat his urgent requests for the sorely-needed supplies; only patriotism induced him to withdraw his resignation. His efforts, moreover, were everywhere hindered by the scarcely veiled hostility of the French authorities, whose sympathies, since the advent of Mendizabal and the triumph of British diplomacy, were wholly lost to the Liberals. The Carlists came and went across the frontier importing arms and supplies unchecked. But, though the reopening of the frontier afforded some relief, the Basque and Navarrese provinces were suffering severely from the continual drain of men, money, and food. Willing as they were, it was evident that they would not be able to resist much longer the pressure of four-fifths of Spain. The Provincial Parliament began to talk of the exhaustion of the country and to grumble at the ruinous taxation they were forced to impose. Don Carlos fell more and more under the influence of the dreary waiters

on Providence known as "the tinsmiths" (*hojalateros*) from continued repetition of the words "ojalá!" "would to God!"

The discouragement fast spreading in the Basque Provinces turned the attention of the Carlists to Cabrera, who, now commander-in-chief of Lower Aragon, was organising the country under his command, and establishing arsenals and depôts. Between him and Nogueras, the Cristino commander, a dismal and terrible rivalry in cruelty extinguished all principles of humanity and soldierly honour. At last Nogueras shot Cabrera's mother (February, 1836). The charge that she had acted as intermediary in a plot to seize Tortosa was an afterthought, and was unsupported by evidence. So little ashamed was this ferocious brute of his act that he declared his intention "to make Cabrera responsible for the death of his sisters as he already was for that of his mother, and to shoot the wives, fathers, and mothers of Carlist leaders five at a time in revenge for each execution carried out by Cabrera." Mina brought eternal disgrace upon a fair name by sanctioning the hideous murder. Argüelles, the well-tried Liberal, sought to extenuate if not to excuse Nogueras' act before the Congress. Some indignation was roused, but it was only momentary. Mina's resignation was not accepted. Nogueras was sentenced to banishment; but the matter was soon forgotten, and he returned to his command. Cabrera in revenge shot six women hostages, and answered Nogueras' circular by ordering his officers to retaliate if possible with greater ferocity. These were no isolated instances of barbarity. Subordinate officers followed the example set by generals, and had even less to fear from publicity. The mob of Barcelona broke into the prison and massacred all the Carlist prisoners in revenge for murders supposed to have been committed by their comrades at San Lorenzo de Morunys, Jan. 4, 1836. When this Carlist stronghold was captured, most of the men believed to have been murdered were found alive; but even this did not save the Carlist garrison from slaughter. Dire indeed was the fate of

the region of Catalonia, Valencia, and Aragon, over which the war raged. Captured and recaptured, the wretched villages paid to successive roving bands heavy penalties for supposed connivance or too ready submission. Undefended villages were burned; murder, even poison, was employed as means of warfare; and private feuds were gratified under the cloak of political differences.

Don Carlos in the Basque Provinces and Cabrera in his own district could control their subordinates; but in La Mancha and on the Pyrenean slopes of Catalonia the Carlists refused to submit to any central authority. They were brigands captained by the boldest and most ruthless. The Carlists were not insensible to the discredit these brought upon their cause; and more than one attempt was made to impose discipline. General Guergué was sent with a body of Navarrese troops, but the Catalans refused to recognise his authority; and, finding that their lawless spirit was spreading among his men, he returned westward at the end of 1835. The command was then given to Maroto; but he too resigned it after six months, disgusted with the lack of discipline and horrified at the cruelty he was unable to repress. On the Cristino side, Mina had been appointed to the captaincy-general of Catalonia by Mendizabal. Impaired health prevented him from taking command in the field; but he showed splendid energy, infused a new spirit in the flagging cause, brigaded the national guard with the regulars, and captured the stronghold of Nuestra Señora del Hort. Though the Carlists defeated his subordinate Aspiroz at Pelotilló, they became discouraged; and desertion reduced their ranks from 25,000 to about half that number.

The glowing despatches in which General Fernandez de Córdoba reported the campaign gave rise to the false hope that the war was rapidly coming to an end. The general himself paid a visit to Madrid to consult with Isturiz's Cabinet. He arranged for the formation of an Army of the Centre under Narvaez to oppose Cabrera, and a large reserve depôt at Burgos

to protect Old Castille. After receiving promises of more regular supplies for his army, he took over the command from Espartero, whom he had left with strict injunctions to act only on the defensive. At the same time (June, 1836) the Count of Casa Eguia was superseded by General Villareal in the command of the Carlist armies ; and a new and startling change in their tactics took place.

Feeling the pressure of want within their own provinces and eager to achieve something which should encourage the courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia to more determined support of their cause, they organised a series of raids into the heart of Spain. The most brilliant, though not the first of these, was made by General Gomez. His object was to rally the Carlists of Asturias and Galicia ; it was hoped that the province would rise, as Navarre, Biscay, and Guipúzcoa had done, as soon as they saw a Carlist force among them. Once safely past the lines of the Ebro, Gomez met with hardly any opposition, for the country was well-nigh stripped of troops. Oviedo, Santiago de Compostela, and Leon, fell into his hands, furnishing men, arms, and supplies ; but the general rising that had been expected did not take place. Finding his direct retreat cut off, Gomez turned southward, joined Cabrera at Utiel, threatened Madrid, and captured a division of the Royal Guards hard by its gate. He visited Córdoba and Almadén, and reached even distant Extremadura. Everywhere he seized the arms of the national guard and distributed them to Carlists. Though followed by a large train of ox-waggon carrying his booty, he managed to evade pursuit, owing his safety as much to the ineptitude of his pursuers as to his own skill. But, whilst with Cabrera he harried the country round Terez, General Narvaez, a soldier of a sterner stamp, overtook and defeated them at Majacete, near Los Arcos (Nov. 25, 1836). Narvaez was prevented from annihilating their scattered forces by the mutiny of a brigade of his own troops under General Alaix. Gomez returned to the Carlist lines at Orduña in



December. In six months he had marched 2500 miles; he had shown how weak Spain really was; and, in spite of defeat and a quarrel resulting in separation from Cabrera, he had brought back a large booty and a force larger than that with which he started.

In the meantime his comrade, Don Basilio, had accomplished a raid hardly less extraordinary. But interesting as these expeditions are from a military point of view, and great as was the consternation they spread, they had but little influence on the course of the war. When Gomez retreated to the Ebro, the fate of the Carlist cause was being decided beneath the walls of Bilbao; during his absence Spain had been transformed by a revolution.

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE RISE OF ESPARTERO. THE FIRST PRONUNCIAMIENTOS. END OF THE CARLIST WAR (1836—1840).

THE Parliament summoned for August 24, 1836, never met. Gomez and Don Basilio had shown the futility of General Córdova's system of blockade on the Ebro. The help of France so often promised by Isturiz was not forthcoming; the hopes so rashly raised were dashed. Mendizabal and his Radicals declared themselves revolutionary; the half-starved army had broken out into mutiny and was murdering its commanders. The great towns refused to be ruled by a court clique whose incompetence was evident, its honesty questionable. Isturiz had been in power but two months when the first mutterings of revolution were heard. Order was with difficulty restored in Málaga and Córdoba when all Andalusia rose to revive the Constitution of 1812. Saragossa, weakly ruled by Evaristo de San Miguel, took her fate into her own hands, elected a junta, and sent envoys to the Army of the Centre urging it to join the revolution. Narvaez, however, succeeded in restraining his troops until Madrid fell to the revolution, and the oath to the Constitution "became a duty instead of a crime." Barcelona sent a warning message to the Queen Regent. Mina, its captain-general, anticipated rebellion by proclaiming the Constitution. General Fernandez de Córdova, grown weary of failure and mutiny, had already resigned

his command on the Ebro. He was only awaiting its acceptance to hand over his authority to Espartero. When the news of the general rising reached him, he retired into France, accompanied by the greater part of his staff. But by this time the Queen Regent had fallen into the power of the revolutionaries.

The court was in its summer quarters at La Granja. Day by day came news of fresh revolts, everywhere triumphant; for the national guard and the mob made common cause, and no troops were at hand to resist them. Still Madrid was held by a sufficient garrison under an unflinching commander. Relying upon General Quesada's approved loyalty, the ministry at first put a bold face on the matter. Queen Cristina published (Aug. 4) a proclamation recalling her services to the cause of liberty in the dark days of King Ferdinand's reign. She declared the revolution to be the work of "an anarchical and turbulent faction intent on profiting by the misfortunes of the country in order to defeat the will of the nation and to arrogate to itself rights that belonged only to its legitimate representatives, and to outrage the royal majesty." On the next day Isturiz appealed to France for such instant help against the Carlists as should enable him to employ some part of the Spanish army against the insurrection. Then came news of the revolt of Badajoz, Valencia, Alicante, Murcia, and Barcelona; but still the Queen, misled by the ministry, refused to be warned and to call the Progressive party to power.

The tidings from the provinces were discussed with feverish interest by the tiny garrison or guard of honour of La Granja, consisting of eight companies and four squadrons under the command of the Count of San Roman. The sergeants, violent Radicals, were eagerly listened to by their men; and the little force manifested unchecked its delight at each advance of the revolution. At last, to the menacing strain of the Hymn of Riego, it assembled in arms, proclaimed the Constitution of 1812, with Isabel as Constitutional Queen and

her mother as Regent. Bearing the colours and accompanied by the junior officers, the soldiers demanded an audience in terms that could not be refused. A deputation, two non-commissioned officers and a private, were admitted; and Sergeant Gomez, its spokesman, after kneeling and kissing hands, set forth the grievances of the land as the spirit moved him. He censured the Regent's refusal to proclaim the Constitution in obedience to the clearly-expressed will of the provinces; he deplored the persecution of Liberals and the dissolution of the national guard. Some wrangling took place between the sergeant and the Queen—herself the wife of an ex-corporal—over the meaning of the word liberty; the royal lady had by no means the advantage. After three hours of hesitation, Cristina sought to satisfy her guard by a promise to submit a proposal for a new Constitution to the forthcoming Cortes. But the deputation stoutly refused the offer; the waiting crowds of soldiers outside became impatient, and broke forth into threats and insulting jeers with regard to the Regent's domestic affairs. Then Cristina, who alone of the Court showed no sign of alarm and did her best to preserve her dignity in her ridiculous and dangerous situation, gave way and signed a decree of three lines ordering that the Constitution of 1812 should be observed until the Cortes decided for the future (Aug. 13, 1836).

When news that the Regent was the prisoner of a few hundred soldiers was brought to Madrid, the Cabinet debated with General Quesada the possibility of an armed rescue. But Cristina had ordered that no troops should be sent. The British and French ministers, moreover, had given their opinion that all attempts to settle the matter by force of arms must fail, and that the Queen must submit at least to a change of ministry. So Mendez Vigo, Minister for War, hurried off with certain bags of gold to bribe or wheedle the mutinous soldiers and to receive the royal person from their hands. He returned to report the utter failure of his mission, and bringing with him

the extorted decrees appointing Radicals to high commands in place of *Moderados*.

The attitude of the capital became momentarily more threatening; the ministers and their known supporters fled abroad, or went into hiding, leaving Quesada to die at his post (Aug. 15). A decree dated the day before his murder ordered the proclamation of the Constitution throughout Spain and the rearming of the national guard. At the same time a new ministry under the presidency of José Maria Calatrava was nominated. Calatrava, an upright and disinterested man, the type of what was then called a patriot, delighted in the atmosphere of revolution. He and his fellows triumphed when the royal family, escorted by its captors, was forced to submit to the degradation of a ceremonial entry into Madrid, with Sergeant Gomez, the spokesman of the mutineers of La Granja, riding by the side of the Minister for War.

It is probable that if Don Carlos had shown a spirit of concession and conciliation after the revolution of August, 1836, he would have rallied a sufficiently large number of moderate men to his cause to secure its success. But Don Carlos cared less for victory than for principle; he believed himself to be the chosen instrument of heaven for restoring a certain form of government in Spain, and he would be King only through fulfilment of his mission. Moreover the Carlists now believed they could impose their own terms. Furious at the treatment she had received, Queen Cristina after the revolution entertained a scheme for the union of the rival dynasties by the marriage of her daughter to the son of Don Carlos. Negotiations were actually begun through the court of Naples, but the Pretender proved unbending as ever. He demanded as a preliminary that his claim to be the one legitimate King should be recognised. Until this were conceded, he preferred the village court of Estella to the court of Madrid. Here Nuestra Señora de Dolores had been solemnly appointed to the

chief command of the Carlist armies ; and Erro, the universal minister, had to contend against a host of jealousies and ambitions, though sanctity rather than ability was the title to advancement. Foreign diplomatists and the leaders of Spanish parties were alike rebuffed when they suggested any modification of the extreme doctrines of autocracy and religious intolerance. The selfish theory that had gathered round the unselfish leader wanted no accession of eleventh-hour labourers to share the spoils about to be delivered into their hands.

Opposed by a resolute foe, and neglected by their weak and bankrupt Government, the state of the Cristino armies had gone from bad to worse. Starved, ragged, and mutinous they welcomed the Constitution whilst Gomez was marching unopposed through Spain in the rear. The success of the Radicals had brought about a decline of French and a corresponding increase of English influence at Madrid. Sir George Villiers, the British minister, aided in the agreement whereby Mendizabal and Lopez were included in Calatrava's Cabinet. It was by his advice that Narvaez was selected, in spite of his political views, to command the expedition that brought Gomez's raid to an end at Majaceite. In the autumn Palmerston sent a British squadron to Bilbao to cooperate against the Carlists. On the other hand Thiers' policy of armed intervention on behalf of Moderate principles and a dynasty related to the House of Orleans was abandoned when his Cabinet fell (Sept. 6, 1836). His successor Molé declared that French blood belonged to France. The legion gathered at Pau and on the point of entering Spain when the mutiny of La Granja took place was dispersed. Louis Philippe, dreading revolution above all things, came to an understanding with Metternich. Austria was pledged not to interfere on behalf of Don Carlos on condition that no French aid was given to Isabel. In Spain the *Moderados*, who had been charged when in power with subordinating Spanish policy to French influence, now



accused their adversaries of being in the pay of England. Suspicion that a commercial treaty ruinous to Spanish industry would be exacted in return for aid given by the British Legion and squadron did much to weaken the position of Calatrava and Mendizabal.

Their first measures had been to revive the greater part of the Radical legislation of the second constitutional period (1820-1823). A general attack was made upon the property of the clergy and nobility. It was intended to fill the treasury whilst gratifying a grudge against classes which had no love for the Radicals. One thousand nine hundred religious houses were suppressed, and their property confiscated. Little advantage resulted to the Treasury, for almost the whole proceeds of the sales were embezzled. A most unjust law called upon landowners to show titles to their property; immemorial possession was declared not to constitute a valid title; and the result, in most cases, would have been confiscation had not the action of the law been defeated by the practice of the tribunals.

The great majority of the Spanish people was still politically indifferent. The revolution had had its origin in the lower middle class; and it was this class that was represented in the Constituent Cortes which met on Oct. 24, 1836. Their position was little better than that of their predecessors of a quarter of a century before, for the Carlists, who held many provinces and threatened the rest, were even more dangerous enemies than the French invaders. The opening speech from the throne spoke of war, anarchy, and bankruptcy necessitating the suspension of payment of interest on the exterior national debt. The tampering of Toreno and Mendizabal had only made the financial confusion worse. A project of proscription against the *Moderados* failed. The Bill conferring on the ministry arbitrary and unlimited powers to arrest and banish, and to confiscate the property of suspects and refugees, was happily thrown out by the determination of the less militant

Radicals to prevent the inauguration of a French Terror. The powers of the Queen Regent were confirmed by an almost unanimous vote.

The Cortes had met in a single Chamber as directed by the Constitution of 1812. But even those who for years had used its name as their battle-cry felt that the famous Constitution was unworkable. An alternative scheme drawn up by the late ministry lay among the archives ; but the new order of things had made an end of the *Moderados* and all their works ; and a commission of nine, including Olózaga and Argüelles, was appointed to devise new fundamental laws for constitutional and monarchical Spain. Their work, approved by the Cortes on April 27, 1837, was superior to the Constitution of Cadiz in that it contained only 77 articles as against the 385 of its predecessor. It guaranteed liberty of the press and the right of public meeting and petition. It promised the abolition of local privileges or *fueros*. Its declaration with regard to religion was meant to disprove the carefully fostered idea that all Liberals were necessarily atheists and sworn enemies of the Church. "The nation binds itself," it ran, "to maintain the worship and the ministers of the Catholic religion which Spaniards profess." The legislature was divided into two houses, a Senate and a Congress. The nomination of Senators from lists presented by the electoral bodies was reserved to the Crown. One-third of the Senate must be renewed at each general election. In the Lower House, chosen by direct vote, one deputy represented each group of 50,000 souls. Deputies were no longer forbidden to present themselves for reelection. The Permanent Deputation of Parliament, a sixteenth century device for restraining encroachment by the Crown, but found by experience to be a useless and irritating hindrance to the ministry, was abolished. The sanction of the Crown was necessary to the validity of an Act by Parliament. To the Crown also was granted power to summon, prorogue, or dissolve Parliament ; but it was ordained

that, failing the summons, Parliament should assemble automatically each year.

The Constitution of 1837 is rather a working compromise than an *à priori* declaration of general principles like its predecessor of 1812. It is a development and extension of the Royal Statute rather than a limitation of the extreme doctrines of 1812. No such moderation had been expected from the committee that drew it up. It was therefore all the more welcome. Its recognition of the necessary prerogative of the Crown and its honest attempt to include within the reformed state all honest Conservatives found favour with the Moderate Royalists. Even those who had been so rudely dispersed by the late revolution accepted its amnesty and returned to work under it. Martinez de la Rosa, the leader of the doctrinaire party, waxed fervid in its praise. "The party which has had no share in framing it," he declared, "not even a voice wherewith to make itself heard, can say with pride to those who drew it up, 'The work is yours, but the principles it embodies are ours; they are those Conservative principles which guide us, and therefore we accept it as our banner.'" Cánovas del Castillo, the great minister of Alfonso XII, expressed a no less favourable opinion. "With a Queen," he says, "who understood and exercised her authority, all that was now wanted was sufficient force to repress and root out the bad habits of impatience, pessimism, slander, instability and anarchy." If we put at the head of the list corruption writ large, we have a fair catalogue of the evils that infected public life when Cánovas himself was in power half a century later.

The first effect of the new Constitution was to divide the Progressive party. One section of it, the non-Conservative, thought that the time had come to cry thus far and no farther. They became Conservatives; and their alliance with the Moderate party hastened the reaction inevitably following upon revolution. Meanwhile the thoroughgoing Radicals formed an Opposition; and Lopez, their leader, abandoned the ministry. Calatrava's

Government grew daily more unpopular. The old Constitution-*alists* or *Doceañistas* considered themselves defrauded; it was hardly worth while to have brought about a revolution to secure so colourless a result. The Carlist danger had come nearer than ever; the Government did nothing to combat, in fact it depended upon, the "gentle anarchy" (the expression is Cánovas') that reigned in the provinces. When Calatrava's Government fell four months after the promulgation of the Constitution, two weak ministers prepared the way for the military dictatorship of Espartero; and Spain, utterly lacking in civil stability, became the plaything of rival generals. In order to understand how this came about, it is necessary to return to the Carlist War.

When General Fernandez de Córdova abandoned the command in the north on hearing of the success of the revolution, it devolved upon General Oráa, known and dreaded under the name of "the Grey Wolf." He was succeeded, a month later, by Espartero; and a notable improvement in the situation of the Cristinos took place. The armies had accepted the Constitution, and were for the moment undistracted by political intrigue. The ministry, fully persuaded of the necessity of vigorously pushing the war, used all means at their command to forward supplies and money. On the other hand, the revolution had given fresh hopes to the Carlists. In order to obtain the loan which they so much needed, and the active cooperation of their friends at Vienna, Berlin, and St Petersburg, it was necessary to gain possession of some important city, and to raise themselves from the position of mere *guerrilleros* in the mountains to that of an established government. A seaport on the northern coast would best serve their purpose. Refusing to be warned by the failure that had cost them the life of Zumalacárregui, they again laid siege to Bilbao (Oct. 24, 1836). The townsfolk, bitterly hostile to the Pretender, supported the slender garrison, enrolling themselves as volunteers and defending their walls with the utmost gallantry. So strong,

however, were the blockading lines that Espartero, with the force at his disposal, did not attempt a rescue from the land side. He concentrated his army at Santander and Castro Urdiales, and conveyed the greater part of it by sea to Portugalete. Thence, with the help of the British squadron, he crossed the river. On Christmas Day, 1836, he defeated the Carlists at the bridge of Luchana and entered Bilbao. The much-harassed city received the title of Invincible, well deserved by its unflinching constancy during the two months' siege. The actual number of killed among its defenders was not more than 240. Espartero, created Count of Luchana, became the most popular and influential man in Spain.

Encouraged by their victory, the Cristino generals decided to invade Guipúzcoa, the heart of the enemy's country, with three converging columns—one from Pamplona under General Sarsfield; another from San Sebastian under Evans, the commander of the British Legion; the third from Bilbao under Espartero. Their united force amounted to 85,000 men. Against them the Carlists could bring only about half that number under the command of the Infant Don Sebastian. Nevertheless the plan failed disastrously. Sarsfield was blocked in the passes by the snow. Evans, after breaking out of San Sebastian by dint of five days' hard fighting, was defeated at Hernani; and San Sebastian was saved only by the presence of the British squadron. Espartero, on hearing of the failure of his comrades, retreated with heavy loss to Bilbao (March, 1837). He rescued himself from the blockade, to which he had been subjected since his victory at Luchana, by taking ship to San Sebastian. There he joined Evans; and their combined forces succeeded in capturing the Carlist lines of Hernani (May 11, 1837). He next cut their chief line of communication with France by recapturing Irun at the end of the main road; and finally, marching through the heart of their country by Lumbier, he reached Pamplona on June 3.

But by this time the main body of the Carlists was far



south, and only the remains of their army opposed Espartero in Guipúzcoa and Navarre. Encouraged by the experience of Gomez and Don Basilio, Don Carlos had decided to quit his loyal northern province, join Cabrera in the west, and invade Spain. Had this plan been carried out whilst Espartero was engaged before Bilbao, and the country was still reeling from the shock of the revolution, it would almost certainly have succeeded. But it was deferred till the middle of May, when Don Carlos with twelve thousand infantry and sixteen hundred cavalry under the command of Don Sebastian crossed the river Arga. In an allocution addressed to his volunteers, he spoke of the Saracens who had once ruled the land as "less impious than your contemptible enemies." With him went a staff of prospective magistrates and ecclesiastical dignitaries sufficient for the country he hoped to conquer. At Huesca he defeated and killed the Liberal general Iribarreri; at Barbastro with equal forces he gained an advantage over General Oráa (June 1); but, by the time he reached Catalonia, he had lost 3000 of his little army. He was coolly received by the local juntas, but overwhelmed with demands for favours of all kinds. His partisans claimed shares in his future kingdom as rewards for their questionable service. He was, moreover, half starved in the wild hill-country; and his troops, driven to marauding, became undisciplined. Baron de Mier, Mina's able successor, hurried from stamping out the centres of a Republican rising at Reus to oppose their march. He inflicted a slight reverse upon them at Grá (June 12); but before the end of the month they succeeded in joining hands with Cabrera near Tortosa.

Cabrera, after quarrelling with Gomez in the autumn, had made his way back with difficulty, and only after suffering a severe defeat, to his native province. During his absence, his stronghold of Cantavieja with its foundry, printing-press, stores and offices had been captured (Oct. 30, 1836). But Cabrera, defeated and wounded, had rallied his men, recaptured Can-



tavieja, and, though opposed by the dreaded Oráa, had again become strong.

Don Carlos' army, when it reached the Ebro, though still undefeated, was little better than a band of half-starved fugitives. It crossed the river in boats brought by land from San Carlos de la Rápita. Cabrera threw open to it his stores drawn from the rich garden-lands of Valencia. A few days of rest and plenty, and the addition of Cabrera's forces, made it more formidable than when it started on its adventurous march.

Whilst the Carlists wasted their time in a further attack on Castellon de la Plana, Oráa had concentrated his troops to cover Valencia. He fell upon the combined Navarrese and Catalan armies (July 14), and gained some advantage, but failed to check their advance. At Cantavieja they were received with wild enthusiasm; the itinerant military court mustered all its splendour; and a great ceremony of kissing hands took place. A month later at Herrera, on the border of New Castille, a great victory was gained. The Cristino troops lost 90 officers and 2000 men, whilst their adversaries had only 100 killed. Meanwhile a second Carlist expedition, starting from the north under the command of Zariátegui, had captured Segovia, La Granja, and Valladolid, and had come in sight of the capital at Las Rozas (Aug. 12).

The distracted Government, instead of devoting its energies to supplying its armies, dictated from Madrid military movements which must, if carried out, have brought disaster. Both Espartero and Oráa refused to obey, and sent in their resignations; but both, in view of the primary danger, were induced again to face the Carlists. The guards outside Madrid were timid; the ministry took the opportunity of escaping by resignation (Aug. 17) from the perilous position. Espartero, now Minister of War, as well as commander of the army covering Madrid, advanced as far as Daroca (Sept. 1); but the Carlists slipped by him. Zariátegui's raiders joined the main body; and on Sept. 12, 1837, Don Carlos occupied the

dreary village of Arganda del Rey, whence he could catch a glimpse of the capital some ten miles distant.

Within Madrid there was a moment of intense anxiety. The regular troops had marched out with Espartero; only the much-abused militia was left to defend the walls. No man knew how many adherents the Pretender numbered within them, or what would be the effect of his printed proclamation announcing that "the hour had rung when the conquering arm of the invincible Don Carlos would break the yoke of a handful of ambitious cowards steeped in all the most horrible crimes. The first general of the age, the conqueror of Morella (Cabrera), will soon occupy the capital; but there is nothing to fear. All has been carefully arranged by the northern Powers. The Prince of Asturias (the son of Don Carlos) will occupy the throne of Spain which his father cedes to him; the daughter of Ferdinand VII will be his wife; and the august widow will return to Italy to enjoy that which is hers by right...The days of the Inquisition and of despotism are gone for ever."

But Madrid resolutely shut her gates and prepared for defence. Espartero was hurrying back. The expected rising within the city did not take place. Discouragement seized the Carlists; and, after occupying Arganda for a single day, they withdrew westward. Their generals quarrelled; their retreat became a rout. Though not overtaken, their army melted away till only 4000 of its 12,000 were left. These reached the Ebro in deplorable condition (Oct. 24), hotly pursued by Espartero.

So soon as the Constitution of 1837 had been voted, an amnesty excluding only Carlists in arms brought back the exiled Conservatives, Isturiz, Martinez de la Rosa, Toreno, and Miraflores. Again the Treasury was empty. The nation, having made itself responsible by an article of the Constitution for the maintenance of public worship, took over the whole property of the secular clergy; that of the regulars had already been confiscated. The suppression of tithes, to date from

1838, was voted. In November, 1836, the payment of interest upon the Exterior Debt was suspended; six months later the Interior Debt too ceased to bear interest. The revenue (estimated) was £8,500,000, the expenditure (actual) £15,700,000; but this total did not include a number of outstanding obligations carried forward from the last financial year. Sales of Church property to the amount of £2,570,000 and the sums paid for exemption from conscription failed to make good the deficit. The Government five per cent. bonds sank to 22; the country was bankrupt; yet the war must be carried on. Lord Palmerston offered a British guarantee on a new loan, but he asked in return a liberal commercial treaty. This was hotly opposed by the manufacturers of Catalonia, whose prosperity has always depended upon rigid protection; and the scheme fell through. The direct tax on lands and leases was raised to twenty per cent. of the annual rental; and the collection of the other taxes was anticipated (August, 1837).

Extremists on either hand were not restrained by the primary danger of the civil war from active expression of discontent. Although the new Constitution was the work of Radicals, and formally accepted by the leaders of the Conservative party, small republican insurrections at Barcelona and at Reus betokened the dissatisfaction of the poorer people at finding themselves excluded from the franchise. On the other hand, the Catholic party denounced the confiscation of Church lands, whilst the army disliked Calatrava's Radical policy. Espartero had not yet attached himself to the Progressive and Radical party. But he was already distrusted by Queen Cristina, who throughout the Regency relied chiefly on the *Moderados*. He too was dissatisfied with the Cabinet; his name was connected with the insurrection of the Guards at Pozuelo (August, 1837), when Don Carlos was far advanced on his march to Madrid. Events were daily tending to put him into the position of arbiter. His bravery was extreme, his personal incorruptibility beyond dispute; the reputation he had founded in America

had been extended by his victories over the Carlists. His greatest talent, however, lay in the power of waiting upon events, and so following public opinion as to appear to lead it. By promoting sergeants in place of the most refractory officers and by persuading others to withdraw their resignation, Espartero restored an unstable discipline among the Madrid garrison and made himself master of the situation. At the same time the ministry, surrounded on all sides by difficulties, resigned, complaining of his hesitating attitude during the mutiny. After refusing the Presidency of the Council, Espartero became Minister for War; but he resigned after a few days, for he preferred to appear as saviour of the country rather than as a member of a weak Cabinet.

The Queen Regent profited by the confusion to call her Conservative friends under Bardaji to power, whilst Madrid faced the Carlists encamped at Arganda. When they withdrew, the rescue of the capital was added to the list of Espartero's services to the country; and his popularity increased proportionately. Bardaji succeeded in passing a moderately restrictive law to curb the scurrility of the press, which now passed all bounds in its attacks upon the Regent. He sold the plate and jewels of the cathedrals and churches to meet the ever-pressing needs of the war. He restricted the franchise to possessors of an income of £150 or of property taxed at £2. The Progressives rallied and overthrew his ministry; but he chose new colleagues and remained in office.

The elections of September (1837) marked the progress of reaction by returning a Conservative majority styling itself the monarchical-constitutional party. It was pledged to the Constitution of 1837, to the secularisation of Church property, and to a policy of peace, order, and justice. The leaders of the *Moderado* party, Martinez de la Rosa, Toreno, and Galiano, supported the new ministry presided over by Count Ofalia, sometime minister of Ferdinand VII. But they did not actually take office, for some of them were declared enemies of the

Constitution. Espartero, still commander-in-chief, refused to pledge himself to Ofalia's policy and again refused the Ministry for War. It was conferred upon his friend, General Latre. "It was the first time," says Cánovas, "that the electors, under a ministry powerless to influence them, had by means of the suffrage undone the work of a revolution."

The Progressives, disheartened and discredited by their late failure, did not at first oppose Ofalia. For a time it seemed as if a coalition between the two parties calling themselves monarchical and constitutional might be brought about. But the Conservative Congress took up an irreconcilable attitude. Though all professed unbounded devotion to the Constitution, not even a vice-presidency was offered to Olózaga or its other authors. The reactionary Cortes soon began to take back piecemeal the more liberal provision of the Constitution. By making over to the Crown the right of nominating mayors or *alcaldes*, they tried to defeat the law establishing representative government in municipalities. They endeavoured to regain the support of the clergy by reestablishing tithes. Neither project was carried, but the proposals served to aggravate the situation, to show the real tendency of the ministry, and to separate parties. The Progressives became fiercely hostile; they soon found a powerful champion in Espartero.

The end of the war was the object for which all parties sighed, and to which the petitions that poured upon the new ministry were directed. The Carlists were again becoming strong. Help from France had been promised so soon as the anti-clerical and revolutionary faction should cease to hold office. But again Louis Philippe refused his aid to the Spanish Conservatives, though they claimed it as supporters of his kinswoman and protagonists against revolution. So bad was the financial situation, that it was debated by Parliament with closed doors.

Whilst politicians wrangled in Madrid, Espartero had returned northward (November, 1837), and by unflinching severity



had restored discipline in the mutinous army. At Miranda General Ceballos Escalera had been murdered by his own troops; at Pamplona Sarsfield, a gloomy and taciturn man, had met with a like fate; Vitoria had been the scene of a mutiny; at San Sebastian the British Legion clamorously demanded its overdue pay. Espartero's methods were drastic, startling, and dramatic, well-suited to the situation. Ceballos Escalera was murdered on Aug. 16, 1837. The state of the army did not allow of the immediate punishment of the guilty battalion. It was sent into La Mancha; and, when three months later it returned to Miranda, the murder was already half-forgotten. Espartero, however, had been awaiting his opportunity. He paraded the garrison of Miranda, and, by a series of complicated manœuvres, surrounded the unsuspecting battalion, placing his artillery in such a position as to render its escape impossible. He then rode forward and addressed the regiments. "Soldiers, last night I saw in a dream my comrade General Escalera. There (pointing to the grave-yard hard by) lies his body; here (pointing to the battalion) are his murderers." Immediately the men were disarmed and decimated by lot. A somewhat similar punishment overtook the murderers of Sarsfield. The army recognised and welcomed the strong hand. Only Espartero would have ventured to act thus. As a soldier, he was at times magnificent. The rank and file, and the non-commissioned officers, were ready to follow him unquestioningly. That this was the case was felt by Calatrava, by Bardaji, and by Ofalia. Conscious that a word from him would be sufficient to overturn them, they grudged his undue influence. Espartero indeed was overweeningly conceited, and loved to make his power felt. Before finally submitting to him, his enemies endeavoured to set up a power to counterbalance his.

Cabrera had again become dangerous in the west. Fierce Carlist bands ravaged the villages of La Mancha unchecked. All the available troops were away in the north, when General



Narvaez received a commission to form, train, and command an Army of the Centre. He had greatly distinguished himself as a general of division under Fernandez de Córdova, and though he had as yet taken up no decided attitude in politics, it was well known that the closest friendship united him to the military chief of the *Moderado* party. His brilliant victory over Gomez and Cabrera (see p. 127) had given him a reputation for skill and daring only second to that of Espartero. He was held in high favour at Court, and had given valuable help in the formation of the Cabinet. Coolly energetic, he now embarked upon a rivalry with Espartero which forms a main clue to Spanish politics during the next twenty years. Madrid could afford him neither pay nor equipment for the troops he was commissioned to raise; but his popularity enabled him to obtain from Provincial Governments, municipalities, and from private persons in the still rich cities of Andalusia, the resources he needed; and he soon had under his command a well-disciplined force of twelve thousand men. He cleared La Mancha of Carlists by methods so stern that they are still remembered by the peasantry, though many wars since then have swept over their plains. Pushing on vigorously towards the Pretender's provinces, he so shook the confidence of the Carlists in their leader Guergué that Maroto was summoned from France to take his place.

Espartero, foreseeing the rise of a dangerous rival, sent in a protest with a hardly-veiled threat. He complained, not without reason it would seem, of a vast *Moderado* plot to put the somewhat discredited and irresolute, though well-intentioned general, Fernandez de Córdova, in his place. He declared that, in furtherance of this scheme, his army was neglected and starved, whilst that of Narvaez was pampered. Córdova remained for the moment in the background; but the rivals, Narvaez and Espartero, threatened resignation unless heartily supported by the ministry. Espartero actually sent in his resignation. It was refused; but riots followed in Madrid; and

the Cabinet fell, not because it had lost control of the majority in Parliament, or because it had forfeited the confidence of the Crown, but through fear of military sedition.

The Duke of Frias, with a neutral Cabinet, succeeded to Ofalia's place with its dangers and difficulties undiminished (Sept. 6, 1836). One or other of the rival generals must be sacrificed ; but it was more than doubtful if Espartero, who was rapidly assuming the airs of a dictator, would submit. It was decided to sacrifice Narvaez. He was recalled to Madrid (Oct. 8), and ordered to the north with his army, to put himself under the command of Espartero. But Narvaez was not inclined to submit tamely to a sentence dictated by his military enemies the *ayacuchos*, so-called from the battle in which the Spanish power in South America perished. They had brought back from America the worst traditions of discipline ; but their former comradeship in arms was a powerful bond between them, and they shared their leader Espartero's hatred of the new man. Narvaez's way north lay through Madrid ; and on October 14 he paraded his forces before the capital. This demonstration was taken as a threat, the more so as Narvaez, at the same time, sought authority to raise his reserves to 40,000 men. The decree was actually granted (Oct. 23, 1838). Narvaez had seemingly triumphed ; but scruples withheld him from provoking an immediate civil war.

At Madrid Narvaez was equally popular with the Court and with the Progressive Opposition. The latter had actually tried to persuade him to seize the capital and overturn the ministry. When he refused to do so they began to look upon him with suspicion, though he had won golden opinions from the leaders of the national militia and other democratic bodies in the south. The Court party meanwhile was timid ; and the Queen Regent, in spite of her sympathies, refused to compromise herself in the coming struggle. The ministry was the plaything and mouthpiece of that one of the two rival generals who seemed for the moment more powerful.

At Logroño the *ayacuchos* were assembled in a conference which resulted in an ultimatum entitled, "A Petition laid before Her Majesty by his Excellency the Count of Luchana etc. with regard to the decree of the 23rd of October, by which the organisation of an army of 40,000 men is determined on." It declared that the project involved a mortal blow to the cause of liberty, and would result in the final triumph of the cause of Don Carlos. The reasoning, indeed, was of the feeblest, but its purport was unmistakeable. If the decree of October 23 were maintained, Espartero and the Army of the North could no longer be counted among the supporters of Isabel II. The ministry gave way on October 31. Narvaez received a despatch communicating to him "the deep regret of the Queen Regent that the failure of his health did not permit him to continue for the time being at the head of the troops that he had succeeded in organising, instructing, and disciplining with so much zeal." The Army of the Centre melted away; and Narvaez withdrew sulkily, as the Great Captain had done centuries before, towards his house at Loja.

Narvaez from this time was numbered among the *Moderados*. General Fernandez de Córdova, whom the party would have set up against Espartero, was living in Seville when, a few days after the events above related, a *pronunciamiento* led by the Radical Manuel Cortina, supported by the national militia and directed against the Government, broke out (Nov. 15, 1838). Fernandez de Córdova added another to the many existing proofs of his weakness of character by allowing himself to be appointed to the presidency of the junta which took the direction of affairs. Cánovas would have us believe that he fell into a trap, and that the *pronunciamiento* was the result of a plot hatched by the Progressives to compromise him. If so, no further proof of his unfitness for leadership is needed.

Had Córdova alone been involved, the matter would have been unimportant; but he succeeded in dragging Narvaez into the discreditable affair. There was no collusion; only the

desperate appeal of a friend induced Narvaez, who a few days before had refused to begin a civil war with every chance of success, to lend his name to an undertaking subversive of all discipline, and condemned, from the outset, to failure. No sooner had Fernandez de Córdova taken the rash step of lending his authority to the *pronunciamiento* than he saw his danger and repented. In tragic style, he wrote to Narvaez, "Come, my friend. Come and succour me; you know that if I saw you drowning, I should cast myself into the water without stopping to consider that I do not know how to swim." Narvaez came to Seville, but he made no effort to infuse new life into the already moribund insurrection. Espartero's opportunity had come; his enemies had been the first to blunder badly, and he took full advantage of their blunder.

Grown used to addressing commands to the ministry, he peremptorily demanded the punishment of Fernandez de Córdova and Narvaez for treason. Of their guilt there could be no question; and they had little reason to hope for mercy. The weak Cabinet of the Duke of Frias had been swept away as incapable of bringing the civil war to a close; and, in its successor, Alaix, the creature of Espartero and the bitterest enemy of Narvaez, was Minister for War and leading spirit. Just two years earlier Alaix had robbed Narvaez of the fruits of his victory over Gomez by provoking a mutiny in the face of the enemy. Narvaez had not scrupled to characterise his action as it deserved. Alaix appointed the Count of Cleonard, well known for his harshness, to try Narvaez by court-martial at Valladolid, far from the region where the offence had been committed and far from Andalusia, where Narvaez was known and beloved. But neither of the two generals implicated was brought to trial. Fernandez de Córdova escaped to Portugal, where he died in 1840. Narvaez took refuge in France. For three years and a half Espartero was left undisputed master of Spain. At the end of that time his overthrow was due mainly to Narvaez. Under Espartero's protection a coalition ministry

carried on affairs while he was engaged in bringing the war in the Basque Provinces to an end.

Desperate as seemed the plight in which Don Carlos returned to the northern provinces in the autumn of 1837, his cause was not yet lost. Uranga, who had been left in command during his absence, had gained several small victories though opposed by O'Donnell, already a general of repute. In Catalonia Urbistondo had fared almost equally well, until the undisciplined bands drove him from his command. But Don Carlos, influenced by the most worthless of his adherents, ascribed his failure to capture Madrid to the fault of his generals. Persuaded that Don Sebastian, Zariátegui, Elío—the best of his well-trying officers—had played him false and were only seeking for an excuse to abandon him, he issued a proclamation (Oct. 29, 1837) accusing them of treason. The Carlists were divided into two factions; and only the most violent and unpractical followed the prince and his *camarilla*. Tejeiro, a worthless creature of the Bishop of Leon, became universal minister and played upon his master's suspicions. The "traitors" were persecuted and imprisoned. Guergué was made commander-in-chief in place of Don Sebastian. Nevertheless the Provincial Governments, in spite of the exhaustion of their districts, called upon them for fresh efforts, and succeeded in raising, in the course of the year 1838, nearly half a million sterling wherewith to carry on the war. But Espartero had again taken command of the Cristino army on the Ebro. In June he regained possession of the important fortress of Peñacerrada, and defeated Guergué, who attempted a rescue. At the same time the famous Don Basilio returned from a foray routed, and with the loss of half his men. Even in this style of fighting, hitherto so profitable, the Carlists now met with reverses. The court of Estella became convinced that a change in the chief command was again necessary; the policy of suspicion which had driven away the most able men and had put in their places the "plain, rough men" (*brutos*), as

they styled themselves, was reversed. But again the choice of Don Carlos fell awry; he called to the chief command the man who was destined to betray the cause. Maroto was one of the disgraced leaders who, for their opposition to the fanatical but astute *brutos* and *apostolicos*, may be called the Liberal wing of the Carlists. He found an able lieutenant in Val d'Espina; and, though intrigue was still rife, the position of the Carlists improved. A victory was gained over Alaix (September, 1838), while Espartero was busied with his scheme to overthrow Narvaez. The Cristinos did not, however, feel themselves sufficiently strong to attack Estella, the Carlist capital.

It was during the autumn of the same year that Don Carlos married his sister-in-law and old friend, the Princess of Beira, the mother of his able nephew Don Sebastian. From that time his interest in public affairs seemed to fail; and no controlling hand checked the factions at his Court. For some time back the party that sought peace and local privileges (*Paz y Fueros*) had been gaining ground. The Carlist motto, *Dios, Patria, y Rey*, expresses, in the order of their importance, the causes for which the Basques and Navarrese fought. They honestly believed that all Liberals were atheists and freemasons, the latter a name of dread supposed to imply devil-worship, black masses, and other hideous and sacrilegious observances. The victory of the Liberal cause, they were assured, would mean the persecution or abolition of Christianity. Their religion was intensely dear to them; the belief that those who died for the cause died as martyrs was carefully fostered by their leaders. It was their strongest motive in their long and heroic struggle. Next to it came *Patria*, in the restricted sense of local autonomy and the cherished privileges to which they owed the simple prosperity of their valleys. Even the Catholic Majesty of Ferdinand and Isabel had recognised their claim to be a "separate nation." Loyalty to their King, or rather overlord—for the King of Spain is Lord of Biscay—was



a real, though less powerful motive ; but it had been sorely tried. Carlos, though an upright and a brave man, was hardly fitted to call forth enthusiastic personal loyalty. Stiff and narrow-minded, he was the tool of faction, ever ready to listen to interested murmurs against the best of his adherents.

The so-called Liberal government of the greater part of Spain had not been followed by the disappearance of Christianity ; and in the north the conviction was gaining ground that life would be tolerable even under Isabel II, provided the *Fueros*, the pride and glory of the race, could be preserved. Peace was ardently desired by the provinces, which for four years had been devastated by a ruthless war, and in spite of natural poverty had maintained, with but slight help from abroad, an army of nearly 40,000 men, a little Court, and a large civil and military staff. The Provincial Assemblies had already declared that their resources were at an end, that the utmost they could do was to find rations ; to pay the troops was no longer possible. The policy of dividing the interests of those who had hitherto been united under the name of Carlists, and of leaving to a section of them only the frigid principle of Divine Right and legitimacy wherewith to adorn their banner, was carefully pursued by Isabel's Government. Since 1835, its agent, Muñagorri, had been at work ; and, though at times disavowed and forbidden to pledge his employers in any way, he had convinced the Basques that peace and autonomy were attainable, though not under the King of their device. Muñagorri had even raised a small body of volunteers to fight against the Carlists.

After the capture of Peñacerrada, Espartero pushed steadily forward, treating obstinate districts with severity, but granting ready amnesty to all who laid down their arms. Meanwhile he had entered into negotiations with Maroto, his former comrade in arms, nominally for the exchange of prisoners, but really with a view to bringing the war to an end (January, 1839). It is by no means certain what was Maroto's motive or when

he resolved to betray the cause. Intrigue from the first made his position well-nigh untenable; but he was determined not to be set aside as Don Sebastian and others had been. He seized at Estella three generals and a colonel, leader of the party opposed to him, and executed them on his own authority, shooting them in the back as traitors, under plea that they were plotting a meeting. But the ringleaders, Balmaseda and Tejeiro, had escaped, and they had possession of Don Carlos' ear. Maroto was deprived of his command and declared traitor, "for his perfidious and base abuse of confidence." He at once marched on Tolosa, where the prince was quartered, and exacted confirmation in his command and a declaration of his "well-tryed patriotism and loyalty." All his enemies were banished from the itinerant Court. A manifesto gave out that Don Carlos had been "highly surprised when by fresh evidence and loyal reports he had been convinced that Maroto had acted in the plenitude of his legitimate power, and guided by sentiments of love and fidelity so often proved in the maintenance of the cause." No plea of compulsion can excuse the signature of such a document by a prince who demanded of his followers heroic self-abnegation. Don Carlos was now the mouthpiece of Maroto; and Maroto was a traitor. The cause was lost.

In the spring the Cristinos were strong enough to invade the Carlist provinces. Espartero, now rid of his rival, drove the disheartened troops of the Pretender from the Carranza valley. His subordinate Leon recaptured the bridge of Belascoain and reopened communication with Pamplona. Espartero was made Duke of the Victory, and pressed forward, burning the crops whilst promising easy terms of surrender, until he crossed the once formidable lines of Arlaban almost unopposed. A Carlist council of war (May 29) decided that it was impossible to resist the invasion; that the outposts of Balmaseda, Durango, and Orduña, must be abandoned; and that *guerrilla* tactics must again be resorted to as at the beginning of the war.

Intrigue and mutiny were rife in their ranks. The irreconcilables were distributing pamphlets to prove Maroto a traitor. The battalion defending Navarre had revolted against his authority. But, even so, Elio succeeded in beating back Leon from Estella. Don Carlos sided with the party opposed to Maroto; but it was impossible to supersede him while more than half the army obeyed him, and it was even invidious to declare him a traitor when his adversaries were treating for peace. A plot to seize and murder him failed.

France and Great Britain offered mediation, though Lord John Hay refused to make his Government responsible for the conditions of peace. The terms offered were generous. The rank and privileges of an Infant of Spain were assured to Don Carlos. All his officers were granted rank in the Queen's army equivalent to that which they held in that of the prince. The real difficulty of the negotiations lay in the clause respecting the *Fueros*. "The captain-general, Don Baldomero Espartero, promises to use his interest to obtain from the Government the fulfilment of its offer to pledge itself formally to propose to the Cortes the confirmation or modification of the *Fueros*." This was felt to be too vague; but it was impossible to obtain any more definite guarantee. Don Carlos would not hear of peace; he merely smiled when told by Maroto that neither the army nor the people would consent to further war. So Maroto took the matter into his own hands. The prince presented himself before the battalions, and tried to rally them to his person; but his reception left him without hope. The Biscayan commander was the first to accept the conditions of peace; he was followed by the Castilians and Guipúzcoans. On Aug. 31, 1839, Maroto came with his staff to Espartero's camp; Carlists and Cristinos embraced; the Convention of Vergara was signed; and the war in the Basque Province was at an end. Of the Navarrese and Alavese some eight thousand remained faithful, and followed their prince when, on September 14, he reentered French territory with a final anathema

against "the infamous traitor and treachery that had sold for foreign gold and recognition of military rank, God, the King, the Country, and the Fueros." The verdict of Cánovas del Castillo is significant. "Equally balanced," he says, "as were the conditions of the struggle, victory belonged to the less imprudent; and it was a wonder that in this painful rivalry the Carlists proved in the long run madder and more foolish than their adversaries. It seems hardly credible that it should have happened thus amidst *pronunciamentos*, quarrels of the best generals, and heated and afterwards irreparable hatred between extremists or Progressives and monarchical constitutionalists or Moderates, continually undermining the throne of the Queen. The peace was not entirely a good one; but it was useful, perhaps necessary...Some there were who marked that the enemy had been vanquished, not by force of arms, but by a treaty very advantageous to the generals, leaders, and officers of the Carlists, and not, in the last resort, so honourable for the nation in general as might be wished, on account of an interpretation given to the article with regard to the *fueros* of the Basque Province."

Even after the Convention of Vergara much remained to be done in north-eastern Spain. For nearly a year after the submission of the province, Cabrera struggled on. In January, 1838, he had captured the almost impregnable position of Morella and made it his headquarters. His factories and depôts, there safely established, kept his men well supplied with arms and food. In March of the same year the Carlists came near capturing Saragossa by a bold surprise. The discouragement of the Basques and Navarrese actually brought an accession to Cabrera's force, for the most resolute spirits of the dispersed regiments joined him. The "Grey Wolf," Oráa, attacked Morella, but Espartero withheld the necessary troops; and, after a brave attempt to storm the fortifications (Aug. 17, 1838), the siege was raised. Cabrera, trusting the defence of Morella to his lieutenant, Negri, had remained in the open

country to harass the enemy and threaten his communications. Further Carlist victories and hideous massacres of prisoners followed. Van Halen, the commander of the Army of the Centre, retaliated; it became necessary for Great Britain to intervene for the second time; and an arrangement for the exchange of prisoners was effected (April, 1839). It has been calculated that the number of prisoners slaughtered by Cabrera before his mother's murder was 180. After that crime 730 perished by his order; and nearly 500 were put to death by his subordinates. Van Halen having failed like his predecessor, O'Donnell, Espartero's *protégé*, was appointed in his stead. Cabrera was now so hated that a subscription was started in Madrid to procure his assassination. O'Donnell was obliged to act on the defensive, for in view of the forward movement that brought about the Convention of Vergara, all supplies were sent to the Army of the North. Nevertheless he frustrated Cabrera's efforts to cause a diversion.

When peace was signed in Guipúzcoa, Cabrera was in a stronger position than ever. The outposts were being pushed forward towards Madrid; on the day that Don Carlos crossed the French frontier Cabrera captured two thousand of the Queen's troops at Carboneras. But now the whole Cristino force, freed by the submission of the provinces, took the field against him under Espartero. Still he did not waver. He gave permission to all whose hearts failed them to make their submission while it was yet time, and he warned those who remained faithful that they must expect hardships and must be prepared to suffer willingly the utmost rigour of military discipline. He set aside the junta that had hitherto cooperated with him, and, left to his own resources, prepared for a desperate resistance; but illness overtook him and defeated all his plans. By the time he was sufficiently strong to take command again his old lair at Cantavieja had been captured. Concentration of all his forces failed to save Morella; but Cabrera was still free and in command of 6000 men, the flower of an army formed

by years of constant fighting. The operations were now confined to the left bank of the Lower Ebro, for amnesty combined with severity against all who harboured Carlists had restored peace in Aragon, Murcia, and Valencia.

A death as harsh as his life had overtaken the grimly famous Conde de España in Upper Catalonia. He had destroyed the town of Ripoll and left only a stone inscribed "There stood Ripoll," to mark the spot. He terrorised a great district by executing in the most public manner batches of prisoners of war or of his own party who had incurred his displeasure. By such means and by mutilation ruthlessly inflicted he had reduced the Catalan levies to some form of discipline; but he was hated by his own men, and it was at their hands he suffered the fate he deserved. The junta seized him in the council chamber, and sent him under escort towards the frontier of Andorra; but his guards had wrongs to avenge. At night, when they came to the river Segre, they beat down the fierce old man with a bludgeon, tied a stone round his neck, and cast him into the river.

Cabrera avenged his death; it was his last effort, for Espartero at the head of an overwhelming force was already in sight of Berga. The Carlist officers had for some time been depositing abroad, in view of exile, the sums levied on their districts. Further resistance was useless; when defection set in it became impossible; and Cabrera sullenly bowed to the inevitable and crossed the French frontier (June 2, 1840). Two thousand of his men followed him. His farewell to the troops was the signal for several suicides; two Aragonese soldiers fought to the death with bayonets in proof of their friendship, refusing separation. To many of these stubborn men life without the cause was valueless.

While the Carlists under Cabrera still held the field in Catalonia, another struggle, less bloody than the former but scarcely less disastrous for Spain, was preparing. The first general election held under the Constitution of 1837 had



unexpectedly returned a Conservative majority. The new ministry, whose President was Perez de Castro, but whose guiding spirit was Arrazola, an ex-professor of the University of Valladolid, proved itself the willing servant of Espartero by sacrificing Generals Córdova and Narvaez in the circumstance already mentioned. In the following spring Parliament was prorogued; in June, 1839, it was dissolved, in order that a majority favourable to the ministry might be secured by the usual means. The Conservatives, foreseeing defeat, abstained from taking part in the election; and the new Congress or Lower Chamber was, with the exception of one member, wholly Radical. All this had been done in obedience to the powerful commander of the Army of the North; for the two rival parties in the state, the Progressives on the one hand, and the Conservative and Court party on the other, were trying to secure his alliance, and using every means to secure it. But as yet Espartero had not declared himself; he had followed a purely personal policy; he was a monarchical constitutionalist like the rest. So thoroughly was the Queen Regent supposed to be under his influence that she was said to "believe in God and worship Espartero." Soldiers and politicians alike looked to him for advancement; ministers feared him and waited on his words; even convinced Liberals had not yet got rid of the delusion that liberty could be conferred by a general at the head of an army.

The Radical Cortes proved as untractable as the preceding ones and bitterly hostile to the ministry. It became necessary to sacrifice the Cortes or the Cabinet. The Queen Regent looked to Espartero for guidance, but he gave none. Perez de Castro and Arrazola had deserved Espartero's approval by their submissive attitude; they represented, moreover, the moderate Conservatives, among whom Cristina naturally looked for allies, whereas the Radicals represented by the Cortes had inflicted on her the insults of the insurrection at La Granja three years before. She decided to repeat the farce of a general election,

in order to fill the Congress with *Moderados*, now in alliance with the ministry. But the Radicals did not take their dismissal as quietly as the Conservatives had done. They protested that the dissolution of a newly-elected Parliament of decided views was a violation of the spirit of the Constitution; they warned the nation that the budget had not been sanctioned, and that taxation was consequently illegal; they appealed to Espartero, and at last the verdict for which all now waited was forthcoming.

Behind the Moderates Espartero ever saw the shadow of Córdova and Narvaez, whose return to Spain and to command he had reason to dread. He cast his sword into the balance. His military secretary, General Linaye, gave to the press a manifesto censuring the ministry for dissolving the Cortes and attempting to pass laws incompatible with the Constitution of 1837. Called upon to disavow, he confirmed it by an open letter to the Regent (Dec. 19, 1839). In face of his threat the Cabinet abandoned their submissive attitude and sought to defend themselves. The general election resulted in a *Moderado* majority of two-thirds (Jan., 1840); Argüelles, Olózaga, Calatrava, Cortina, and San Miguel had kept their seats, and had every reason to be pleased with the course of events which had brought them so powerful an ally. The situation was now clear; the ministry, the majority in the Cortes, and the *Moderado* generals O'Donnell, Leon, and Córdova in Spain and Narvaez in exile were matched against the Progressive Radicals and Espartero, henceforward the champion of the Constitution. The Queen Regent, now that Espartero had failed her, tried to remain neutral; but her eventual alliance with the *Moderado* party was inevitable.

The opening of the session was stormy. The Progressive minority fiercely demanded an account for the acts of violence whereby the ministerial majority had been secured. Madrid, its municipality and its mob, was with them; the galleries of the House were invaded; and clamour drowned the speeches.

Once more an attempt was made to conciliate Espartero. A list of eight names was submitted to him from which to nominate a Minister for War, but he refused the bait held out by the Queen Regent, ironically declaring himself "convinced of the wisdom that marks her determination." His demand for the promotion of his faithful henchman Linaye was granted. Three members of the Cabinet who objected to this further concession were forced to resign. Perez de Castro, however, and Arrazola still remained in power.

After discussing the burning question of the endowment of the clergy, and revising the policy of the revolution by undoing so far as possible the process of the secularisation of the estates of the Church, the Cortes turned to the still more crucial discussion with regard to the municipal law. The importance of the town-councils lay chiefly in the fact that, as guardians of the voters' lists and the whole electoral machinery, they exercised an all-powerful influence over the return of deputies to Cortes. Moreover the town-council of to-day was in revolutionary Spain the junta of to-morrow; and the representative bodies of the great towns were staunchly Progressive. The aim of the *Moderados* was, by enforcing a property qualification on municipal electors, to give the control to the middle-class or Conservative element. They sought also to assign to the Crown the right to nominate *alcaldes* or mayors, and to suspend or dissolve municipalities. Over these proposals the two factions joined issue. The Moderates represented them as necessary measures approved by the nation, as expressed by the Conservative majority in Parliament, whereas the Progressives alleged that their opponents owed their majority to corrupt means, and that they purposed to take back piecemeal the liberties guaranteed in 1837.

While the municipal law was under discussion, the Queen set out accompanied by her daughters and attended by Espartero's wife, for the baths of Caldas in Catalonia. With her went also Perez de Castro, President of the Council, and General

Cleonard, Minister for War. It was intended to combine with the water-cure for the young princesses an interview between the Regent and the commander-in-chief, who was now driving Cabrera towards the French frontier in a final victorious campaign. The interview took place near Lerida (June 27, 1840). It was not unfriendly in character. Cristina sought to win over Espartero by adopting his opinions, whilst he urged her to change her ministry and to refuse to sanction the restrictive municipal law now passing through the Cortes. It was an ultimatum politely conveyed.

The submissive attitude of the Queen Regent was dictated by the circumstances of her private life, which gave those to whom they were known a great and cruel power over her. A few months after King Ferdinand's death she had secretly taken another husband, Fernando Muñoz, a handsome corporal in the Body Guard, whose promptitude had saved her from a carriage accident. Muñoz, though of very humble birth—his parents were small shopkeepers—was a man of naturally good manners; and when, years after, he was presented as the husband of the Queen-dowager, his courtly and unassuming bearing made him a general favourite. But for seven years the marriage was kept a secret from all but a very few, though six children were born of it. Cristina, fond of power and fond of money, had forfeited by re-marriage her legal claim to the Regency and to the large income allotted to the Regent. This was her defenceless side, and those who knew it could sway her by threatening exposure. Espartero was among the number; but events were shortly to prove that he overrated his hold over the royal lady, and that Cristina valued her independence even higher than her position and her fortune.

For the moment a quarrel was avoided. The Queen, according to her own account, refused to pledge herself with regard to the municipal law, but she consented to change her ministry; and Espartero himself agreed to form a Cabinet as soon as he should have brought his campaign to an end. For

this three weeks sufficed; and the victorious general joined the Queen at Barcelona. But in the meantime a change had taken place. In reply to a demand for an outline of his proposed policy, Espartero had written, "The state of fermentation of the chief centres of population of the kingdom, and the justifiable anxiety of good Spaniards who form the majority of the nation, demand such reforms in the system of government as shall give assurance that the Constitution of 1837 shall not be infringed. ...The new Cabinet must begin by a decree dissolving the existing Cortes, and fixing a date for fresh elections; and it would be well that these should be the product of free choice, and that parties should refrain from intrigue to procure the election of the several factions...The measures (municipal) proposed to the existing Cortes, and discussed by them, must be annulled by refusal of the royal assent in order that the minds of those who consider the Constitution violated by them may be set at rest. Thus confidence in the august Queen Regent and affection towards her will be increased. Announcement must also be made of the presentation of other projects in harmony with the fundamental law of the State...." It was well-nigh impossible to treat with one who thus disputed the right of the Cortes to alter or reform the laws of the land, who, whilst deprecating party-spirit and pressure at elections, demanded the dissolution of a duly elected Parliament because its majority was not of his own way of thinking, and who set himself up as the sole interpreter of the Constitution.

Barcelona had received the Regent with cheers for Espartero, and clamours against the proposed municipal law. The attitude was that of all the great towns, including the capital. Its captain-general, Van Halen, an intimate friend of Espartero's, made no secret of his opinion with regard to the burning question. The attacks of the scurrilous press and its allusions to the Regent's private life were more outrageous than ever. Espartero entered the capital of Catalonia in triumph. Cristina was in his power; his troops protected her from the mob, which



daily became more violent and clamorous. But she sacrificed her Conservative friends, whose good-will she believed to be necessary to her daughter's throne, and became a mere instrument in the hands of a general who, though unaware, was himself the tool of an extreme Radical faction. The text of the municipal law, duly passed by both Houses of Parliament and wanting only the Regent's signature, reached Barcelona on the same day as did Espartero. The same evening the document was returned duly signed.

The challenge thus given was at once taken up by Espartero. In a braggart letter appealing directly to revolution, he resigned all his offices and titles under plea that the Regent had broken faith with him (July 15). On the advice of the President of the Council this resignation was refused; and an assurance was sent to the autocratic general that he still enjoyed the confidence of the Regent. Espartero, however, refused to take back his word, but he still remained at the head of his troops. Encouraged by his attitude, if not directly provoked by his henchman, Van Halen, riots broke out in Barcelona; and the Regent was dependent for personal safety on the man who dictated terms to her. Espartero paraded the streets escorted by the mob and bidding them be patient, for the Constitution was safe, "thanks to the immense power of its defenders." The ministry, which had only awaited the validation of its municipal law, having been practically dismissed a month before by Espartero's appointment on the termination of his campaign, now resigned. Cristina left Barcelona for Valencia to put herself under the protection of O'Donnell, who, like Diego Leon and other Conservative generals, had made formal offer of his sword in her service.

But the battle was already hot. Madrid "pronounced" in favour of Espartero (September 1). Its municipal council, supported by the national militia, refused to submit to the law that deprived it of its power. The captain-general, who had attempted to resist the assembly of the militia, was expelled;



the civil governor was imprisoned. The revolution triumphed without blood. Madrid was acting in concert with other great cities, determined to defend the privileges bestowed upon them by the Constitution. A junta was constituted to carry on the government. It declared itself independent until a satisfactory ministry should be appointed. It put the capital in a state of defence and scolded the Queen Regent (September 4), telling her that "nothing so exposes the dignity of the crown, nothing so compromises its power, its authority, and its very existence, as an illegitimate claim to place itself above the law...The perfidious counsellors of your Majesty...have not hesitated to put a malicious interpretation upon the clamour of public opinion, and, abusing our patience and long-suffering, to bend your Majesty's mind to a system of reaction no longer possible in Spain." The Madrid junta was in communication with similar bodies throughout the land; and negotiations were on foot for the formation of a central or supreme junta in which all the local juntas should be represented. It also corresponded with Espartero, who still lingered at Barcelona, and sent for his guidance a programme on the fulfilment of which depended its confidence and favour. It demanded (1) that the Regent should publicly denounce to the nation her perfidious counsellors; (2) that the whole court should be changed; (3) that the new municipal law should be annulled; (4) that the Cortes should be dissolved; and declared (5) that the people should continue in arms until all these demands were fulfilled.

Espartero, as was his wont, hung back until the cause which he was supposed to lead was triumphant. To the message of the junta he sent an indecisive answer, blowing hot and cold. Manuel Cortina, the energetic Radical leader, started from Madrid to win him from his wavering to a decided attitude with regard to the events he had provoked. Meanwhile he refused (September 7) to obey the explicit order of the Queen Regent to march against the rebels at Madrid. He answered her in a rambling and half-insolent letter, renewing his recom-

mendations that she should observe the Constitution, dissolve the Cortes, and select a ministry of six patriots—"patriot" was a title to which the extreme Radicals laid exclusive claim, and which they were fast rendering both ridiculous and hateful.

Cristina made some show of yielding, and as a last resort called upon Espartero to form a ministry. The arrival of Cortina, however, again swayed him to the other side. The clever lawyer succeeded in leading him off to join the junta at Madrid. He was now dictator, for he was at the head of an army of which the rank and file at least were devoted to the chief who had often led them to victory ; he was President of the Council with mission to form a Cabinet ; and he was at the same time the real though not the nominal head of the junta.

Led by Calatrava, Rodil, and Evaristo de San Miguel, the junta aimed at wider measures than mere repeal of the municipal law, and a change of ministry. It demanded a new Regent or Regents, and that the forthcoming Cortes should be empowered to alter the Constitution by abolishing the Senate. Leaving these Radical proposals for future discussion, Espartero chose a ministry with Cortina as Minister of the Interior, and set out accompanied by it to confer with, or rather to impose terms upon, the Queen Regent at Valencia. Their plan was that all blame should be cast upon the late minister, whose works Queen Cristina should publicly abjure ; and that a new epoch should begin by prosecution of those who had mismanaged affairs in the old.

But, hampered as she was by her secret marriage, and blockaded in Valencia by the revolution, Cristina refused to humiliate herself by recantation and by denouncing her friends at the bidding of rebels. After formally admitting the new ministers to their offices, she announced her fixed resolve to abdicate. No remonstrance served to turn her from her purpose ; and the first duty of the new ministers was to draw up the message announcing the abdication of the Regent to the Cortes. Over it some disagreement arose, for Cortina wished

to give the Queen's second marriage as the reason for her abdication. Cristina, on the other hand, desired to lay the blame for making her position untenable at the door of the Radicals, and to justify herself in the eyes of the nation. But the ministers were naturally unwilling to publish such a manifesto against themselves; and a compromise was arrived at. A short and colourless document was drawn up, mentioning "the present state of the nation, the delicate nature of my health, and my inability to yield to the exigencies of some of the terms." The poet Quintana, a Liberal of the early days, was appointed Governor to the young Queen Isabel; and it was in his charge that Cristina left her daughter when she sailed for Marseilles (Oct. 17, 1840).

The struggle had been between the legal and constitutional institutions of the country and the chief of the army, egged on by a noisy minority. How small was this minority was perceived only when the defeated party had time to gather. Espartero the soldier was respectable; Espartero the politician was contemptible. He was the first, says Cánovas, who consciously used the Radical programme as a means towards the gratification of personal ambition. Riego and the sergeant of La Granja had been blinded by passion and by ignorance, but not by ambition or by interest. It was indeed the beginning of a new epoch.

## CHAPTER VII.

### ESPARTERO'S REGENCY (1840—1843).

THE revolution had been mainly the work of Manuel Cortina, now counted among the extreme Radicals, though so lately he had played a leading part in the unsuccessful *pronunciamiento* that resulted in the banishment of Narvaez and Córdoba (see p. 149). But, though the real workers were the chiefs of the juntas, Espartero was the hero of the hour. Without a better qualification than personal bravery and a kind of ostentatious frankness that delighted the mob, ignorant and vain, stiff and pompous, he found himself at the age of forty-seven charged with almost unlimited power for good or evil. By a strange mixture of awkward obstinacy and timorous groping for a lead at moments when decision was most urgently needed, he squandered in three years a fund of popularity that should have lasted a lifetime. The seething of revolution brought him to the surface; but, as soon as a strong current of public opinion, a current of which he had overrated the depth and permanence, ceased to support and guide him, he sank.

An interim Regency (Oct., 1840—May, 1841) was undertaken by the ministry which the revolution had imposed on Queen Cristina. With Espartero at the head it entered on the difficult task of reducing to order the unruly forces by which the revolution had been brought about. The country was studded with juntas; even villages had declared themselves independent of the central authority, and had resolved

not to submit until fantastic political programmes devised by local wiseacres should be fulfilled. The public service was utterly disorganised ; the " patriots " had fallen upon the spoils and pushed their claims with threats and clamour. Comfortable Government employment was what they demanded in reward for their services. Four thousand chose the Post Office as the scene of their future activities ; two thousand four hundred fancied that their abilities fitted them for handling public monies in the employment of the Treasury. In granting or promising appointments, the self-constituted authorities had not waited for the approval of the central Government ; nor had they limited their action to local affairs, as did the village junta which, after due deliberation pompously recorded in minutes, made use of its momentary independence to change its bellringer for one more in sympathy with the new political conditions of the country.

The first step was to get rid of the inextricable confusion of local juntas by absorbing them in larger associations. They were dissolved, while those of the provincial capitals were confirmed in their functions, and enlisted as aids to the central Government. Before the end of the year the ministry found itself strong enough to suppress these also. But this was not done without provoking a vigorous protest from the Radical extremists represented at Madrid by the central junta. These were the fervid spirits who looked to Cortina and his comrades to carry out, when in power, the policy which they had advocated when in opposition. The test question was the abolition of the Senate, now the stronghold of the Conservative party. But the Government held strictly to the Constitution, which directed that one-third of the Upper Chamber only should be renewed at each general election. Many were alienated by disappointment ; and the disruption of the victorious faction began. The members of the late Cortes found courage to issue a dignified protest against the charges heaped upon them.

During the Carlist War the army had increased out of all proportion to the permanent needs and financial resources of the country. Its numbers had been still further swelled by addition to its ranks of the Carlists who took advantage of the Convention of Vergara guaranteeing them their grade and pay in the service of their late enemies. The ex-Carlists had rendered important help in the final campaign against Cabrera ; to withdraw their commission would have been to violate a solemn agreement. On the other hand it was not expedient to favour them at the cost of those who had fought for Queen Isabel from the first. With the privates the matter was simpler, for their only wish was to return to their homes. By disbanding militia and volunteer regiments the soldiers were reduced from two hundred and forty thousand to a hundred and fifty thousand. But the burden of the army was still great, and it continued to drag Spain still further into the depths of insolvency. Pensions were granted to officers placed by their own consent upon the retired list. The army, feeling itself threatened, became a standing menace to the civil authority, the centre of intrigue, the scourge, and the vampire of Spain.

Something was done to reestablish public credit by formal recognition of the loans raised by former ministries. To pay the interest due upon them was not possible ; but bonds bearing nominal interest at three per cent. were issued to its amount. The Ministers of Finance took possession of the whole property of the secular clergy ; that of the regulars was already sold, and the proceeds spent. The Constitution of 1837 declared the nation responsible for the maintenance of public worship and its ministers ; *ergo* the Church had no longer any need of property, whereas the nation was in sore straits. But the parties interested recognised that confiscation was at least as much an anti-clerical as a financial measure. The Papal *chargé d'affaires*, who had held the place of the Nuncio since the Pope had repudiated the claim of Ferdinand to bequeath his throne to his daughter, protested indirectly.



His protest was directed nominally against certain administrative measures which he represented as violations of the rights of the Church. The challenge was taken up and he was expelled. Pope Gregory XVI then intervened, and in an allocution (March, 1841) reviewed the conduct of Spanish Governments towards the Church since the death of the late King. He declared invalid all measures infringing its ancient rights and privileges. This was a declaration of war. Opposition to the Liberal Government became a religious as well as a political duty to those whose ideal was traditional Spain.

On reaching Marseilles, Queen Cristina published her wrongs to the world, and specially to the Spanish people, in the tragic style of the romantic school. At her request her version of the events that had led to her abdication was published in the official *Gazette*; but with it was the antidote in the shape of a ponderous ministerial refutation. Her near relationship to the House of Orleans, and the deference with which she had always treated its head, secured for her not only a safe retreat but a champion. Louis Philippe could not invade Spain on his kinswoman's behalf, for he was bound by the Quadruple Alliance; but he did not conceal his intention of bringing about her restoration by intriguing in Spain and by lavish expenditure of French money. He lived in terror of revolution; this was an opportunity for combating it. The Spanish Radicals always looked to Great Britain for support; and the British Government was the only one that had not frowned upon the new order. This alone would have been sufficient to arouse jealousy in Paris; but more far-reaching schemes were hatching. Isabel was still an infant when the question of her marriage was already agitating European courts. If her kinsman, the King of the French, defended his right against Liberal encroachments, and those of the Church against freethinkers, he would establish a strong claim. M. Thiers, who during the latter part of the Carlist War had helped the Cristinos by neutralising the French fron-

tier, was succeeded (Oct. 24, 1840), about the time of the arrival of the ex-Regent in Paris, by Soult, but the ruling spirit of the Cabinet was Guizot, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. His policy was to combat British influence at Madrid. The Spanish Government sent Olózaga as ambassador to France to break up if possible the dangerous alliance between the King, the ex-Regent, Guizot, and the banished Spanish Conservatives.

The Cortes had been summoned for March 19, 1841. The general election was preceded by provincial and municipal elections under the law saved by the late revolution from abolition. The Government ostentatiously refrained from pressure; and indeed pressure was unnecessary, for the tide was still running strongly in its favour. The provincial and municipal assemblies showed strong Radical majorities: only two Republicans and one Conservative, or a total opposition of three, presented themselves in the Lower Chamber. After formal recognition of the abdication of the Queen Regent, and approval of the acts of the interim Government, the question of a new Regency was considered. There seemed to be but one solution—Espartero; yet it was only after a fierce wrangle, lasting two months, that this solution was reached. The first question raised was as to the number of the Regency—whether a single Regent, or three, or a commission of five, should be appointed. Those who did not share the general belief in Espartero's political omniscience were in favour of giving him two assessors. Thereupon Espartero suddenly threw off his cloak of lofty indifference, and, against the advice of Cortina, the most judicious of his friends, angrily resisted the proposal, threatening to retire into private life if he should be unable to agree with the Cortes as to the composition of the Regency. He was becoming rapidly more egotistical and autocratic; and he had his way. The question was decided by the two Chambers voting together; the Upper House contained about a score of Conservatives; to these and to ministerial pressure he owed a majority of seventeen. A Regency of one

man was voted, but Espartero's undisguised attempt to impose his will had created a determined Opposition. On the final issue 179 votes were cast for him, against 103 for Argüelles, and 5 for Cristina (May, 18, 1841). The ministry resigned in order to free the hands of the new Regent ; they advised that their successors should be chosen among those who had taken no active part in the revolution.

Espartero unwisely accepted their resignation, and thus lost the invaluable aid of Manuel Cortina. After Cortina the cleverest man of his party was Salustiano de Olózaga, the fervid orator and cunning manager of majorities. To him Espartero owed his position as sole Regent ; but, puffed up by confidence in his own powers, he sent Olózaga to combat the schemes of the counter-revolution in Paris, and to the general astonishment charged his predecessor in the post with the formation of a ministry. Antonio Gonzalez's only claim to distinction was a subordinate part in the revolution ; with the exception of Evaristo de San Miguel, he chose as colleagues men as obscure as himself. Thus Espartero contrived to disagree with Lopez and Fermin Caballero as to the number of the Regency, to sacrifice Cortina and to disappoint Olózaga, the most influential men of the party which had made him. The programme of the new ministry—conciliation, recuperation, friendship with the Republics of South America, improved public education, reduction of the army, financial reform, and the sale of national property—was indeed unexceptionable ; but the leaders of the Progressive party were now in opposition.

Though Queen Cristina's second marriage and consequent forfeiture of the guardianship of her daughter was not yet officially announced, her absence rendered it necessary to supply her place. In order to combat intrigues and at the same time to gratify a democratic delight in the exercise of authority over royal persons, the household of the infant Queen was chosen among those who had no previous knowledge of the corrupting influence of courts. Argüelles, the Puritan (*el*

*Santón*, President of the Lower Chamber, became guardian; Quintana was confirmed in his post of tutor (*Ayo*): the Marquesa de la Romana, an austere dame, was appointed Lady of the Bedchamber, and the widow of the democratic guerrillero Mina, governess. The private virtues of these persons were as much beyond suspicion as their Liberal principles; but their company was ill suited to charm a precocious and self-willed child of eleven. Isabel flouted and mocked her directors at the bidding of such members of the old aristocracy as had access to her.

Her mother took the matter more tragically. Urged by her Moderate friends and supported by Louis Philippe, she formally protested (July 19, 1841) to the Spanish Cortes and to foreign Powers against the violence which had driven her from her natural and legal position at the side of her daughter. Casting off the caution and respect with which she had hitherto spoken of Espartero, she compared his conduct with that of those "who at Valencia outrageously trampled under foot the laws which they of all men were bound to defend." Many ears were open to her words, many hands eager to undertake the work of counter-revolution. The nobility openly sided with her; those who still held positions at court resigned; the disaffected generals were mustering; all eyes were turned towards Paris. Cristina's protest was a formal declaration of war against the new *régime*. The three months that followed saw several military insurrections and a most dramatic attempt to seize the Queen's person. They failed only through mismanagement; the ill-laid train caused a series of partial explosions instead of a general one. The course of events, however, sufficed to show that Espartero, now become a civilian, was rapidly losing his hold over the army.

If the northern provinces were no longer Carlist, the country districts at least were strongly anti-Liberal, and could be roused by a call to defend the Church and the Throne, especially when artfully combined with the cause of their

privileges. Don Carlos had expressly forbidden his followers to take part in the movements directed to bring about the restoration of Queen Cristina and the overthrow of Espartero. He represented them merely as traps set by the Liberals to catch the unwary faithful; but, nevertheless, many leading men of the provinces were implicated when (Sept., 1841) O'Donnell, freshly returned from an interview with the ex-Regent, attempted to lead out the garrison of Pamplona to bring about the restoration. At Bilbao, at Saragossa, and at Vitoria like attempts were made, but all were unsuccessful; the insurgents were captured or driven across the frontier. Though the superior officers were for the most part Royalists, the non-commissioned ranks were Liberals, and still devoted to Espartero. Sergeants have ever played a great part in Spanish military politics.

In Madrid the insurrection failed through faint-heartedness at the decisive moment. Yet its very rashness nearly brought success. Acting on information received, the ministry had removed from the capital that part of the garrison which it most distrusted, and had put in their place regiments on which it could rely. But Generals Manuel de la Concha and Diego Leon were not to be deterred. On the night of Oct. 7 Concha set out with three hundred men of the Regiment of the Princes to attack the great palace that overhangs the desolate open country on the extreme west of Madrid. He had expected to be joined by the Body Guards, but was not so discouraged by their failure as to desist. He knew that the palace was almost defenceless; its guard in fact consisted of eighteen men of the Corps of Halberdiers, a kind of inferior gentlemen-at-arms, generally old soldiers, whose picturesque uniforms gave brilliancy to court ceremonials. Into the court of the palace and up to the very door Concha and his soldiers passed unquestioned, but they had not counted with Colonel Domingo Dulce of the Halberdiers. Half of his little troop fired from the windows of the palace upon the companies massed below; half held the



great staircase on whose marble lions Napoleon laid his hand in token that he had conquered Spain. At midnight Leon arrived, but without the expected reinforcements. He came indeed to tell Concha that the regular troops faithful to the Government, together with the national militia, were about to surround him. At three o'clock in the morning the attacking party sought to retreat. But it was too late. They were overtaken by cavalry and dispersed. Concha escaped, but Leon was captured; a week later he was shot. In a well-ordered country the penalty of death would not be considered too severe for his offence; its only excuse would have been success, and he had failed. But in Spain the standard of political and military duty was so degraded that his death was attributed to cold-blooded revenge; only his youth—he died aged 31—and his brilliant exploits as a leader of cavalry in the Carlist wars were remembered. His death-warrant was the doom of Espartero's waning popularity.

The rescue of the Queen was due to the energy and resource of Manuel Cortina, upon whom the command of the national militia had chanced to devolve on the eventful day. Espartero had done nothing; and his reputation suffered accordingly. The failure of their associates and the miscarriage in the north and in the capital obliged the other leaders of the party that sought to bring back Queen Cristina to defer their plans. Projected risings under Narvaez at Cadiz and under Pavia at Barcelona were postponed. At the latter place and at Valencia juntas sprang up to resist the counter-revolution. But so great had been the danger that, if Guizot's *Memoirs* are to be believed, the Government had actually contemplated carrying off the child-Queen to Cuba to put her out of reach of reckless men like Concha and Leon. Enough had been done to show that the revolutionary Government neglected a necessary precaution when it failed to proscribe and banish the Opposition.

Madrid had been saved by the national militia; and it



was to them that Espartero's congratulations were addressed. In their charge he left the capital when he started on the day following Leon's execution (Oct. 15) to restore order in the northern provinces. By the Convention of Vergara the question of the maintenance of the privileges of the Basque Provinces had been reserved for the consideration of the Cortes. Espartero had bound himself to secure their favourable consideration. Shortly afterwards (Oct., 1839) it was unanimously resolved by the Cortes that the *Fueros* should be preserved "in so far as they were consistent with the constitutional unity of the country"; and that, after consultation with the local Parliament, such changes should be introduced as the interests of Spain and the advantage of the provinces themselves demanded. It was far from being a satisfactory or definite settlement. The central administration began to encroach upon local privilege; and the Basques began to perceive that the ancient rights which they had so strenuously defended were slipping from them. Their resentment was expressed by participation, despite Don Carlos' prohibition, in the general conspiracy to overthrow Espartero. Against him they were particularly incensed, for they had considered his ambiguous assurances as a guarantee; and the encroachments that followed seemed a breach of faith.

Whatever may have been Espartero's original views, he now went north with the intention of punishing the provinces and of taking full advantage of the opportunity given by late turbulences. By a decree dated Vitoria (Oct. 29, 1841) he suppressed without opposition the most important of the *Fueros*. Biscay and Guipúzcoa were deprived of the special magistrate who had hitherto acted as royal assessor to the local Parliaments. Civil governors were appointed as in the rest of Spain. The powers of the local Parliaments were transferred to Provincial Deputations, in accordance with the Constitution. The municipalities and courts of justice were made uniform with those of the rest of the kingdom.

The fiscal frontier of the Ebro was broken down; and the Spanish customs dues hitherto collected only at the seaports of San Sebastian and Pasages were now imposed along the land and sea frontier. The provinces hitherto bound to provide only for the defence of their own territory were subjected to military conscription. Little was left, beyond public works, education, and the maintenance of the Church, to assemblies which had asserted their right to refuse or approve the writ of even the most autocratic King. It was a step towards the unification of Spain; but it was a step towards the centralisation that has proved fatal to some of her best interests. The cost, moreover, was known only thirty years later when the disaffection of the mountaineers caused another civil war. It would have been well if part at least of the liberties of the privileged provinces, instead of being suppressed, could have been extended to the rest of Spain.

Espartero was able to return to Madrid at the end of November (1841), and was greeted with delirious enthusiasm as the Peacemaker; but late events had shown that the Regency was weak, and that its forces were not under control. The Royalists had been beaten in the first bout and had lost a few adherents; but the executions carried out had been most damaging to the party that inflicted them. Its adversaries burned to avenge the blood of their martyrs; and it was evident that they would shortly renew the attempt. Meanwhile Queen Cristina hastened to disavow complicity in the late insurrection. She refused, however, at the bidding of Olózaga to condemn explicitly its aims and methods. Her very disavowal was an indictment of the Government that had deprived her of her throne and her daughter, had broken the faith pledged at Vergara, and so outraged the Church as to bring upon the nation the wrath of the Holy Father. Such open encouragement to revolt could not be borne in patience by those whose "odious tyranny" was held up to reprobation. Cristina's pension was withdrawn; and her expulsion from French terri-

tory was demanded. When Guizot met the request with a flat refusal, the Government of the Regency protested against the conduct of France to the ministers of the Powers in Madrid and appealed to the British Government. Peel was now carrying on Palmerston's policy of aiding and in part directing the Regency. The British ambassador, George Villiers, was obeyed in Madrid as an oracle on all that concerned representative and constitutional government. But Louis Philippe was bent on picking a quarrel. After lavishing money on O'Donnell's attempted rebellion, he sent to Madrid a new ambassador with instructions to flout the Regent by refusing to present his credentials to any but the infant Queen in person. Espartero demurred; the ambassador demanded his passports; and only a *chargé d'affaires* was left in Madrid (Jan., 1842).

Espartero's following in the Cortes had ceased to be a majority; and only a vigorous onslaught was needed to overturn the ministry. It had carried through some useful legislation, notably the abolition of an obsolete law giving to occupiers of dwelling-houses permanency of tenure without increase of rent unless the owner were prepared to occupy in their stead for five years. The value of town property doubled; and the increase of rateable value enabled sorely-needed municipal improvements to be carried out. Sales of the Church property continued; but so corruptly and ineptly were they managed that but little money came into the Treasury, and the deficit of the budget was not materially reduced. It was found necessary to farm the stamp duties and the salt monopoly for six years. The maintenance of the clergy, guaranteed by the State, had been charged to the municipal budget. It was hoped that the taxpayer would be less clamorous for a large and well-endowed establishment when the necessary funds came directly from his pocket. Antonio Gonzalez's ministry had been saved by a very narrow majority when its general policy and its hesitating and feeble

action in the face of rebellion had been attacked by the Opposition under Cortina, Olózaga, Lopez, and Fermin Caballero (Feb., 1842). Its answer to the speech from the throne was debated for thirty-four sittings. It fell in May, when some questionable dealings between the Treasury and the great banker Salamanca were brought to light.

Espartero, when it was already too late, sought to rally the disaffected. But their resentment was too deep to be overcome. The Opposition was divided into three groups, the several personal followings of Cortina, Lopez, and Olózaga. The situation might have been saved by winning over one of these groups; but Cortina and Lopez were again passed over; and, when Olózaga refused to form a coalition Cabinet, it was evident that troubles were near at hand. General Rodil undertook the task at Espartero's bidding, and succeeded in getting together a ministry of second-rate men, devoted, like himself, to the Regent. But the Opposition united against him; and prorogation was found necessary as soon as an unsatisfactory budget had been passed and the number of the army had been fixed at 100,000 regulars and 40,000 reserves. Regent and ministry alike had become more unpopular both in the Cortes and in the country at large when the law compelled them to face Parliament again in the autumn (Nov., 1842). The election of Olózaga to the Presidency of the Lower House by a large majority was an act of direct hostility against the Regent. The session was short and stormy. Disturbances in Barcelona were fostered by Lesseps, the French consul-general, acting under the orders of Guizot's Government with a view to bring about Espartero's downfall and the restoration of Queen Cristina. For these disturbances the Opposition blamed the Government. It cost a great effort to secure a vote of confidence; and even so a menacing rider was added recommending "legal measures" for the pacification of the principality. It was an indirect condemnation of Espartero's usual high-handed military methods. Then the Cortes were again prorogued;

and Espartero set out for Catalonia, accompanied by the President of the Council. The disturbances at Barcelona proved the immediate cause of Espartero's downfall; they had their origin in deep-seated and still operative political and economic aspirations. A brief explanation of these aspirations is therefore necessary, and will serve to illustrate the present position of the region that has been called, not inaptly, the Lancashire of Spain.

The Catalans no less than the Basques are "a separate people," cut off from the rest of Spain by ethnological characteristics, by language, by tradition, and by industrial interests strongly contrasted with the agricultural and pastoral interests of their fellow-countrymen. They are artisans, manufacturers, sailors, and merchants, with all the marks of a progressive race. Their civilisation and their ideals resemble the French rather than the Spanish type. Their interests are so often in conflict with those of the rest of Spain that they feel the union to be a burden rather than an advantage. Centuries of common gloom and misfortune have not sufficed to weld them into the nation or to efface the memory of former independence. They are an active and progressive people unequally yoked to a backward and Conservative aggregate. Barcelona resents the misgovernment of Madrid. In the War of the Spanish Succession, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Catalans took the losing side, and were punished by the Bourbon dynasty with loss of their remaining liberties. Sulkily submitting, they turned to their industrial pursuits, and, thanks to the protected market of the vast American colonies, they grew rich and prosperous. In the War of Independence they took hardly any part. The French invaders gave them a better government than they had hitherto enjoyed; their province was the last to be restored to Spain. It had not, like the rest of the country, been devastated by the war. Catalonian commerce suffered from the loss of the American colonies, but it had still the home market as well as that of



Cuba; its cottons and woollens clothed nearly all Spain. Constant communication with foreign countries, and specially with France, widened the views of the Catalans. Already democratic by temperament and tradition, they became eager disciples of the French Revolution. Their political education advanced apace; instead of lingering like the rest of Spain in the background, they readily absorb and are eager to practise the most advanced political and social theories. The above remarks apply only to the capital, Barcelona. The industrial centres and the coast towns—for the defence of Gerona against Napoleon's armies is hardly less famous than that of Saragossa—and the country districts and mountain regions of Catalonia, furnished some of the fiercest and most stubborn of those who sought to revive medieval Spain under the sceptre of Don Carlos.

The revolution of 1840 was enthusiastically welcomed in Barcelona; but its results failed to satisfy the strong democratic and socialist party, the existence of which it revealed for the first time. This party aspired to nothing less than republican government, political equality, and local autonomy or relaxation of the laws which bound its vigorous life to the less highly developed organism of Spain. For the moment these hopes had to be laid aside; but those who entertained them were resolved not to lose the ground already won and to combat reaction. Accordingly when in October, 1841, Van Halen, the captain-general, was obliged to march against O'Donnell at Pamplona, a junta of citizens was formed to carry on affairs and watch events. The junta began to pull down the walls and citadel that hampered the development of Barcelona. It had long been a favourite scheme with the municipality to free the city from the congestion of its narrow limits; but the fortifications were under the control of the War Office in Madrid, and no permission to level them had been obtained. So soon as the abortive insurrection in the Basque Province ended, the central Government dissolved the junta and ordered the works



already destroyed to be rebuilt. The city demurred; and it was only under threat of a visit from Espartero, the Peacemaker, that it submitted and received back its captain-general. The agitation continued, however; and a new subject for alarm and discontent was found in the report that Espartero was about to enter into a treaty of commerce with Great Britain ruinous to the textile and other industries of Catalonia. The report obtained the readier belief because it was a perverted and exaggerated version of actual facts. Each time the Liberals came into power a commercial treaty was discussed; and each time the cry was raised that the Liberals were sold to England. The scheme proposed by Villiers in 1836 had been welcomed by Mendizabal; and the opposition it provoked had been one of the most powerful causes of his fall. It was nevertheless renewed four years later; and a commission under Calatrava drew up the basis of an agreement imposing an *ad valorem* duty of twenty-five per cent. on British goods while corresponding advantages were granted to Spanish wines and spirits. Even under these terms the Catalans dreaded competition; and, thanks to false reports fostered by the intrigues of the Conservatives, the question became a party one, and roused the fiercest passions in the principality. It was believed that the commercial treaty was on the point of being signed in order that British help might save Espartero's Government, and that its signature would be the doom of Catalanian prosperity.

During the autumn of 1842 some slight disturbances of public order caused Van Halen to proclaim a state of siege, and to arrest the leader of the Republican party. The national militia took part in the agitation; the citizens rushed to arms and drove the captain-general, with loss of 300 men killed and wounded, to take refuge in the citadel and in Monjuich, the hated fortress raised by Philip V to control the turbulent province that so long resisted him. The junta was again constituted; and this time it did not restrict itself to

merely local affairs. It ordered Van Halen to quit the province; it demanded the resignation of Espartero, revision of the Constitution, a triple Regency, and a Spanish husband for the Queen. But the rebellion did not spread; even Catalonia outside the capital remained quiet. Discouragement set in; and a junta of more moderate views succeeded the one that had been elected in the first fervour of revolt.

Van Halen could now have overcome without aid the languishing resistance of the city that lay at the mercy of his forces. Espartero, the Peacemaker, had already been summoned, and was hurrying to Catalonia, burning to disprove the charge of weakness and irresolution that had been brought against his conduct during the revolt of the previous year. He was in his martinet mood; he scornfully refused the moderate terms of capitulation demanded by the proud city; he sent away its deputation unheard. Instead of arguments he brought up cannon. The city shut its gates; the most violent faction got the upper hand; a pedlar became head of the fantastic junta; and all the forces of disorder broke loose. Whilst respectable citizens were terrorised and plundered by the mob the city was bombarded (Dec. 3, 1842). More than four hundred houses were destroyed. Defence was impossible and was not attempted. Barcelona submitted the next day, and was condemned to pay a fine of £12,000 and to repair the citadel that held it in subjection. Within the next year she suffered another bombardment in punishment for having questioned the right of the revolution that overthrew Espartero to inflict upon her freedom-loving people a reactionary Government. Since that time a large body of public opinion in the most enlightened city of Spain has aimed at separation from the corrupt and ever-changing central authority of Madrid.

The events at Barcelona still further embittered the relations between Espartero's Government and France. A complaint was lodged in Paris with regard to the unwarrantable interference of the consul-general Lesseps. Guizot readily

accepted the opportunity of inflicting humiliation and insult on the Radical Regency. He first refused to believe the evidence brought against his emissary, and, when further and conclusive proofs of his complicity in the insurrection were offered, exacted their withdrawal, a declaration of their falsity, and an apology in the *Gazette*.

Espartero was far too weak to push a diplomatic claim abroad ; he was fast losing his grasp upon Spain. During his absence in Catalonia the coalition against him was gathering recruits. It included the disaffected Progressives as well as the Conservatives and Republicans. It was rumoured that he purposed to prolong his tenure of power by deferring the legal majority of the Queen, which would fall in 1844. That such was really his intention has never been proved. Only the *ayacuchos* and a few personal friends now remained faithful to him ; short-sighted as he was, he could hardly hope to impose his will upon the nation by their help alone. The bombardment of Barcelona, carried out in opposition to the expressed opinion of the Cortes, was regarded as wanton and unnecessary. The Peacemaker was coolly received on his return to Madrid ; an effort was about to be made to get rid of a dictator so uncompromising.

The easiest way to do so was to bring back all his exiled enemies. A general amnesty was discussed. Espartero saw the trap and dissolved the Cortes (Jan. 3, 1843). A half-threatening, half-apologetic manifesto from the Regent, and pressure shamelessly exercised at the hustings, failed to secure a majority at the ensuing general election. The united Opposition outnumbered the partisans of Espartero and Rodil by thirty votes ; and the ministry fell (March 16). The Lower Chamber elected Manuel Cortina to be its President, in the belief that he would be at the head of the new ministry. But both he and Olózaga refused to undertake the invidious position with a fluctuating and divided majority. At last, after a long crisis, Lopez accepted office (May 9). Fermin

Caballero, a political economist of well-earned reputation, and Francisco Serrano, a rising general, were among his colleagues. A programme of amnesty and government without coercion was published. But in this again Espartero saw an attack upon himself. The express condemnation of exceptional measures and martial law was a reflection upon his conduct at Barcelona. The proposed restoration of Narvaez and the rest to their military rank meant his speedy downfall. The exercise of dictatorial power had given him an overweening conceit; and, relying on the fidelity of the army, he cast off his usual caution. Obstinate refusing to sanction the proposed amnesty, he brought about the resignation of the Cabinet, after it had been only a week in existence, under the pretext that Serrano was openly hostile to himself and his friends. Serrano had indeed sought to relieve the faithful Linaye of some of the plurality of commands which he exercised under his powerful protector. The Lopez Cabinet on withdrawing protested, truly enough, that it had "not been allowed the free action required with all the exclusive responsibility of ministers of the Crown." Its place was taken by a Cabinet almost equally short-lived, under Gomez Becerra, with Mendizabal as Minister of Finance.

Face to face with a frankly hostile Parliament, a rebellious ministry, growing discontent and gathering intrigue, Espartero had for a moment contemplated abdication. His friends, however, persuaded him not to accept defeat but to have recourse once more to prorogation. The new ministry declined to meet the Chamber under the plea that it required time to prepare a political programme. When it did so, the majority of the Lower House refused to recognise its existence. They held that the Regent had overstepped his prerogative by dismissing Lopez, and chose to consider Lopez as the duly appointed minister of the Crown. On May 20, 1843, the Congress broke up in confusion, amid the dismal echo of Olózaga's words, "God help our country, God help our

Queen." The ministers of the Regent were stoned and chased by the mob to their homes. The sole encouragement that Espartero received came from the Senate, which waited on him in a body to congratulate him and express its confidence.

Taking such comfort as he could from this friendly demonstration on the part of a body carefully packed with his own adherents and enjoying but little influence in the country, Espartero fortified himself in his obstinacy and determined to treat a disaffected Parliament in the same way as he treated disaffected cities and battalions. On May 26 he dissolved Parliament, putting himself still further outside the law, for the taxes were not yet voted. The revolution was already upon him. By the end of the month, part of Andalusia had pronounced against the Anglo-Ayacuchos; and Catalonia, remembering the bombardment of Barcelona, had risen to the call of Juan Prim, the soldier-democrat.

Taken singly, these local revolts were not very formidable; nor were they generally the cause of much bloodshed. Often the work of a noisy minority, they were not lacking in comic incidents. On this occasion, for instance, when the *pronunciamiento* of the citizens drove the captain-general and the civil governor from Granáda, the command devolved upon a simple major. Too modest and diffident for the position thus thrust upon him, he in turn resigned his authority into the hands of Nuestra Señora de las Angustias, the patroness of the city. She was forthwith appointed general; and her image was invested with the sash and *bâton* of office. The neighbouring city of Málaga were on this, as on all like occasions, among the first to revolt. The reason for her turbulence is not far to seek. The ringleaders of the mob were in the pay of rich cotton-merchants, who used them, when the chance offered, to overturn the authorities, in order to run cargoes duty free amid the general confusion.

But the revolution, though mild in character among the civil population, was general. It was, in fact, sanc-



tioned implicitly by the Constitution of 1837. The oath taken by the Regent ran, "If I act contrary to the good and profit of the nation, I am not to be obeyed." An effort at compromise had been made when it was already too late. Mendizabal showed an unwarrantable confidence in his countrymen when he appealed to them to pay of their own free will the taxes which he had no legal authority to collect. Remission of the fine imposed on Barcelona, and a promise that the much-talked-of amnesty should be granted as soon as the existing disturbances were quieted were alike disregarded. Before the end of June only Madrid, Saragossa, Cadiz, Leon, and Oviedo held out for the Regent.

For many months past a secret society under the name of the Spanish Military Order had been extending its ramifications through the army. Founded in Paris by O'Donnell and Narvaez with the object of bringing about the overthrow of the *ayacucho* faction and the restoration of Queen Cristina, its associates were everywhere; and its effects were apparent as soon as the troubles began. Resignations of commissions showered in upon the Government; and the officers who retained their command were for the most part only watching events. Now that the crisis had come, Espartero's obstinacy was not supported by energy. He was sunk in one of the fits of lethargy to which he was subject. Only when his cause was already practically lost did he quit the capital, leading the troops he could muster southward (June 21). A week before, he had published an apologetic manifesto to the nation, defending himself against the charge of wishing to prolong the Regency, and declaring that Isabel's attainment of her majority would be "the crown of his public life." "Is it to be supposed," he asked, "that I should seek to imitate those who violently trampled under foot the laws of their land? I have not their genius, nor does their fatal ambition inspire me...for Baldomero Espartero, born in private station, brought up in the service of the liberty of his country and his Queen, will



return to private life satisfied with having fulfilled all his duties ; and his reward will be to have earned the approval of all good men....On the Constitution I rely, and by its impenetrable shield I am protected." Many other declarations of a like kind followed during the next few days ; but no enthusiasm was aroused. The eyes of the capital were turned towards the provinces.

Serrano had been welcomed in Barcelona, and had artfully kept in the background the Royalist and reactionary character of the revolution, whilst dividing Liberal opinion by proclaiming the Lopez ministry to which he as Minister of War belonged. Narvaez and Manuel de la Concha, landing at Valencia, were received with open arms by the already constituted "Provincial Junta of Salvation of Valencia." Concha went southward to organise the revolution in Andalusia. Narvaez hurried north along the Roman road, and after a successful skirmish at Teruel advanced towards the capital. He joined forces with Aspiroz, commander of the revolted garrison of Valladolid, and camped before Madrid. At Torrejon de Ardoz the troops brought by forced marches from Aragon to oppose them joined their ranks, shouting, "We are all one"; and on the next day (July 23, 1843) Aspiroz entered Madrid, after binding himself to observe the Constitution of 1837, maintain the national militia, and aid in the formation of a junta. The Queen, liberty, and the Lopez ministry were proclaimed. Narvaez followed the same evening ; and on the following day came Prim. Narvaez was appointed captain-general ; Prim, with the title of *Conde de Reus*, became military governor of the capital.

A message was forthwith sent to Espartero bidding him cease hostilities, on pain of being declared a traitor to his country and "incurring the execration of Spaniards and of all mankind." For a time he lingered hesitating at Albacete, near the junction of the main roads. Then with his friend Van Halen and ten thousand untrustworthy troops he advanced

on Seville and summoned the city to surrender. The message from Madrid and the news that Saragossa, his chief stronghold, had gone over to the enemy, saved Seville from the fate of Barcelona. The bombardment had already begun when the ex-Regent, pursued by Concha, and deserted by his own troops with the exception of a few faithful battalions, set out for Cadiz. But even Cadiz revolted in the face of him who alleged himself to be the true exponent and representative of Spanish Liberalism. Espartero was obliged to turn aside with his rapidly dwindling following to Puerto de Santa Maria. Here he took ship and employed his last moments before quitting Spanish shores in drawing up a protest. In fewer words than was his wont, he made declaration before the Deputy Grand Notary of the Realm that only against his will did he commit a misdemeanour provided against by the Constitution in quitting Spain without the consent of the Cortes. He claimed however to be still Regent of Spain until the Queen should reach her majority. A British man-of-war bore him out of reach of his enemies, to enjoy for a time the applause of his foreign admirers and the hospitality of the Mansion House (July 30, 1843).

To Espartero's protest the victors of the hour replied by a counterblast intended to be the epitaph of his political corpse. Its violence and utter incoherence show a lack of the calm that befits a triumph. "The last proof," it ran, "of blindness and ambition given by Don Baldomero Espartero in quitting Spanish territory obliges the Provisional Government to brand the new pretender with the stamp of public execration which the vote of the country had already hurled upon him. Since he is not content with the bombarding of rich cities, with plundering public monies, or with the evident design to leave among us the germs of subversion and disorder, which, though fruitless and deserving of contempt in the judgment of a heroic people, prove the barbarous purpose of keeping some Spaniards in misapprehension and error; the Government, jealous of its

own dignity and the peace of the nation which has proclaimed it, decrees as follows :—Clause one and only. Don Baldomero Espartero and all who subscribed the protest of July 30 last are deprived of all their titles, ranks, offices, honours, and orders. August 13.”

The accusation of peculation was false. Espartero was scrupulously honest, and had more than once spent his own money on what he considered the public cause.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### TEN YEARS OF CONSERVATIVE RULE (1843—1854).

THE revolution that overthrew Espartero's Regency had been brought about by an overwhelming coalition of the two extreme parties, the dynastic Conservatives and the Radicals. The King of the French lavished money for the restoration of Queen Cristina; the Holy See thundered against her supplanter. The Radicals bitterly resented the siege of Barcelona and the Regent's disregard of constitutional checks; the Conservatives looked upon him as a sacrilegious usurper, the tool of *ayacuchos* less scrupulous than himself. There was, however, no doubt from the first which of the two parties would profit by his fall. Though they called themselves Liberals, Narvaez, Concha, Zabala, Serrano, and O'Donnell regarded the Radicals as enemies; Prim's democratic scruples had been adroitly silenced by the grant of a title. The coalition took a neutral name, calling itself "Parliamentary"; but the military and Conservative wing under Narvaez were the real masters of the situation. They disarmed the Madrid militia in violation of the terms on which the capital had opened its gates. They dissolved the provincial juntas, and thrust Conservatives into all positions of authority, trust, and profit.

Pompous titles were conferred on the cities distinguished in the late revolt. Málaga was officially styled "First in the Perils of Liberty," Cuenca "The Intrepid"; and Spain, after another upheaval, congratulated herself on having, "by her noble conduct, acquired new claims to the respect of civilised

nations." Officers were rewarded by a step in promotion ; and the rank and file of the army by a remission of two years of service. Abominable as is the system of thus encouraging military revolt, it had at least the effect of reducing the overgrown army. The Constitution was violated by a complete dissolution of the Senate, which had lately ventured to express its confidence in Espartero. A still worse scandal was the dismissal of the magistrates of the High Court, who refused to recognise the legality of the successful revolution. The royal household was changed from top to bottom ; the ministry appointed the Duke of Bailen guardian of the Queen in place of Argüelles, though the appointment was vested by the Constitution in Parliament. The Radicals soon showed their chagrin at finding themselves the catspaws of their political adversaries. Barcelona made formal protest against the reactionary policy of the Government, and supported it by a fresh revolt. She received her answer in the form of another bombardment. Within six months insurrections were suppressed at Saragossa, Cartagena, Cadiz, Valladolid, Leon, and Vigo.

Parliament, with a reconstructed Senate, met (Oct. 15, 1843) and elected Olózaga to the Presidency of the Lower Chamber. The first care was to regularise, as far as possible, the situation. The State lacked a legal head. Serrano had pledged himself to call together a central junta to discuss the appointment of a Regency. But such discussion was full of danger to the coalition that had made the revolution. A year only separated the Queen from legal majority at the age of fourteen. It was prudently decided to forestall ambitions by anticipating a date. On Nov. 8, 1843, Isabel was declared, by a majority of 192 over 15 of the two Houses voting together, to have entered upon the exercise of full power. She took an oath to observe the Constitution of 1837, with its comminatory clause, "If I fail to fulfil this my vow in whole or in part, I must not be obeyed ; and all that I have done contrary to

it shall be null and void." The ministry now resigned after an experience unprecedented even in those days. Nominated by Espartero, it had resigned and been replaced. A revolution had declared it to be still in existence. It had then deprived Espartero of the Regency, and pronounced him guilty of mal-adversion of public monies. By a most illegal fiction it was credited with continuous existence, whilst the Cabinets had risen and been swept away, and juntas had declared themselves independent or supreme. Elected to carry out a Radical policy, it became at last the tool of reaction. The President, nevertheless, was an honest man; he had done his best to reconcile forces that he could not control. Its farewell was not without pathos. "On us fell the task of governing in turbulent and perilous times; and, despite our will, we had to transgress the law, so that we—least of all men—are fitted to inaugurate an epoch of strict justice such as our principles, the throne, and the situation require." The retiring ministry received the thanks of Cortes "for having reconciled Spaniards." How hollow was that reconciliation was soon to be seen.

For her first ministry, Isabel took the advice of Lopez; and her choice fell upon Salustiano de Olózaga, once her tutor, and now President of Congress. His knowledge of the royal household was supposed to fit him to counteract the schemes of the reactionary *camarilla* led by the Marchioness de Santa Cruz, Lady of the Bedchamber. Olózaga, though pronounced Radical, sought to preserve the coalition of the "Parliamentary" party by taking two members of its opposite wing, Serrano and Joaquin Frias, into his Cabinet. But the Conservative and Court party had consented to his appointment only because they were not yet strong enough to throw over their allies; and no real cooperation between parties so utterly divided in aims was possible. The Conservatives or *Moderados*, roughly speaking, were the richer classes and the nobility, with the exception of the Carlist faction. Against them were ranged the Progressives or Radicals—the people, or rather the small



section of the town population that took an active interest in politics. So long as the Progressives could maintain discipline in their ranks they were sure of remaining in power. When their dissensions reached a certain pitch they were ousted by the well-drilled oligarchy, which generally counted in its ranks the chiefs of the army. It is to be noted that the Conservatives, though they branded their adversaries as revolutionaries, were hardly less scrupulous in their appeals to military revolt. The weakness of the Conservatives, on the other hand, lay in the fact that they depended on the support of a violently retrograde and anti-popular party, whose views were reflected by the arbitrary acts of Narvaez and the absolutist schemes of Gonzalez Bravo rather than by any constitutional formula, however colourless. The Church and the Court were always scheming to thrust them over the line into intolerance and autocracy.

From the first, Olózaga's proposals for amnesty, confirmation of the acts of Espartero up to the time that he had quitted Spain, and rearming the national militia, were fiercely opposed. The Cabinet was weakened at the outset by the secession of Serrano, the handsome young general who enjoyed the highest favour at Court. The reconstituted Senate was decidedly Conservative; the Lower House contained, besides the personal enemies of Espartero such as Concha, Serrano, Ros de Olano, Aspiroz and the rest of the generals, the leaders of the old *Moderado* party, Xavier de Burgos, Martinez de la Rosa, Mon, and their destined successors, Cándido Nocedal, Bravo Murillo, Donoso Cortes, and Luis José Sartorius. To these were added Gonzalez Bravo and his independent young-Spanish party; and the whole formed an Opposition in face of which it was hopeless for Olózaga to attempt to carry out a Liberal policy. He was treated, moreover, with studied disrespect by the royal household; but, in spite of this accumulation of difficulties, he determined not to be ousted without a struggle.

Accordingly he prepared, without the knowledge of his colleagues, a decree for the dissolution of the Cortes, intending to use it such time as the attitude of the Chambers should oblige him to do so. This decree he submitted to the Queen in a private audience on the evening of Nov. 28, 1843, and it received her signature. But if Olózaga fancied that he had thus outwitted his opponents he was sorely deceived. Next morning Isabel declared that her signature had been extorted by personal violence exercised upon her by the President of the Council. The scene, according to her solemn declaration, read before the Cortes three weeks after its occurrence, was as follows: "On the night of the 28th of last month, Olózaga presented himself before me and proposed that I should sign a decree dissolving the Cortes. I answered that I was unwilling to sign it, among other reasons because these Cortes had declared me of age. Olózaga insisted, and I again refused to sign the decree. I rose and turned to the door which is on the left of my desk. Olózaga placed himself in front of me and bolted that door. I turned to the opposite door; and Olózaga again came before me and bolted that door also. He caught hold of my dress, and obliged me to sit down. He seized my hand, and forced me to sign. After that he left, and I withdrew to my apartments."

This was the statement of a wilful, capricious, and spoilt child of thirteen, surrounded by persons hostile to the minister affected. Against it must be set not only Olózaga's solemn oath, but also the fact that the persons in an adjoining room heard no noise. Moreover, General Dulce, Isabel's erstwhile defender against Leon and Concha, swore that, when Olózaga left the room, the Queen followed him to give him a box of bonbons for his daughter; and this Isabel did not deny. Whether Isabel lent herself to the scheme of a palace party bent on ruining Olózaga, or whether the minister so far forgot himself as to compel the child-Queen by violence, will probably never be known. Olózaga never varied in his denial, nor did

Isabel in her statement. Those who profited by the astounding and unseemly charge were the Court party. It was impossible to give the lie to the Queen, or to set aside her statement. Public opinion was inflamed against Olózaga by scandals of the most atrocious kind; it was said that he had abused his position as tutor to obtain a wicked influence over the child. On the day following his alleged violence he was summarily dismissed from office. Impeached before the Cortes, he made an eloquent and vigorous defence, but he could not hope for a favourable verdict. He went into hiding and shortly afterwards fled the country, whereupon proceedings against him were abandoned.

Olózaga was succeeded in the Presidency of the Council by Gonzalez Bravo, an evil product of a bad age. He had begun life as the editor of a scurrilous newspaper, which by shameless libel and still more dangerous innuendo had helped to stir up the revolution that drove Queen Cristina from Spain. Afterwards, as a politician, he made his way to the front, leading a compact faction holding the balance between parties and seeking to make government impossible except on its own terms. The daring adventurer was a man of considerable ability; and the party that sought to bring about a clerical and Royalist reaction showed wisdom when they took as their instrument the former scourge of the Court. In power he proved himself an uncompromising upholder of the principle of authority, and the humble servant of his former victim, Queen Cristina. He began by proroguing Parliament (Dec. 27). It never met again, for prorogation was followed by dissolution; and Gonzalez Bravo carried out the programme of the Court party by means of decrees. Attempts at insurrection following upon Olózaga's dramatic fall gave him an excuse for disarming the national militia. Cortina and Narvaez, who ventured to raise their voice against him, were imprisoned. A decree undid the work of the revolution of 1840 by depriving the municipalities of the wide powers conferred upon them. In

their place commissions were nominated by the ministry to govern the communes. Control of the police was given to paid magistrates under civil governors appointed by the central authority. A commission of enquiry had valued at £80,000 the amount of national property, in jewels and other valuables, carried off by Queen Cristina when she abdicated. Gonzalez Bravo gave her back her liberal pension, together with arrears from the time at which it had been declared forfeited. He moreover created her husband, Muñoz, whom as editor he had outrageously insulted, Duke of Rianzares and grandee. The expectations of the birth of yet another scion of the Muñoz-Bourbon family detained Queen Cristina in Paris until the spring, so she was unable at first to share in the triumph over her old enemy, Olózaga; but she took a large share in the direction of politics, whilst arranging that her second family should be richly provided for.

Gonzalez Bravo won a title to the gratitude of all who live or travel in Spain by creating the civil guard, a constabulary formed of picked men, horse and foot, armed with carbine or rifle, sword or bayonet, and revolver. This fine corps has rendered life and property as safe in Spain as in most European countries. By activity and free use of its arms it has stamped out organised brigandage. It is respected by all, and beloved by all but evil-doers. Repeated revolutions have ever found it on the side of law and order. When unable to control, it has always moderated disorder. Its picturesque uniform is a welcome sight on the broad sunny plain, in the crowded streets, or in the mountain pass.

Gonzalez Bravo had lent his name to the subversive policy of persons who chose for the moment to remain in the background. He had revoked Olózaga's decree recognising honours and titles conferred by Espartero; he had appointed to the most profitable positions in the State men whose only claim was their usefulness to their party; he had suspended the sale of the lands of the Church without, however, venturing to annul

the sales that had already been effected. But, willing tool and jade as he was, the time soon came when he was no longer needed; it was thought well that a man of more authority should take his place. Accordingly, when Queen Cristina returned to Madrid, he was rewarded for his services by the appointment of ambassador to Portugal; and Narvaez, the stern and upright disciplinarian, took his place (May 2, 1844).

Narvaez never ceased to call himself a Liberal; but his task in life was to check the excess of party rule, and chiefly of that party to which he professed to belong. He took Mon, Pidal, and Armero for his Ministers of Finance, Interior, and Marine, and was joined later by Martinez de la Rosa at the Foreign Office. With these respectable assistants he prepared to enforce a moderate Conservative Government, whilst keeping in check the clerical and autocratic Court party.

Efficient administration and financial reform were more than ever needed. Towards the former the newly-created civil guard proved a powerful help. Mon devoted his energy and ability to the Treasury. He found a floating debt amounting to £25,000,000 and met it by issuing three per cent. bonds. A year's pay was owing to the whole of the public services; the pensions granted recklessly by successive Governments were even farther in arrear. The permanent excess of expenditure over revenue was more than two million pounds annually in normal times; and normal times were rare indeed in Spain. The suppression of the tithe, of which about one-half belonged to the State, had diminished already slender resources, whilst a further burden had been assumed in the maintenance of the clergy, costing somewhat over a million each year. Hitherto there had been collected with infinite expense, irritation, and peculation more than one hundred distinct taxes, some of them local, some of them almost unproductive. Castille paid more than twice as much as the privileged provinces of the north. Mon reformed the whole fiscal system; a great part of his work survives until the present time. Taxes were evenly



distributed and reduced to five chief headings: (1) a tax on agriculture; (2) a tax on urban rents, manufactures, and commerce; (3) an octroi duty; (4) a tax on land-registration, mortgages, and successions; (5) customs dues. The profits of the Post Office, lottery, tobacco and other State monopolies made up the total of the still inadequate national income. The two first taxes produced somewhat more than three millions annually, the octroi more than half this amount. The whole revenue, calculated at £6,500,000 a year, left a nominal surplus for payment of interest upon the debt. But in fact there was still a large deficit. Nevertheless large public works were undertaken with money borrowed at a high rate of interest. Mon's fiscal reform, useful and necessary as it undoubtedly was, proved most unpopular. The town population was irritated by the rise of prices consequent upon the octroi duties. The first care of each popular revolution has been to sweep them away, the unpleasing task of each strong Government to reimpose them as a necessary source of revenue. Hardly a month passes without some disturbance arising from their collection; they are often the cause of bloodshed.

In the new Cortes which met in the autumn (1844) the Opposition, in the Lower House, was represented by one member. The Progressive party had refused to present candidates for election. They alleged that they were terrorised, illtreated and insulted. Adopting a means of protest hardly justified by the most extreme wrongs, they withdrew from public affairs, and conspired in Madrid as well as in London, Paris, and Lisbon. The apparent unanimity of the country was indeed due to the pressure upon electors. In many districts only a small proportion of the enfranchised understand, value, or exercise their right. Voters are often overawed or elections decided by some fraudulent trick which when discovered is generally greeted with laughter. But, besides this, Spain in 1844 was weary of revolution, excitement,



and uncertainty; the strong hand was welcomed; and ideas that ten years earlier would have been branded as servile were openly avowed. A real reaction against the excesses of an ill-understood Liberalism had set in, and its effects lasted ten years; it seemed an eternity of rest after such agitation as the country had undergone.

Even Espartero abandoned the hope of another revolution in the near future. He added, however, to the manifesto in which, on Isabel's fourteenth birthday, he formally abandoned the position from which he had been summarily expelled, a significant promise that he would be ready when the country should need him. Meanwhile he was the centre, if not the director, of the plots of the excluded and banished Radicals. But under Narvaez's rule conspiracy and revolution were no longer safe roads to success. In a little more than a year he shot two hundred and fourteen persons for political offences. The downfall of Olózaga, and the Radical secession, provoked small insurrections even as far afield as Cuba and the Philippine Islands; but they were put down with a strong hand.

Undiscouraged by the fate of former Constitutions, the ministry laid before the Cortes a project of revision. It ascribed the disastrous anarchy of the last few years to defects in the Constitution of 1837; its "reform" proved to be a general and formal reversal of the Liberal principles enunciated after the revolution of that year. The clause asserting the sovereignty of the people was so modified as to lose all significance. On the other hand, the declaration that Catholicism is the religion of the State was accentuated. The nomination of all senators was entrusted to the Crown; the office was made a life one; and two hundred bishops, grandees, generals, bankers, and magistrates were appointed. The Lower House was still elective; but a property qualification was imposed, and the duration of the dynastic mandate extended from three to four years. The national militia, the ultimate foundation of the power of the Radicals, was not directly suppressed; but the

clause that rendered its enrolment obligatory in every province was dropped and the matter left to local authorities who would not be likely to cultivate such a hotbed of revolt. The question of municipal and provincial government was reserved for the decision of the Cortes. They shirked responsibility, deputing the ministry to legislate by decree on this once all-absorbing question, with ample powers to coerce refractory local assemblies. The press laws were made much more vigorous, editors of newspapers being compelled to find bail to the amount of £1000 for their good behaviour. A new law decreed that the Regency, when necessary, should be undertaken by the next of kin to the sovereign instead of by a commission appointed by the Cortes. One important clause, in view of the Queen's age and the tendencies of the nearest relative, was that which empowered her to choose a husband without the authorisation of Cortes. This Constitution was promulgated in May, 1845, and like its predecessors and successors is known by the date of its legal enactment. Though detested by the Radicals, it has had the warm approval of some of those who have had most experience of the task of governing Spain. Among its admirers was Cánovas del Castillo, who reproduced it with but few modifications on the accession of Alfonso XII.

Abortive Liberal revolts still continued; but the Government of Narvaez was now felt to be so well established, and to have given such proof of its anti-Liberal policy, as to deserve recognition of the Holy See. After years of estrangement the Vatican was far from demonstrative, or eager in its desire for reconciliation. It was only by the most roundabout paths and after numberless slights that the Spanish agent at Rome was able to make it known that his Government was ready to submit to terms in return for recognition of the rights of the Queen, and of the validity of the sales of Church property. These sales had been denounced as impious if not sacrilegious. The Pope demanded the immediate return to its owners of that

part of the unsold lands of the Church calculated to produce an annual income of about £300,000, or less than a quarter of the sum required for the maintenance of the clergy. With regard to the form in which the deficit should be made good difficulties arose, so radical as to delay for six years longer the agreement desired by both parties. After the revolutionary upheaval of Europe, the Papal negotiators were much less exacting; but in 1845 they demanded nothing less than that the Church should again be placed on a footing of independence. A concordat prepared in May by the Spanish agent provided that the incomes of the clergy should be derived from a fund granted as the absolute property of the Church and should not take the form of salaries paid by the State. In other respects this scheme encroached upon the ancient rights of Spanish kings to nominate to sees and benefices. To this Narvaez and Martinez de la Rosa, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, refused to agree. But by entering upon negotiation the Pope had in part recognised the right of Isabel.

Useful as Narvaez's repressive and disciplinary government undoubtedly was, it could not fail to be unpopular. The legislation was all in the direction of further centralisation, and was, for the most part, carried out by decree. The country, recovering from its exhaustion, was becoming prosperous; but under such a system it was impossible for the Radicals to remain content. It was ever the aim of Conservative Governments rather to win over the Carlist, clerical, and traditionalist faction, than to satisfy the moderate Liberals. In this Narvaez's ministry was partially successful. His evident desire for reconciliation with Rome was guaranteed by his negotiations and by the suspension of sales of Church lands. But there was a corresponding loss on the other side. Curtailment of popular liberties by the new Constitution and repressive decrees had alienated a section of the party that had brought him into power. The Liberals had begun to rally: in the first Parliament

elected under the new franchise, Madrid, Saragossa, and Cadiz were represented by Progressive deputies. The majority of the Lower House desired a strict application of the constitutional system, and declared that the necessity for government by decree had now ceased. Disagreements arose within the Cabinet over schemes for the marriage of the Queen with the Count of Trapani, her maternal uncle; and Narvaez abandoned the Presidency of the Council to the Marquis of Miraflores (Jan. 12, 1846).

Though the new Cabinet, including Arrazola, Topete, and Isturiz, professed to carry on the policy of its predecessor, and relied on the same class for support, the fall of Narvaez was rightly considered as a victory for the Queen-mother and the Court party. This party called in Narvaez only in times of danger, for he treated palace and clerical intrigue in the same autocratic fashion as Radical plots. It was hoped that the courtly marquis would be found more submissive to gentle influences. But Miraflores, as his memoirs show, soon learnt that the young Queen was wilful and capricious at times, while at others she was merely the mouthpiece of a dangerous faction. He was moreover unable to manage the daily more self-assertive Cortes; and in the middle of March, 1846, Narvaez again took the leadership. Owing to the unconcealed disfavour with which he was now regarded at court he quitted it again after three weeks, but during this time he had prorogued the refractory Chambers, and had taken upon himself the odium of a decree conferring upon the ministry wide and undefined powers "to combat without truce moral and material anarchy," and to punish the publication of matter calculated to bring discredit on the Crown. His successor was Isturiz, once a Liberal. Mon, Pidal, and Armero, pronounced Conservatives, took office under him. The Court party sought to get rid of its masterful protector by appointing him ambassador to Naples. Narvaez refused the post, but retired to France, where he had many friends.

April was taken up by the suppression of a military mutiny in Galicia, where subversive cries were coupled with the names of Espartero and Don Enrique, Duke of Seville, the Queen's cousin, a hot-headed young prince, who sought by parading extreme Liberal views to push his candidature for the position of King-consort. The Liberal rising in Galicia was not an isolated movement; in Madrid and Málaga a simultaneous attempt had been planned. Though the Galician insurgents were subdued without great effort by General Manuel Concha, and the plot miscarried at Madrid and Málaga, the symptoms showed a real danger. Everywhere there were whisperings of a royal favourite and an intellectual power behind the throne. The cry for a "free Queen" had been uttered; and a parliamentary party, styling itself "Puritan" and demanding the repression of corrupt influence, was growing under Pacheco and Pastor Diaz.

For years the question of the Spanish marriages had been agitating the courts of Europe. The Powers chiefly concerned were France and Great Britain. France relied on the powerful interest of Queen Cristina. Her kinsman Louis Philippe had earned her gratitude. To him she owed her triumphal return to Spain, and the rich pension which was scarcely less dear to her than political power. In return she proposed to marry her two daughters to his sons, the Dukes of Aumâle and Montpensier. This arrangement would place Spain entirely under the influence of France. In deference to the wishes of the British Government, and the terms of the Quadruple Alliance, which bound the two countries to common action in the Peninsula, it was abandoned, or at least not openly pushed. Great Britain, on her side, ceased to urge the claims of Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, cousin of Queen Victoria and of the Prince Consort. In 1843, when Queen Victoria met the King of the French at the Chateau d'Eu, it was agreed that Isabel should be allowed to marry a Bourbon descendant of Philip V, and that after the birth of an heir to the throne of Spain her sister should be at liberty to marry an Orleans prince. Mean-



while, Austria and Prussia favoured the candidature of the Count of Montemolin, Don Carlos the Second, or, as the legitimists would have it, Carlos VI, the recognised head of the party since his father's abdication (May, 1845). It was hoped that, if he became King-consort, the monarchical principle would be strengthened in Spain and the risk of another civil war evaded.

In 1844 the King of the French married his second son, the Duke of Aumâle, to the Princess of Parma. The project of a marriage between the duke's younger brother and Isabel's sister, the Infanta Maria Louisa, was still entertained. It looked as if Queen Isabel would be compelled to marry the Count of Trapani, her mother's brother. But nearer at home ambitions were working. Queen Cristina, during her husband's illness, had owed the preservation of the crown to her sister, Doña Carlota. She and her sister had quarrelled; but Doña Carlota still hoped that the wish of the Spaniards for the marriage of their Queen to a native prince would give the throne to one or other of her two sons. The elder, Enrique, Duke of Seville, a dashing young sailor, had, it was supposed, favourably impressed his precocious cousin. But he threw away his chance by overdoing his part. In his eagerness for popularity he adopted views so Radical as to be hardly compatible with monarchy. He was implicated in the Galician insurrection; and his cousin, instead of marrying, was obliged to banish him.

A dark scheme was now agreed upon between the Queen-mother and the King of the French. Isabel should marry Francisco de Asis, Duke of Cadiz, brother of the banished Duke of Seville; and at the same time her sister, Maria Louisa, should marry the Duke of Montpensier. It was believed that Isabel's union with her effeminate and feeble cousin precluded all chance of succession, and that then the throne of Spain would fall to the children of her sister. That so wicked an agreement should have been entered into by a mother, and abetted by statesmen of the highest position, seems well-nigh



incredible. The fact, however, rests on indisputable evidence. Isabel's happiness weighed as nothing against the advancement of the Orleans family. Her scandalous life is partially excused by her mother's fiendish betrayal. In order to carry out the scheme, it was necessary to brave the displeasure of the British Government and to violate agreements. The King of the French pleaded that Great Britain, by pushing the candidature of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, had virtually released him from his engagement to postpone the marriage of his son with the Spanish Infanta until an heir should be born to her elder sister. Lord Palmerston ordered Sir H. Bulwer, the British ambassador at Madrid, to protest against the proposed marriage of the Queen by every means in his power; but the two weddings were celebrated simultaneously on the Queen's sixteenth birthday (Oct. 10, 1846) with all the splendour of the Spanish court.

Isabel's marriage to a native prince was popular with her subjects; but her sister's marriage to the son of the King of the French was regarded with suspicion. The Count of Montemolin took the opportunity of again publicly asserting his claims to the throne. The exiled Duke of Seville refused to recognise any claim resulting from the Duke of Montpensier's marriage. A more important consequence was the termination of the agreement which, since the outset of the Carlist War, had bound Great Britain and France to concerted action in Spain. France had gained a great diplomatic victory; the additional bond between her reigning family and that of Spain was expected to prove a source of strength to both, and to make French influence supreme beyond the Pyrenees. Great Britain showed her displeasure by championship of the Liberal cause and by protests almost amounting to threats of intervention against retrograde policy.

The King<sup>1</sup> was a Carlist at heart; he actually wrote to the

<sup>1</sup> The husband of a Spanish woman takes her rank, if it be superior to his own. Consequently Don Francisco de Asis was called *el Rey* in

Count of Montemolin offering to give way if Montemolin himself would marry their common cousin. Montemolin, however, confident in his right, refused any settlement which did not bring with it explicit recognition of his sole title to the throne. King Francisco de Asis grouped round him the clerical and absolutist faction of the court, and continually intrigued to further their views and ambitions. But the Liberals had at the Queen's side an equally powerful advocate in General Serrano, whose influence was founded upon a singularly handsome person, soldierly courage, and courtly manners. His dignified bearing concealed an ambitious but shallow mind. His energy was fitful ; in times of crisis he was irresolute ; but he was for years the instrument through whom the Spanish Liberals resisted their opponents' preponderance at Court. He played a great, perhaps a useful, but not a creditable, part in Spanish history for nearly thirty years.

Shortly after the Queen's marriage a general election took place. The new law imposed annual payments of £4 in direct taxation as qualification for the franchise ; and payment of £10 in direct taxation or proof of an income of £120 as qualification for the office of deputy. From these restrictions, however, the liberal professions were exempt. Confident that such conditions must result in the return of a Conservative Lower House, Pidal, Minister of the Interior, relaxed the pressure usually exercised by the Government ; and forty Radical Progressives were returned. Among them were the well-known figures of Cortina, San Miguel, Mendizabal, and Olózaga. The last was returned by two districts. He crossed the frontier to take his seat, but was seized and imprisoned at Pamplona and, after a time, banished. The new Chambers proved hostile to the ministry ; and Isturiz resigned (Jan., 1847). He was followed by a new Conservative coalition under

Spanish ; but politically he was only the Queen's consort. To call him King, simply, gives the wrong impression that he was in much the same position as William of Orange in England. [J. F.-K.]

Sotomayor, and including Bravo Murillo and Seijas Lozano. Some efforts were made towards economic reforms; and a new ministry, distinct from that of the Interior, was created to supervise commerce, public works, and education. Entitled at first the Ministry of Commerce, it has since been known as the Ministry of *Fomento* (encouragement), and carries Cabinet rank. The first occupant was Roca de Togores, better known as the Marqués de Molins, a diplomatist and writer of high reputation.

But public attention was unhappily centred on the Court; the King and the Queen had disagreed shortly after marriage and had separated. Whilst they wrangled, Serrano's influence with the Queen was permanent. Working in concert with Bulwer, the British ambassador, now in high favour at Court, and with Salamanca, the sporting banker, the golden calf to whom all Spain at that time bowed down, he created such difficulties that Sotomayor decided to remove him from the Court by nominating him head of a military commission in Navarre. He refused the appointment, and appealed to his right as a senator to justify his breach of discipline as a soldier. The ministry was driven to the necessity of prosecuting him for insubordination. But the Queen decided the question by dismissing the ministry that had ventured to interfere with her favourite.

Sotomayor and his colleagues had used every endeavour to stay the scandal; they had even refused entry to the palace to persons whose influence they considered objectionable. The same disagreeable duty devolved upon their successors, Francisco Pacheco and his Puritans. When the Queen quitted Madrid for the summer, the King-consort remained behind. His feeble and tortuous brain, or his interested advisers, had suggested to him a plan by which he might turn his wife's misconduct to account and make himself the real King of Spain. Isabel, about to become a mother, could be terrorised. She was indeed immensely popular, especially with the lower

orders of the capital, whose compliments, grotesque and at times obscene, she received with a winning smile when she drove abroad ; but the Crown was rapidly being brought into contempt. The King's cabal, contemptible as it was, was a real source of danger. The Queen-mother refusing to countenance the scandal—a direct result of her heartless political intrigue—had retired in wrath to France ; the reckless young Queen was left to her own caprice for guidance. A plan for challenging and shooting Serrano after fixing on him a pretended private quarrel was actually discussed by serious men. The ministry ordered the King-consort to reside outside the capital when unaccompanied by the Queen ; but no reconciliation was effected. The Radicals were profiting by the scandal to spread agitation in the country. A sop was thrown to them in the shape of the pardon of Olózaga, who now took his seat in the Cortes. Then for a time public attention was called off from the Court by the movement of armies.

Portugal had fallen into anarchy ; and the authority of its Queen, combated on one side by the Radicals and on the other by the partisans of Don Miguel, the legitimist Pretender, was wrecked. It was restored by Spanish troops under Manuel Concha, acting in concert with a British squadron. The mandate of the Quadruple Alliance to interfere in the affairs of her neighbour gratified the pride of the Spanish nation, and helped it for the moment to forget its own unhappy condition. Concha carried out his delicate mission in such a way as not to offend Portuguese pride, and was rewarded with the title of Marqués del Duero (July, 1847). This slight success, with its feeble gleam of glory, strengthened Pacheco's ministry and gave it heart for more serious work. Catalonia had fallen again into revolt and anarchy. A famine was desolating the land ; and the starving peasants, incited by agitators, readily seized the chance of booty offered by enlistment in the Carlist ranks. The abdication of Don Carlos the First had given to the party a new leadership marked by fresh

energy. For a moment it was held in check by the hope of the submission of Spain to Carlist rule under the cloak of a royal marriage. When this failed, revolt was again encouraged and loosely organised; undisciplined bands roamed the country. At first they abstained from levying blackmail and seized only public money, or exacted the taxes due to the Government. But the capture and execution of one of their leaders, the priest Tristany (May 17, 1847), together with other severities exercised against them, soon gave a more bitter character to the struggle. In the autumn the newly-created Marqués del Duero took command, but even with 40,000 men operating against less than a tenth of his force he was unable to restore order. It is true that he sought to effect his object rather by persuasion than by severity; but by this time the insurrection was complicated with organised resistance to conscription, and by the economic question that had so often disturbed Catalonia. Salamanca, the banker, now led the councils of the ministry, and had revived the proposal for a commercial understanding with Great Britain. Already the customs tariff had been lowered for certain manufactures; and the Catalans, in face of a competition they considered ruinous, were dismissing their workmen. The Marqués del Duero was relieved of his half-accomplished task; and General Pavia, his predecessor, again took command. By calling the whole of the inhabitants to arms he was able in January, 1848, to restore some semblance of order.

The insurrection in Catalonia, and the ever-increasing feeling against Serrano, at length alarmed the Queen; and she recalled Narvaez from Paris to face a very dangerous situation. On his advice, amnesty was granted to all who were willing to swear allegiance to the Queen and fidelity to the Constitution. Espartero was made a senator. Olózaga had come back; even the once brilliant Prince of the Peace was invited to return to his native land; he preferred however to end his life as a frequenter of the sunny benches of the



public gardens of Paris. But Narvaez did not take office immediately. Salamanca, the banker, had dazzled the Court by brilliant promises and ostentatious luxury. All he touched seemed to turn to gold; the public fortune was entrusted to him. Narvaez refused to enter his Cabinet; it fell after a few weeks, leaving behind it a general suspicion that Salamanca had used political power to push his private fortune. In October, 1847, Narvaez was given a "free hand to seize the stick and strike hard." It was his own expression, and accurately, if brutally, expressed the needs of the country. His Cabinet, as finally constituted, included Sartorius, as Minister of the Interior, Sotomayor as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Bravo Murillo. The General himself took the Presidency of the Council as well as the Ministry of War. Discipline was everywhere needed, but chiefly at Court; and it was with the associates of the Queen that Narvaez began. Serrano and his supposed rival for the royal favour were expelled. A reconciliation between the Queen and her husband was negotiated by the Nuncio. The return of Queen Cristina from Paris gave to the palace the respectability it lacked. The Marquis of Miraflores, as Governor of the Royal Household, guaranteed good behaviour or at least consideration for the Queen's reputation.

It was fortunate indeed that a man so strong as Narvaez was at the helm when the crash came in France, and the Orleans dynasty fell before the revolution of February, 1848. The Montpensier marriage, brought about for the purpose of securing the protection of France, now became a source of weakness. Cordial cooperation between the new republic and the highly-centralised and somewhat reactionary monarchy fostered in Spain by Louis Philippe could not be hoped for. The Radical party had already the sympathy of the British Government; its extreme faction hoped that the general revolution would spread to Spain. But the number of Republicans was small; and the Liberal leaders, Cortina,



Madoz, and Mendizabal, were even more opposed to the extremists of their own party than Narvaez. A peculiarity of the situation was that Narvaez' dictatorship was carried on under Liberal and Constitutional forms though, as a Prussian minister remarked, "There is no Government less Liberal than that of Spain. All the men who compose it make a mockery in private of the words 'liberty' and 'constitutional safeguards,' but they never cease to proclaim them as holy in their speeches and official declarations."

Political ignorance and indifference were so general that Spain was ready to accept Narvaez' assurance that she already enjoyed Liberal government. In order to save a discredited dynasty, the Liberal leaders cooperated with Narvaez. With a patriotic view to avoiding civil war from the Carlists on the one hand and the Republicans on the other, the Chambers granted him permission to govern by martial law and to raise two million pounds to meet the emergency. Narvaez prorogued Parliament on March 23; ten days later he dissolved it, and prepared to ride out the storm alone.

The dissolution was the signal for riots in Madrid; but they had been foreseen, and were easily suppressed. Sentences of death pronounced by Council of War were wisely commuted; and the ringleaders were banished to the Philippine Islands. The British ambassador, Sir H. Bulwer, was suspected of abetting the attempted revolution; his recall was demanded, but was refused. On April 9, 1848, he delivered a threatening note, pointing out that Isabel owed her crown to the Liberals, and demanding that Cortes should be summoned and that government by martial law should cease. The publication of this note in a Radical newspaper was a gross breach of diplomatic etiquette, and, in view of the circumstances, a direct incitement to revolt; but still the Spanish Government, out of deference to Great Britain, forbore. Early in May another insurrection in the capital, this time a military conspiracy promoted by the versatile financier Salamanca,

had to be suppressed. Its object was to bring back Espartero and the Liberals to power. Some dozen executions followed; and again Sir H. Bulwer's name was connected with the agitation, not only in Madrid but in Andalusia also. Though the evidence was not quite conclusive, the British ambassador received his passports on May 17. The excuse given for his expulsion was that his conduct had made him so unpopular that the Government was unable to make itself responsible for his safety. The letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs was couched in apologetic terms; but Great Britain supported her envoy by expelling the Spanish ambassador, Isturiz, and breaking off diplomatic relations. This quarrel with the recognised fountain-head of Liberalism had most important consequences. Narvaez' spirited refusal to submit to dictation from abroad flattered the national pride and gave him the popularity he lacked. Austria and Prussia held that by incurring a quarrel with Great Britain the Spanish Government had given proof of attachment to Conservative principles and must be accepted as an ally in the struggle against revolution. At last they recognised Isabel's right to the throne which she had occupied for fifteen years; at the same time full diplomatic relations with the Holy See were renewed.

The crisis had been a sharp one; but Narvaez' determined attitude had saved the situation. While Madrid was given up to riot, Liberal bands in Catalonia had proclaimed the Duke of Seville. His turbulence made it necessary to deprive him of his rank as Infant of Spain and in the army. Don Carlos had called his followers to arms. The northern provinces obeyed; Extremadura and Andalusia were infested by lawless *guerrilleros*. It was the country folk who now, as before, followed the Pretender; and again they showed the stubbornness that has ever distinguished the slowly roused energies of the peasant from the easily excited and easily quelled turbulence of the towns. Cabrera entered Spain through

Cerdagne; and his arrival (June, 1848) produced a panic at Barcelona. But he was no longer the Cabrera that Catalonia and Valencia knew. Years of residence abroad, and perhaps marriage with an Englishwoman, had changed him. He had dropped his old views with regard to the absolute rule of the Church and King. He declared that the time for despotism, the Inquisition, and the rule of friars had passed away. The new Carlism was a protest against social corruption and the scandals of the Court. Cabrera pleaded earnestly for humane conduct of the war; he urged that Spain needed true liberty.

But the word liberty was an abomination to Carlists of the old stock; and many of them looked upon its new disciple with suspicion. Nor were the Radicals likely to accept his definition of liberty, though for a time they shared his attempt to overthrow the throne. Another cause of his failure to provoke a struggle as obstinate as the former one was the report that he and his master had accepted the financial help of Great Britain, and had pledged themselves to grant the much-dreaded commercial treaty. This report was founded on nothing more solid than the marked civility with which Don Carlos had been received in London after the rupture of diplomatic relations with Spain.

Simultaneously with Cabrera's appearance in Catalonia, General Alzáa took command of the Carlists in the Basque Provinces. His plan to seize some strategic point to which the scattered mountaineers might rally failed utterly. The vigilance of the Government frustrated his attempts to surprise Tolosa and Plasencia. Alzáa was captured and shot (July 3, 1848). Cabrera held out for eight months in north-eastern Spain. His army increased from 4000 to about 10,000 men. General Pavía, and after him Fernando Fernandez de Córdova, failed to capture or drive him across the frontier. General Concha was more successful. The Maestrazgo, the scene of Cabrera's former exploits, was kept down with a ruthless hand; and the

war was confined to the region north of the Ebro. Ceaseless military activity scattered the Carlist forces; ready pardon was granted to those who quitted their ranks. Irritated by failure, and provoked by his opponents, Cabrera soon ceased to practise the humanitarian methods which he had advocated. His native fierceness was exasperated by fears of assassination; more than one treacherous attempt upon his life had been made. But his raiding, blackmailing, and severities towards those who, after making their peace with the Government, had the misfortune to fall into his hands had become intolerable. Moreover, towns of over 1500 souls were no longer allowed to plead compulsion for having received the Carlists and contributed to their ranks and funds. They suffered a 50 per cent. increase of taxation; and, warned by their example, others took courage to resist. When Don Carlos himself was captured by the French police and expelled, about 4000 of Cabrera's followers claimed the promised amnesty. He himself abandoned hope and crossed the frontier (April, 1849).

Narvaez' dictatorship, with martial law and closed Houses of Parliament, had lasted nine months, when the Queen's speech on the opening of Cortes (November, 1848) congratulated the country on the way in which the revolutionary crisis had been met, administrative reforms that had been carried out, and prosperity fostered by a strong Government. The feeling of confidence created by the recognition of the Powers encouraged the Conservative Cabinet to take up once more Spain's traditional position as protector of the Holy See, and to attack abroad the revolution which at home it had successfully resisted. The conciliatory attitude with which Pius IX began his pontificate had given to Spain the chance of long-wished-for reconciliation. But the truly Christian wish of the Pope to make Catholicism compatible with Liberalism had only hastened the Italian revolution and brought about the downfall of his feeble temporal power. Driven from his capital and hard pressed, he appealed to France, Austria, Spain, and Naples to

restore him to his throne and the political independence which he considered necessary for the free exercise of his spiritual powers. It was Pidal who, as head of the Spanish Foreign Office, arranged for the concerted action of the Catholic Powers. On May 1, 1849, a Spanish squadron brought about the submission of Terracina and handed it over to a Neapolitan army.

Three weeks later Pidal announced the intention of his Government to send an expedition against the Roman Republic. The project was approved by a majority of 155 over 17 dissentient votes in the Lower House. A small but well-equipped Spanish force was blessed by the Pope at Gaeta. Its co-operation in the capture of the Eternal City was refused by the French; and it undertook the inglorious work of overawing the country districts. The Italians mocked the humble part played by the Spanish general bearing the illustrious name of the Great Captain. The maintenance of his troops continued to burden the Spanish budget till April, 1856, when Pius IX, no longer a Liberal Pope, formally thanked the Spanish nation for his restoration. At home, however, the Spanish Government gained largely in popularity by the championship of the Church.

A palace plot was attended with more ridicule than danger. King Francisco, now living at peace with his wife, had succeeded after much intrigue in suppressing the office of Governor of the Palace. Once rid of its occupant, the Marquis of Miraflores, he hoped with the aid of his *camarilla* to rule not only the palace but Spain. His clerical satellites, and still more worthless lay favourites, continually urged the Queen to assert her authority. Even Narvaez was not considered sufficiently well disposed towards the Church; he certainly interfered with the exercise of the royal prerogative as understood by courtiers. It was resolved to get rid of him by a *coup d'état*. Accordingly, on the eve of the meeting of Parliament (Oct. 20, 1849), the official *Gazette* announced to the astonished capital a change of ministry, and published a list of nobodies, mere creatures of the royal household, as successors to Narvaez and his col-



leagues. Next day the *Gazette* gave notice, without comment, that the former Cabinet had been reinstated in office. Nothing further was heard of the "Lightning Ministry" (*Ministerio Relámpago*). Narvaez had hurried them off to their homes "to rest," as he sardonically expressed it, "from the fatigues of office." Nevertheless the power that had brought into brief being the Lightning Ministry continued to sway the Court, though for the moment Fray Fulgencio, a half-frantic monk, and Sor Patrocinio, a nun who had been punished by her religious superiors for counterfeiting *stigmata*, were relegated to their convents. King Francisco's petulant and childish escapade was punished by deprivation of the post of Intendant of the Royal Patrimony, which gave him control of large sums.

After this arbitrary and unconstitutional but necessary assertion of his authority, Narvaez continued to rule for fourteen months in comparative peace. Certain changes were made in the Cabinet. Bravo Murillo, succeeding Mon at the Ministry of Finance, made an honest attempt at reform. The diplomatic quarrel with Great Britain had given the death-blow to Spanish credit abroad. To revive it was impossible. It remained only to face the situation, and call upon the country to undergo the sacrifice necessary to bring about some sort of balance between revenue and expenditure. The Queen led the way by abandoning a claim for £900,000 due to her. Bravo Murillo declared himself unable to pay the arrears due to many officials; he refused even to guarantee the future, or to present, as his predecessors had done, a fallacious budget. He ceased to juggle with the paper currency and the consolidated and floating debts. He did not shrink from exposing the disastrous financial system pursued for so many years, and its appalling results. This in itself was beneficial; but unfortunately Bravo Murillo did not continue in office long enough to inaugurate a better system. His project for economy in all departments was opposed by Narvaez, unwilling or unable to consent to reduction in the budget of the Ministry for War,



The Ministers of Marine and the Interior also refused to curtail the expenses of their departments. Bravo Murillo resigned (November, 1850). His successor brought back the ruinous plan of mortgaging future revenue.

In July the Queen bore a son ; but the apparently healthy child died within an hour of its birth. The Montpensier faction was suspected of procuring its murder within the royal chamber. Its life, of course, entailed failure of the wicked scheme to which Isabel's happiness had been sacrificed. It is said that Isabel's hatred of her sister dated from this time, and that she never allowed the duchess or any of her friends' faction to approach her children. The enormity, even more than the risk, of such a crime seems to disprove it ; but the fact that it was believed and set down in contemporary memoirs is shockingly significant.

Sartorius had secured the election of all the ministerial candidates, with the exception of twelve, to the Cortes that met in October, 1851. On account of their supposed unanimity they were nicknamed the Family Congress ; but Chambers, Court, and Country alike had grown weary of the strong hand that controlled them. Narvaez' characteristic impatience of contradiction had grown upon him ; even friendly representation he received with violent outbreaks of temper ; and those who were most anxious to work with him found it well-nigh impossible to brook his haughty imperiousness. The retirement of Bravo Murillo had crippled the ministry. The Queen-dowager, though she owed everything to Narvaez, opposed him with a stubbornness equal to his own, and seized the opportunity to increase his unpopularity. In January, 1851, he resigned.

The results of Narvaez' retirement are summed up by Andrés Borrego, annalist of the turbulent age in which he played a second-rate but respectable part. "Since 1843," he says, "the *Moderado* party had become accustomed to follow the Duke of Valencia (Narvaez) by any road he might choose to lead them. It had surrendered its principles to a man.

The man disappeared and nothing was left." It was indeed impossible to find anybody of like authority to replace him; but the choice of the Queen, directed by her mother, fell at any rate on an honest politician. The late Minister of Finance, Bravo Murillo, belonged to the dynastic party which aimed at limiting the power of the elective Chamber; and it was among this party that he chose his colleagues. For himself, he took the Ministry of Finance as well as the Presidency of the Council, and determined to carry out the reforms he had prepared whilst he belonged to the late Cabinet. Steady opposition, however, obliged him to dissolve the refractory Cortes (April, 1851); at the same time he made some changes in his Cabinet; and the Marquis of Miraflores became Minister for Foreign Affairs. The election was managed in the usual way; and its result was the return of a neo-Catholic, Conservative, and Royalist Chamber devoted to the ministry. Already all important posts were held by its friends. General Fernando Fernandez de Córdova had replaced O'Donnell as inspector-general of cavalry. The embassy in Paris was held by Donoso Cortés, the prophet of the new Catholicism, who had acquired a reputation for almost supernatural wisdom by interpreting without acknowledgment the doctrines of Joseph de Maistre to his admiring countrymen. It seemed as though nothing need be feared from the once-formidable Progressives, but that the ministry, professedly devoted to altar and throne, might safely undo the work of many revolutions.

Bravo Murillo's financial reforms were accepted without question. They consisted roughly of cutting down liabilities to the possibilities of resources. It was laid down as an axiom that no new debts must be incurred, and no promises of payment made beyond those that were capable of fulfilment. The three per cent. loans were recognised in full; but the four and five per cent. loans suffered a reduction of interest and of capital. Seventy-four million pounds of the debt were classed as "deferred" until better days. In spite of the arbitrary

nature of these "reforms," and the storm of protest they raised abroad, their evident honesty created on the whole a favourable impression. It was more advantageous to receive payment, however small, than merely to have interest added to capital as bonds that could never be redeemed. Eight hundred thousand pounds a year were assigned to the foreign creditors of Spain.

More important still was the Concordat with the Holy See, signed in October, 1851. Though violated by successive revolutions, and constantly modified in a more liberal direction, it is still the basis of the relations between Church and State. In its original form it was a complete surrender by the State after eighteen years of painful disagreement. It may be well to recapitulate here, though they have been mentioned under the years in which they befel, the successive steps in the quarrel. At the outset of Isabel's reign the Church, whilst preferring to observe a neutral attitude in the dynastic dispute, had placed its power at the service of Don Carlos. In 1834 the Spanish Government had retaliated by suppressing convents guilty of giving aid to the Pretender, and all religious houses containing fewer than twelve persons. The property of the suppressed convents was confiscated; the temporalities of sees whose occupants had joined the Pretender were seized; and orders were sent to the bishops to prevent the priests under their charge from encouraging rebellion. In 1835 the Jesuit Order was suppressed. In 1836, a Radical ministry being in office, the whole of the regular orders were declared illegal, and their property was confiscated. Exceptions were made in favour of the missionary, teaching, and nursing orders. In 1837 the tithe was suppressed; and the property of the secular clergy was taken over by the State, which made itself responsible for their maintenance. During the years 1838-1840 the Conservatives, seeking reconciliation, promoted schemes for reendowment of the Church. In the latter year the Progressives swept away their work. In

1845 a settlement had been attempted; but the demands of Rome were such that they were refused by Narvaez in spite of his eagerness to secure the recognition of Queen Isabel. A new Pope, a European revolution, and Spain's efforts on behalf of Pius IX, produced a more conciliatory spirit. In 1847 an apostolic delegate was sent to Madrid. Next year a commission was appointed to study the bases of a Concordat. In 1849 the submissive Cortes granted to the ministry authority to conclude a Concordat without previously submitting its terms to themselves. Thus, after years of struggle, the decision of a question that had radically divided Spaniards was abandoned to a ministry of avowed retrograde tendencies. The result was as follows.

The chief clauses of the Concordat agreed upon provided (§ 1) that the Catholic religion, to the exclusion of all others, remains the sole religion of Spaniards, and shall ever be maintained as such; (§ 2) that education, public and private, shall conform to the doctrines of the Church; (§ 3) that bishops and other ministers of religion shall be aided by the public powers in their efforts against the wickedness of those who seek to pervert the Faith, and in suppressing harmful books; (§ 4) that they shall enjoy full ecclesiastical freedom as defined by canon law; (§ 38) that the endowment of the Church shall consist of the property restored to it by the law of 1845, of the funds raised by the sale of indulgences under the bull of Holy Crusade, of the revenue of the master-ships and commanderies of the medieval orders of religious knighthood, and of the proceeds of a tax on rural and urban property sufficient for the proper maintenance of the Church and collected by the State tax-gatherers; and that the property of the Church not included in the law of 1845 shall be sold and the proceeds handed over to the clergy in three per cent. bonds; (§ 41) that the Church shall have full authority to acquire and hold property both real and personal in the future.

Some ancient dioceses were abolished, and some new ones created, in accordance with the needs of the population. The orders of St Vincent de Paul and St Philip Neri were permitted to found religious houses in Spain. In return for all these concessions, the Pope recognised in carefully guarded language the validity of sales of Church property previous to the date of the above Concordat. The moral validity of these sales was however purposely left ambiguous; the faithful must settle the question with their own consciences. The maintenance of the clergy, charged on the budget, was fixed at about one million and a quarter sterling a year; salaries ranged from that of the Archbishop of Toledo, £1800, to that of a village priest, £22 a year. Thus the Church became once more independent of the State; education was handed over to its charge; and the Spanish Crown gave up many ancient rights. Yet there were still many who would have gone still further, taking back the Church lands from the buyers and restoring the tithe.

The confiscation of the estates of the Church proved without doubt in the end an economic good. It freed well-nigh one-third of the real estate from stagnation. But the sum that came into the Treasury was ridiculously small. Frauds on a very large scale were committed; insecurity of tenure—for it was known that the Carlists, if victorious, would annul the sales—together with the scarcity of money, kept prices low. Four or five years' purchase of a very low rental was the average amount realised. Haste to realise profit caused much deforesting and further increased the aridity of rural Spain. When at last the sales were completed, the number of landowners had vastly increased; but mal-administration, coupled with fraud, had frittered away a capital that would, as Mendizabal had seen, have sufficed to pay the National Debt.

The Cortes were sitting, and the policy of the Government was under discussion, when the news of Louis Napoleon's



*coup d'état* threw Madrid into a state of wild excitement. The sittings were suspended; the budget was approved without discussion; and Bravo Murillo, made reckless by fear, gagged the press and imprisoned without trial all who ventured to question his autocratic methods. The army showed signs of restlessness; Generals Prim and Ortega were removed from the capital. Minister after minister resigned; but still the President clung to office, and reconstructed his shattered Cabinet.

For a moment public attention was withdrawn from politics by an attempt on the Queen's life. Her eldest daughter and namesake was born on Dec. 20, 1851. On February 2 of the following year the Queen was about to proceed in state to the Church of Atocha to give thanks for her safe delivery, when she was stabbed, in the midst of her Court, in the grand corridor of the palace. The would-be murderer was a priest named Martin Merino, more than sixty years old. A man of pure life, charitable and witty, he had become crazed with Liberal doctrines, disordered vanity, and bilious disease. He suffered death for his crime. Isabel, though severely wounded, would have saved his life; she was ever merciful. The rumour that, before his death, he implicated persons in high positions was officially denied. No shadow of evidence has ever been produced to connect Merino's crime with the plot to give the throne of Spain to an Orleans prince.

The Queen's danger and courage revived for a moment her popularity; but it was soon drowned again in a storm of scandal. Railway speculation was at its fiercest. The Government granted concessions and guaranteed six per cent. interest. The Queen-dowager and her husband were known to have made large sums by corrupt use of influence. The work of government became daily more difficult, and Bravo Murillo's methods more arbitrary. When the Cortes met (Dec. 1, 1852), the ministerial nominee for the Presidency of the Chamber was defeated by Martinez de la Rosa.



Armero and Miraflores had quitted the Cabinet during the summer.

Bravo Murillo felt that power was slipping from him, but nevertheless he issued (Dec. 2) his proposal for revision of the Constitution. Frankly reactionary, it aimed at extensions of the royal prerogative and further limitations of the franchise. Even Pidal, a leader among Conservatives, declared it to imply complete abolition of the representative system. The *Moderado* committee described it in a manifesto as calculated to destroy the whole fabric of the Constitution, to rob the nation of the safeguard of an annual budget, to give to the ministry power to legislate without cooperation of the Cortes, to render the discussions of the Cortes secret by closing the doors of the Houses, and to prevent the amendment by Parliament of ministerial bills. Public discussion of this project was forbidden.

Even at the palace the danger of this attempt to rival Napoleon's *coup d'état* was seen; and Cristina opposed it. Narvaez was called in for consultation; but Bravo Murillo sent him to examine the military archives at Vienna. But by this time the *Moderado* committee, Concha, O'Donnell, Rivas, Mon, Pidal, and San Luis, were working with the Progressives under Mendizabal and Olózaga to overthrow a ministry without adherents. Bravo Murillo had dissolved the Cortes immediately after presenting his great proposal; he had forbidden meetings of electors and had threatened that "though he wore but a tail-coat, he would hang generals in their own sashes." But he was incapable of fulfilling his bold words; he stood alone against the Court, the *Moderados*, and the Progressives; and he was forced to resign (Dec. 14, 1852).

The projected reform of the Constitution was, in fact, little more than an attempt to codify and legalise actual practice; but Spain was swayed by words rather than by facts. The Liberal forms must be maintained; and the Court renounced its dangerous alliance with Bravo Murillo, not

because it disapproved of his aims, but because his methods were too straightforward. His successor, General Roncali, took two other generals into his stop-gap ministry. The scheme for extending the authority of the Crown was not abandoned; but it was deemed prudent to make some concessions at first to Liberal opinion. Accordingly the severity of the decrees that controlled the press was relaxed; and a promise was given that no alteration in the Constitution should be made without the assent of the new Cortes.

They met on March 1, 1853. The ministerial majority in favour of reform numbered 250; the Opposition mustered 44 Moderates and 19 Progressives. According to Spanish ideas the return of so large an Opposition was well-nigh a victory, for O'Donnell, Serrano, Mon, Pidal, Ros de Olano, and the rest represented a formidable body of public opinion. The ministry had raised a loan at nine per cent. guaranteed upon the revenues of Cuba; they had appointed a new batch of senators pledged to support them; but their arrangements for long tenure of power proved useless. In the midst of the discussion of their somewhat colourless proposal for constitutional reform General Concha made a fierce attack on the railway concessions, in which Salamanca and Queen Cristina were implicated. Parliament was at once prorogued; and the ministry which had been unable to protect those in high places was dismissed (April 12, 1853).

The succeeding Cabinet of nobodies under the influence of Queen Cristina and the nominal leadership of General Lersundi disappeared in September, leaving even less trace of its existence. Dangers were growing thick when the ex-journalist Sartorius, now Count of San Luis, was called to power. He made a bold effort to save the tottering throne, first by concession, and when that failed, by repression of a kind to which even Spain was unaccustomed. He began by recalling Narvaez, conferring commands on some of the Opposition generals, and reopening the Cortes. But the question

of the railway concessions was brought up again. The Opposition made honesty its watchword; and San Luis had a desperate cause to defend. A proposal in the Senate that railway concessions should be granted only by Parliament, and not as heretofore by decree, was recognised as an indirect attack on the Queen-dowager; and San Luis was obliged to oppose a reasonable and necessary reform. The ministry was defeated; the Cortes were prorogued; and compulsion was resorted to. All functionaries who had voted with the Opposition were dismissed; many senators were deprived; Generals O'Donnell, Serrano, Zabala, and the brothers Concha were banished; the budget was passed by decree. A forced anticipation of taxation roused indignation to its highest pitch.

Distrust and alarm grew daily; the wildest schemes, even a pan-Iberian kingdom, were discussed. The gagged newspapers of Madrid issued (Dec. 29, 1853) a blank sheet to indicate that they were prevented from expressing or directing opinion. The Queen was living in retirement awaiting her confinement; it is said that San Luis carefully concealed from her the state of public feeling. Nevertheless on Jan. 13, 1854, eight days after the birth of her child, a manifesto was laid before her bearing the signature of many senators, deputies, grandees, officials, and men of wealth and position, in fact the whole Liberal party. It pointed out that for years past the budget had not been submitted to the Cortes as the law directed; that meetings of the Cortes were rendered futile by prorogation following immediately upon opposition; that the deficit in the public accounts was ever growing; and that the railway concessions had given rise to scandals. The reopening of the Cortes with a view to the redress of these evils was demanded.

The reply given to this petition was the proclamation of a state of siege in Madrid, and the banishment of all leaders of the Opposition to the colonies or abroad. The result was inevitable. Constitutional methods had failed; and the coming

revolution was directed by men of high character and position. Its military leader was General O'Donnell, who owed his advancement and his title of Count of Lucena to success in the Carlist War. Hitherto he had not been reckoned among Progressives; he had opposed Espartero, and had aided in the restoration of Queen Cristina. He had been governor of Cuba and, later, inspector-general of infantry under Narvaez. This post he had held till 1851, when he joined the Opposition in the Senate. He was now in hiding in Madrid. His most active and able lieutenant was the civilian Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, statesman and historian, whose opinions have been so often quoted in this book.

Whilst the plans of the conspirators were maturing, and Cánovas was recruiting adherents in all classes of society, a military revolt broke out in Saragossa. Energetically repressed, it served only to put the Government on its guard. Police precautions were redoubled, but the ground was everywhere undermined; the authorities were powerless against the nation. On April 26, 1854, appeared at Madrid the first number of a mysterious newspaper calling itself *The Bat* (*El Murciélagos*). Within its black-edged border it contained statements, in the plainest of language, of facts that had hitherto been whispered only. Dropping vague accusations it charged Salamanca, the Duke of Rianzares, his wife, the Queen-dowager, and San Luis himself, with corruption, mentioning times, circumstances, and the sums involved, with a precision that could hardly fail to carry conviction. *The Bat* was secretly printed, by whom was never discovered; copies of it were sent to the Queen and the ministers. On June 4 Isabel herself was attacked. "Her faithful subjects," said *The Bat*, "sorrow because her name cannot be pronounced without contempt, some are thinking of Pedro V (the King of Portugal), some of Montpensier." A week later appeared the last and most scandalous number of all. The Queen's favourite was named; and the steps of his promotion were

carefully reviewed. A scheme of Queen Cristina's to increase her fortune with connivance of the Treasury was exposed.

Fear fell upon Madrid ; everybody was waiting for the crash to come. The Queen was at La Granja ; and a portion of the garrison had been enlisted in the cause of the revolution. June 15 had been fixed ; but the explosion was postponed, in order that its organisation might be more complete, till June 28. On that morning General O'Donnell met General Dulce's cavalry brigade, leaving the capital to exercise beyond the suburbs, and called upon it to join him to overthrow the ministry. The soldiers acclaimed him ; none took advantage of the permission to withdraw formally granted to any who disapproved of their enterprise. Having made their *pronunciamiento*, and being joined by volunteers from Madrid, the troops marched to Alcalá de Henares, the university city a few leagues distant. Thence their leader addressed to the Queen a demand for a change of ministry, the assembly of Cortes, and abandonment of the forced loan. Meanwhile revolutionary pamphlets were distributed broadcast ; and the agitation was fostered in Madrid by Cánovas and his assistants. The Queen and San Luis hurried back.

Isabel's first plan was to ride out to the revolted troops and recall them to their allegiance. This bold scheme might have succeeded, but it involved a great risk ; and, even if the soldiers submitted, the ministry must be sacrificed. Instead a state of siege was proclaimed ; the insurgent generals were outlawed ; and the Queen reviewed the portion of the garrison that remained faithful. She placed herself under its protection and sent it out under General Blaser, the Minister for War, to fight the rebels. O'Donnell refused an offer of pardon conditional upon giving up General Dulce ; and the opposing forces met at Vicálvaro on the outskirts of Madrid (June 30, 1854). The action was neither bloody nor decisive. Blaser had artillery but no cavalry ; O'Donnell had only cavalry ; but his success was sufficient to induce many waverers to join the



cause. Next day he marched to Aranjuez, so as to keep open his communications with the south, the quarter from which he expected reinforcements. Though he failed to seize Toledo, and Blaser followed him close, he was so well assured of success that he replied to another conciliatory message by stating conditions which he knew that the Queen could not accept.

Hitherto the Radicals of Madrid had remained quiet, awaiting the issue of the struggle between the two wings of the Conservative party. The declaration of the generals, that they would not lay down their arms until the ministry had been dismissed and public opinion satisfied by conformity to the principles of liberty, justice, and morality, had been too vague to rouse enthusiasm. It was left to Cánovas to win them over to the revolution by the "Programme of Manzanares." Issued in the name of O'Donnell and his fellow-generals, its purport was clear and its proposals definite. "We desire," it ran, "the preservation of the throne, but without *camarilla* to dishonour it; we desire the exact fulfilment of the fundamental laws and their improvement, especially in the matters of representation and the press; we desire that taxation be rendered less heavy by strict economy; we desire that in civil and military appointments seniority and good service should have weight; we desire to save the provinces from the centralisation that is eating them up, by giving them the self-government necessary for the preservation and increase of their special interests; and, to guarantee all, we desire, and will place on a firm footing, the national militia." The last clause, addressed to the Radical mob, changed the character of the revolution. Madrid rang with cries of "Death to the ministers! Death to Queen Cristina!" The great towns were electing juntas; it was clear that this was no longer a mere military revolt, to be appeased by a change of ministry. But it was not until July 17 that San Luis realised his position and resigned.



His fall was greeted with rapture ; the Hymn of Riego was played at the bull-fight after an interval of eleven years ; bells were rung ; the reviving national militia built barricades ; the mob wrecked the houses of Queen Cristina, San Luis, and his colleagues. General Fernando Fernandez de Córdova, hastily appointed President of the Council, failed to restore order ; and for ten days the capital was in the hands of the rioters. The late ministers, the *camarilla*, and the Court favourites fled or went into hiding ; the Queen was prevented from following their example by the representations of the foreign ambassadors. Bad news came from the provinces. Valladolid, Barcelona, and Saragossa had joined the revolution. It was clear that only by yielding could the Crown be saved. Immediate assembly of the Cortes and liberty of the press were promised. Córdova was replaced by Rivas, but continued to hold the ministry for war. The Marquis of Perales, a trusted Liberal, was made governor of Madrid. Brigadier Garrigó, a revolutionary officer captured at Vicálvaro, was pardoned and promoted. He went about among the barricades to stay the fight between the soldiers and the citizens who were storming them. On the 19th a junta of "Safety, Armament, and Defence of Madrid" was elected. It was recognised by the Queen ; it included a number of respectable citizens ; and its president was General Evaristo de San Miguel, a recognised leader of the Liberal party since 1820.

The declared objects of the junta were "to give a successful direction to the popular movement, to restrict bloodshed, and to save the institutions trampled on by the most barbarous and unheard-of tyranny." By proclamation "it immortalised the great deeds that had saved liberty and public morality." It redeemed O'Donnell's promise to his troops by granting the discharges and promotions. It decreed the suppression of the Council of State, really an independent body, but supposed to be guilty of Conservative leanings ; it ordered all public monies to be paid into the account of the junta. San Miguel

was now Captain-General of New Castille and Universal Minister pending the arrival of Espartero. The insurrection, intended to merely overthrow an unpopular ministry, had shattered the fabric of the State. San Miguel and his junta formed but a feeble barrier between the Queen and the mob.

Espartero was appointed President of the Council; and immediately the fighting in the streets ceased. It had not been very fierce, for the Madrid mob is not bloodthirsty. The army reckoned 23 killed and 125 wounded, the citizens 70 killed and 300 wounded. They now fraternised on the 284 barricades that obstructed the streets, "stout pedestals of liberty," as they were styled by a newspaper of the time. Comic incidents had been innumerable. A bull-fighter named Pucheta, the doughty leader of the patriots of Lavapiés, the Seven Dials of Madrid, commanded three thousand men and presided over an opposition junta. He seized the powder magazine and dismissed the carbineers who guarded one of the gates of the city. After relieving their feelings by executing a deservedly unpopular officer of police, the astute patriots found means to turn their position to profit. They started an office and reaped a rich harvest by granting safe-conducts in the name of the people to those whom fear impelled to leave Madrid. The reigning favourite was among those who paid the tax. San Luis, the autocratic minister, had gone forth attired as a valet.

When the Radicals adopted the Programme of Manzanares all eyes turned to Logroño, where the ex-Regent was living in retirement. But the Queen's summons found Espartero no longer at home. He had already plunged into the revolution by accepting at Saragossa the presidency of a junta whose programme was even more revolutionary than that of Manzanares. On July 26 Barcelona made its *pronunciamiento*; and its governor, Concha, Marqués del Duero, in order to save bloodshed, took the presidency of the junta. Seville had already joined the revolution. General Blaser, finding himself

no longer obeyed, handed over his authority to the next of rank, whereupon his troops joined their late opponents under O'Donnell. Espartero was now in a position to dictate terms. It is believed that he might have made himself King of Spain at this time. But, after hesitating for some days, waiting, according to his wont, upon events and receiving assurances from the Queen that his intervention would be accepted with due submission, he came to Madrid.

He received a delirious welcome. Met by the junta, he answered its complimentary address with foolish vanity: "Men of Madrid, you have summoned me to establish for ever the liberties of our land. Here I am; and if the enemies of our most holy liberty would snatch it from us, with the sword of Luchana I will put myself at your head, at the head of all Spaniards, and will show you the way to glory!" He entered the capital standing in an open landau and spreading his arms abroad as though he would fold in one embrace the thousands of noisy patriots who seethed around him. A foreign acquaintance relates that he underwent a kind of transfiguration, "his heavy form and dark complexion seemed to leave him. Friends and foes alike were seized with an indescribable emotion. Suddenly he had been invested with the dignity of an inspired spirit sent to save Spain from the rack of civil dissolution." Thus he was drawn in a kind of juggernaut procession to the palace to be received by the Queen.

Until his arrival Isabel was, in fact, the prisoner of the revolutionaries. They had not laid down their arms or quitted their barricades gay with the portraits of the people's general, and, after her submission, of the Queen. Her proclamation regretting "the deplorable mistakes that had caused absurd distrust of me," and praising the sacrifices made in the cause of liberty, had been received with distrust or derision. In order to escape from one bondage she was obliged to enter into another hardly less injurious to her dignity. Her

interview with Espartero lasted only a few minutes, for the patriots, who kept watch and ward over the palace, howled for the reappearance of their chief. Already she had promised that her whole household should be changed and that Constituent Cortes should be convoked. She now made over all her powers to Espartero to do as he thought best.

Espartero had no plans. To all questions as to his proposed course of action he gave but one answer, "Let the will of the nation be fulfilled." This phrase, which for a time served to cloak his irresolute time-serving, soon became a subject of mockery. A man who knew his own mind was coming to share his triumph. O'Donnell reached Madrid a day after Espartero. He too was welcomed by the junta; and his first care was to pay his respects to the hero of the hour. Their embrace, in sight of the multitude, was supposed to betoken the fusion of the two parties, the Parliamentary-Conservative and the Progressive, that had made the revolution. For the moment O'Donnell was obliged to content himself with the second place. Refusing the governorship of Cuba and the Foreign Office, he claimed the War Office, in which he could make his power felt. The revolution which had imperilled the throne, and for which he had combated hitherto, had resulted in a manner widely different from his hopes and expectations; but O'Donnell could be patient and dissemble. His object was to regain the confidence of the Queen and to get rid of Espartero, whose advancement he had unwittingly served. It took him just two years to do it.

Thus fell, rotted from within, the party which under Narvaez and Bravo Murillo had governed Spain for ten years. It had stood the shock of the European revolution of 1848, crushed Carlist rebellion, and braved the displeasure of Great Britain; it had quieted consciences by the Concordat, and gratified Spanish pride by intervention in Portugal and Italy. The methods, it is true, were harsh; but Spain revived,

and her prosperity increased under its strong hand. The project of constitutional reform was intended to formulate the necessary prerogative of the Crown and to rally the Conservatives, who had hitherto been Carlists, to the dynasty. Bravo Murillo failed to see that the only safe basis for the throne outside a military dictatorship was the good-will of the Progressives. Two short ministries followed, whilst parties were so broken up that it was impossible to find a foundation for a durable Cabinet. Then came San Luis, whose adoption of the Opposition programme served only to alienate his own party. His attempt to govern in opposition to the Cortes, the army, and the country, collapsed before the cry of dishonesty. A revolution made by Conservatives made the chief of the Progressives arbiter.

## CHAPTER IX.

### THE BIENNIUM (1854—1856).

THE melodramatic embrace of O'Donnell and Espartero inaugurated an abortive Liberal Union, or coalition of the moderate and the advanced Liberals. The party overthrown by the revolution, the party which but a few days before had been seemingly all-powerful, had, as was usual in like circumstances, utterly disappeared. Its leader had fled; its rank and file had gone over to the enemy; those who so lately had struggled to make themselves conspicuous were now most anxious to escape attention until their connexion with a lost cause should have slipped from the short memory of a troubled age. Meanwhile the victors of the hour were neither satisfied nor unanimous. The revolution planned and carried out by the Moderates had turned to the advantage of the Progressives and their leader, Espartero, who, coming at the eleventh hour, had been thrust by the sovereign people into the first place. Only he could lay the Lord of Misrule, who in the shape of Pucheta triumphed in the streets of the capital. Writing many years later, Cánovas del Castillo summed up the situation with his usual lucidity and with rare frankness. "The Progressives," he says, "had unexpectedly and rapidly passed from the position of half-hearted auxiliaries to that of victorious leaders." The Moderates had indeed overthrown and put to flight the Court and clerical faction; but by resorting to intrigue, sedition, and military revolt they had forfeited their chief title to respect as well as the confidence of the Queen. The result had been



to place in power a party scarcely less odious to them than the late ministry.

The first task to which the new Government turned its attention was the division of spoils. In the civil service a complete change of office-holders was at once carried out. A most disturbing and dangerous element in Spanish social and political life is formed by the *cesantes*, ex-office-holders, deprived of their livelihood so long as their party is out of power. Starvation makes them unscrupulous as to the means they employ to bring back to power those on whom they depend. The prospect of hard times makes their opponents equally unscrupulous as to the means by which they prolong the days of salaried idleness in public employment. On this occasion the *cesantes* had been languishing for years, while others, not more worthy, fattened on the budget. At length they were gratified by a heroic effort on the part of their superiors to compensate them for their notable activity in the cause of the revolution by entering, as nearly as possible, an eleven-year-old list of public servants.

The army, too, claimed fulfilment of promises made to secure its support in a moment of danger. Promotion was given to all officers who had helped the cause; it signified no more than the additional annual charge of some millions of reals on the already overloaded budget. But, now that the late foes had discovered that from the first they had all been fighting in the sacred cause of liberty, it was invidious to make distinctions; so all alike were promoted. The same generous course was pursued towards the rank and file, whose political perceptions had been quickened by the prospect of a remission of two years of enforced service. Thus the army which had deserved so well of the country lost half its private soldiers, but was strengthened by a corresponding increase in its already large establishment of colonels and generals. Dulce, Echagüe, Ros de Olano, Serrano, Infante, and Manuel Concha received "the just reward of their services" in the shape of high military

commands at home. José Concha went as Governor-General to Cuba. When all this was settled, there remained the many "supreme" provincial juntas that had sprung up at the call of those who now found themselves invested with the responsibilities of government. The juntas had made full use of their "supremacy"; they had legislated on matters involving the widest principles, as well as on those of purely local interest; and their efforts had produced a crop of thirty-eight new generals. Roughly to abolish the juntas and their works would be to risk another and a still more violent demonstration of its rights by the sovereign people. It was wisely decided to temporise, and to let the local politicians enjoy a little longer the delirious delights of independence. So proclamation was made in the Queen's name to the juntas, commanding them not to hinder the new executive, but to continue their patriotic labours in cooperation with it, enlightening it with their councils until such time as the Cortes should decide to what uses the people's victory should be turned.

A still more difficult question, and one on which the Liberal union was nearly wrecked at the outset, was that which concerned the Queen-mother. Her corrupt influence had been cited as the abundant justification of disloyalty; against her *The Bat* had piled up its scurrilous charges, representing her as a rapacious and shameless Jezebel. The patriots had readily believed the story; and, now that Queen Cristina was in their power, they not unnaturally demanded that her many crimes should be punished. But this seemingly obvious course led directly to one of two dangers. If Queen Cristina were put upon her trial before the Cortes, and the charges were proved against her, there was reason to fear that the blow might bring down the tottering throne. If, on the other hand, the charges were not proved, they might overwhelm those who had brought them; and suspicion might be aroused that motives other than pure zeal for public and private morality had influenced the leaders of Vicálvaro. The most ready way out of the difficulty

would be for Queen Cristina to escape abroad. But the excited mob, fearful of losing its intended victim, declared that justice must be done, and that he who aided the ex-Regent to quit the country would be "the first to cast filth upon the splendid banner hoisted by Manzanares and Saragossa." This threat came from a powerful body of extreme Radicals pledged to secure effective sovereignty of the people, a single tax, abolition of conscription and of capital punishment, and a national militia. But, even if the ministry had been willing to take the risk of connivance at Cristina's flight and to break their solemn promise "not to let her go by day or by night furtively," this path was barred; for Cristina would not "go furtively." She had saved her life, her family, and her jewels by cool daring. A revolution was no new incident in her life; she refused to quit Madrid otherwise than with the dignity befitting her rank. So the ministers were obliged to take formal leave of her before she set out for Portugal, accompanied by a guard of honour.

A howl of baffled rage went up from the patriots when they found that their intended victim had marched out with flying colours. The leaders of the Radical clubs, with the noble demagogue Orense at their head, accused Espartero of betraying the popular cause; and for a few hours it looked as if Madrid would appoint leaders from among the extreme Radicals to carry out its will. Repression would have been impossible for the "barn-door fowl" and the "peacock," as Espartero and O'Donnell were aptly nicknamed. They held power by the grace of the mob; and those who had made could unmake them. To the "peacock" at least the humiliation of submission to such a tribunal was distasteful; nevertheless it had to be undergone. The presidents of all the popular political clubs were invited to the Home Office to lay their wishes before the assembled ministers. The mob sulkily dispersed, pacified in some degree by what it considered a proper demonstration of respect by the ministers to their masters. Cristina's pension was for the

second time withdrawn, and her property confiscated. She lost but little, for, profiting by experience, she had safely lodged the bulk of her large fortune in Paris.

The revolution had not been democratic in the French sense of the word. No country is less troubled by class jealousies than Spain, where a perhaps overwhelming sense of personal dignity has at any rate the corresponding advantage of freeing its possessor from the galling consciousness of social inferiority. Every popular movement since 1810 had numbered among its adherents members of the old nobility; commoners who fought in the cause of liberty incurred no reproach when they accepted a title as part of the reward of their services. But the radical differences of opinion that divided the coalition now in power were apparent as soon as it became necessary to decide whether the Constitution of 1837 (Progressive) or that of 1845 (Moderate) should be the law of the land. The Government reserved this question too for the decision of the sovereign people; and intrigues filled up the interval before the meeting of the Constituent Cortes (Nov. 8, 1854). A single Chamber elected by universal suffrage must decide once more the fate of Spain.

The Government ostentatiously refrained from pressure during the elections, in order that the real will of the country might be ascertained; but the result proved only that the majority was profoundly indifferent to the question which kept the capital and some provincial towns in a fever of agitation. In many electoral divisions the number of voters was ridiculously small. The extreme Radicals had tried to leave the question of the monarchy open, hoping that the election might turn to the advantage of Espartero. But Espartero lacked ambition, or perhaps nerve, to grasp the crown which was more than once within his reach. He discouraged his followers who wished to make him dictator or first consul, and allowed the maintenance of the monarchy to be put beyond question by the terms of the summons to Parliament. It was opened by

Queen Isabel in person. She read a clever speech written by Pacheco to suit a most difficult situation. Her voice, tremulous at first, gathered strength as she went on; and her peroration was greeted with applause that showed that she was still very dear to her people. The most significant sentences were, "Recent events cannot be blotted out, nor disappear from the page of time. But, though our hearts be still oppressed, and our eyes still tearful, at the recollection of our disasters and misfortunes, let us draw from them example and teaching for the political life that is now opening before us. Perhaps we have all done wrong; from to-day we will do better."

The assembly to which this speech was addressed comprised a United-Liberal majority. The leaders were the two brothers Concha, Serrano, San Miguel, Ros de Olano, and Dulce among the generals, Cortina, Madoz, Rios Rosas, and Pacheco, civilians. Taking the Programme of Manzanares as the basis of its principles, it declared for the sovereignty of the people, the throne of Isabel II, a citizen militia, and fiscal reform. The party was supposed to include all but the extremists on either hand. It was easy to foresee that the loose bond of general principles would give way immediately the Unionists were called upon to choose between the living realities, O'Donnell and Espartero. Each had already the nucleus of a personal following. The Progressives pure and simple were grouped, to the number of about fifty, under Salustiano de Olózaga; Progressive and Esparterist were in those days convertible terms. The bond that held the Moderates to the allegiance of O'Donnell was somewhat more lax; but he could be sure of the support of the Ultramontanes under Cándido Nocedal and Alejandro Castro when opposing any Radical measure. Outside these more or less clearly defined factions stood a group of some two dozen democrats, many of them avowed Republicans, among them Estanislao Figueras, member for Tarragona and afterwards first President of the Spanish Republic. This was the tiny band of twenty-three



that voted against the maintenance of the monarchy when it was carried at an early session by the overwhelming majority of 206. On this occasion Prim, who afterwards overthrew Isabel's throne, declared himself its champion and defender. "I am," he said in his usual braggart style, "as I have always been, an upholder of the Constitutional Monarchy. My love for Queen Isabel the Second is as it was in the days when I fought for her on the field of battle and in the rostrum.... Note well my words against the day, should it ever come, when the bullets are flying between us."

The Chamber thus composed chose Espartero for President; but the office, incompatible with that of President of the Council, which he already held, finally fell to the vigorous Liberal, Madoz. In an early session Salustiano de Olózaga tried to tear off from the deputies their transparent uniform of United-Liberalism and to show them as followers merely of one or other of the rival generals. He proposed a vote of censure upon the ministry for having failed to secure the objects aimed at by the late revolution, excluding Espartero by name. But Espartero, with his usual good faith, elected to stand or fall with his colleagues, and hotly opposed the motion. It was lost by a large majority; and the alliance had still eighteen months to run. When it broke up, it left O'Donnell and not Espartero at the head of affairs.

Controversy as to the adoption of one or other of the Constitutions, with which the country had experimented since the Royal Statute, ended by the resolution to draw up yet another which should represent exactly the principles for which war had so lately been waged. Accordingly a commission was named, including Salustiano de Olózaga and Modesto Lafuente, the historian, to draw up a project to be submitted to the Constituent Cortes. The commission hurried on its labours; it had a variety of models to choose from; and by January, 1855, it was ready with its scheme.

Its first article declared that all public powers emanate from



the sovereign people—a proposition sure to commend itself to the assembly for which it was intended. The next article, however, dealt with highly controversial matter, by laying down that “the Spanish nation undertakes to maintain and protect the worship and the ministers of the Catholic Religion, which the Spaniards profess.” It went on to enact that no persecution should be suffered by nonconformists, unless their nonconformity was “manifested by acts contrary to religion.” Wording so loose left the matter practically in the hands of the tribunal called upon to define “acts contrary to religion”; but the clause was supposed to involve the principle of religious liberty, a principle abominable to the majority of Spaniards. The question was hotly debated for fifteen days. Very few deputies ventured to raise their voices in favour of thorough liberty of conscience: the Progressives were whole-hearted in their opposition to it. Articles guaranteeing the liberty of the press and abolition of the death penalty for political offences met with less opposition. For suspension of the constitutional guarantees—the favourite weapon of unpopular ministries—a special law of Parliament was made necessary instead of a mere decree as heretofore. The scheme proposed, moreover, that the Cortes should consist of a Senate of life-members nominated by the Crown, and a House of Deputies elected for three years (by constituencies of 50,000 souls). This, however, was modified in accordance with the minority report presented by Olózaga; the Senate was made elective, its members being subject to a property qualification and appointed for twelve years instead of for life. It was enacted that one session at least should take place in each year; and that, when the Cortes were not sitting, their place should be taken by a Permanent Commission. Provincial deputations and municipal assemblies were created for local government. The law demanded that taxes should be sanctioned by Parliament before collection; and that the Cortes should fix each year the number of recruits needed for the army.

That this Constitution resembles the Radical one of 1837 much more closely than the Moderate one of 1845 shows that the Progressive majority was still preponderant in the Constituent Cortes. But with the creative effort their strength seemed to be exhausted. They were afraid of their own work, and, after solemnly accepting the Constitution, they turned to debating whether the Constitution should be promulgated at once or should be withheld for a time. Thus reaction overtook them; without violent effort, a few short months undid the pretentious but utterly unsubstantial structure raised in 1854. The Constitution of 1855 was still-born; it was never put into practice.

The Constituent Cortes had not reached the end of their first session when the inevitable collision between the Queen and the Liberals who had saved the throne occurred. In May, 1855, a Bill was passed intended to settle once for all the question of vinculated property. Often as it had been decided to take over the property of the Church, reaction had hitherto always come in time to save a part of it. This had been the case in 1814, in 1823, and notably in 1843. The property already sold represented a value of fifty-seven million pounds; the part that still remained was estimated at a still larger sum. With it were now included communal lands, and the vast estates owned by the religious orders of chivalry, by guilds, by charitable institutions, and by pious foundations endowed for the everlasting welfare of souls. A new law provided that this huge mass of property should be sold by auction in small parcels so that the poorer classes might buy. Great facilities were granted for payment. Only ten per cent. of the total amount was demanded at the time of the sale; then eight per cent. for each of the two following years; then for two more years seven per cent.; the remaining three-fifths of the price was secured by a mortgage of six per cent. spread over a period of ten years. By payment of a not exorbitant rent the peasant would in fifteen years become owner of his farm. In so far as

it took over the property of the Church this was no new measure ; but the powerful party that regarded as sacrilegious and subversive the guarantee of the impending Constitution that no Spaniard or foreigner should be persecuted for his opinions so long as they were not manifested by acts contrary to the religion of the State, could hardly be expected to agree. Moreover it had now something more than the old traditional arguments to rely upon. Further spoliation of the Church would be a flagrant violation of the Concordat solemnly made between the Spanish nation and the Pope only four years before. Against the plea that the Church had no further need of estates now that the nation had undertaken to maintain its worship and ministers, it might reasonably be urged that neither was the Constitution in force, nor could those interested rely upon the promises of a Government which was already taxing, as pensions, the endowments guaranteed in the latest agreement between Church and State.

When Espartero presented himself at Aranjuez, bringing with him the Bill for the royal signature, Queen Isabel met him with a steady refusal to sign. She had consulted the Nuncio and had been persuaded that by carrying out what the ministers represented as merely a necessary formality she would imperil her soul. "I would rather abdicate," she passionately declared, "for then I should prove at least that I can sacrifice myself for my faith ; and God will count it in the balance for the pardon of my sins." Matters had now reached a deadlock. While the ministry saw that it might become necessary to declare the throne vacant since the Queen had refused her consent to a measure duly passed by Parliament, the clerical party was discussing the possibility of carrying off their royal champion to the Basque Provinces, where she would certainly be regarded as a martyr to the best of causes. Another Carlist and religious war, as well as a complete break with Rome, must result from the Queen's steadfastness in refusal. But at length, after several conferences with the ministers on the one

hand and her spiritual advisers on the other, Isabel gave way and signed the Bill, making a protest, as vigorous as was consistent with safety, against the violence done to her conscience. Nobody questioned the sincerity of her letter to the Pope declaring that consent had been wrung from her only by irresistible pressure, and that she would welcome the earliest opportunity of undoing the impious deed.

Even after their champion had given way the clerical party resisted the execution of the law. The bishops who protested were exiled. The Pope broke off diplomatic relations; and the Spanish ambassador left Rome declaring that, should his Holiness refuse to listen to representations, "the ambassador must regret the fatal blindness which would place the worthy successor of St Peter in the position of enemy to a nation which had ever counted its Christianity and Catholicity as its chief glory." In Spain attempted riots had to be suppressed; and the appalling report that the crucifix in the Church of San Francisco in Madrid had sweated blood was discredited only after exposure of the crucifix itself to the gaze of the people, and punishment of the authors of the false prodigy. Again it was necessary for the Government to make its authority felt within the Palace; and Sor Patrocinio was expelled, together with a dozen other worthless members of the *camarilla*, in spite of a ridiculously theatrical threat of armed resistance from the King-consort.

Having momentarily checked Court and clerical intrigues, the Government was free to face a difficulty from the opposite quarter. High prices and the introduction of machinery had provoked grave social and economic troubles, not only in industrial and commercial centres like Barcelona, Saragossa, and Valencia, but also in Old Castille, where crops and farm buildings were burnt by the hungry peasantry. The national militia had made itself conspicuous on almost every occasion of disorder as the upholder of the popular cause against the executive. Under the leadership of turbulent demagogues,

freed from all restraint by the events of the past year, the citizen army was fast making itself sole arbiter between class and class. Interference was urgently necessary but was full of danger. While the Progressive majority in the Cortes held together, it was useless to appeal to them to alter the constitution of a force that was supposed to guarantee liberty. Accordingly the ministry was forced to act in opposition to the known views of the Cortes within a year of a revolution intended to sweep away all hindrance to immediate execution of the clearly expressed will of the majority. A decree suspended the compulsory enrolment of every citizen of full age in the militia; individuals were left to decide whether they would join or not; while provincial governors, creatures of the ministry, became judges of their fitness. This so-called interference with the bulwark of freedom raised a tumult; five members of the ministry resigned. The objectionable decree was recalled; but the vacant portfolios were given to followers of O'Donnell, and the Conservatives had gained a step.

The majority in the Cortes was still Progressive. After replacing the moderate regulations for municipalities and provincial assemblies by the anarchical enactments of 1821; after abolishing the octroi, the most productive but most unpopular tax, and resorting to a forced loan in order to make up the deficit; after granting rewards and pensions to all who had suffered for attempting revolution since the Radicals were last in power eleven years before, and deciding that Liberals in Government service should be allowed to count for seniority and pensions years passed without employment, it suspended its sittings (July 15, 1855). Many deputies went off to the Paris Exhibition to repose after passing ninety-one laws, of which at least half were made in the interest of individuals or coteries. When they met again in October, Espartero was still President of the Council; but all real power was rapidly slipping from his grasp. He was the sole Progressive in the Cabinet containing not only his rival but men as masterful as Alonso



Martinez, a young lawyer, then at the outset of his long political career. O'Donnell had taken advantage of Espartero's inactivity to thrust his friends into every department of the administration. He had cunningly regained his footing in the Palace. A few hollow protestations of devotion had sufficed to persuade the unwary Queen that the man who had brought upon her so many dangers and humiliations was really her best friend, eager to help her to shake off the bondage of the self-righteous Liberals by whom she had been obliged to violate the dictates of her conscience.

An organised campaign of ridicule and persistent belittlement of Espartero speedily made an end of whatever authority was left to him. His rough appearance, his lack of manners and education, his pompous simplicity, and the childish vanity, the love of applause that kept him continually posturing before the patriots with his mouth full of bombastic phrases, made him an excellent butt to the *Padre Cobos* and other popular journals. Hiding a deep political purpose under the comic mask they laughed away the results of the revolution of 1855. The tendency of events provoked by O'Donnell perhaps escaped the dull wits of Espartero; but the leading Radicals were not so candid or so blind. Olózaga, as has already been mentioned, had done his best to break up the one-sided alliance, while the Progressives were still strong enough to act alone. He had withstood the Moderates in the commissions of Finance and Revision of the Constitution, but had failed because Espartero, refusing to see his own danger, opposed him. So, too, Orense's attempt to make O'Donnell responsible for disorders at Saragossa resulted in an overwhelming vote of confidence in O'Donnell and a corresponding increase of his influence. His followers included the most respected politicians, Concha, Cortina, Rios Rosas, and Collado. These formed the *centro parlamentario*, the most stable group in the Chamber. Espartero's friends of the *centro progresista* were still numerous; but their chief dis-



couraged them by repeatedly disavowing their victories and allowing himself to be supplanted everywhere. Nevertheless the Constituent Cortes remained Progressive to the end; it was not by an adverse vote that Espartero was fated to go out of office for the last time. When the retirement of Alonso Martinez made necessary a reconstruction of the Cabinet, and the Progressive element was strengthened by the introduction of Escosura and other Radicals, the deputies approved by 152 against 57 voices. O'Donnell's power had its foundation in the Palace, not in the House of Representatives.

Famine had provoked agrarian riots round Valladolid and other centres of Castille. Escosura, Minister of the Interior, was sent to make enquiry and to suggest a remedy. His report proved to be a Progressive manifesto. It was intended to provoke a crisis; and in it O'Donnell recognised an indirect attack upon himself. He and Escosura were old enemies; the Progressives were not less eager than the Moderates to rule alone. O'Donnell's plans were carefully laid, even his Cabinet was prepared and awaiting to take office. The Queen's help had been promised for the *coup d'état*. Accordingly Escosura's challenge was taken up; and O'Donnell informed the President of the Council that it was impossible for a Cabinet to include differences of opinion so wide as those that separated him from his colleagues at the Home Office. Escosura had warned Espartero of approaching danger, and had urged him to appoint men on whom he could rely to the chief military commands about the capital. But Espartero was convinced that O'Donnell would attempt nothing without the consent and approval of the Queen, who had only lately assured him "that she would never forgive the trick played upon her by O'Donnell and Dulce in 1854." Accordingly, after a sincere but unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the dissentient members of the Cabinet, Espartero betook himself in all confidence to the Queen and besought her to decide the matter at issue. For himself he sought only to evade the

responsibility of choice, and the consequent enmity of rejected politicians. The three were received in audience together; and Espartero, as President of the Council, explained the causes of the disagreement between O'Donnell, the Minister for War, and Escosura, the Minister of the Interior. He besought the Queen to use her influence to save the Cabinet from the loss of either of these two indispensable members. "If either of them quits me," he said, "I must resign too." The Queen then addressed O'Donnell, asking if no compromise were possible. On receiving a negative answer she went on to say that, being reluctantly obliged to choose, she accepted the resignation of the Minister of the Interior. Escosura at once turned to quit the council-chamber. "I will go too," exclaimed Espartero. "O'Donnell will not desert me," rejoined the Queen; and the Duke of the Victory found himself outside the door and no longer President of the Council (July 13, 1856).

O'Donnell had played a daring game, relying on Espartero's irresolution. His Cabinet was already formed, and was actually assembled when the expected news of Espartero's resignation reached it. It contained Cantero, Pastor Diaz, Rios Rosas, and Collado; Alonso Martinez awaited a portfolio. Its first act was to proclaim a state of siege throughout Spain. There was a moment of wild excitement and uncertainty. The national militia, some sixteen thousand strong, took arms unbidden, and held for two days the centre of the capital against the regulars under Serrano and Concha. The Cortes were not sitting; but the Permanent Commission, twelve hours after the announcement of the change of ministry, gathered ninety-three deputies in the Congress House. Of these eighty-one—among them Sagasta and Salmeron, later the leaders of two divisions of the Radical party—passed a resolution declaring the new ministry unworthy of the confidence of the country. This resolution was forwarded by a deputation to the Queen. But the deputation was refused

admission to the Palace and treated as seditious by Rios Rosas, the new Minister of the Interior. Indeed the resolution was informal, if not illegal, for the eighty-one stalwart deputies did not form a quorum. O'Donnell had been careful not to give time for the Permanent Commission to summon the absent deputies. Then another proposal was made, calling upon Espartero to take measures to defend the inviolability of the Cortes; but Madoz, the President, refused to put it to the House. While bombs were bursting in the immediate neighbourhood, a few devoted deputies still sat on, awaiting Espartero, who never came. The officers of the national militia reported that the cartridges of their men were spent; they were bidden to give up the useless struggle. At last the session was declared closed, after notification that the date of the next meeting of the Congress would be announced to each deputy at his private address. The Constituent Cortes of 1855 never met again.

Espartero never showed himself so utterly unfit for command as upon this, the last but one of the great opportunities of his life. He had been warned by Escosura and could easily have forestalled the plotters by changing the headquarter staff of the army. His conduct was that of a coward. He showed himself in the streets before fighting had actually begun, and called for cheers for the national independence, which was not threatened. Then, leaving his party to struggle on or to lay down their arms without orders and without hope, he went into hiding only to withdraw some days later unmolested to his home at Logroño. He pleaded afterwards that he was convinced that the Queen was so deeply involved in the *coup d'état* that its failure would entail the fate of the dynasty. That such was his conviction is quite credible; at least he was guilty of allowing hundreds of lives to be lost for want of a word of warning. So on the afternoon of July 15 and on the following day a desultory fight went on in the streets of Madrid. The citizen militia lost heart and was

everywhere worsted. On the 17th fighting was at an end ; the militia had dispersed ; and the Provisional Deputation, for some time the centre of resistance, had submitted to a decree of suspension.

In the great provincial towns the course of events was much the same as in the capital. The military commands were in the hands of O'Donnell's officers, prepared to crush any popular outbreak. This was not effected without a sharp struggle at Saragossa ; at Barcelona, where the killed and wounded were reckoned at five hundred, the fight raged in the streets for two whole days. But before the end of July Spain had submitted to her new masters ; and the *biennium*, the two restless years following on the battle of Vicálvaro, was being rapidly forgotten. O'Donnell was far from rancorous. Nobody was punished for having taken up arms against him ; the amnesty speedily proclaimed was a real one, and not, as was often the case, a proscription of persons excluded by name from its provisions. O'Donnell hoped to share his power in amity with the Palace ; he wished to appear to the Queen as her rescuer from Radicals and atheists, and to the people as their saviour from San Luis and his fantastic absolutism. The people, short of money and cynically sceptical of politicians, allowed him to hold power and to keep the peace for five years ; but the Queen had not forgotten. As Fernando Garrido, the reformer, put it : " O'Donnell attained power by revolution, violence made the Queen accept him ; when he tore the arms from the hands of the revolution he himself was left defenceless."

## CHAPTER X.

O'DONNELL AND NARVAEZ. (1856—1858.)

RIOS ROSAS, the new Minister of the Interior, was the working politician of O'Donnell's ministry. A Liberal, but a Liberal of a very different type from his predecessor Escosura, he immediately dissolved the Provincial and Municipal Councils, and modified their constitution so as to check their semi-independent power. At the same time he restricted the liberty of the press, and abolished the national militia throughout the kingdom. The preamble to the decree enforcing this most necessary reform demonstrated—as, indeed, it was easy to demonstrate—that this turbulent force had ever been a source of weakness, danger, and disorder. On September 2 followed the dissolution of the Constituent Cortes, to which, as Rios Rosas scathingly remarked, “Heaven denied the gifts of wisdom and moderation.” Their principal work, the Constitution of 1855, was still incomplete. No part of it had been promulgated, so it did not need abrogation.

The Constitution of 1845 was reenacted; but, far from regarding it as a perfect work to be guarded with superstitious jealousy against innovation, the ministry expressly declared the Queen and the Cortes competent “to correct its errors, fill the voids which experience has shown to exist, and shut the door on dangerous and abusive interpretations, thus fortifying the representative principle and, as far as is humanly possible, drying up the sources of deplorable strife.” These words introduced an “Additional Act” complementary to the original

enactment of 1845. Though promulgated without the consent of Parliament, it was distinctly more Liberal in its provisions than the Constitution which it supplemented. It created an elective Senate, and enjoined trial by jury for press offences, the reelection of deputies on receiving office or pension from the Crown, sessions of Cortes for at least four months of each year, and the presentation of the budget within eight days of the opening session. Published in the *Gazette* of September 15, 1856, it disappeared a month later during the temporary eclipse of its creator, O'Donnell.

By the Additional Act O'Donnell sought to prove himself still a Liberal and to rally round him all but the irreconcilable Esparterist Progressives, preparatory to initiating a policy of reconciliation and toleration. But it soon became evident that the Queen proposed to exercise her newly-regained power in accordance with her own judgment, and that in accepting O'Donnell, when the choice lay between him and Espartero, she had intended merely to use him as a stepping-stone. There can be little doubt that, in abetting O'Donnell's plot against Espartero, her real purpose had been to save for the Church the remainder of its wealth. The ministry was aware that this question was a test by which it must stand or fall in the Queen's estimation. It was impossible to evade the danger; for the Treasury had been left empty by the late Government, and there was no other source whence the sorely needed funds could be raised. A cunning trick was however devised to gain the royal assent to the principle of confiscation. The whole estates of the Church and of religious and charitable institutions were already by law public property; but sales were suspended. Cantero, the Finance Minister, proposed that £600,000 should be raised by further alienations for the pious purpose of restoring churches falling into decay. But Isabel saw that the whole principle of the rights of the State over the property of the Church was involved. She declared that, "now that she had power, she



was responsible." She flatly refused her consent, and insisted that the decree of confiscation should be formally rescinded instead of being merely held in abeyance as hitherto. O'Donnell was forced to submit; on September 23 the new order was published, as the Queen demanded. Cantero was sacrificed and resigned, warning his colleagues that they would soon follow him, but with the difference that, whereas he had retired of his own free will, they would be dismissed with disgrace.

Then followed the taking-off of the embargo from the property of Queen Cristina, and Narvaez' return to Madrid. O'Donnell found himself overwhelmed in the tide of reaction that had given him his opportunity against Espartero. But up to the last moment he was deceived by the Queen's cordial attitude towards him. The court ball on the Queen's birthday, October 10, was the occasion for a hint so broad and so public that he could not fail to take it. He was received with chilling disfavour; the Queen hung on Narvaez' arm and lavished flattering attention on her trusty ex-minister. Wishing to ground his resignation on something more weighty than a personal slight, O'Donnell next day demanded immediate execution of the law concerning ecclesiastical property and other measures from which he knew the Queen to be averse; and, being met with calculated stubbornness, he resigned (Oct. 12, 1856). He had thought to build his power on Isabel's gratitude for her deliverance from the anti-clerical party; but Isabel knew how little disinterested had been his action. She could not forget Vicálvaro; she believed the widely-circulated story that O'Donnell, when her crown hung in the balance, had tossed a coin and so decided whether he should take side for or against her. The net result of the events of 1856 was a considerable increase of the Queen's power.

With O'Donnell fell the Additional Act or Appendix to the Constitution. It was abolished, as it had been imposed, by decree, being declared, with unconscious humour, uncon-

stitutional, and illegal as wanting the consent of the Cortes. It was the second Constitution in succession that had gone into the waste-paper basket untried and unlamented. The Moderate Constitution of 1845 was declared to be still in force without necessity for reenactment; for, as usual, all that had taken place during the revolutionary period was ignored as though it had never been. Even promotions and orders promised by General Blaser to the army with which he marched out to Vicálvaro were formally confirmed. The Royal Council, a body notorious for its Conservative opinions, was reconstructed after the traditional model, the ecclesiastical element in it being strongly marked. Municipal and provincial self-government was curtailed to such a degree as to be merely illusory. So convinced was the ministry of its strength that it ventured to reimpose the unpopular octroi tax and to gag the press by a stringent law.

This last measure was the work of Nocedal, the new Minister of the Interior, who has left his name subjoined to that of Narvaez on the ministry of which he was the leading spirit. His ascendancy was due to the violence with which he held the opinions that for the moment dominated him. From a Liberal he had become a champion of absolutism and of views far more pronounced than those which had been unsuccessfully advocated by Bravo Murillo. He was, moreover, a leader of the fashionable Neocatholic or Ultramontane party, a party that, having misread scraps of history and formed a pleasing but utterly unreal picture of bygone national glories, sought to reconstruct, two centuries later, the conditions to which they erroneously believed those glories to be due. It has been shown by Juan Valera, the most impartial critic of his own country, that the means advocated by the party were the very means to which more enlightened students of history have attributed Spain's decline, namely, centralisation and enforced uniformity in Church and State.

Nocedal's opinions were held, though with less violence,

by his colleagues Piclal (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Urbistondo (War), Lersundi (Marine), and Seijas Lozano (Justice). Narvaez, who held the Presidency of the Council without portfolio, might well be described as the one Liberal of the ministry. As Mazade, the French historian of the Spanish revolutions, has said, "the struggle was no longer between Moderate constitutional principles on the one hand, and Progressive or revolutionary principles on the other; it was from this time forth between Conservative opinion or opinions slightly tinged with Liberalism, and opinions of which the absolutist character could not be mistaken, opinions which had long waged and have never ceased to wage resolute war against all the ideas and all the habits of the parliamentary *régime*. This was the real danger; and this it was that put Spain upon the direct path to new revolutions at the very moment at which she was emerging from a revolution." In little more than two years the ascending scale from Radicalism to high Conservatism had been followed: from anarchy to Espartero—Espartero with O'Donnell—O'Donnell alone—Narvaez and Nocedal. Another step and we have Gonzalez Bravo attempting to wield a power almost too heavy for Narvaez; this step, deferred for twelve years, cost Isabel her throne.

Though Narvaez was called, and believed himself to be, a Liberal, Isabel had gained a sincere coadjutor in her proposed work of combating Liberalism and restoring the Church to its ancient splendour. The characters of the three generals who for twenty-five years alternately swayed Spain were as widely different as their aims and methods. Now that it is possible to distinguish between the men and the causes they represented, it can hardly be doubted that Narvaez was the best man, perhaps also, indignantly as the title would have been denied to him during his lifetime, the best patriot of the three. He stood for old-fashioned Spain—in so far as old-fashioned Spain was not Carlist—for the party that refused to break with the past at the bidding of a noisy minority. For

it must not be forgotten that the Spanish Liberals were ever a minority. The artisans of the great commercial and seaport cities, and their sons, the non-commissioned officers of the army, had largely grasped the principles of democracy and were animated with all the zeal of neophytes. But the industrial and commercial population is outnumbered eight or nine times by the agriculturists. Dwellers in the smaller towns and villages, the ploughmen of the plains and the herdsmen of the sierras, the owners of the land and the clergy, were either indifferent or sincerely attached to tradition. They were still as though the French Revolution had never been. Utterly lacking in organisation and in political education, they took no part in elections or in rebellions ; the weight of their numbers and their worth were never felt in the struggles that went on around them.

It is for this reason that Narvaez' policy is generally represented as opposed to the general will and interests of his countrymen, and that he has been regarded as a mere servant of the Court and the Church. It was because of the inactivity of this huge mass that he was forced repeatedly to give place to his shifty rival O'Donnell, and to Espartero, who cloaked a half-conscious ambition under hollow phrases and was guided by an intermittent belief in his own mission. Narvaez' character was upright and unbending, his methods straightforward, and his integrity unquestioned. He took up the responsibilities of office and laid them down with equal simplicity. In an age of treason and mutiny he maintained the standard of loyalty and of military honour. Even those who reject his cause admit that it counted among its upholders the best men of the time ; among them Narvaez is certainly worthy of a place. Nature made him a disciplinarian ; and the times called for sharp methods. One of those stories that impress a truth by gross exaggeration tells how, when bidden on his deathbed to forgive his enemies, he replied that he had no enemies, for he had shot them all. Yet, though lacking O'Donnell's rigid

self-command, he was no cruel martinet. Personal vengeance was gratified by none of the innumerable executions carried out by his orders. Only extreme laxity of view with regard to political crime would question their justice.

It was to Narvaez that men turned when the fabric of the State seemed to be breaking up. His short, stiff, alert figure and brusque military manner were as far removed from O'Donnell's graceful form and courtly bearing as from Espartero's underbred and slovenly appearance and embarrassed address. For Espartero's political influence it is hard to find any explanation. He shared with the vast majority of his countrymen great personal courage; he was a lucky rather than a great soldier. His victories he owed rather to popularity with the rank and file than to skilful strategy. He was a commonplace man with a good heart and a spark of genuine enthusiasm for the cause of the humble and the oppressed. He continually mistook the path of personal ambition for that of public duty, but he did so honestly. For his intellect was confused; it was lack of definite purpose and failure to grasp means, as much as constitutional irresolution, that led him to squander so fruitlessly the unexampled powers for good or evil that chance had thrust into his hands. He was not a rancorous enemy, nor was he a thoroughly trustworthy friend. He was a creature of spasmodic emotion, broken by long fits of lethargy, a waiter on events, a self-deceived man. Espartero rose by making himself the servant of the mob, Narvaez by obedience to an earnest though limited sense of duty, O'Donnell tortuously by intrigue and open-eyed pursuit of self-aggrandisement. A hard-headed, frigid man of the world, impatience led him to make, in the Revolution of 1854, the mistake fatal to his good name. The words "loyalty" and "discipline" sounded ill in the mouth of one who had so betrayed his trust. One step in political dishonesty led to another. He gave a Judas kiss to Espartero and straightway proceeded to worm his way back into the confidence of the Queen. He overthrew his allies by



the aid of the *camarilla* against which he had conspired, trafficking in mutiny and treason. He was one of the ministry that trampled on the lately-executed Concordat and broke off diplomatic relations with the Holy See. He made his peace a few years later by bearing a taper in a procession led by Sor Patrocinio.

Narvaez' retrograde ministry lasted one year (Oct., 1856—Oct., 1857), and honourably distinguished itself by a severely honest administration. Under it conspiracy was not tolerated through fear of reprisals. Imprisonment or banishment on mere suspicion were the rough methods employed for keeping the peace, but they were effectual. In fact the country even went beyond the will of its new masters in submissiveness. The Cortes elected to support them contained only five Progressives. Never had a fallen party more completely disappeared. Though sure of the servility of their overwhelming majority, the ministry made no pretence of respecting the prerogative of the Cortes. They flouted Parliament by usurping its functions. Thus, within a few days of its meeting, they hired troops by decree. Presided over by Martinez de la Rosa, and using Liberal forms, the Cortes reconstructed the Senate, strengthening the aristocratic and hereditary element in it, and voted stringent measures abolishing the modified liberty enjoyed by the press. With regard to religion the Queen had won her battle; and the words of her speech contain a note of triumph. "In accordance with the terms of my royal promise, and the exigencies of my religious sentiments, the Concordat with the Holy See has been reestablished in its full force and vigour, and other measures have been taken to restore to the Church that liberty wherewith its Divine Founder endowed it, and which has ever been respected by the religious Spanish nation and by my royal ancestors." It is needless to point out the falsity of this statement. All but the weakest kings had sought with more or less success to assert authority over the Church; and



Parliaments had petitioned, as long as Parliaments worthy of the name existed, against its excessive wealth, its independent jurisdiction, and its encroachment upon the civil power.

The Cortes were too nearly unanimous to be roused by the above-mentioned legislation. The case was far different when the events that led to the fight of Vicalvaro were debated. The discussion arose out of the petition of a deputy, a general of strong loyalist views, for permission to impeach all who had been concerned in the late rebellion. O'Donnell's reply to this attack was a *tu quoque* addressed to the President of the Council. He was able to show that Narvaez had been cognisant of the *pronunciamiento* before it took place, and had been guilty of something like a breach of faith in failing to support it. Narvaez was unable or perhaps unwilling to rebut the charge. He explained that he had always been a Liberal, that he had considered it his duty to shake off the yoke of San Luis, but that he had stopped short of the Programme of Manzanares (p. 229), considering it disloyal and revolutionary. Such a position seems nowadays tenable; but in the Cortes of 1856 Narvaez was held to have come badly out of the encounter, to have defended himself by sophisms. This much at least must be admitted—he was guilty of inconsistency in demolishing the work he had inadvisedly styled heroic.

When the excitement raised by these recriminations died away, the proceedings of the Cortes lost all interest; the lassitude of exhaustion followed the political fever of the last three years. It was a time of commercial and industrial activity; railroads had opened up new sources of wealth, and the ministry followed the trend of public attention. Instead of wrangling over the sections of a Constitution that could hardly outlast the Chamber that made it, they set themselves to study the social and economic position of the people with a view to improvement. A careful scheme of educational reform was prepared; lack of funds prevented its execution. An Academy of Moral and Political Sciences was incorporated, and took

rank alongside of the already existing Academies of Language and of History. An agricultural show was held in Madrid for the first time, with a view to introducing methods and implements less primitive than those that still hamper throughout the larger part of Spain the most conservative of industries.

No sooner was tranquillity restored and the hope of its continuance well grounded than the strong hand that had made it possible was impatiently shaken off. Narvaez was respected both by the Queen and by the nation, but his services were of a kind that seldom attract gratitude. To Isabel he told disagreeable truths in blunt language; she was glad to be rid of him as soon as she had paid off her grudge against O'Donnell and no longer feared immediate danger from the Radicals. She took as her excuse the necessity of concession to public feeling, roused by the harsh repression of a Republican rising in Andalusia and demanding a minister more respectful of constitutional forms. Isabel, in fact, had now reason to be apprehensive for the personal popularity which had hitherto never left her, and had more than once saved her throne. Her political mistakes and rumours as to her private life had gone far to quench the fervid loyalty cherished during seven years of war against the Carlists, and later confirmed by the Queen's genuine love for her people and for all things Spanish, her confidence in their good-will, her sympathy with suffering, and the frank simplicity of her manner. Fearing that the expected birth of another child (Alfonso XII, born Nov. 28, 1857) might again let loose the flood of scandal, she sought to humour her subjects by a change of ministry. Narvaez, personally disinterested as ever, resigned with good grace.

Bravo Murillo refused to undertake to form a Cabinet unless allowed to carry out his favourite scheme of constitutional reform. But constitutional reform involved interference with forms and words much more potent to rouse indignation than facts and institutions. So the Queen's

choice fell upon the somewhat obscure General Armero; under him Martinez de la Rosa and Mon accepted office (Oct. 15, 1857). But this ministry proved too Liberal for the Cortes elected to support Narvaez and Nocedal. Meeting on January 10, 1858, they chose Bravo Murillo as their President. The debate on the speech from the throne showed that Armero could not command a majority; and he resigned after having stopped a gap for three months. His successor, Isturiz, fared little better, though he tried to win the confidence of the Cortes by giving a portfolio to their President, Bravo Murillo. By midsummer the way was clear for O'Donnell's return to power.

## CHAPTER XI.

### THE LIBERAL UNION. O'DONNELL'S FOREIGN POLICY. (1858—1863.)

EVER since he had made way for Narvaez two years before, O'Donnell had been preparing his own return ; he was determined that this time his tenure of office should not depend merely upon the caprice of the Queen. He succeeded in gathering into one vast party all who would be satisfied to take as their watchword "Dynasty and Constitution"; and, when Isturiz resigned, there was no alternative but to send for him. He took for himself the Ministry for War as well as the Presidency of the Council ; and, choosing colleagues on whose fidelity to himself he could rely, he commenced in June, 1858, a ministry that far outlasted any since the days of King Ferdinand. O'Donnell himself was a more skilled politician than either Espartero or Narvaez, but he would scarcely have been so successful in retrieving his past mistakes and in withholding the Queen from self-destruction for so many years, had he not had at his elbow Posada Herrera, known to his contemporaries as "the Great Sophist," who had carried over his portfolio of Minister of the Interior from Isturiz' Cabinet. An adversary truly said that no choice was now left outside O'Donnell's party or revolution, for so wide was the ministerial net spread, so few and simple were its principles, that only the Carlists and the Democrats on either hand, and their political kinsmen the Absolutists San Luis, Pidal, and

Gonzalez Bravo, and the extreme Progressives Olózaga, Madoz, and Sagasta, were excluded from sharing in its success.

The secret of their success was that the Liberal Union had no policy. The great questions of the balance of power between the democracy and the Crown, the due representation of each class and interest, and localised against centralised government, were shelved; and Spain benefited by the pause in the struggle that had been agitating her for nearly forty years. O'Donnell governed under the Constitution of 1845; but he did not pretend, as its creators had pretended, that it embodied the results of political wisdom. He promised that the Cortes should have an opportunity of accepting or rejecting the Additional Act, and of introducing such other modifications as might be necessary. The Cortes did not meet until O'Donnell had assured his position. When he took office at the end of June, the Cortes elected in March of the previous year to support Narvaez' ministry stood prorogued. They were not reassembled. A new ministry required new Cortes; and the responsibility of their formation was left to the "Great Sophist," Posada Herrera, who by the use he made of his opportunity gained the additional title of "the Great Elector." In the Lower Chamber of the Cortes that met on Dec. 1, 1858, the Government, of course, had its majority, a majority that could make light of any opposition; but Posada Herrera had not made the usual mistake of depriving those who stood outside his fold of all chance of airing their views constitutionally. He was aware that a unanimous House broke up speedily into groups led by private interests; that, when the Opposition was not represented, it was generally plotting revolution outside; and that nothing gave stability to a party like the necessity for holding together in the face of attack. Accordingly, whilst careful to secure the return of the leaders of his own party, Posada Herrera was no less careful to secure the return of the leaders of both the Radical and the ultra-Conservative Oppositions. To the latter were allowed some thirty seats, to the

former about twenty. At the same time the Progressives were conciliated by the nomination of some of their number to seats in the Senate ; many also accepted administrative posts. The Cortes thus formed received from the crown as President of the Senate Manuel Concha, the Marqués del Duero ; the Lower House elected Martinez de la Rosa, the survivor of the struggles of King Ferdinand's days, a man who, in his gradual drift from Radicalism to Conservatism, had temporarily approved every intervening shade of political doctrine.

No sooner did the Cortes meet than the admirable result of Posada Herrera's arrangement was seen ; at times the two Oppositions would combine for an attack upon the Government, thus putting the Liberal-Unionists upon their mettle ; more often the two neutralised each other ; occasionally they attacked one another with a fury even greater than that which inspired the onslaughts on the ministry ; and O'Donnell, with a smile upon his face, would call upon his adversaries to respect the rules of fair fight, and the decencies of debate. The Progressives under Olózaga, Sagasta, and Salmeron led the attack by angrily calling the Government to account for illegal revision of the electoral lists, carried out, as they said, in the interests of the party in power. O'Donnell hardly troubled to answer their arguments or to contest their facts ; he was known to have declared that when his time came for *post mortem* examination he would certainly not be found to have succumbed to over-anxiety to observe the strict letter of the law. Moreover, however defective were the electoral lists after they came from the hands of his agents, they were certainly less so than before the revision. The Moderates, on the other hand, led by Gonzalez Bravo, twitted O'Donnell with allusions to Vicálvaro ; and he retaliated by cross-questions as to their attitude with regard to the revision of the Constitution proposed by Bravo Murillo, a source of disaster and stone of stumbling to the party.

But the ministry was occupied in something more serious



than these Parliamentary jousts. Secure in the support of Chambers so skilfully chosen and managed that they held together as none of their predecessors had ever done, for the full legal period of five years, it settled once for all the great question of the estates of the Church. So long as these remained unsold, the Radicals could obtain a hearing for dark stories of clerical intrigue; to tear them from the Church against its will was to offend the conscience of the Queen and of a large part of the nation. It was evidently a case for compromise. The circumstances of the Holy See, surrounded by dangers and difficulties, rendered it more accessible than usual to the idea of compromise. Already, at the opening of the Cortes, the Queen had been able to announce that his Holiness had recognised the validity of sales already carried out. Eight months later Rios Rosas had effected an agreement, according to which the remaining estates of the Church should be sold with the consent of the Pope, and the proceeds handed over in inalienable 3 per cent. bonds to the Church. The Concordat of 1851, which had been shamefully infringed by the Liberal administration of the Biennium, now came again into force. Spain was held to have given sufficient proof of repentance to deserve again the favour of the Holy See. Sor Patrocinio, with her following, reappeared at Court; and the Jesuits were put in possession of the noble convent of San Marcos at Leon. O'Donnell, sometime a member of the most anti-clerical Government Spain had known, and signatory of the Programme of Manzanares, took part along with the Queen, against whom he had rebelled, in religious processions. The net result of this reconciliation was to secure for the Liberal Union the toleration, if not the enthusiastic adherence, of the great body of devout Catholics, and to put into its hands a huge capital in return for its depreciated 3 per cent. bonds.

The fact that men so widely separate in opinions as Martinez de la Rosa, Prim, Isturiz, Cortina, and Mon accepted employment under the Liberal Union might be cited as proof

of its catholicity and toleration ; but it was far otherwise interpreted by honest men who stood outside it. They declared that it lived by libelling those who opposed it, "that it produced nothing, but served only to deceive the hopes of the simple-minded, to give a refuge to the weary, and a prey to the greedy." Alcalá Galiano wittily likened it to the "Happy Family" shown in fairs, the cage containing cat and mouse, wolf and lamb, and other naturally hostile and desperate beasts living in peace imposed by punishment and reward. But to admit that the Liberal Union was eclectic in men and principles, that it was opportunist, waiting on events and avoiding when possible burning questions, that it did not attempt to settle anything permanently, is not to condemn it. That it gave Spain a period of rest, allowing men to pursue their business uninterrupted by an uncertainty as to who would be the rulers and what the laws of to-morrow, constitutes a title to gratitude, if not to respect. It is true that O'Donnell governed with a packed majority in the Cortes ; but this was one degree better than governing by decree. It is also true that those who followed with their eyes shut got honours and rewards, while those who ventured to oppose him were liable to persecutions, like that of Esteban Collantes, founded on misrepresentation ; but Narvaez had banished and imprisoned on mere suspicion.

Even during the disturbed period that followed the Carlist War the prosperity of the country had been increasing ; now the rate of increase was greatly hastened. Between the years 1848 and 1864 Spanish commerce more than trebled ; in the latter year it amounted to thirty-five millions sterling. Many railways were built ; public works were undertaken ; and banks were founded. Nevertheless the matter in which the Liberal Union most notably failed was its administration of the public finances. The agreement with the Holy See allowed the remainder of the estates of the Church to be sold on much higher terms than had been obtained when the title given was liable to be questioned by a retrograde Government. But the

huge sums then realised faded away, leaving hardly any perceptible effect; the country was not less embarrassed or more lightly taxed than before. The budgets of 1859 and 1860 showed a surplus as usual, but it was entirely fictitious; the floating debt had mounted to seven million pounds; the taxes, direct and indirect, were crushing; the Government spent recklessly the monies deposited in the State banks. Only a very small proportion of the sums lavished was devoted to matters of permanent utility or profit; by far the larger part went to pay for military expeditions abroad.

After a brief sitting in 1859, public attention was almost wholly withdrawn from the Cortes, for O'Donnell, tolerated by Royalists in the belief that he alone could stay Revolution, and by Liberals in the belief that he was the only safeguard of the representative system, had hit upon the masterly idea of turning the minds of his countrymen from controversial questions by committing them to a series of adventures beyond the seas. These resulted in small gain of honour, and much waste of life and money; but they had the important result of rousing patriotic enthusiasm, and making the Spaniards feel, after years of civil strife, that they were still one nation holding in common glorious traditions and undeveloped powers.

In 1857 General Armero had signalised his fleeting ministry by placing 1500 Spanish soldiers under the orders of the French Admiral sent to avenge hideous murders of French and Spanish missionaries in Cochin China. When O'Donnell succeeded Armero, he continued his policy. The little corps of Spaniards, dependent for the most part on their French allies for transport, fought throughout the Annamite War with the valour they have ever shown when well led. At the end of the war, France had laid the foundations of her eastern empire; while Spain received a small share of the war indemnity, and an assurance that her missionaries would in future be respected (1862). O'Donnell, though severely criticised for embarking on a rash colonial policy, followed up the venture with an

expensive and unsuccessful attempt to occupy and develop the Spanish West African possessions, Fernando Po, Annobon, and Cape San Juan.

These two expeditions, however, are far from being the most important of those undertaken by O'Donnell. The threat of intervention by the United States in Cuba had necessitated the strengthening of the Spanish army. On the outbreak of war in Italy, imperilling the throne of a prince closely related to the Spanish Bourbons, a further increase was made; and a fine force of 100,000 men was available. Spain protested against the dethronement of the Prince of Parma, but did not venture to interfere to prevent it. Employment was found for the troops in a war against Morocco.

The greatest men of Spain have believed that "the natural frontier of Spain towards the south is not the narrow strait that joins the two seas, but the chain of the Atlas, correlative to the Pyrenees." In times of national well-being this dream of a great African empire, and of conquests over the Moslems, is revived. After the days of the great Cardinal Jiménez de Cisneros, it was in abeyance until Floridablanca, in the reign of Charles III, dreamed again the same great dream. But the resources at his disposal were utterly inadequate to the undertaking. Spanish statesmen were dragged along by the current of European politics. Spain possessed on the north African coast Ceuta, Melilla, and other small stations used chiefly as penal settlements, fishing ports, and centres of a trade mainly contraband. The relations between the Spanish garrisons and settlers on the one hand, and the Kabyles, their neighbours, on the other, are always strained. The Africans by insolence, by pilfering, and by refusing to recognise a frontier or a neutral zone, give a permanent excuse for war. Among them the authority of the Sultan of Morocco is hardly recognised; yet any attempt to punish them throws the whole of Moslem North-West Africa into a ferment of religious and political excitement.

In 1859 the Moors and the Spaniards were on even worse terms than usual. The Moors, accusing the garrison of Melilla of trespassing upon their lands for the purpose of collecting firewood, retaliated by harrying and illtreating individuals and small parties, and by destroying Spanish outworks on debatable land round Ceuta. O'Donnell seized the opportunity of embarking Spain upon a crusade; for it is as a crusade that a campaign against the Moslem is regarded. A memory of old wrongs still lingers. Hatred of the infidel lies deep in Spanish blood. So late as 1898 a Spanish general, unable to suffer the traditional enemies of his race and faith as honoured guests on Spanish soil, struck the envoy of the Sultan of Morocco in the streets of Madrid<sup>1</sup>. So, too, in O'Donnell's day it was no political plan, or desire for territorial aggrandisement, that roused high and low when an ultimatum was sent to the Sultan, but merely the wish that the crescent waving in sight of the *tierra de Maria Santisima* might be replaced by the cross, and further blood be shed in a quarrel of a thousand years.

Secure of the whole-hearted support of the nation, O'Donnell made the Sultan's Government responsible for the acts of its unruly subjects. Instead of entering upon negotiations, such as Moslem diplomacy loves to prolong for years, he demanded that within a delay of ten days the frontier marks should be replaced, that the Moorish subjects guilty of aggressions should be punished, that the Spanish flag should be saluted, and that the clause forbidding the fortification of Ceuta should be erased from the existing agreement between Spain and Morocco. The answer of the Moorish Court was most conciliatory. It yielded on every point except the fortification of Ceuta. With regard to this most serious matter the Shereefian Court declared itself unable to decide while its Sultan lay

<sup>1</sup> The explanation in the text is charitable. Prosaic people in Madrid at the time said the officer was tipsy. [J. F.-K.]



dying. The Sultan died ; and his successor obtained a further delay whilst he besought the good offices of the Powers to stay the storm that was about to break upon him. France declared her neutrality ; Great Britain offered mediation. The point at issue might have been satisfactorily arranged had not O'Donnell been set upon war. Seeing this to be the case, Lord John Russell exacted a promise that Spain would seek no territorial aggrandisement, and that, if in the course of operations Tangier should be occupied, it should be given up as soon as peace was signed. Unable and unwilling to draw back after his formal challenge to the Moors, O'Donnell concealed from his countrymen the humiliating fact that he had been obliged, at the bidding of a foreign Power, to give up all eventual advantages of the war before it actually broke out. Sharp punishment inflicted on the coast towns by a Spanish squadron would now have been all that honour and interest demanded ; but this was no longer sufficient to satisfy public opinion, carefully inflamed by the press. The invasion of Morocco was decided upon ; war was declared (Oct. 22, 1859) ; and Tangier, Tetuan, and Larrache were blockaded.

Having thus provoked war, O'Donnell was unwilling that another should have the credit of victory ; he himself took command of the expeditionary force. His plan was to collect troops under shelter of the guns of Ceuta, which possesses a good landing-place, and then to march along the coast-road to Tetuan, accompanied and supported by a squadron bearing supplies. He believed that this would prove easy, and that the capture of Tetuan would be followed by unconditional submission. Cut off from the rest of the Moslem world by the French in Algiers, the Moors could receive no help from outside. Their troops had only valour to make good their deficiency in training and armament. The Spanish force, on the other hand, consisted of 40,000 men carefully chosen, full of enthusiasm and well equipped ; but it took them two months to reach Tetuan, nine leagues distant from their starting-point.



The coast-road proved to be a mere bridle-path impassable for artillery until a large amount of labour had been expended upon it by the sappers. No sooner did the troops leave the shelter of Ceuta than they were fiercely attacked by the Moorish irregulars. The first division was checked; the second was opposed by the Sultan's regular forces, which had now come up. After fifteen skirmishes the Spaniards were still in sight of their landing-place. Yet on every occasion they had shown great eagerness to fight, and courage in facing difficulties. It was not the enemy, brave as he was, that prevented them from breaking through. The season was mid-winter; storms fell upon the wild coast, turning the camping-grounds and the newly-made roads into lakes and rivers of mud. The regular supply of food from the squadron failed, for no boats could brave the surf upon the coast. Every mile of road won had to be fortified and guarded against the vigilant and active enemy. Cholera and dysentery attacked the invaders; and their available force was reduced to little more than 15,000 men. The battle of Castillejos (Jan. 1, 1860) cost them six hundred men; and it was only by the rashest daring that Prim broke through the Moorish hordes. A fortnight later the remains of the Spanish army struggled round the lofty cape and down into the valley in sight of Tetuan. The weather had calmed; and the squadron with supplies and reinforcements was off the coast opposite to them. It was evident that, had the mouth of the river by Tetuan been chosen as a landing-place, instead of Ceuta, all their losses and hardships might have been avoided.

Between the Spaniards and the city lay the Moorish army commanded by Muley el Abbas, brother of the Sultan. But, now that the Spaniards enjoyed something like equality of position, the defending force hardly proved an obstacle. Muley el Abbas was defeated; his camp as well as the city of Tetuan fell into the hands of the Spaniards, whose victory cost them eight hundred men. When the Moorish army withdrew to the defile guarding the road leading from Tetuan to Fez and the

interior, their general sent to ask on what conditions peace would be granted, or in his own words, "to speak of the things that Allah had been pleased to put between the Spaniards and the Moors." O'Donnell demanded the whole of the territory occupied by his army from Ceuta to Tetuan, including the city itself; an indemnity of £2,000,000; the opening of the city of Fez to Spanish missionaries; the admission of a Spanish legation to the Moorish capital; and a treaty of commerce. The Moors indignantly refused to cede territory; and fighting was renewed. It culminated in the battle of Wadi-Ras (February 23), in which the Spaniards captured, at a cost of one thousand three hundred men, the defile leading to Fez. Then at length Muley el Abbas recognised that he was beaten, and came in to the Spanish camp to discuss terms.

O'Donnell's position was most difficult. He had just received news of a Carlist rising in Spain; the Moorish army was still formidable; to follow it into the interior would be dangerous; even if by insistence he forced the Sultan to cede the coast territory, he was debarred from retaining it by his promise to Great Britain. So the Moors found his demands diminished instead of increasing after his victory of Wadi-Ras. He insisted that Tetuan should be left in his possession temporarily, on a pledge for the payment of the indemnity. The other clauses of the agreement remained as they stood before the earlier negotiations were broken off. On these terms peace was signed (April 26, 1860). The six months' campaign had cost 7000 lives, cholera being the cause of death in more than two-thirds of the cases. For these losses, and for the money spent, Spain obtained, it is true, no adequate material return; but she obtained what was much dearer to her, a taste of the intoxication of success and a belief in her own fitness for great undertakings.

After the failure of their attempt to profit by the agitation consequent upon the Revolution of 1854, the Carlists had apparently abandoned the hope of success by force of arms.

As usual, the extravagances of the Progressives and particularly their ruthless spoliation of the Church had swelled the ranks of the Traditionalists. These nearest to the Queen had been so terrified by the Revolution that they ceased to fear the opposite danger, and sought the alliance of the Carlists in order to show a united front against the "anarchists" and "atheists." Under the guidance of King Francisco de Asis, troubled throughout his life by conscientious doubts as to his consort's rights to her throne, negotiations were undertaken in the hope that the two branches might be fused by a marriage. To secure this end the King was prepared to urge his wife's abdication. Under cover of negotiations the Carlists enjoyed a kind of semi-official recognition and protection. They profited by it to spread their organisation. The "Supreme Royal Commission," with secret agents in all influential circles, succeeded in obtaining for its adherents many posts of trust and authority. But, while the general public was hoping that the Carlists would follow the lead of the Pope and acknowledge the rights of Isabel, and while Isabel herself was going beyond the bounds of permissible concession in her desire for conciliation, the Carlists and their prince remained irreconcilable as before and eager to profit by the weak indulgence shown to them. Accordingly, when the main part of the army was away in Africa, and the Court of Madrid was lulled into security by the friendly discussion of the rival claims, they determined to make a dash for power. Their chosen instrument was young General Ortega, Captain-General of the Balearic Islands. A secret adherent of the cause, he was indicated for command in a dangerous enterprise by personal valour, a handsome person, and the "resolve to perform some great and bold deed in which he would lose his life or make his name famous" (his own words). Under the mistaken belief that the presence of the Carlist prince on Spanish soil would provoke a general rising, and relying on promises of support from many influential persons, he landed with the three thousand five hundred troops under his com-

mand at San Carlos de la Rápita, near Tortosa (April 2, 1860). With him came, preceded by the usual manifesto to the Spanish nation, Don Carlos Luis, Count of Montemolin, the eldest son of the first Don Carlos. Since his father's formal abdication (May, 1845) the Count of Montemolin had been recognised by the party as leader and king.

The rash venture ended disastrously. Ortega had been led to expect that he would be met by the news of rebellion in the capital and in half the provinces. But those who had so boldly promised were waiting for victory before declaring their sympathies; no rising took place. When Ortega's little force learned for what purpose they had been brought to Spain they not only refused to march, but, following the example of one of their officers, cheered lustily for the Queen. Ortega refused to add ridicule to disaster; he paid for the mistake with his life. Montemolin and his brother Fernando remained in hiding for a fortnight; after enduring much discomfort, and some actual hunger, they were captured, together with the old and staunch Carlist Elio, and all papers relating to the conspiracy of which their adventure was the outcome.

Neither Queen nor ministry was inclined to severity. An extraordinary piece of good fortune had put the Pretender into their power; he himself seemed abundantly willing to recognise his own failure. He was not made of the same unbending stuff as his father; and, when he obtained his liberation by a solemn renunciation of his claims, it seemed that the Carlist danger was ended. He wrote, moreover, to his cousin, begging her pardon for what he had done, and imploring clemency toward those who had compromised themselves in his cause. He desired that he and his brother might be allowed to quit the country and "to enjoy in peace the seclusion of home." So humbled was the prince who had lately rejected the advances of the royal family and refused to compromise his claims even by a marriage which must eventually bring the crown into his line. Examination of the

captured papers showed that many influential people were implicated in the projected rising. To punish them would have been to show the strength of a party, now (it was hoped) disbanded and disarmed by the abdication of its leader. A general amnesty was published (May 1, 1860); and even General Elio was pardoned.

If the Morocco war brought no profit to Spain, it had at any rate increased O'Donnell's popularity and strengthened his authority. He was soon ready to start again on fresh adventures. The year 1861 gave him two opportunities, and he seized them both. The first presented itself in a way especially grateful to Spanish pride. The state of Santo Domingo had grown weary of the attempt to govern itself and sought protection against its neighbour and bitter enemy Haiti. It now applied for readmission to the Spanish monarchy. The repentant republic was reincorporated by decree (March 19, 1861); and vast hopes were aroused that this was but the firstfruits of kinship, and that the nations which Spain had so prodigally sown might still be gathered in to her. But mismanagement on the Spanish side and bad faith on the other prevented any such result. A swarm of functionaries from Cuba swooped down upon the island, and treated it almost as a conquered country. Only a faction had called in the Spaniards, and that merely with the object of securing allies. All now united in making war upon the masterful intruders. For four years Spain continued her efforts; and then, after having spent in vain the lives of ten thousand soldiers and a sum of four million pounds sterling, she abandoned Santo Domingo to its chronic and grotesque dissensions (May, 1865).

In Mexico the triumph of the Liberal and native faction under the wise Indian Juarez had brought about in 1860 a temporary pause in the long-continued civil war. In view of the exhausted state of the Treasury, the Congress resolved to suspend payment of interest upon the Exterior Debt for two



years. The interests of the foreign bondholders in Spain, France, and Great Britain were thus injured. These countries had moreover other claims against Juarez' Government for losses and injuries suffered by their subjects during the war. When, therefore, separate protests were disregarded, they decided upon united action (Oct., 1861), agreeing previously among themselves to refrain from territorial acquisition, and from interference "with the right of the Mexican nation to choose freely its own form of government." A Spanish squadron joined the French and British ships in Mexican waters; and a Spanish contingent, under General Prim, seized San Juan de Ulloa. Juarez entered into negotiations, which resulted in the speedy break-up of the alliance against him (April, 1862). For it became at once apparent that France entertained designs far wider than the satisfaction of claims to monetary compensation. The Empire needed the popularity derived from a successful foreign war. Great Britain sought only redress. Spain for a time hoped that the Mexicans would change their republic into a monarchy, and demand of its royal family an occupant for their throne; but the scheme was not seriously pushed. Engaged in their great civil war, the United States looked with extreme disfavour on the interference of European Powers in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine. In deference to the great Republic, the British and Spanish contingent withdrew after receiving promise of full satisfaction for their claims (April 9, 1861). France was left alone to set up, with the feeble help of the anti-republican Mexicans, the tragic throne of the Emperor Maximilian. General Prim had given explicit warning that without the protection of foreign bayonets a stranger prince could not rule in Mexico. Napoleon was inclined to visit on Spain his displeasure at the failure of his schemes. So far did the quarrel go that the ambassadors on either side were withdrawn. O'Donnell would have made a scapegoat of Prim; but the Queen intervened, and by publicly commending him made it impossible for her first minister to disavow Prim's action.



After three years the Liberal Union began to show signs of breaking up. The packed majority, hitherto so unquestioningly obedient, manifested signs of insubordination. The wise measure of taking General Zabala, a pronounced Liberal, into the Cabinet, failed to conciliate the party to which he belonged. For O'Donnell fell daily more under the influence of the Court, until he was twitted in Parliament as the submissive proselyte of the Absolutists, accepting penance at the hands of Sor Patrocinio. In the Lower House an independent group, that might easily become an Opposition, obeyed Rios Rosas and Alonso Martinez. This tendency, already marked in the autumn session of 1861, became much more strong in the following spring when Cánovas del Castillo and the Marqués del Duero ceased to support the ministry. In the summer Queen Isabel made a progress through the southern provinces of her kingdom; and the warm welcome prepared by officials was reechoed by many who were not paid for demonstrations of loyalty. The royal progress showed at any rate that the republicans and democrats were still a small minority, even in the provinces in which their doctrines had been most favourably received. Encouraged by this success, O'Donnell, before the end of the year, challenged a vote of confidence. It was carried by 166 votes against 77; but this, in an assembly which had four years before been entirely unanimous, was held to be a premonitor of defeat.

O'Donnell's loss of popularity was due partly to the burdens imposed upon the country by his foreign policy, a policy which had served for a time to distract public attention from the sores of the body politic at home, but brought no other advantage. The progressive wing of the Liberal Union was sarcastic over O'Donnell's supposed recantation of that part of his political ideal which he had held in common with them. But most of all he had provoked public opinion by seemingly gratuitous cruelty in a suppression of a harebrained agrarian riot among starving people. Andalusia is a land of large estates, half-developed and left by absentee owners to the

management of harsh and grasping bailiffs. The labourers are distributed in isolated *cortijos*, great blocks of buildings comprising the unused country-house of the owner, the humbler lodging of his dependents, and the stables for the cattle, often under a single roof. Living thus, the labourers are incapable of organisation; but the dwellers in the country-towns, driven desperate by over-taxation and the shrinkage of local industries, turned their eyes to this misused wealth, and, maddened by the crudest doctrines of socialism, began to clamour for the division of the land. They found a leader almost as ignorant as themselves in Pedro Alanio, a horse-doctor, who took possession of the undefended town of Loja and assembled around him a clamorous mob of about 8000 men. As soon, however, as troops appeared, the rioters, for the most part quite unarmed, submitted without an attempt at resistance. Nevertheless the authorities, not content with the execution of six of their number, condemned four hundred to penal servitude in Africa. This local revolt, attributed to the teaching of democrats, served as a pretext for the suppression of all associations having as their object the increase of wages, for jealous prying into the purposes and working of clubs and guilds, and for the prohibition of all literature of a socialistic or inflammatory nature.

In view of the growing difficulties of his position, O'Donnell reconstructed his Cabinet, retaining of his former colleagues only Vega de Armijo, whom he believed to be necessary to him. The others resigned, so as to allow their chief to strengthen, if possible, his following in Parliament, at Court, and in the country. Pastor Diaz and Serrano, Duke of la Torre, took office. But the feeble policy of the new ministry failed to rally the party; and its heterogeneous composition soon showed in radical differences of opinion. Pastor Diaz was the first to quit. A more important loss was that of the Queen's favour. The ministry had thought fit to demonstrate the reality of the Liberal sentiments of which they

continually made parade by proposing to recognise formally the new kingdom of Italy. Immediately the *camarilla* was up in arms; and O'Donnell learnt that years of strict conformity to the views of the clerical party had left him their servant rather than their master. The Queen was put forward to oppose the ministry, and intrigued to create difficulties for it, with the special purpose of getting rid of Vega de Armijo and the Minister of Marine, Ulloa. O'Donnell saw that the time for resignation had come. He had lost the Queen's support by trespassing upon the only department of politics on which she held really strong views, respect for the claims of the Holy See; the majority in Parliament had got quite beyond control; and the Queen, by withholding her consent to a dissolution, had refused to allow him to recruit a more submissive flock. The country was growing restless; after five years of adventurous foreign policy it was neither stronger nor weaker; after five years' submission to the guidance of one man, no single question of those that agitated it had been brought nearer to a solution, nor had the long-standing animosities cooled. The end of the opportunist coalition, from which sprang the Liberal Union, came when O'Donnell resigned (Feb., 1863).

## CHAPTER XII.

### THE LAST YEARS OF ISABEL'S REIGN. (1863—1868.)

ISABEL followed the constitutional custom in consulting the leaders of all the political parties before choosing her new President of Council. From the Progressives, Cortina and Madoz, she heard the real truth as to the political situation. She was warned as to the extreme danger of government on non-party lines. The country, misrepresented by Parliaments really nominated by a colourless ministry, was deprived of the legal means of expressing a healthy opposition; the sovereign, when a ministry fell through lack of union due to selfish interest, and not to political considerations, was left without an alternative of choice. Disregarding their good advice, and persisting in her refusal to dissolve the Cortes, Isabel called to power the Marquis of Miraflores, a devoted servant of the dynasty, a moderate Conservative, but committed to no views calculated to rouse either violent opposition or violent enthusiasm. It was a continuation of O'Donnell's policy of excluding both of the two real parties, the Moderates and the Progressives, from office. Miraflores showed a most conciliatory spirit. The usual complete renewal of the whole staff of public servants was for once not carried out. The nation was informed of the benevolent intentions of its new rulers, of their wish for an honest and economical administration, and of their resolve to govern in strict obedience to the Constitution. But no amount of fair words, even though they carried with them the evidence of their speaker's good faith,

could secure a majority in an assembly constituted as was that which the Queen had refused to dissolve. A great number of deputies had remained faithful to the Liberal Union and its leader; even those whose insubordination had weakened O'Donnell refused to support his successor. Miraflores was forced to prorogue the long-lived Cortes of 1858 (May 6, 1863). Before deciding whether he should face them again, he sought to bind the remnant of the United-Liberal deputies to himself by taking Alonso Martinez and another of their leaders into his Cabinet. In order to provide an extra seat, he created a new Cabinet office, the Ministry of Overseas (Colonial). Even thus he failed to evade the necessity for dissolution; and, moreover, the Cortes were approaching their legal term. The general election was fixed for October (1863); and Miraflores approached it in what was considered a fair and honourable, nay, even a generous fashion. Acknowledging that his sympathies marked him as a Conservative, he frankly offered to allow the election of a number of Progressives sufficient to form an Opposition.

The rejection of this offer by Olózaga opened a new epoch in Spanish politics. The Progressives not only refused to assist the ministry in its plan of reviving artificially the two great parties, but, provoked by a circular prohibiting the presence of persons not possessed of the franchise at political meetings, the whole of the Radical and Democratic groups withdrew from constitutional opposition. In justification of their conduct the Progressives published a manifesto to the nation. In it Olózaga, Prim, Madoz, Sagasta, Ruiz Zorrilla, and other well-known Liberals scornfully refused to lend themselves to the "ridiculous make-believe of an election," whereby successive ministries contrive "that all Spain that has a voice in such matters votes, as one man, the condemnation of their opponents, and gives to the ministry a unanimous Congress to make use of as it shall think fit." The manifesto went on to declare that the Constitution was violated, liberty outraged, the right of public meeting denied even at election time. The name of the

Queen was not once mentioned in this long document ; its signatories declared that, while resolved to respect the law, they did not reject the name of revolutionaries, "if by revolutionaries are meant the enemies of a tyrannous faction." The Democratic group under Orense, Figueras, and Castelar issued a like protest. Neither they nor the Progressives abandoned this attitude of threatening aloofness until Isabel's throne had fallen. The grievances alleged were very real, but they were not new. The verdict of the most impartial of the Spanish writers in this time is that only very extraordinary circumstances could warrant so revolutionary an attitude. Miraflores had done nothing to provoke it. On the contrary, his conduct, according to the strange political code then in force, had been conspicuously fair.

The Parliament, elected without contest, and consequently without enthusiasm, soon broke up into violently hostile groups, bound to their leaders by ties utterly unconnected with political principle. The speech from the throne sought to disarm criticism by hollow flattery addressed to all parties, and by equally hollow promises of a rapidly approaching political millennium. It also introduced the slight and unimportant constitutional reforms to which the ministry stood pledged. Their rejection by the Congress was sufficient to discourage Miraflores from a further attempt to deal with so abnormal a situation ; he resigned Jan. 15, 1864. It was indeed impossible to govern in face of the personal hostility of the Liberal Union and the disdainful disapproval of Narvaez. Moreover the Moderates had changed from lukewarm supporters to fierce enemies. They were aggrieved by a more Liberal constitution of the Senate ; they held, too, that a dangerous laxity was shown when the sentence of penal servitude pronounced upon certain Protestant propagandists was reduced to one of banishment. Rios Rosas and the Marqués del Duero refused to court defeat at the hands of those who had turned out Miraflores. Arrazola proved more bold and made the attempt. But, even after the



prorogation of the hostile Cortes, the deadlock remained, for it was impossible to govern without the support of either Narvaez or O'Donnell. All who played a part in public affairs were followers of one or other of these military chiefs, or had withdrawn with the Progressives and Democrats.

Arrazola's ministry languished for six weeks, and took as pretext for its resignation the Queen's refusal to sanction a dissolution of a Parliament only a few months old (Feb. 29, 1864). Already the attitude of the Radicals and Democrats was causing some uneasiness; but Isabel had contrived to retain the friendship, in appearance at least, of Prim, their most dangerous leader. There was not much reason to fear a conspirator who still looked to the sovereign for the means of gratifying a vast ambition. The harsh Catalan was now hardly so enthusiastic in his devotion to the person of the Queen as when he made the statement of faith cited above (p. 241), but he, at any rate, refrained from attacking the monarchy, as did his fellows, or the Queen's conduct. There can be no doubt that, on Arrazola's fall, Prim expected to be called upon to form a ministry and to lead back the Radicals from their secession. When he found himself passed over, he was no longer a constitutional opponent, but the bitter enemy of the Queen. It is said—and nobody who is familiar with the manners prevalent in the Spanish Court under her Catholic Majesty, Isabel II, will reject the tale as incredible—that, as Prim retired one day from the royal presence after confidential discussion of matters of high policy, fooled and flattered to the top of his bent, he caught sight in a mirror of his sovereign, with protruded tongue, directing towards his back the gesture wherewith bold urchins mock their dominie. Prim had all the morbid pride of the *parvenu*, and would not readily forgive contempt for his growing importance.

Having lightly made an irreconcilable foe of the man who held her fate in his hands, Isabel turned again to the opposite party. Mon became President of the Council; but behind the

Cabinet stood O'Donnell directing it by means of his clever associate, Cánovas del Castillo, who had a seat in it. For a time, under the revived influence of the Liberal Union, the monarchical parties worked smoothly together. The Liberal Union was indeed rapidly losing all right to the first part of its title and closely allying itself with the retrograde party. Thus supported, Mon's ministry lasted six months. It settled once more the ever-recurring question of constitutional reform by adopting the Constitution of 1845 in its entirety; it promised to do away with corrupt influence at elections, to fortify the constitutional authority of the Congress, and to modify the harsh law that rendered the press either dumb or servile. It carried out, moreover, some useful and necessary social legislation. But attention was no longer fixed on the ministry and the Cortes. Revolution was in the air; and all were awaiting the moment when the Radicals could renounce their promise to keep within the limits of the law, and, having retired from the hustings, should reappear on the barricades.

That such was their intention was made clear at a banquet held in Madrid (May 3, 1864), when Olózaga declared that the party no longer obeyed Espartero, who had proved himself unfit for leadership by hesitating before "traditional obstacles" now to be swept away. It was clear that by traditional obstacles the throne was meant. O'Donnell advised stern repression as the fitting answer to such a challenge. Thrice during the summer revolution was on the point of breaking out; but the appointment of the civilian Olózaga to lead the Progressives had thrown out of gear the revolutionary organisation in the army, where Espartero's personal following was still strong. While recommending that avowed enemies of the monarchy should be put outside the law to be banished or imprisoned as the ministry should think fit, O'Donnell was unwilling that the odium entailed by such severity should attach to his own name. Accordingly, when, by the help of his well-disciplined band, he had brought about the fall of the Cabinet, he advised the Queen

to send for Narvaez, the one man who, in an age that regarded treason as a venial offence, did not fear to visit it with the penalties of the law, or, when the law was weak, to assume the responsibility of punishment. Narvaez can hardly have failed to see that the result, if not the purpose, of O'Donnell's action must be to discredit him; but he did not hesitate to come to the rescue of the throne. He took as his colleagues Arrazola, Córdova, Alejandro Llorente, and Gonzalez Bravo (Sept. 14, 1864). O'Donnell promised support; and the new ministry began by declaring itself Liberal—a declaration sufficiently belied by its composition—by publishing an amnesty, relaxing the harsh press-law and remitting fines owing for its infringement. By these concessions it was hoped that public opinion would be reassured. But again the Progressive Radicals and Democrats abstained from taking part in the general election; their manifesto published before the meeting of the Cortes (Dec. 22, 1864) made it plain that they refused to have any dealing with the Queen's Government.

The Cortes were asked to sanction the abandonment of Santo Domingo. It was a humiliating admission of defeat; and the Queen, always intensely patriotic, delayed it as long as possible; but it was now full time to abandon so worthless a cause. Unfortunately, this formal condemnation of O'Donnell's foreign policy did not put an end to its results. Spain's intervention in the West Indies and in Mexico had spread alarm and irritation throughout Spanish America. Peru had special reasons for discontent. Her independence had never been fully recognised; and Spain still maintained a number of claims against her dating from the time when she was ruled by a viceroy. A diplomatic agent sent (Jan., 1864) with a Spanish squadron to obtain satisfaction for private grievances acted in the most aggressive manner, seizing the *Islas Chinchas*, the vast guano deposits of which furnish a large part of the revenue. The diplomatic body protested; but the Spaniards remained in possession, disclaiming any intention of

permanent occupation, but holding the Islands as a guarantee for the satisfaction of their claims. Peru yielded and paid three million dollars on condition that her islands should be restored and her independence at length recognised (Feb. 2, 1865).

By this time other South American republics, feeling themselves threatened, and sure of sympathy in Europe, had made the quarrel their own, prepared for war, and promised help to Peru. The Spanish admiral, Pareja, peremptorily demanded of the Chilian Government an explanation of its hostile attitude and presented an ultimatum. War broke out; and the Chilians gained a slight and accidental advantage by the capture of the Spanish gunboat, *Virgen de Covadonga* (Nov., 1865). Admiral Pareja, on hearing of the loss, blew out his brains; while among the Chilians and Peruvians patriotic enthusiasm rose to the highest pitch. But the little fleet of the two republics was unable to hold the sea against the overwhelming Spanish force. It took refuge under the batteries of Valparaiso; and Mendez Nuñez, Pareja's successor, unable to get at it, cruelly bombarded the city under the eyes of the foreign squadrons. Unable to obtain supplies and coal in hostile waters, he made known his plight to his Government. He was ordered to strike some great blow for the honour of Spain before sailing for home. Acting on these instructions he attacked Callao (May 2, 1866), and withdrew wounded after a fierce battle in which both sides claimed a victory. No peace was signed; the only result of Spain's attempt to browbeat her former colonies was the revival of old hatreds along the Pacific coast.

These unprovoked and unnecessary wars had brought Spanish credit to the lowest ebb. The accumulated deficit of the ordinary budget had reached the sum of ten millions sterling; the deficit of the extraordinary budget stood at a like amount. London and Paris, already deeply involved and disgusted at such reckless wastefulness, refused further help. Heavy drafts had already been made upon the savings and deposit banks. An issue of mortgage bonds at eighty-eight

failed ; a forced loan, taking the usual form of anticipation of taxation, had to be resorted to. It cost fourteen million pounds to realise six millions. Nevertheless the ministry determined to draw up a full statement of public debts and assets and to consolidate. There still remained unsold a large amount of national property taken over from the Church and the communes, besides the vast estates of the Crown. The Queen consented to alienate two-thirds of her estates ; and the ministerial newspapers overflowed with laudation of her gracious generosity (Feb., 1865). But a quite new light was cast upon the whole transaction when Emilio Castelar, the "great tribune" of later days, then a rising pamphleteer and Professor at the University, pointed out that, far from sacrificing herself, the Queen would gain immensely by the proposed scheme. It was easy for a Professor of History to show that the royal patrimony had never been considered as the private property of the sovereign, but rather one of the main sources of public revenue. An improvident ministry, Castelar showed, was about to squander this vast national capital, to make a present of a quarter of its value to the Queen whilst leaving to her the most desirable of the Crown domains. The Court clamoured for Castelar to be deprived of his professorial chair : the Rector of the University refused, and was removed from his post. The students of the University proposed to serenade the bold men who had withstood the ministry. The necessary permission was granted ; when, however, it became clear that the Home Office had allowed what was really a demonstration against the ministry, the permission was withdrawn. But the students persisted in their proposed procession ; crowds collected and were dispersed only by cavalry charges. Many were wounded, and several lives were lost. The municipality and the Provincial Council were superseded for openly expressing their disapproval of the action of the ministry. The memory of the Night of St Daniel (April, 1865) hastened the coming Revolution.



When Narvaez became President of the Council, Queen Cristina returned to Madrid. The ingratitude with which she had been treated by the Liberals did not blind her to the risks incurred by her daughter in following the political guidance of scandalous favourites, or of those who persuaded her that duty to the Church admits of no consideration of expediency. More than once ministers had to intervene to remove from Isabel's side secretaries who had gained undue influence. On the other hand stood the clerical band. Mention has already been made of the half-cunning and half-crazy nun, Sor Maria de los Dolores Patrocinio. A more regular influence was that exercised in the royal councils by Fray Cirilio de la Alameda, Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo and general of the Franciscans. His political antecedents suffice to indicate his opinions. A person of some authority at the Court of Ferdinand VII, he had later fought for the Church and Absolutism as a member of the Council of Don Carlos. He had followed the Pope in acknowledging Isabel and had disavowed the rash attempt made at San Carlos de la Rápita by his former associates. His entire devotion to the interests of the Church and his Order made him a most dangerous guide. Hardly less influential was the Queen's confessor, Father Claret. His revivalist sermons, combining the narrowest doctrine with the most awful denunciations, sent a pleasant shudder through the ladies of the Court. The presence of these pious folk about the Palace and their vast influence over the Queen were clearly dangerous. Isabel had been repeatedly warned, but she sought to atone for private feelings by submission to those who professed to have her highest interests at heart. Whatever their other faults, they were not, like most of her lay advisers, guided by obvious selfishness and ambition. Thus the *camarilla* stood behind the throne, outlasting all ministries. Each in turn railed against its undue influence when out of power; some tried to get rid of it; but no party could hold office for long without sharing power with it and flattering its



members. That Isabel the Queen was too often the mouth-piece of monks and nuns, whilst Isabel the woman scandalised Europe by the irregularity of her private life betokens no hypocrisy. She was not only frank, generous, high-spirited, confiding, and forgiving, but unaffectedly pious also, as piety was understood by those who formed her ideas. Her utter ignorance blinded her to the essentials of public duty; she inherited the private vices of her grandmother and her father; her bringing-up had been such as to endanger even the best and purest nature; but she risked her crown for conscience' sake, and certainly she would have sacrificed herself for the good of her subjects. The world laughed when Pius IX conferred upon her the emblematic Golden Rose. Yet in most respects she was probably as worthy to wear it as any.

Even the masterful Narvaez, in spite of his honest determination to keep his independence and to govern with the consent and approval of the Cortes, found himself after a month or two dependent upon the retrograde group which took its cue from the *camarilla*. Now that the Radicals abstained from taking part in elections, the usual pressure upon voters had been somewhat relaxed; and the number of deputies, mere creatures of the ministry, was somewhat less than usual. Narvaez' Liberal programme had had the effect of defining a strong ultramontane and Conservative group in the Congress. This group sold its support only on conditions. But compromise alienated the other wing; the Liberals began to desert. In nine months Narvaez had forfeited the allegiance of the central Liberal group represented by men of the type of Alejandro Llorente, and had won in return the approval of Necedal and San Luis. Persuasion now gave place to coercion. The press, which had been abusing a partial freedom, found itself bound hand and foot. Fine and suspension punished "intended misdemeanour" (*delito frustrado*), that is to say, opinions expressed in unpublished articles submitted to previous censure. This measure was followed by a circular

directing governors of provinces to punish all attacks on the foundations of political and social order "which common sense in all countries and constitutional legislation in Spain have placed beyond the reach of controversy." Even before the riots of St Daniel's Night, Narvaez' majority in the Congress had been reduced to twenty-nine by the secession of the centre under Alonso Martinez, Cánovas del Castillo, and Francisco Silvela. After the riots the Queen called in O'Donnell. She feared to share Narvaez' intense unpopularity and to face the fury of her capital, gagged but by no means reduced to impotence by the arbitrary supersession of its provincial and municipal assemblies. Prim had indeed failed to raise the country when he landed in disguise at Valencia in June. His associates had succeeded no better at Pamplona and Saragossa; but the situation was known to be one of extreme danger. The army, though still perplexed by Espartero's retirement from militant politics and by the new anti-monarchical Radicalism, was seething with discontent. To get a unanimous Parliament of enthusiastic loyalists was easy; yet everybody knew that the opposite party was daily becoming more powerful and more audacious.

Narvaez having been sacrificed to popular outcry, O'Donnell (June 29, 1865) took Cánovas del Castillo, Alonso Martinez, Posada Herrera, and Zabala into his Cabinet, and once more sought to entice the Radicals from their abstention by offering places in the ministry and in the Chambers. But the wiles of "the great sophist" failed, as did also an attempt to cut the ground from under them by adopting some of the articles of their programme. The harsh press regulations were relaxed; the property qualification for electors was reduced by half, with the result of doubling the number of those who possessed the franchise; the suspended municipality of Madrid was restored; and the kingdom of Italy was recognised. This last measure brought upon O'Donnell's Cabinet the fierce hostility of the clergy. Father Claret and Sister Patrocinio rebuked even their

royal patroness for her consent, however unwilling, to formal friendship with the usurpers of the dominions of the Holy Father. They were sent into honourable banishment in convents of their Orders. This show of Liberalism, while it failed to win over the Radicals, so thoroughly alienated the Moderates that they too were on the point of withdrawing from participation in public affairs. Meanwhile Prim and Castelar took advantage of the relaxation of police supervision to make inflammatory speeches in Madrid. The discipline of the army was known to be undermined; but the extent of its disaffection was miscalculated by the Revolutionaries. Prim, impatient to be rid of the "traditional obstacles," twice more produced partial and unsuccessful risings. The summer wore away with cholera and unrest at Madrid, whilst the Court amused itself with scandalous levity in cool retreats on the Cantabrian coast and in the Guadarrama mountains.

The new Cortes were opened by the Queen in a speech breathing idyllic calm (Dec., 1865). Even sober citizens were convinced that Isabel's government and the welfare of Spain were incompatible when she spoke the foolish words put into her mouth, "setting, one and all, before our eyes the public good as our sole aim, taking the nation's opinion as our guide, the law as our rule, and invoking the name of God, there will never fail us, as we hope, that cordial understanding between the powers of the State which establishes peace and progress in the present and ensures prosperous and happy days for future generations." In January, 1866, while Spain was humiliated by the inglorious results of the wanton war with Chile and Peru, and was passing through a great commercial crisis provoked by the withdrawal of foreign capital in anticipation of the coming Revolution, Prim put himself at the head of two regiments that had made their *pronunciamiento* at Villarejo near Madrid. But the movement did not spread as he hoped. Pursued by Zabala, the Minister of War, he withdrew into Portugal, being careful in his retreat not to

render his party unpopular by requisitioning villages or allowing plunder. From Portugal he issued an impudent manifesto declaring that "the hindrances that obliged him to rest for a while would soon cease to exist." The allusion was perhaps to the monarchical principles of Espartero, who, though formally deposed, was still recognised by the old school of Progressives as their leader. Prim himself later declared that he had thought that a small show of force would have sufficed to bring about a bloodless revolution and to save property and the dynasty from terrible dangers. But no such homœopathic system sufficed to cure. Enquiry showed that the abortive rising had adherents throughout the army, and that only almost incredible blundering and cowardly hesitation on the part of officers involved had prevented it from becoming general.

A short lull followed, during which the Cabinet demanded of the Chambers extraordinary powers, military and financial, to meet the coming crisis. A bill of indemnity by anticipation was passed ; and for the last time negotiations were undertaken to induce the Radical leaders to reconsider their position. It is stated on the best authority that they were about to accept the offer of a ministry under Lersundi, a complete amnesty, and a general election without ministerial pressure, when O'Donnell, who had not been consulted, defeated the scheme by sending Lersundi to Cuba as Governor. So Prim and his assistants, Moriones and Sagasta, betook themselves again to remaking their shattered and half-abandoned plans.

Then came another and a still more peremptory warning, the mutiny of the sergeants of artillery in the barracks of San Gil at Madrid (June 22, 1866). The mutiny sprang from a purely military grievance, but was artfully turned to political ends by Prim. While in other branches of the army privates could rise by long or brilliant service to commissioned rank, in the artillery it was not so. The corps had always been exclusive, maintaining a much higher standard of discipline

and efficiency than the infantry or cavalry. Its officers, from general to subalterns, claimed to be of noble, or at least of gentle birth. At the head of the non-commissioned ranks stood the first sergeants (*primeros sargentos*), a survival of medieval organisation, many of whom were grey-haired veterans well educated in the scientific details of their profession. They possessed a vast influence over their men, with whom they lived in barracks, whereas the officers were quartered or lived with their families outside. On more than one occasion removal of the disability to rise in their own corps had been promised to the first sergeants. But the officers devoted to their aristocratic tradition hotly opposed the change. The sergeants, bitterly resenting their disappointment and rightly attributing it to the haughty exclusiveness of their officers, listened to the revolutionary propaganda carried on by civilians like Sagasta or soldiers like Moriones. Finally they decided on mutiny, and after shooting down their officers marched with thirty cannon to attack the Ministry of the Interior.

Madrid was saved by the coolness and bravery of the officers in high command. It happened that Serrano, Echagüe, the brothers Concha, Quesada, and Ros de Olano, as well as O'Donnell, Zabala, and Narvaez himself, were in Madrid. All showed the greatest energy. General Chacon, at great personal risk, recalled his regiment to discipline; waverers were overawed; and the tide was turned against the mutineers. Zabala met and drove them back; Serrano and others cleared the streets. Narvaez was somewhat severely wounded. Sixty-six executions followed. This severity horrified the public. It is said that O'Donnell declared in private that the blood would mount to the Queen's chamber and drown her. Yet these men had murdered their officers, and in a rash attempt to seize the ministers had caused the loss of eight hundred lives. A similar mutiny broke out at Gerona, but it met with no support; and the survivors with difficulty reached the French frontier. Prim, the organiser of both attempts, appeared on



the Bidassoa, but was prevented from entering Spain by the news of their failure.

It was a tradition that bloodshed in the capital should be followed by resignation of the ministry, however blameless. Accordingly, after proclaiming martial law, O'Donnell resigned, as Narvaez had resigned after the riots of the year before. Narvaez took his place. Once more a carefully-planned insurrection had failed; and again its failure was due to lack of obedience. Prim had ordered the Madrid conspirators not to move until Valladolid, Burgos, Miranda, San Sebastian, and Catalonia had made their *pronunciamiento*. But the Spanish Cabinet, warned by the French police, had taken the precaution of breaking up the suspected regiments. The over-eagerness of the artillery sergeants, whose military grievance was much dearer to them than any political programme, had defeated its own object, had justified the imposition of martial law, and had brought about the return to power of the avowed Moderates, "the light-horse of absolutism." But the Radicals had no cause for discouragement. Every day added to the numbers of those who held revolution to be not only justifiable but necessary. Two years more, and the men who had been most active in crushing the revolt of the artillery sergeants would lead the attack upon the throne. Men of strong monarchical views were at the time making common cause with Republicans and Democrats to sweep away the "traditional obstacle."

The Court and the middle class of Madrid welcomed the strong hand of Narvaez when he came into power for the last time (June 10, 1866). Under him order was secure as long as it was humanly possible to preserve it. But discipline hardly brings popularity or gratitude to the disciplinarian. The Spanish Liberals were quite in earnest when they cried out against it as tyranny. Yet Narvaez was no uncompromising Absolutist. He would have lived content and done his duty under any system strong enough to secure good order. He ever showed respect for genuine Liberal sentiment. He even



called himself a Liberal ; and, if he was repeatedly obliged to punish, it was because he dealt with an irreconcilable party. Even now, at the last, he tried conciliation and aided the escape of many who had forfeited their lives by participation in rebellion. But soon the attitude of opponents and the clamour of supporters alike sent him back to his favourite plan of a six months' dictatorship to drill Spain into a fitting mood to profit by the liberty she demanded. His ideas were shared and his methods approved by the Minister of the Interior. Gonzalez Bravo did not, however, like Narvaez, claim to be called a Liberal. Acting in perfect harmony they gagged the press, suspended representative assemblies in the provinces and municipalities, filled the towns with spies, and banished their opponents one by one. They announced their intention to bring back morality and religion into the scheme of teaching, in other words to suppress lay education. The Constitution directed that the Cortes should meet at least once in each year. They had now been prorogued since July, 1865. The extraordinary powers granted to O'Donnell had been taken over by Narvaez. They would lapse with the reassembly of the Parliament that conferred them. Narvaez showed no inclination to lay down his dictatorship. The year 1866 was drawing to an end when the deputies present in the capital petitioned the Queen against the reckless illegality of the Government. The petition lay in the House of Congress, and had already received many signatures, when (Dec. 28) Count Cheste, the captain-general, broke in, insulted the President of Congress, Rios Rosas, and cleared the House. He then issued a circular threatening those whose names were found on the petition. Rios Rosas and many others, among them Cánovas del Castillo, were banished. This means of reaching the ear of the Queen having failed, it was decided to make use of General Serrano. As a grandee, he had the right of entry to the Palace ; as President of the Senate, the right to speak in the name of the representative assemblies. But neither this nor his former

intimacy with the Queen availed him. He was banished to the Balearic Islands.

Even Narvaez and Gonzalez Bravo could not govern indefinitely without a Parliament. They resolved, however, not to reassemble the one that had made so unseemly a claim to independence. New Cortes were summoned for March 30, 1867. The decree convoking them declared that the Constitution had hitherto been misunderstood, but that the Cortes would now apply it "in a manner more in keeping with the sentiments of the nation and would give back its ancient force to the prerogative of power." "The time has come," it said, "for Spaniards to be governed in accordance with the spirit of their history and the feelings that make up their essential character."

The new Lower Chamber contained only four members of the constitutional (United Liberal) Opposition, though the Count of San Luis and Nocedal captained semi-independent groups. The Marquis of Miraflores was nominated President of the Senate; and Serrano was allowed to return from his banishment to occupy his seat. The decree imposing martial law was revoked. Successive ministries obstinately shut their eyes to the dangers that surrounded them, or at least to the permanence of their dangers; and, each time some ill-timed effort of the revolutionaries was crushed, they acted as though the crisis was over. It is true that the army had given its formal adhesion to a kind of retrograde *pronunciamiento*, curiously illustrative of the military and political manners of the time. Captain-General Narvaez sent a circular forbidding soldiers to take sides in political questions; every regiment acknowledged the circular by protesting its complete devotion to the Government of Prime-Minister Narvaez.

Though some Democrats and Republicans under Castelar and Pi y Margall kept a separate organisation, others had voted side by side with the Progressives at a Conference held at Ostend (Aug., 1866). The programme adopted by the main

body of the malcontents was sufficiently definite, though expulsion of the Bourbons was kept somewhat in the background for fear of alienating officers scrupulous as to their oath of allegiance. But it was not only Republicans, Democrats, and Progressives who despaired of finding a peaceful issue from an intolerable situation. The Liberal Union now figured so largely among the exiled conspirators that it was thought advisable to offer to O'Donnell the leadership of the whole enterprise. Prim declared himself willing to abdicate and to serve under him; but O'Donnell refused to commit himself. In the Lower House of the new Cortes Cánovas del Castillo gave solemn warning as to the danger of repressing all legitimate expression of public opinion. Gonzalez Bravo, answering him, made no apology for the policy of the Cabinet. Things have reached such a point, he argued, that compromise is no longer possible; the battle of Armageddon is upon us. "Does this House imagine," he said, "that the ministry is unaware of the ineluctable responsibility it is incurring? I know that the votes of the two Chambers do not absolve us from that deadly responsibility; and that not only we, but others also, shall be overwhelmed if a time should come when the raging force of revolutionary passion is let loose....The day the tide of revolution returns, nobody and nothing of that which makes this country what it is will escape." It was a challenge, and a bold one, to the nation from the throne and the ministry. Each day their isolation increased; even the royal family was falling away. The Duke of Seville, brother of the King-consort, published his sympathy with the exiled Liberals, avowing that he would rather live abroad poor and obscure than submit to constant and irritating police supervision. He was punished by deprivation of his rank and orders. The Duke of Montpensier, too, joined the party of the future; his warning and protest still further alienated the Queen. Her loose and Bohemian Court stood condemned before the almost sanctimonious respectability of her brother-in-law's household.

Meanwhile the Government was increasing its already large stock of repressive weapons. A decree conferred on provincial governors and on mayors power to expel on mere suspicion persons whom they held to be dangerous. Newspapers were made liable to suspension if guilty of thrice submitting to the censor matter that he considered objectionable. Publication in a newspaper of certain clauses of the Constitution under which the country was supposed to be ruled, unaccompanied by comment, was considered as a manifesto of disaffection. So a clandestine press sprang up; and *El Relámpago* (The Lightning-flash) equalled the scurrility of *El Murciélago* of twelve years before. It gave to the world the generally-believed story that the Queen was helpless in the hands of the *camarilla* and her husband, held in terror by threats to disclose autograph letters affecting the legitimacy of her children. Even the foreign press broke silence when, on the reconstruction of Narvaez' ministry, Marfori, the latest favourite, was transferred from the civil governorship of Madrid to the Ministry of Marine.

Whilst the submissive and almost unanimous Chambers—unanimous because Senators who voted against the Government were at once expelled—were passing votes of confidence, and approving all the stringent decrees of O'Donnell and Narvaez, the plans of the revolutionaries were again approaching completion. Their organisation was somewhat better than before; but once more it broke down when put to the test. In August (1867) the signal was given; and Prim appeared at Valencia. No longer seeking to win the army through its generals, as Espartero had done, he addressed his pleading to subalterns and non-commissioned officers and privates. To the rank and file he promised abolition of conscription. But this promise at once divided the army. The officers, seeing their position threatened, helped the civil authorities; Prim's enterprise failed. His lieutenant, Moriones, met with no better success in Catalonia. With a small band of followers he

manœuvred successfully to avoid capture. But the rebellion did not spread ; and he retired again behind the shelter of the French frontier. In many other districts, notably at Bejar, simultaneous assemblies of malcontents in arms took place. Yet, as soon as armed resistance had ceased, the ministry regained confidence, and, believing its victory to be as complete as it had been easy, pardoned all concerned. Perhaps this seeming magnanimity sprang from fear of treasured rancour, and the fierce revenge of a successful Revolution.

O'Donnell had abdicated the leadership of the shattered Liberal Union, and refused the advances of the Progressives. But Dulce, his successor, was in communication with Prim. Serrano and Admiral Topete were negotiating with the Duke of Montpensier, who hoped, by dethroning his sister-in-law, at last to fulfil the purpose of his life. But so long as O'Donnell lived, and refused to join the extremists, there remained a hope that a middle course might be found which would satisfy moderate men without raising the dynastic question. O'Donnell had taken part in Revolutions, both Conservative and Liberal ; but, his ambition once satisfied, his practical sense and strong will had been directed to combat both extremes. His somewhat sudden death at Biarritz (Nov. 5, 1867) removed one of the two barriers that stood between the throne and Revolution. O'Donnell dead, and Espartero finally withdrawn from politics, Narvaez alone remained of the three generals who figure so largely in the blood-stained history of the middle of the nineteenth century. He, too, died within six months of O'Donnell ; and the throne which he had so often saved did not outlast him for half a year. As champion of a bad woman and a bad Queen he was pledged to a worthless and corrupt cause. But he was the noblest and most disinterested of the party that produced the best men and best Spaniards of the time. It was his misfortune to live when the Conservative and old-Spanish element in the nation was radically divided by the dynastic question. Most of those who might otherwise have



been his staunchest supporters in his long struggle against the forces of disorder were pledged to the Carlist cause.

Queen Isabel either failed to understand or artfully ignored her danger. When the Cortes reassembled (Dec. 27, 1867) she congratulated the nation on "the success of a policy as energetic as it was far-seeing and wise." She summoned to Narvaez' place the man she thought most suited to carry on his policy. Gonzalez Bravo was a man of strong views and great courage. But the arms that Narvaez had successfully wielded were too heavy for his hands; he sought to make up for lack of authority by violence; where Narvaez was severe, Gonzalez Bravo was bitter. The situation demanded a soldier; but Gonzalez Bravo declared that, though a civilian, he could play the dictator, and would make generals bend their gaudy backs before his plain coat. He seemed to be determined to make his countrymen feel the weight of their chains.

A few days after Narvaez' death Isabel's last Parliament stood prorogued. For the past year it had been so thoroughly convinced of its utter insignificance in the struggle which had begun that two-thirds of its members had ceased to attend. They knew that the really significant announcements and declarations of policy were made not by ministers in the Congress, but by Sagasta, editor of *La Iberia*, the newspaper of the united Democratic, Republican, and Liberal parties. Gonzalez Bravo seemed anxious to hasten on the struggle and to bring his adversaries to a trial of strength. He recklessly inaugurated his dictatorship by banishing all leaders of the Liberal Union who still remained in Spain. Generals Serrano, Dulce, Zabala, Córdova, and Echagüe started for the Canary Islands. On their way through Cadiz, the Unionist generals entered into communications with the local revolutionary committee, and, more important still, obtained promise of aid from Admiral Topete, commander of the Atlantic squadron. Topete and most of his officers were moderate Liberals; to the general grievances against the ministry they added a peculiar one as



sailors; the Navy Estimates had been ruthlessly cut down by Gonzalez Bravo, at his wits' end for money. Still unsatisfied with the solitude his "senseless outrage" had made around the throne and the ministry, Gonzalez Bravo decided that the royal family must feel the weight of his hand. He banished the Duke of Montpensier and his wife, the Queen's sister. The Duke retaliated by issuing from Lisbon a protest which was in fact, though not in form, a justification of the coming Revolution. He had long ago incurred the penalty against which he protested and spent large sums in aid of the vast conspiracy. All parties were agreed that Isabel's throne must fall; they were content to postpone the question as to what should take its place. The Duke, like others, hoped that the cataclysm would turn to his advantage. The Republicans and Democrats, too, had their solution ready. Even the Carlists proved willing to further their ends in an alliance with the Liberal mammon of unrighteousness. Negotiations went so far that Sagasta journeyed to England to consult with Cabrera. But during their interview fundamental differences of opinion cropped up, and rendered agreement impossible. Sagasta returned to Belgium without seeing Don Carlos; once more the honesty of the Carlists triumphed over its need of a powerful alliance.

Admiral Topete and his four frigates gave to the Revolution not only the nucleus of a force, but means of coming and going and of communication through the open door of Cadiz. It was decided to act at once. A first plan, according to which the garrison of Ceuta was to revolt and be brought across to Spain by the squadron, was abandoned; and the honour of making the *pronunciamiento* was reserved for the sailors. Prim, Sagasta, and Ruiz Zorrilla reached Gibraltar in disguise (Sept. 16), and were secretly conveyed on board Topete's ships. Two days later the booming of guns announced that the admiral had proclaimed from the bridge the sovereignty of the people. The sailors, with their allies ashore, took possession of Cadiz without bloodshed. A few batteries of

artillery refused to join the *pronunciamiento*; but their numbers were too small to allow them to attempt resistance.

Meanwhile the banished generals were on their way back from the Canary Islands. They reached Cadiz on the day following the admiral's *pronunciamiento*. At once a conference was held to discuss plans. Topete, as straightforward as he was brave, demanded help to enable him to carry out his engagements to the Duke of Montpensier. According to him the only way in which "the people" could legitimately and wisely make use of the liberty he had proclaimed was by conferring the crown on that astute prince. But the others, more cunning, postponed the sharing of spoils until after the victory. They drew up, however, a manifesto, entitled "Spain with Honour," and addressed, "To all Liberals, to the richer classes, lovers of order, upholders of the liberties of the individual, ministers of the altar whose aim it is to choke all the springs of vice and bad example, to the whole people, and to the appreciation of Europe." The rest of the document bore signs—scarcely less equivocal than the strange cross-classification—of the excitement under which it was composed. Its declarations were vague, for the views of Serrano, Prim, Sagasta, Topete, and the others whose signatures it bore, varied widely. They agreed, however, that scandals must cease; "that the person charged with the observation of the Constitution should not be its irreconcilable enemy; and that the considerations which decided the most important questions should be such as could be named before mothers, wives, and daughters." They announced that a new Government, founded on universal suffrage, would unite and represent all the vital forces of the nation and inaugurate an era of social and political regeneration.

Without further progress towards decision of the vast question they had raised, the leaders of the revolution separated. Topete was left to cooperate with the junta that had taken the direction of affairs at Cadiz. Prim sailed away eastward with

the revolted squadron to raise the cities of the Mediterranean seaboard. Serrano went inland to Seville, which had followed the example of Cadiz and made its *pronunciamiento*. He undertook to gather and organise the military forces of the rebellion in order to meet the troops that would be sent against them. Success, however, seemed assured from the first. Málaga, Granáda, and Huelva welcomed the rebellion; the coast towns, both Atlantic and Mediterranean, were stirring. That many more regiments would come over was certain. Even guardships on the Cantabrian coast deserted the Queen and steamed away to join their comrades. The Duke of Montpensier formally offered his services; but they were respectfully declined by the revolted generals "for important political reasons." Queen Isabel was at San Sebastian when the news from Cadiz reached her. She saw that the affair was serious; she was not convinced that it was desperate. Gonzalez Bravo, her minister, was not lacking in spirit; he did not fear to face the dangers he had foreseen and in a great measure provoked. But it was no time for civilian leadership. He therefore gave up the Presidency of the Council to the Minister for War, General José Concha, Marqués de la Habana. Concha divided the command of the army between four generals, his brother Manuel, Marqués del Duero; Pezuela, Conde de Cheste; Pavia, Marqués de Novaliches; and Calonge.

In Calonge's district Santander and Santoña had made *pronunciamientos*. Santander was retaken. Barcelona and Saragossa, generally the first in revolts, remained quiet for a time under Pezuela. Novaliches had been sent forward to hold the line of the Guadalquivir, or, failing that, the passes of Sierra Morena. His was by far the most difficult position; the force at his disposal, about 10,000 men, was notably insufficient for the task set it. On September 26 he was in the valley of the Guadalquivir between Andújar and Córdoba. His plan was to seize the Bridge of Alcolea, the recognised key to the position ever since St Ferdinand's days, and then to

march on Córdoba by both banks of the river. Meanwhile he left a small detachment of his troops to keep open the passes of Sierra Morena in his rear. On the eve of the attempt to seize the bridge, he received a letter from Serrano, warning him against opposing the clearly-expressed will of the nation by disputing the passage of the liberating army. But Novaliches was too good a soldier to be turned from his purpose by the letter, or by the arguments of its bearer, Lopez de Ayala, the scribe of the revolutionary party and author of the manifesto "Spain with Honour." He replied that his command had been conferred upon him by the established authorities, and that he intended to do his duty. But, while his words were bold, his action was feeble and hesitating. He allowed the enemy to seize the bridge of Alcolea, and thus leave the Royalist troops cut in two by the broad and rapid river. The engagement began by a skirmish between the smaller division of Novaliches' troops occupying the right bank, and a force about equal in number. Here the revolutionaries had the advantage; but, when Novaliches, with the main body, attacked the bridge itself, the superiority of his artillery told heavily in his favour. His men, however, lacked enthusiasm. Their spiritless assault was easily beaten off; and Novaliches himself was wounded. The losses on either side were equal, about 800 men. The Royalist wounded remained on the field, for the troops sent to bring them in went over to the enemy. At nightfall Novaliches fell back on both banks (Sept. 29, 1868) and left the way to the capital open before Serrano. On the same day Madrid made its *pronunciamiento*. The two armies on the Guadalquivir united; and Serrano followed precedent by promising his late opponents rewards and remissions of service equal to those guaranteed to his own men.

On September 30, Queen Isabel crossed the Bidassoa into France, exclaiming, "I thought I had struck deeper roots in this land." Her throne had fallen in a single skirmish. Her reign had been a period of almost uninterrupted anarchy, amidst

which political theories became merely war-cries. Self-seeking, envy, or revenge often affords the only clue to its tangled history. The Church and the army, the two organisations that alone resisted disintegration, alternately swayed the distracted country. But not even they were united. By the Carlist split the Church had lost half her power; in the army the commissioned officers were for the most part men of Moderate views, whilst the non-commissioned and privates were, like the class from which they sprang, Radicals. On Isabel fell the sins, political and private, of her ancestors for two generations, her grandfather's folly, her father's cynical brutality and reckless opposition to the spirit of his age. The division of the royal family into two bitterly hostile factions had undermined Spain's chivalrous loyalty to the person of the sovereign. The scandals of Isabel's Court and her faithlessness in political matters extinguished it altogether. She had the disadvantage of being left in early youth without experienced male relatives to guide and advise her. Her nearest kin, with the exception of her brave and able, but capricious and avaricious mother, were Don Carlos and his brothers, and the scheming Duke of Montpensier. Her unmanly husband was of no account, except as the tool of the *camarilla*.

The enthusiastic Liberal movements of 1812 and 1820 had indeed attained their object, in that they finally broke down absolutism; but its place was taken by an evil no less great, the tyranny of ministers. The representative system, implanted on a soil unprepared for it, was from the first, as it is to-day, a hollow sham, the tool and stalking-horse of a faction or an individual. Jostled by the noisy crowd of political charlatans and self-seekers, or still sunk in the ignorance and apathy of ages, the majority remained voiceless amid the contending cries, or ceased, after a brief struggle, to try to understand or to obtain a hearing. From their apathy they were occasionally roused by appeals to their most deeply-rooted prejudices. The charges that did most harm to the Liberals were those of



atheism, heresy, freemasonry, favouring of foreigners and foreign institutions. The repetition of these charges brought persecution; and it was persecution that made the Liberals, or at least a section of them, anti-religious and anti-monarchical at last. They became persecutors in turn; and even the most worthy among them resorted at times to means that no end, however praiseworthy, could justify. Their weakness lay in the fact that their only consistent supporters were the town mobs, the elements of disorder. The Liberals, it cannot be too often repeated, were a small minority in the nation. The repression and persecutions carried on by the Conservatives are explained, if not justified, by the fact that Spain, as a whole, if it could have been stirred to thought and action, would have belonged to them or to the Carlists. The Liberals had perhaps the better cause and the more generous enthusiasm. The Conservatives ranged against them the better men and tradition. Political morality sank to an almost incredibly low ebb. Public good was utterly lost sight of; often its very pretence was dropped. Shocking as are the facts, they fall far below the monstrous accusations recklessly bandied from side to side without arousing indignation amongst those by whom they were believed, nor protest from those against whom they were directed. Above the warring factions stood the Court and the *camarilla*, alternately butt, arbiter, victim, protector, executioner, and *protégée*, till at last the factions united to overthrow one stronghold of the corruption that still curses Spain.



## CHAPTER XIII.

### THE INTERREGNUM AND THE REIGN OF KING AMADEO. (1868—1873.)

QUEEN ISABEL quitted Spain half-frantic with grief, refusing to believe that the verdict of Alcolea was final and that she would return no more to misrule the land. She honestly loved her people, and she did not realise that she had forfeited the enthusiastic affection that had so often greeted her in Madrid and in the great provincial cities. She was aware that she had been betrayed by Serrano and Montpensier; she knew nothing of the vast body of public opinion behind them. At the frontier she was met by an offer of hospitality from the Emperor Napoleon, who was at Biarritz, and was in fact on the point of becoming her guest when the revolution overtook her. She accepted the Castle of Pau as a temporary residence, and was welcomed as her train passed Biarritz by the Emperor in person. A few miles further on, at Bayonne, she was met by Gonzalez Bravo and other members of her last ministry; and a proclamation solemnly affirming her right was drawn up. "With my eyes turned towards my country," said the deposed Queen, "I hasten to formulate before God and before men an explicit and solemn protest. The violence that has forced me to quit Spain must in no respect prejudice the integrity of my rights."

In Madrid the Revolution had been carried out with little disturbance of public order. The Queen, it may almost be said, had no political friends; and her private ones were

people of little influence and less courage. Not a single general made offer of his services to restore her throne. The Marqués de la Habana saw that resistance was hopeless, and finding his opinion confirmed by a council of war, handed over the capital to the charge of the Captain-General of the district, his brother, Marqués del Duero. He resigned his civil powers to a junta hastily elected to carry on the government. In it figured representatives of all the parties, Republican, Democratic, Progressive, and United-Liberal, that had made common cause against Queen Isabel and Gonzalez Bravo. The President was Madoz, and its military chief Ros de Olano. After solemnly declaring that the Bourbon family had forfeited all right to the throne of Spain, it sent assurances to Prim and Serrano that it regarded its functions as merely provisional, and was prepared to resign them as soon as a more regular authority was ready to take its place. Nevertheless it attempted to lay down the future course of their authority by promising, in the name of the Revolution, universal suffrage, freedom of worship, of teaching, and of the press, the right of public meeting, decentralisation by means of delegation of powers to municipal and provincial assemblies, trial by jury in criminal causes, equality of all citizens before the law, inviolability of dwellings, and abolition of capital punishment. Some local juntas went even beyond this ambitious list of proposed reforms and announced abolition of conscription and of taxation.

Serrano was the first of the leaders to reach the capital. He was welcomed by the mob and by the junta and became Universal Minister pending the arrival of his fellows. A graceful concession to a strong body of public opinion was his formal offer of the leadership to Espartero. It was merely formal, for Espartero's life had been passed in the attempt to discover a *modus vivendi* between Isabel's government and the Radicals; now that one of the two terms of his problem was eliminated he was utterly at a loss. Phlegmatic by temperament, he was now sunk in the weariness of age. He replied to

Serrano's offer by recommending his favourite nostrum, the Constitution, regardless of the fact that the Constitution was monarchical, and that the streets were blazing with posters announcing "the everlasting downfall of the spurious Bourbon race." The concluding words were, "Those who conceived and have initiated and carried out this Revolution are those who ought to form the Provisional Government; and the rest ought to lend their support whilst respecting and defending the fundamental laws which the nation in virtue of its sovereignty has made."

After spreading or confirming the Revolution at Valencia, Tarragona, and at Barcelona, Prim joined Serrano in Madrid. A Cabinet was formed; Serrano took the Presidency, Prim the Ministry for War, Topete the Navy, and Sagasta, the wisest head among them, the Home Office. Places were also found for Ruiz Zorrilla and Adelardo Lopez de Ayala, who had deserved well of the Revolution. On October 19, Lorenzana, Minister for Foreign Affairs, forwarded to the representatives of Spain abroad a long and wordy discourse on the causes and aims of the Revolution, for, as he justly remarked, "the fall of a monarch, and the perpetual exclusion of her descendants from the throne, brought about by a Revolution that writes upon its banner the declaration of the most advanced principles of modern Liberalism, are phenomena deserving of mature study, and lessons which neither kings nor peoples can afford to neglect."

The circular was followed (October 25) by the publication of the ministerial programme. It was, as circumstances demanded, a general statement of Liberal principles, and gave no guidance as to the future form of government. Serrano congratulated the nation on the overthrow of "a power whose unconcealed opposition to the spirit of the age had been a drag upon all progress; over it the Government out of self-respect would cast the merciful veil of silence." He went on to declare that the Revolution had established universal

suffrage, and assured the principles of liberty of conscience, of teaching, of the press, of association, and public meeting. Financial reform and better husbandry of the nation's resources were promised. A wise forethought extended these advantages to the colonies, "the provinces beyond the sea which have the right to intervene with their intelligence and vote in the arduous political, administrative, and social questions under discussion. Thus founded on liberty and credit Spain may peacefully proceed to the definitive establishment of the form of government that shall be found most suitable to her essential condition and proved needs, and that shall provoke the least amount of distrust in Europe." The juntas, the ministry announced, had one and all kept silence with regard to the monarchy, and "had not included in the discredit attaching to the dynasty the lofty principle which that dynasty represented"; if, however, the Provisional Government proved wrong in its forecast and the decision of the Spanish people were unfavourable to the reestablishment of the monarchical form of government, the vote of the sovereign nation would be respected. In conclusion the juntas were bidden to nominate provincial and municipal councils to take over their powers until such time as the newly enforced suffrage could be exercised. The national militia was reestablished under the name of Volunteers of Liberty.

The Revolution of 1868 came nearer than any previous one to uniting the nation in a common purpose. So long as its work was merely destructive all were agreed. But, when the time came to reconstruct, it was evident that views as to the ultimate purpose of the great upheaval differed widely. Still it was clear that the Royalists commanded a large majority. The verdict of the Constituent Cortes, summoned for February, had really been anticipated. In the preceding November a manifesto signed by the majority of the revolutionary chiefs already spoke of "the monarchy we are about to establish by our votes," thereby deciding the question in

the only way conceivable to most Spanish minds. It is true, however, that the proposed monarchy would be but a pale shadow of the late one. It was to be "a monarchy springing from the rights of the people and consecrated by universal suffrage, symbolising the sovereignty of the nation, implying and consolidating all public liberties, personifying in fact the rights of the citizen, those rights which are superior to all authority and to all institutions; a monarchy which destroys root and branch the claims of Divine Right and the supremacy of a family over the nation; monarchy surrounded by democratic institutions; popular monarchy."

At this time the Republicans too published the programme of their aspirations; but, except in one or two large provincial towns, such as Tarragona and Valladolid, their numbers were too small to allow them to hope for its immediate realisation. In Cadiz, Málaga, and other towns, the failure of the Revolution to bestow immediate peace and plenty, in accordance with the promises of its promoters, caused socialist risings. The Duke of Montpensier, full of zeal, hurried from Portugal to show himself among the soldiers sent to restore order. His services were, however, declined; and he was ordered by the Provisional Government to recross the frontier.

In the elections the Radicals had everywhere the upper hand. It was unnecessary for the executive to exert pressure on behalf of ministerial candidates; the mob took upon itself the duty of terrorising the Opposition. Many Conservatives, including a section of the clergy, stout loyalists, but unable to fight or pray for the restoration of Queen Isabel, transferred their allegiance to Don Carlos. A few Republicans were elected, among them Emilio Castelar, returned by Saragossa. These, with one or two Moderates, bold friends of the fallen dynasty, and one or two avowed Carlists, made up the Opposition in the Constituent Cortes. The majority called itself Liberal or Radical; the name Progressive disappeared, for it connoted Liberal principles under the Bourbon dynasty. The

leader of the majority was General Prim ; so long as he lived he kept the utopians, republicans, socialists, and democrats in check. For himself he chose the part of king-maker without at first realising its difficulty. When Castelar demonstrated that exotic royalty could never take root in Spain, it was easy for Prim to rejoin, *a fortiori*, that a Republic had still less chance of success. Both arguments were obviously good ; both experiments were, however, about to be tried.

The first act of the Constituent Cortes was to confirm the ministry, hitherto regarded as merely provisional, and to confer on its President, Serrano, the title of "Chief of the Executive Power." Then, at the outset, a difficulty arose with regard to the army. "Every successive minister," declared a wise and impartial contemporary, "had used it for the purposes of his own personal ambition and had left in it a swarm of superfluous officers, who owed their grades to personal or political services more or less illegal.....owing to the enormous number of promotions squandered among the supporters of General Prim the officers had risen to the proportion of one to seven." Abolition of conscription had been freely promised ; it had, in fact, been the cry most effective to rally the people to the Revolution. But the attitude of the Republicans of the south and the Carlists of the north made it impossible, as Serrano said, to grant this most desirable measure for the present. The Government needed thirty-five thousand men ; conscription was the only way to get them. From this moment the popularity of Revolution faded among the important class for which Liberalism meant no taxes and no conscription.

A commission was next appointed to draft a Constitution to be submitted to the Constituent Assembly. It completed its work in less than a month ; its scheme contained nothing original. The clauses indeed seemed to have been gathered piecemeal from all the various Liberal Constitutions since that of 1812. Spain was declared a strictly limited monarchy, the



real power being vested in a Parliament of two Chambers. The commission did not take upon itself to define exactly the rights and powers of kings and Parliaments; nor were these the matters that excited the strongest feeling. It was over the question of religious toleration that parties joined issue: in this respect, at any rate, the Spanish nation was not prepared to adopt the most advanced Liberal doctrines. A petition, praying that no other than the orthodox Roman Catholic worship should be allowed, gathered, it is said, three million signatures. But the Radicals were not to be deterred from their purpose of "cutting off the secular arm of the Church." A measure guaranteeing freedom of worship was forced through the Assembly; and civil marriage was legalised (May 24, 1869). The jury system was adopted, and individual liberty solemnly guaranteed. The new Constitution was voted by a majority of 214 against 55 votes. The promulgation (June 6) was the signal for riots at Seville, Málaga, Saragossa, Valencia, and Alicante. For, while its declared neutrality in matters of religion offended many and swelled the gathering Carlist groups, a still larger number, advanced Radicals of the industrial towns, declared its provisions ridiculously inadequate. They insisted upon the necessity of a new and more drastic revolution, declaring that the overthrow of the Bourbons had resulted merely in the establishment of a new form of tyranny. An old mistake was repeated; and the number of justly aggrieved Catholics was swelled by a renewed attempt to exact from the clergy an oath of fidelity to the abhorred Constitution.

The Constituent Cortes having voted in favour of monarchy, Serrano changed his title from Chief of the Executive Power to Regent. Prim took the presidency of the ministry, almost unchanged except for the addition of Manuel Silvela. A little later Ruiz Zorrilla too joined it; and the Cortes stood prorogued (July 15). The situation was most dangerous and most abnormal. The lawless condition of the country called for the strong hand of authority; but repression was combated

by the Republicans. They formed federal unions to resist so-called oppression and to further their extreme but ill-defined views. Thus, while the noble demagogue, Orense, Marquis of Albaida, was preaching Republican utopianism to eager listeners along the northern coast, Castelar was doing the same with only slightly less extravagance among his constituents in Aragon, and Pierrad found his socialistic doctrines welcome among his Catalan countrymen. Revolts at Cadiz and Málaga expressed the active discontent of the south. The Carlists were arming and mustering; the country was breaking up.

The Constituent Cortes, elected to choose the form of government most suitable for Spain, had chosen monarchy; but they had no power to elect a king. Nevertheless they decided to do so, for there stood the empty throne waiting to be filled. So Serrano, the Regent, and Prim, the President of the Council, began in the autumn of 1869 to search for an occupant. The search lasted for more than a year. Meanwhile Spain was a monarchy without a monarch, under a Regent without authority and a disregarded Constitution. The Constituent Assembly was without guidance, hesitating and discredited; the revolutionary enthusiasm had cooled; the country was restless and expectant. Isabel's government had left a deficit of twenty-five millions and somewhat less than four shillings in cash. The party that had sought popularity by abolishing the hated octroi duty had been obliged to reimpose it; the party that had promised freedom from conscription had levied an exceptionally heavy blood-tax. The middle way became daily more difficult to follow; some joined the Carlists, others the Federalists. Though a formal decision had been reached, the balance still hung between King and Republic; some proposed to add to the Regent's power so as to make him dictator; others to limit his powers by giving him Prim and Topete as assessors.

Of the possible candidates for the throne three were Spaniards. Alfonso, son of Queen Isabel, was the most

obvious, but he was still a child. Moreover, the memory of his mother's misrule was too recent; and the perpetual exclusion of the Bourbon family from the throne had been solemnly voted and repeatedly reaffirmed. This law excluded also Prince Alfonso's uncle, the intriguing Duke of Montpensier. Years of careful trimming of sails and double dealing had availed him only to clear the way for another. Perpetual plotting and supposed participation in many schemes as dark as that which brought him to Spain had rendered him unpopular. His indecent haste to profit by the errors and misfortunes of his kindred had been marked. Serrano and Topete were pledged to make him king and had made use of his money. But Montpensier found that he and his agent had been the tools of a still more skilful plotter, Prim. When the matter came to a vote only 27 out of a total of 311 votes were cast in his favour. But by this time he was more than ever disliked. In revenge for outrageous libels he had killed in a duel (March, 1870) the Duke of Seville, brother of Isabel's consort, and his own kinsman.

The third Spanish candidate, Espartero, Duke of Victory, was the most unkingly man in Spain. Petitions begging him to save the country poured into Logroño, disturbing strangely the half patriarchal, half middle-class life into which the victorious general had withdrawn. It is notable that the Catalans, whose capital he had ruthlessly bombarded, were particularly eager to be ruled by Don Baldomero the First. He might have been King of Spain or president of an Aragonese republic had he so willed it. The Duke of Montpensier, when he saw himself rejected, offered to support Espartero; he had still grudges to gratify even after he had laid aside ambitions. In May, 1870, the Provisional Government assured Espartero that they had no official candidate and would remain neutral whilst the nation made its choice. But Espartero refused to come forward. His memory deserves respect; for, though he often took arms against Isabel's

government, he was never disloyal to the Queen, nor sought to increase his own power by allowing her to forfeit unwarned her claims to political and personal consideration. He would not supplant her in the end.

The three Spanish candidates being put aside, it was left to the king-makers to search abroad. The Pan-Iberians, a small party, regardless of the teaching of centuries, proposed to offer the crown to King Luis of Portugal, supposing that if he accepted he would abdicate his own throne. But he refused the perilous adventure, and delighted his subjects by declaring his intention to die as he had been born, a Portuguese. Then the Pan-Iberians turned again to his father, Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, King-dowager of Portugal and cousin of Queen Victoria and of Prince Albert. He had already once refused, declaring his honour pledged to support the claims of the Duke of Montpensier. On the second occasion the Spanish Provisional Government and the Emperor Napoleon urged him to accept. He expressed his willingness, subject to the approval of the Powers and election by plebiscite of his future subjects. The latter condition he afterwards withdrew, substituting for it election by three-fourths of the votes of the Constituent Cortes and a formal guarantee that Spain and Portugal should ever remain separate and independent. Prim suggested the insertion of a clause making the eventual union of the two countries subject to the consent of both nations. But by this time the question of the succession of a Portuguese king to the Spanish throne and the consequent relegation of the proudest of nations to the second place, had raised such a storm in Portugal that negotiations were broken off, after many months of bargaining (July, 1870). The candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohen-zollern-Sigmaringen, supported by Prussia and opposed by France, was incidentally the cause of the great war of 1870-71 and the fall of the Second Empire. The prince withdrew before the war broke out. Bismarck sought alliance with Spain; but Prim refused to entangle his distracted country.

The nation, or the wirepullers in obedience to whose promptings it figured, had taken a year or thereabouts to decide that monarchy was the form of government best suited to Spain. Another year had slipped by; the autumn of 1870 had come; and the throne still stood empty. The Cortes were wrangling over minor or personal questions, whilst the country was going from bad to worse. Industry and commerce had shrunk to the narrowest limits; the Carlists were armed and organised, the Federalists everywhere active; the administration had utterly broken down. Parties which had taken no share in the *pronunciamiento* of Cadiz and the battle of Alcolea, Democrats and Republicans, now began to urge more strenuously their views. A direct challenge in the House failed to draw from them an explicit disclaimer of participation in the schemes of anarchists and utopian demagogues. Necessity for a decision of some kind, however unpromising, caused Prim to turn in the last resort to the princes of the House of Savoy, sons, brothers, and nephews of the King of Italy. The Duke of Genoa refused the crown of Spain; but Amadeo, the second son of Victor Emmanuel, accepted it. The ministry, anxious to reassure Amadeo, exercised pressure to secure his election by a strong majority of the Constituent Cortes. But only 191 votes out of a total of 311 were cast in his favour (Nov., 1870). The minority votes included 63 for a republic, 27 for the Duke of Montpensier, 1 for the Duchess, 8 for Espartero, 19 blanks, and 2 votes for Alfonso, son of the ex-Queen. His mother had abdicated; and the boy's hand had been kissed in recognition of his sovereignty by his grandmother and the chief Royalists in Paris (June 25, 1870). Relieved of a discreditable connexion, the remains of the old Conservatives united with the few staunch loyalists, Cheste, Gasset, San Luis, and Lersundi, to form the party of the future. Leagued with Republicans, Carlists, and Progressives, they undertook the easy task of rendering all Amadeo's attempts to win the confidence and affection of his new subjects unavailing. The



first cause of his unpopularity was his parentage. The selection of a member of the reigning family of Italy, the impious usurpers of the temporal dominions of the Holy See, the family that had profited by revolution and the overthrow of long-established thrones, shocked the conscience and roused the most deep-seated prejudices of Catholic and Conservative Spain. Even without this disadvantage it would have been well-nigh impossible for a stranger, however painstaking, to win the loyalty of the Spanish people.

The Constituent Cortes prepared to dissolve, for their task was now at an end. In a fortnight the necessary business was got through, the chief matters being a new civil list, provision for immediate financial needs, and slight modifications in the electoral law. Then all attention was fixed on the Commission which offered the crown to the young prince at Florence. Its spokesman was Ruiz Zorrilla, the man to whose passionate interference Amadeo's fall was eventually due. Born an orator and profiting by an almost unexampled opportunity, Ruiz Zorrilla, spokesman of a nation, made his offer in a noble and touching speech. Amadeo made a modest and fitting answer. He promised that the Spaniards should at least be able to say of the King they had elected that single-heartedness ever raised him above the strife of parties, and that he had no aspirations other than the concord and prosperity of the land.

He did his best to fulfil his pledge; but ill-fortune dogged his steps from the outset. To Prim his election was chiefly due; and to Prim he looked for effectual support and guidance amid the dangers by which he knew his path would be beset. Prim died assassinated on the very day that Amadeo landed in Spain (Dec. 30, 1870). On the snowy night of Dec. 27 he left the House of Congress in his brougham, and turning from the dark and narrow Calle del Turco into the Calle de Alcalá, the main thoroughfare of the capital, he fell into a carefully-prepared ambushade. A cab blocked the way; armed men approached from either side; one of them drove the muzzle of



his gun through the closed windows of the brougham, and calling upon Prim to prepare for death fired into his body. The murderers were never brought to justice; the affair is still unexplained. Of those who could throw light upon it some were made away with in gaol and others imprisoned for life, cut off from all communication with the outside world. It seems certain that this was no act of private vengeance; but it is impossible, amid the many who thought to profit by his death, to point with any approach to certainty to the guilty<sup>1</sup>. Public opinion, however, ever ready to ascribe dark deeds to the Duke of Montpensier, laid this crime too at his door, regarding it merely as an addition to the series of sudden deaths of those who stood between the throne and the husband of Ferdinand the Seventh's younger daughter.

With Don Juan Prim was removed the strongest will in Spain. He was worshipped by the populace, who, exaggerating the humility of his birth and calling him the son of a butcher, regarded it as a guarantee of his fidelity to their cause. He was feared by his enemies and also by his associates for a certain grimness of temper, concealed beneath the outward mien of "a pious and sympathising undertaker." His reckless daring in Morocco and at home had won for him the enthusiastic admiration of the private soldier. The election of a foreigner to the Spanish throne obscured his popularity for the moment. Had time been given him to recover his influence, his strength would undoubtedly have sustained for a while Amadeo's throne. The real ruler of Spain would have been the vigorous Catalan soldier, creature and victim of a turbulent age. Public spirit and personal ambition were so mingled and confused that the men of that time hardly knew which of the two they obeyed; nor can their children do more than guess. Amadeo was met at Cartagena by Topete, who had hastily

<sup>1</sup> See, however, Paul Angulo's pamphlet, *Les Assassins du Maréchal Prim et la politique en Espagne* (Paris, 1886). [J. F.-K.]

taken Prim's place, accompanied by Generals Concha and Zabala. On the second of January of the eventful year 1871 he entered his snow-covered capital. His first visit was to the Atocha, the royal church of Madrid; it was partly a thanksgiving for his accession, partly a visit of respect to the remains of General Prim. The crowds that lined the streets were drawn together by curiosity only. No enthusiasm on the part of his new subjects encouraged the stranger at the outset.

Left to his own resources at the age of twenty-six years, King Amadeo did his best to fulfil conscientiously the office of a constitutional monarch in a country little fitted for such a form of government. Affable, painstaking, well educated, he had travelled over most of Europe and had given proof of personal courage when wounded at the head of his regiment in battle with the Austrians. Knowing nothing of Spain, a foreign King with a Republican Constitution, he repeatedly declared that he would reign only over a willing people. This was interpreted as a sign of weakness and gave encouragement to the faction sworn to drive him from Spain. Disaffection took a form that neither courage could vanquish nor good-will disarm. The nobility not only abstained from appearance as a corporate body at Amadeo's Court, but seized every opportunity of heaping slights on him and his wife. Their grandfathers had not shown themselves so scrupulously patriotic when Napoleon thrust upon them his brother and a ready-made Constitution. Some officers of the army and navy ostentatiously refused the oath of allegiance; and again Amadeo erred on the side of mercy, declining to take notice of a public challenge to his right. Coming after dictatorships, veiled under Parliamentary forms, but rising and falling by force of arms, his government seemed insipid, even as the studied plainness of his dress and behaviour were thrown into shadow by the strutting splendour of the revolutionary heroes.

Amadeo's election had been brought about by a coalition of every shade of opinion between the extremes of Carlism on

the one hand and Republicanism on the other. The new King sought to give permanence to the coalition by charging Serrano to form a ministry including Sagasta, Ruiz Zorrilla, and Martos, the Radical leaders. For a moment only, differences of opinion seemed to be sunk in eagerness for the public good. The first disappointment was the result of the general election. In spite of the efforts of the ministry, the first Parliament (April 3, 1871) contained a strong anti-dynastic Opposition. Its two wings, Carlist and Republican, entered into an unholy alliance, and, profiting by the violent dissensions of their opponents, worked unremittingly, at first by constitutional means only, to bring about Amadeo's fall. Though the ministry had a majority, the Republicans proposed in Congress to annul the election of the King. The Carlists gave their casting vote in a contested division over the law regulating associations, political and religious. Many days were passed in discussion of abuses invalidating the late elections; many more over a proposal to revise the Constitution. When at last the response to the address from the throne was voted, it was adverse to the ministry; and Serrano retired (July 25, 1871).

The experiment of government by a coalition had failed in the face of a united and resolute Opposition. Accordingly it was decided to revert to the party system. Ruiz Zorrilla, the most Radical member of the late Cabinet, was bidden to form a ministry, for it was still hoped that the parties which had so lately elected the King would abstain from quarrelling in the face of the enemy. These hopes were not justified. The Radicals were split into two bitterly opposed sections under Ruiz Zorrilla and Sagasta respectively. No reconciliation was possible; Sagasta was becoming less violently Radical and Zorrilla more so. Their decision to separate their forces decided the fate of the Liberal-Monarchist party; each section was at the mercy of the Carlist-Republican alliance. Sagasta was elected to the Presidency of the Chamber in opposition to

Zorrilla's nominee; and Zorrilla at once retired (Oct., 1871). Amadeo was at a loss to find a man of any authority to accept the thankless office of President of the Council. Espartero refused to be drawn from his retirement; Sagasta declined; finally the choice fell upon a person of secondary importance. None but the most disinterestedly patriotic motives induced Admiral Malcampo to accept a responsibility to which he declared himself unequal. Though Serrano and Topete put their experience at his service, he failed to navigate for more than six weeks the stormy Parliamentary sea. A vote of censure brought his cruise to an end. Parliament was adjourned until the ministry could be reformed under a stronger leader. Sagasta now became President; and Malcampo took office under him as Minister of Marine, Topete as Minister for the Colonies.

Sagasta saw the impossibility of carrying on the Government in the face of an anti-dynastic majority vowed to obstruction. He dissolved Parliament, reconstituted his ministry, taking in the turbulent turncoat Romero Robledo, then at the outset of his erratic career, and prepared to strain every nerve to save the throne. He published a programme under the headings of Liberty, the Constitution of 1869, the Savoy dynasty, and the integrity of the national territory. The last clause referred to menacing representations made by the Government of the United States with regard to the deplorable state of Cuba. The election took place in April (1872). The Carlist and Republican Opposition worked together to overthrow by their votes the foreign King; Sagasta on his side strove recklessly to save the situation. He succeeded indeed in securing a majority favourable to the dynasty; but, in order to do so, he had been obliged to abandon his usual prudence, to add bribery to pressure, and to make use of the means of government which he had so often and so eloquently condemned. It was in protest against this make-believe of representative government, the corrupt influence of the administration on


electors, and the trickery resorted to by those in charge of the urns, that the Progressive party had withdrawn from all constitutional means of making their opinion felt during the latter years of Isabel's reign. But now all limits had been overstepped by the prefects and their subordinates, in order to secure at any cost the return of ministerial candidates. When the Cortes met, Sagasta was questioned as to the employment of a sum of £20,000 which had disappeared from the Colonial Office. His enemies suggested that it had been embezzled; but the attitude of the ministry left no doubt that the money had been spent on the elections. The Congress, though it owed its election to Sagasta's unscrupulousness, declared itself the champion of the purity of public life. In view of its attitude Sagasta resigned (May, 1872). Serrano again became President of the Council. Topete acted as his representative in Madrid, for Serrano was absent in the north fighting against the Carlists.

O'Donnell had fancied that by Montemolin's renunciation (see p. 275) they were free of the danger that had overhung Spain for thirty years; they betrayed a strange ignorance of the party with which they were dealing. No sooner was Montemolin safely back at Cologne than he annulled his formal abdication by a still more formal and solemn repudiation (June 15, 1860). It runs thus: "Seeing that the deed executed at Tortosa.....had its origin in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances, and that, drawn up in captivity and signed under restraint, it lacks all the essentials of legal validity and therefore is illegal, and not to be ratified; and seeing that the rights to which it relates cannot belong to any other than him who holds them in accordance with the fundamental law from which their binding force is derived; and that by this law the person on whom they devolve is bound to exercise them in due time and place; acting by the advice of eminent lawyers consulted and in obedience to the negative opinion repeatedly expressed by my most faithful



servants, I hereby retract the aforesaid deed of Tortosa of the 23rd of April of the present year and declare it null and void." Don Fernando, too, signed a like retraction of his promise to refrain from taking part in any scheme against the authority of Queen Isabel (p. 275). It was a pretty piece of casuistry. Is not the renunciation of a divine right a sort of contradiction in terms, as well as a sacrilegious trafficking in holy things? And is not the case still stronger when pressure amounting to compulsion can be pleaded? On these difficult questions the legitimist party both in and out of Spain was for a time divided. Its chief, the Comte de Chambord, gave his opinion flatly against the Count of Montemolin, and expressed a doubt as to whether it would be possible to find among the genuine and faithful holders of tradition priest or layman to justify the retraction.

But even nearer his own royal person Montemolin's right to play fast and loose with his word was disputed. The Infant Don Juan, a younger son, had anticipated the retraction by publishing (June 2, 1860) his claims to the rights renounced by his two brothers<sup>1</sup>. "The renunciation of his rights to the throne of Spain made by my brother Carlos Luis (Montemolin).....compels me to assert the rights of my family and my own to the throne of my ancestors. Though determined to maintain these rights, and the principle of legitimacy in which they are rooted, I shall not allow them to owe their triumph to an appeal to arms or to further outpouring of





the noble blood of Spaniards. I await events confident in the Divine Providence, and in the wisdom and patriotism of my countrymen. Order will be established ; and with order will come national prosperity in harmony with the light and progress of the age." Whatever may have been the intention of Don Juan when he wrote the last phrase, it was regarded by the stalwarts of the party as the introduction of the abominable thing into the sanctuary. A man who could thus tamper with Liberal doctrine was manifestly unfit to lead traditionalists. Don Juan had on other occasions been guilty of like unguarded language ; he was now regarded by some merely as a madcap, by others as a dangerous heretic. Montemolin, however, dealt gently with his erratic brother, trying to win from him an admission that the manifesto had been issued under a mistaken belief in the validity of the renunciation. But Don Juan stoutly refused to withdraw ; and Montemolin in a fresh manifesto sought to justify his own conduct. The whole Carlist party was rapidly becoming embroiled when death suddenly came to cut the knot. Montemolin, his wife, and his brother Fernando all died within a fortnight (Jan., 1861). Three almost simultaneous deaths happening so unexpectedly and so opportunely for certain interests could hardly pass without suspicions of foul play. But there was nothing whatever to warrant such suspicions ; the two princes succumbed to an infectious fever.

No one was left to question their brother's right to inherit their claims. But Don Juan had not only abandoned all the principles of the party ; he more than once urged his cousin, Isabel, to accept his submission. Nevertheless, it was difficult for a party founded upon Divine Right and primogeniture to set the reprobate aside. But Don Juan had a son, Don Carlos Maria (b. 1848), of a very different temper from his own. Brought up among the most uncompromising members of the party, the boy, when he approached manhood, demanded of his father an explanation of his attitude with regard to the family

claims. Don Juan did not vouchsafe an answer; and the matter was left undecided until unmistakeable signs of Queen Isabel's approaching downfall made a recognised leader imperatively necessary to the party. Accordingly, at a meeting held in London (July 20, 1868), Don Carlos Maria was greeted as King, his father's submission to the usurping Government being taken as equivalent to abdication. But Cabrera, the most conspicuous and able man connected with the cause, was not present at the meeting; nor could any promise of cooperation in the projects there discussed be obtained from him. Don Carlos Maria, who now took the title of Duke of Madrid, was formally recognised by his renegade father. Thereafter he gathered round him in Paris an unwieldy council. Its discussions ranged at large over the conditions and prospects of the party, but disposed of no more solid capital than the promises, so often forfeited, of adherents. Its appeal for funds addressed to the Legitimist party in Spain and abroad failed. Nevertheless the cause was far from extinct.

When Isabel joined Don Carlos in exile, the cousins met with a view to coordination of claims and common action. Whilst negotiations were going on Don Carlos checked, to the best of his ability, the over-eagerness of his followers. Nothing, however, came of the conferences except, as is believed, a considerable contribution from Queen Isabel's private purse towards the Carlist funds. Then followed further efforts to raise money and to obtain the cooperation of Cabrera. At length he accepted the command urged upon him, subject to the condition that he alone should decide the moment for action, and the form it should assume. But not all Don Carlos' councillors were so prudent; and he himself, as befitted his youth, was eager for action. In July, 1869, he hurried secretly to the Catalan frontier by Figueras, and actually crossed it in disguise, only to find his partisans in the district utterly unable to perform what they had promised. He

returned disappointed but not discouraged to Paris. Cabrera took a serious view of the matter, and, protesting against the rash direction of the party, withdrew to his English home. Shortly afterwards, out of heart with the cause, and distrusting those who had his master's ear, he resigned the leadership on the plea of failing health.

Then followed another manifesto from the Prince, promising, as is the wont of such documents, the advent of a golden age, the reconciliation of the most sharply opposed tendencies and interests, and prompt solution of all social and political questions under the auspices of legitimate monarchy. Nevertheless, as soon as Cabrera withdrew, the affairs of the Carlists fell into deeper confusion ; Don Carlos himself became aware how necessary were the authority and experience of his wilful follower. Accordingly he commanded and besought Cabrera's return to active participation in his plans. Again he yielded, though only after imposing more stringent conditions than before. It was at Cabrera's suggestion that Don Carlos promised a Constitution and Cortes to the nation. But the main body of the party had not enjoyed Cabrera's opportunities of studying the working of representative institutions ; and, when at Bordeaux he set forth his new-found way of reconciliation between Divine Right and democracy, his words sounded almost blasphemous in the ears of the impatient chiefs. The unpopularity incurred by his ill-timed championship of liberty was increased by Cabrera's declaration of belief that the slender resources of the party were " spent on anything rather than on its interests." To retain the spokesman of such disagreeable truths was very difficult for a Prince whose cause depended on popularity and who must perforce at times shut his eyes to acts of indiscipline and worse. Cabrera, in fact, became more exacting after each concession to his views. He arrogated to himself the right of choosing his Prince's advisers. On the first hesitation to submit to his dictation he again resigned, this time definitively. It seemed as though he

had been merely seeking an excuse for abandoning a cause irreconcilable with his changed convictions. Perhaps he shrank from beginning a civil war as cruel as that in which he had played so ruthless a part twenty-five years earlier.

Cabrera having definitively quitted the party, Don Carlos held a general assembly at Vevey (April 18, 1870) and formally took the leadership into his own hands. Discussion was avoided, for the Carlists differed radically as to the policy most suited to their conditions. Regardless of the empty Treasury, and untaught by bitter experience, the party of action relied on the promises of secret sympathisers. Against their view Cándido Nocedal ably argued that negotiations with the leaders of the Republican party and the army would give a more certain result; that every day was telling in his favour; and that, if he would but wait, Don Carlos would become King of Spain by force of circumstances. But youth and high spirit inclined Don Carlos to listen to the party of immediate action. The Vevey meeting resolved to do nothing until the Constituent Cortes defined the situation. The incidents of Amadeo's election, the narrow majority by which it was secured, the murder of Prim, the indifference of the people, and the haughty aversion of the nobility, were all rightly interpreted by Nocedal as favourable symptoms. This alliance with the Republicans was bearing the fruit he had expected; never had so many Carlist deputies been returned as to the first Cortes of Amadeo's reign. It seemed as though the Carlists would win by constitutional means. It was probably this danger that caused Sagasta to abandon his habitual prudence in the elections of April, 1872, and to stifle all opposition, regardless alike of political morality and of the immediate consequences to himself. By so doing he furnished the Carlist war party with an unanswerable argument. What hope, they argued, have we of success by legal means when elections are scandalously falsified, and we are playing against loaded dice? Reports, too, from local leaders agreed that delay was undermining the

spirit of the party, and that immediate action was necessary in order to prevent its dissolution. In face of these representations, Nocedal was forced to stifle his better judgment, though the Treasury contained only £16 in cash, and preparations were still incomplete, neither arms nor uniforms being ready for volunteers. He countersigned Don Carlos' order, dated Genoa, April 14, 1872, for a general rising on April 21. The Prince promised that he himself would be the first at the point of danger. The war-cry was "Down with the foreigner!"

That the rebellion failed utterly was due to an almost incredible lack of organisation. Promises were not fulfilled; lists of resources proved illusory. Don Carlos joined his partisans in the field (May 2), coming, as he said, "to encourage the brave, hearten the lukewarm, and strike terror into traitors." But by this time the fate of the ill-timed venture, made through over-confidence in the promises of timid turn-coats, was sealed. Serrano hurried up to the north to take over the few battalions hastily equipped by Zabala, Minister for War. Two days after Don Carlos set foot in Navarre, his few ill-armed and hungry volunteers were surprised and routed at Oroquieta by General Moriones. On the following day Don Carlos, who had narrowly escaped capture, recrossed the French frontier. A display of force was sufficient to avert the danger in Biscay; only in Catalonia, where it had first broken out, did the rebellion still smoulder when the Convention of Amoravieta was signed (May 24, 1872). It guaranteed pardon on laying down arms to all persons implicated; even deserters from the regular army retained their rank. That the Provincial Assembly of Biscay and the Carlists in arms gladly accepted such terms is not surprising, for, as they explained in a manifesto, they had been deceived by promises of support into a rebellion foredoomed to failure, and had been deserted in the field by those who had urged them on. But that Serrano, in King Amadeo's name, established the fatal precedent of impunity for rebels is not so easily explained.



Perhaps Amadeo hoped to conciliate the Carlists. If so, he was deceived; the Convention of Amoravieta was interpreted by the Carlists as a show of weakness and a direct encouragement. It is possible also that the Government, aware of the vast number of prominent persons implicated, and feeling its own weakness, sought excuses to evade the duty of punishment.

That the Carlists were not really defeated or discouraged, and that they accepted the Convention of Amoravieta only in order to gain time, was perceived by those who best understood the problem and who stood in the position of greatest danger and responsibility—the Liberal deputies of Biscay, Guipúzcoa, Navarre, and Álava. Accordingly, when Serrano returned to Madrid, expecting to be welcomed as a victor, he was assailed by the Radicals under Ruiz Zorrilla and the Republicans under Castelar for having betrayed his trust by granting ridiculously easy terms to a routed but still determined faction. So violent was the agitation in the press against him, so threatening the attitude of the provinces, that he asked for suspension of the constitutional guarantees in order to enable him to carry on the Government. To grant his request would be to admit failure, and to return to the old bad ways of sheltering the royal authority behind a dictator. Amadeo refused extraordinary powers; and Serrano resigned after a nominal ministry of less than three weeks. Once more the sorely-tried King appealed in vain to Espartero to exercise again his well-known skill as saviour of his country. Then it was found necessary to call in the Radicals, who for the moment represented the largest section of public opinion. Their leader, Ruiz Zorrilla, daily more violent, had resigned his mandate as deputy and quitted the capital. Only with the utmost reluctance did he obey the King's command and form a ministry amid the turmoil of a crisis dynastic and financial as well as political (June 14, 1872). The most active Liberals outside Sagasta's group, Martos, Montero Rios, Echegaray, and Gasset, took office under him. They published a long list of proposed



reforms and entered into alliance with the Republicans, from whose tenets their own were now distinguished by a very narrow line. But, even with their support, Ruiz Zorrilla's party was in a minority in both Chambers; it was found necessary to adjourn Parliament preparatory to a dissolution. Meeting informally, the majority of the two Houses protested against the approaching dissolution as wilfully stifling the expressed will of the nation; they explained, moreover, that, the budget not having been approved, collection of taxes would be illegal. Disregarding this challenge, Ruiz Zorrilla pursued his plan of "making liberty the means of saving liberty." He promised rashly religious freedom and abolition of conscription; and he reinstated the municipal councils suppressed a year before. Having given this sop to his excited followers, Ruiz Zorrilla prepared to carry on the government till the new Parliament met on Sept. 15. Meanwhile the Carlist rebellion still smouldered in Catalonia; and all men knew that another and a formidable outbreak would not long be delayed. On the other hand several leaders of the revolution of 1868, including the Duke of Montpensier, were now working for the restoration of the Bourbons in the person of Isabel's son, Alfonso.

On the night of July 18 King Amadeo and his wife narrowly escaped assassination by an armed band in the streets of Madrid. Of their assailants one was killed by the police and another was captured; but the instigators were not discovered; vague rumour added another to the list of atrocities ascribed to the Duke of Montpensier. The outburst of horror and indignation provoked was mistaken as symptomatic of a growing affection for the foreign King. But the cheers that greeted him during his summer visit to the northern provinces expressed nothing more than admiration of his unostentatious courage. These cheers, moreover, had quite died away by the time Don Amadeo returned to his capital to face the meeting of a new Parliament. Everybody had foreseen that the Liberal extremists, being in power, would likewise

be victorious in the elections. But the manner and extent of their victory astonished and somewhat disconcerted even themselves. Only seven of their opponents were returned. The chief public men of the day, Sagasta, Serrano, Rios Rosas, Cánovas, Topete, and Alonso Martinez were left without seats. Of the hundred and ninety-one deputies who less than two years before had voted the crown to Don Amadeo only forty-six were found in the new Congress. The unseated members now regretted that they had submitted themselves to this farce of election instead of enforcing their protest by formal withdrawal, as certain of their number had proposed.

The Cortes were opened (Sept. 15) by a long speech from the throne. The voice was that of Amadeo; but the words were those of Ruiz Zorrilla, and the proposed measures were essentially Radical. Abolition of conscription was again promised, as a concession to extremists. The proposal had the effect of irritating the army and increasing its distrust and hatred of the Liberals, whilst the Carlists were encouraged to believe that the country would be allowed to fall defenceless into their hands. Equally disastrous to the popularity of the ministry was its policy of granting a liberal measure of reforms to Cuba. The Opposition outside Parliament—for within no Opposition existed—started the cry that the Radicals at home were leagued with their disloyal brethren in the colonies, and that the result of concessions would be disintegration of the national territory. This belief was of course fostered by those to whom reforms in the Spanish Indies and the abolition of slavery meant loss. These, aided by those honest persons who, mistaking illiberality and exclusiveness for patriotism, are always ready tools, founded the National League, to resist colonial reform. The National League, in its turn, was the tool of the factions who were attacking the throne through the ministry. Besides alienating the army and the planters, the message alluded to the outstanding differences with the Holy See in a manner offensive

to sincere Catholics. It announced, in fact, though in perfectly respectful terms, that the ministry had no intention of yielding the points over which diplomatic relations had been broken off. These were connected with arrears in the payment of the clergy guaranteed under the Concordat. The clergy had just cause of complaint; and the few who were not Carlists became fiercely hostile to the Savoy dynasty. Thereupon the ministry devised a clever trick; they proposed to transfer the taxation necessary for the maintenance of the clergy from the central to the communal and municipal budgets, judging that the money would be grudgingly given by peasants and burgesses, and that its recipients would suffer in the popular estimation. While the Conservatives were actively intriguing, the Republicans on their side were becoming daily more importunate. They saw that the future lay between themselves and the Carlists, and, growing impatient, they rose in arms at Ferrol and rioted in Madrid.

But the fall of Amadeo's throne was not due to any great clash of general principles. A mere departmental squabble, raised by obstinacy on both sides to a great question of state, furnished his excuse to retire from a position which from being painful had become intolerable. On the advice of Ruiz Zorrilla he had conferred the Captaincy-General of the Basque Provinces on General Baltasar Hidalgo, a firm and useful supporter of the ministry. But Hidalgo was shunned and banned by his brother officers, and particularly by those of his former corps, the artillery, because he had sided with the sergeants in their murderous mutiny at the barracks of San Gil (June, 1866). The artillery refused to serve under him. When he arrived at his headquarters, the officers of the corps took no part in the formal welcome by the military and civil authorities. Hidalgo wished to punish this breach of etiquette; the ministry hesitated and decided on a half-measure. They transferred him to Catalonia, hoping that, as few artillery officers were serving in that province, the appointment would

pass unchallenged. Encouraged by this concession, the discontented officers declared themselves still unsatisfied; their grievance had been taken up by politicians as a useful arm against Ruiz Zorrilla and the King. When the Minister for War refused to submit to further dictation, a general resignation of commissions followed. The action of the officers is rendered inexcusable by the fact that they were guarding the lines of the Ebro in face of the Carlist enemy. The ministry accepted the resignations; and the Cortes supported it by a large majority (Feb. 7, 1873). The corps was formally dissolved; its cannon were taken over. Non-commissioned officers were promoted to fill some of the vacancies.

This decision had been taken in opposition to Amadeo's expressed opinion. He fulfilled his formal duty as constitutional King by signing the decree embodying it, and seized the opportunity of laying down his uneasy and thankless crown. On February 12 he quitted Spain. A message to the Cortes gave his reasons for resigning "the great honour which the Spanish nation had conferred upon him." He had hoped in vain to find powerful support in facing the dangers and overcoming the difficulties which he knew to exist. Spain's misfortunes, he said, were the work of Spaniards. He was "at length convinced that further efforts on his part would be useless." His conduct indeed throughout the two long years of his martyrdom had been irreproachable. He had never attempted to overstep the rigid limits set by the Constitution to his authority, and he had never shirked the duties it imposed upon him. But his goodness was of a frigid kind; he had not learnt to love the country of his adoption, nor had he made any friends in Spain. He quitted the country amid the gibes of his former subjects. Amadeo appealed to no passion, so he failed to secure the devotion even of a party. If he received a disinterested welcome from any, it was from the timid and peace-loving souls who look to their King to save them from civil anarchy, and who offer in return a ready obedience. Such,

however, are the last to undertake the corresponding duty of protecting their protector or boldly making their voices heard in opposition to a noisy minority. In believing that the Spanish nation as a whole was really eager for political reform, decentralisation, popular government, and severe checks on the influence of the clergy, Amadeo was mistaken. Moreover, the best measures would have been grudgingly received at the hand of a foreigner. For a time he sought to win his new subjects by moderation, patience, self-suppression, and an almost feverish eagerness to interpret and obey the slightest indication of the popular will. As soon as circumstances obliged him to assert his will, he fell. He was never more than King of a Parliamentary majority, and that in a Parliament which misrepresented in an unusual degree the real views of the nation.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### THE REPUBLIC AND THE RESTORATION. (1873—1874.)

As soon as the abdication of the King became known, the two Chambers of the Cortes met and coalesced, illegally calling themselves the National Assembly. They then proceeded further to violate the Constitution by taking over the powers assigned during an Interregnum to the Ministry. Finally, the irregular Assembly hastily decided upon a Republic by a majority of 258 against 32, a result the more astonishing when it is considered that when elected only four months earlier they professed themselves monarchical with but few dissentients. Thus, the very day on which Amadeo left Madrid, four of his late ministers were already holding office under a Republic. Formal proclamation of the new order was deferred until the sovereign people should have approved in Constituent Cortes of the action of its representatives. Accordingly the Ministry chosen directly by the National Assembly called itself merely provisional; and its president took the title of President of the Executive Power. The first holder of the office was Don Estanislao Figueras, lawyer, doctrinaire, dweller in utopias, and philanthropist, with no experience of affairs and little force of character. Under him was ranged a heterogeneous coalition, of which the leading spirits were avowedly Republican; that is to say, they included their ill-defined ideals of polity under a common name. How widely these ideals differed was seen in the successive experiments in government made later by three of them, Pi y Margall,



the Federalist; Salmeron, the Unitarian Republican; and Castelar, who was reduced at the last to invent for himself the name of Possibilist. Martos was elected President of the National Assembly, amidst lusty cheers for the Republic, integrity of the national territory, and a Spanish, that is to say, an unemancipated Cuba. Figueras read telegrams from the provinces, by which it appeared that, with the exception of an unimportant scuffle at Seville, the sudden change in the destinies of Spain had provoked no disturbance.

This was the more satisfactory as grave doubts had arisen as to the manner in which the army in the north would accept the sudden transference of its allegiance. General Domingo Moriones commanded in the Basque Provinces and Navarre; he was respected by his own troops and feared by the Carlists. Though urged to refuse obedience to an order sent by an irregular authority, he was too good an officer to be led into sedition in the face of the enemy. When his successor, Pavia, reached Vitoria, he quietly handed over his authority. General Gaminde, the commander in Catalonia, was, like many other officers, an Alfonsist, and would have been glad to strike a blow for the Restoration. But his troops, like most of the inhabitants of the Principality, were ardently republican; the Republic was pledged to abolish obligatory military service. Gaminde, finding his authority no longer respected, emigrated to France with the majority of his staff. While this danger from the Captain-General still threatened, the whole civil administration also was changed. Room was thus made for supporters of the new order, charged with the all-important task of working the electoral machinery so that the country should appear to welcome enthusiastically the accomplished fact. To such good purpose did they act that, when the Constituent Cortes—the sixth of the century—met, they chose as President the noble demagogue Orense, Marquis of Albaida, and decided by 210 votes against 2 that Spain should be a Republic. The victory appeared as complete as it was easily won. All Spain

seemed agreed. Nothing, however, could be further from the truth. Less than a third of the nation had taken part in the election of the Constituent Cortes. The northern provinces, with exception of the towns, were in the hands of the Carlists. Andalusia was given up to an anarchical debauch. Catalonia, cut off from land communication with the rest of Spain by the Carlists, was acting as an independent State. Civil war was raging; the army was clamouring for immediate discharge; and its officers were known to be disaffected. The Treasury contained nothing but the unbalanced accounts of a huge deficit; and the people claimed abolition of taxation as the firstfruits of the Republic.

Before the meeting of the Constituent Cortes, a contest between Ministry and National Assembly had nearly resulted in a counter-revolution. The Assembly, led by its President, Martos, had set up itself as an authority independent of the Ministry, its creature. With difficulty it had been dissolved; but it had left behind it a Permanent Commission of Parliament to hamper all actions of the Government and pass votes of censure on its members. The Government was Federalist, the Permanent Commission Unionist. The latter rallied a number of Radicals anxious to check the disintegrating process everywhere going on. Their plan was to overthrow the Ministry and leave the United-Liberals in power with Serrano at their head. They found a leader in Salmeron and a champion in the Captain-General, who offered to enforce obedience to the authority of the Cortes. On the other hand, Pi y Margall, Minister of the Interior, armed the police, the Federal volunteers, and the troops on which he could rely. Before this show of force the conspirators lost heart; their leaders failed to support them publicly. The Federal mob stormed the Congress House. Thanks to the exertions of Castelar and others no lives were lost. Nothing further was heard of the Permanent Commission.

For the moment the Federalists had the upper hand. The

Constituent Cortes, immediately after voting the Republic, charged their leader, Pi y Margall, with the Presidency of the Executive Power and the responsibility of choosing a Ministry. How heavy this responsibility was and how critical the state of the country had been explained by the late President. Figueras showed how vividly he realised the dangers which he had depicted by fleeing the country without the formality of resigning. Pi y Margall, still unshaken in his idea of a Federal Republic, named his colleagues and submitted the list to the Cortes. But the Cortes rejected the list, withdrew the power it had just conferred, and named the ministers itself. Doubtless they were good Federalists, but their names are little known. Neither Contreras, nor Roque Barcia, nor Carvajal, nor Castelar, who was still reckoned as belonging to the advanced wing, was found among them. The first and principal clause of Pi y Margall's programme appealed for union to save the Republic, and insisted upon the necessity for enforcing discipline in the army. As for his proposals for separation of Church and State, free and obligatory education, Cuban reforms, and a new Constitution, they rang hollow in the ears of men intensely anxious for the preservation of the foundations of civilised society now seriously threatened. Indeed the state of the country was appalling ; civil government was at an end ; and Spain was falling to pieces whilst the Republicans wrangled over their differences.

So long as the work in hand was merely destructive, it was possible for the Federalist, Pi y Margall, to cooperate with the socialist Roque Barcia, the utopian Castelar, the United-Liberal Salmeron, the military opportunist Pavia, and the constitutional Radical Serrano. These, again, could unite with Catalan separatists to overthrow Amadeo's weak throne ; but, when each section began to practise the doctrines of its creed, the result was chaos. Decentralisation, local autonomy, and complete freedom for the individual were the aims of the Revolution. Four months only had elapsed since a Government pledged

to introduce them had sprung from a fever fit of enthusiasm. During three months the Carlist rebellion had spread; and the Liberal towns beyond the Ebro were left dependent on their courage and local resources. The army that lined the southern bank of the Ebro, without regular pay, rations, or supplies, was rapidly becoming a ragged and half-starved band of mutineers, incapable of facing the enemy and living as banditti on the districts they were supposed to defend. In Catalonia even worse had befallen. So soon as the Republic was proclaimed, the separatists prepared to proclaim the Independent State of Catalonia. The troops were easily won over to the cause; they showed how readily they had learnt to hate "tyrants" and "oppressors" by shooting their officers and demanding their own discharge. Its land communications cut by the Carlists, the great commercial city was left to defend itself against its "protectors." Whilst the press and the Ministry were deliberating on the breaking-up of Spain into thirteen semi-independent states, Valencia likewise anticipated their decision, raised its junta to supreme authority, declared its port free, established a fiscal frontier, and made preparations to defend its walls against interference by the central authority. Catalonia and Valencia, however, preserved some traditions of local government, and, thanks to them, never fell into anarchy as did Andalusia.

The southern provinces, which had returned to Amadeo's last Parliament seventy Radical-Socialist members, welcomed the advent of the Republic by outbreaks of savage anarchy. The political ideal of the Andalusian demagogues was the Swiss Federation; under the name of *cantonalismo* they preached disintegration to ready ears. Málaga, the centre of the new political creed, as soon as Spain had decided against monarchy, set up a republic or canton of its own. It drove out the civil authorities, armed its "volunteers of liberty," disbanded and dismissed its garrison, abolished customs-dues and their hated collectors the carbineers, and opened negotiations with

Madrid for federation on a basis of equality. It then gave itself up whole-heartedly to a civil war between the rival republican leaders, Carvajal and Solier. Seville, Cadiz, and other cities were seized by the same frenzy, its symptoms only differing locally. At Alcoy the mob was ferociously blood-thirsty. At Granáda its pranks were ludicrous rather than terrible. The citizens of Seville, led by their junta, took possession of the arsenal, armed their walls, and then marched out to impose Federalism upon their neighbours. They had abolished individual property.

Cartagéna, one of the most violent, proved also the most stubborn of the revolting cities. The soldiers fraternised with the mob; a deputy and a general, Contreras, led them. The forts and artillery depôt fell into their hands, with several hundred cannon. The armour-clad squadron joined them, increasing their power for harm and making them safe from attack on the sea-side. Closely watched by British ships of war, the ironclads, manned by undisciplined desperadoes, steamed up and down the coast spreading the doctrines of the Revolution, sometimes, as at Alicante, using cannon as the mouthpiece of their propaganda. In most cities the social movement was marked by bitter hostility to the Church and army. In the country districts, cursed by *latifundia*, absentee landlords, grasping agents, and by the number of holidays enforced by the Church, it was communistic; parish assemblies enthusiastically abolished property in law.

Madrid, so often the centre of disturbance, now seemed the one sane city in all Spain. But the authority of its Government hardly extended beyond its walls. The available troops consisted merely of a few thousand men, for the army of the north could not be withdrawn from the lines it held so feebly against the increasing forces of the Carlists. The garrisons of the south had joined the mob, had been driven out by it, or had accepted discharge at the hands of the self-constituted cantonal authorities. The volunteer battalions, recruited by



the Republican Government to replace the conscripts, proved not only ruinously expensive but insubordinate and useless in the field. Even the most ardent reformers admitted that abolition of enforced military service had proved a failure. As centres from which to reconquer the southern half of the country, Pi y Margall held only the capital, the arsenal of Cadiz, and Córdoba, the meeting-place of the main lines of communication. But even of these slender resources he was unwilling to make use. He had won his way by singleness of purpose, guileless honesty, and devotion to an ideal of humanity far different from that existing at present upon earth. Even the facts before him failed to rouse him wholly from his dream. He admitted the necessity for order and discipline, but was unwilling to enforce them by the only means available. His plan was to coax mutinous soldiers back to obedience, and to make them in turn peaceful missionaries of the golden age now dawning so strangely. Federalism had been his panacea for the perennial ills of Spain; but he failed to recognise its workings in the fantastic excesses of the cantonalist south. Federation, he said, should come from above, not from below; should be granted by the central Government after due consideration of number and frontiers, and not torn piecemeal from the body of the country by crazy provincial and parochial enthusiasts. In order to initiate this orderly process, Pi y Margall, as President of the Republic, recommended that the central power should be strengthened. He did indeed send troops to Córdoba to cooperate against the stiff-necked authors of the hideous outrages at Alcoy, but he undertook no sharp and stern measures such as the times required. An excess of scruples and not a lack of courage withheld him. This even his enemies recognised, but the country had need of a stronger hand.

The extreme section of the Republican party, the Federalist, had to tame the beast it had let loose. It gave way to the Republican Centre, or Unitarian party, under Salmeron. Already



the swing of the pendulum was evident, though only five months and a few days had passed since Amadeo's abdication. Pi y Margall resigned because the Cortes were veering round towards a more conservative policy; having fallen out with his colleagues as to the proper means of pacification, he was unable to reform his Ministry.

Don Nicolás Salmeron, third President of the Spanish Republic, if we are to count the fugitive Figueras, announced himself for energetic repression of disorder preparatory to inaugurating reforms. In order to effect this repression he was obliged to employ the senior officers of the army, who were one and all anti-Republican. But the state of the country left no choice. Conscription was reverted to; mutinous regiments were disbanded; and the squadron in the hands of the Cartagena cantonalists was declared piratical and outlaw. The generals recommended that the artillery should be completely reorganised and the cavalry increased. But all this would be the work of time. For the moment the small available force must be employed where it could effect most with least danger to itself.

The credit of the first effort to restore order in the south is generally given to Castelar; but it was Salmeron who during his two months' Presidency began the great work. It was he who sent Martinez Campos to drive out the junta of madmen and rogues who terrorised the orderly citizens of Valencia; and, still more important, it was he who sent General Pavia and his little army to reconquer Andalusia, telling him that if he could but persuade a soldier to fire at a cantonalist public order was saved. Pavia's soldiers did fire; and Salmeron's words proved true. Leaving Madrid in July (1873) with about a thousand men in three trains, Pavia evaded the insurgents holding the pass of Despeñaperros on the direct line to Andalusia by going round by Ciudad Real. He arrived just in time to save Córdoba from the cantonalists of Granada and Málaga, disarmed its national guard, and more than doubled

his little force by incorporating the garrison and artillery. Then he hurried on, fearing always lest delay should spread insubordination from the contaminated troops of Andalusia to his own men. Three days after his arrival at Córdoba he reached Seville, where the cantonalists, relying on the artillery they had seized in the arsenal, determined to make a stubborn resistance. But they foolishly allowed Pavia to detrain his troops unmolested in full sight of their walls, to march round unopposed to the further side, and to take possession of the railway to the south. Thus cut off from the neighbouring and friendly states of Málaga, Cadiz, and Granáda, the fall of Seville was merely a matter of time. Pavia, however, had no time to waste. He attacked the strong positions of the enemy, but was driven back; and more than once his little army nearly despaired of being able to make its way past the forts and through the holders of the barricades into the city. Pavia and his officers knew that failure meant the instant dissolution of their force. They infused some of their spirit into their men. In default of gunners their sixteen fieldpieces were served by cavalry officers. Five days' fighting and a loss of three hundred men made them masters of the city. The moral effect was very great. Cadiz made no resistance; Granáda submitted on Pavia's appearance. There remained, however, the two chief centres of agitation, Málaga and Cartagena. Against the former he was preparing to march when he was stopped by orders from Salmeron. Although, when the danger was most pressing, Salmeron had been obliged to trust the pacification of the south to a soldier, it was contrary to his feelings and principles; he hoped that, now that an example had been made, the remaining cities would submit without further bloodshed. Over and above their humanitarian scruples, Salmeron and the Republicans were influenced by rooted distrust of the military class, to which so much of Spain's sufferings was due. They feared a soldier-dictatorship, set up by a few resolute battalions, in the weakened State.

Pavia, finding himself suddenly checked in the midst of his excellent work, sent in his resignation and retired to Córdoba, whence he sent his officers to explain the position of affairs to the hesitating Ministry. He pointed out that the military measures taken against Seville, Cadiz, and Granáda could be justified only by impartial application to all, and chiefly to Málaga, the ringleader. The lack of firmness betrayed by the sudden arrest of his southward march had already been followed by its natural consequence, a renewed outbreak of cantonalism. But Salmeron would not yield. Carlists and Alfonsists, now allied against the Republic, were gathering on the French frontier, negotiating with Serrano and preparing rebellion in Madrid. He feared to alienate the Republicans. The Cortes, however, were of a different mind; the project of a Federal Constitution had been defeated. The Federalists deserved no mercy; they had recklessly provoked a second civil war when all the energies of Spain ought to have been employed against the Carlists. Stern action was needed. So long as Salmeron showed energy, the Cortes supported him; when he refused to go further, they put in his place Emilio Castelar. Salmeron's Presidency had lasted less than two months.

When Castelar took office (Sept. 8, 1873), the history of the Republic was already a long and bloody one; yet the Republic itself was not seven months old. To Castelar those seven months had been a time of bitter disappointment. Brought to the test of brutal fact, his cherished theories had broken down; and now the apostle of gentleness, the declared foe of bloodshed, violence, and militarism, was obliged "to sacrifice his principles in order to preserve his country and liberty." As soon as he accepted the Presidency, the Cortes prorogued their sittings until the beginning of the new year, and left the champion of all the liberties alone to enforce his authority at the point of the bayonet, and to make head against two civil wars. Castelar's courage was known; but the way in which he faced circumstances so widely different from his highly-coloured

oratorical visions of a republican millennium was not expected. Once thoroughly aroused from his dream, he set himself sternly to reconquer half Spain, determined to establish the Republic "so soon as Spaniards have agreed as to the grounds that divide them least." His first measure was to order Pavia to advance again. Málaga was restored to Spain (September 14) without bloodshed. Her fantastic volunteers sought leave to work off in battle against the Carlists the hot blood that had hurried them into a civil war within their own canton. They travelled only as far as Madrid; insubordination made it necessary to disarm and send them home. That Pavia had succeeded with so little fighting in reconquering Andalusia was chiefly due to the Civil Guard. This splendid constabulary, though cut off from the capital, had not wavered; it alone in the name of law and order withstood the shock of that wild political and social upheaval. No sooner had Pavia finished the work for which he was sent than he was deprived of his command. Castelar indeed was hardly less averse than Salmeron from extraordinary military measures; he hastened to revive the normal authority of the Captains-General, trusting to them to reorganise the still seething districts. Pavia was offered the Captaincy-General of New Castille; but, discontented with the treatment he had received, he at first refused it.

The sudden suspension of military measures was again interpreted as an abandonment of the policy of coercion, and had a bad effect upon the cities still in revolt. In Cartagena the powers of disorder had run a wilder riot than even in Málaga. The convicts released by the mob were more reckless and fiercer than their liberators. Their resistance, too, was more determined, for to them defeat meant exile or return to gaol. Before Castelar became President, their means of doing harm had been curtailed by the loss of the greater part of the squadron. After terrorising the neighbouring coast towns, bombarding and levying blackmail under the eyes of the

commanders of the foreign squadrons, the Federal ships had been declared pirates by the Republican Government. Thereupon the British fleet, acting as police of the seas, took possession of them and brought them to Gibraltar after turning their crews of desperadoes ashore. Still Cartagena remained obstinate, trusting to the great strength of her fortifications and the abundance of cannon and warlike stores. Contreras, general of the canton, actually ventured as far as the bridge of Chinchilla and defeated the feeble force sent against him by Pi y Margall. Salmeron sent General Martinez Campos, who early in August had delivered Valencia from the mob. But with only about two thousand troops and a few mortars he was unable to undertake anything more than preliminary siege works. These had no effect, for the rebels had the open sea behind them and still retained some frigates. Castelar collected a stronger body of troops, properly equipped and provided with cannon. General Lopez Dominguez, its commander, was greatly favoured by chance. The rebel ship *Tetuan* was accidentally burned; the artillery posts blew up; the ironclads restored by the British Government took part in the blockade; and Cartagena surrendered (Jan. 13, 1874) after a tremendous bombardment. The ringleaders escaped to Orán<sup>1</sup>. Castelar was no longer in office to receive the credit due to the success of his arms.

Forced by the responsibility of power to abandon his policy of peace at any price, the ex-professor and inexhaustible coiner of sounding phrases had set his hand to army reform with characteristic thoroughness. Abolition of conscription was one of the few matters on which Republicans of every shade were united. Yet Castelar levied the heaviest blood-tax ever imposed upon Spain. The 120,000 men required could be

<sup>1</sup> One of them was Roque Barcia, eminent as a man of letters. It was largely through the personal assistance of the late Charles Austin, then correspondent of the *Times*, that he escaped in disguise. The author and I heard the dramatic tale from Austin's lips. [W. H. H.]



recruited only in certain provinces, while the north was in the hands of the Carlists and the south still in rebellion. The army became his chief care, the immediate and necessary instrument of the regeneration of Spain. In order to rearm, equip, and pay it, the salaries of civil servants and the stipends of the clergy were allowed to fall into arrear. No interest was paid upon the National Debt. Important commands were given to generals of approved skill, regardless of their political opinions. The sedition of the artillery officers had left the most indispensable and most technical corps of the army under the command of promoted sergeants without authority and without theoretical knowledge. To improvise a new body of officers was impossible. Castelar sacrificed Hidalgo to the just prejudices of his former associates, and reorganised the artillery under its own officers. It was a complete surrender to a section of the army guilty of an act of insubordination; but it is impossible to question its wisdom or to grudge admiration for the resolution with which Castelar thrust down his pride and cut off his prejudices. Even so, the reduction of Cartagena cost the country an enormous effort; and the troops along the Ebro barely held their own.

In order to understand the position of the Carlists at the time of Castelar's dictatorship (September—December, 1873) it is necessary briefly to review the fortunes of the party since the agreement of Amoravieta put an end to the rash rising in Navarre. It was not to be hoped that the efforts of a great party would be terminated in a mere skirmish like the affair of Oroquieta, or that a most stubborn race, influenced by a bitterly hostile clergy, could be reconciled by a few soothing declarations. The clemency of the agreement of Amoravieta amounted to culpable weakness on the part of those who granted it. As such it was regarded by those responsible for maintaining order in the north; the irreconcilable Carlists looked upon impunity as an encouragement to revolt. One good effect, however, for the Liberal cause this famous agreement had—it set the



Carlists quarrelling among themselves. Those who had laid down their arms and accepted the proffered amnesty were treated as cowards and traitors by the more stalwart. The result was confusion, rendered worse by the unpopularity of the Prince's private secretary and trusted adviser, Arjona. So fierce did the quarrel become and so keenly did Don Carlos support his confidant that he dissolved the Basque-Navarrese junta, the central organisation of his party, with scant recognition of its past services, and accepted the resignation of his Commandants-General in the Basque Provinces and Navarre.

The party was breaking up when Arjona was induced to resign, and the command was given to Dorregaray (Feb. 7, 1873). Seven months only had passed since the Convention of Amoravieta when Don Carlos again appeared upon the frontier eager for another attempt. Scattered bands were already rising unbidden to combat in his name. The first of these was the notorious crew of desperadoes recruited and commanded by the fierce priest Santa Cruz. They already infested the mountains of Guipúzcoa, and had made themselves hated by Carlists and Liberals alike by murders, incendiarism, and blackmail. They brought discredit on the cause by beating peaceful citizens to death and wrecking trains, until outlawed, attacked, and dispersed by the Carlists themselves. Alluding to them, the Deputation of Biscay denounced "the assemblies of outlaws who commit all sorts of crimes." The Deputation of Guipúzcoa recruited volunteers to fight against them. These deputations, elected partly by the towns, contained many Republicans and other Liberals; but even their Carlist members were reluctant to implicate the party in another abortive rising, for they were assured that it would be punished by the loss of the remaining *Fueros*. Moreover, the regular Carlist forces during this second war showed themselves anxious to avoid the cruel excesses of the previous one. Don Carlos' orders were strict. He showed his earnestness by punishing disobedience; and, if his men were at times led to commit acts condemned in

civilised warfare, it was almost always in retaliation. Excepting Santa Cruz, and a few others whom they repudiated, the Carlists proved correct and often chivalrous adversaries. Santa Cruz being already in the field, and many others eager to follow, Don Carlos was induced to give the order for a general rising in Navarre and the Basque Provinces.

In Catalonia guerrilla warfare had never ceased, though towards the end of the year 1872 only about 3000 volunteers were left in the field. After the defeat of Oroquieta and the momentary pacification of the Basque Provinces, Don Alfonso, brother of the Pretender and Commander of the Principality, stubbornly kept the war alive. But, though he strove to conceal it, he was dissatisfied with his command. The Catalan *guerrilleros* were unruly and insolent, fierce and brutal. The discredit of their too frequent excesses attached to their commander, even though by supplication and threat he did his best to check them. Many of the so-called Carlists were little better than brigands living at free quarters. Their greatest success consisted in blackmailing towns of third-rate importance. The cause was becoming unpopular, and its adherents were deserting, when Don Carlos hit upon a plan to win the enthusiastic support of those who until now had been indifferent. By a manifesto issued from his hiding-place (June 16, 1872) he promised to give back to the ancient kingdom of Aragon—Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia—"the ancient privileges (*Fueros*) which a century and a half ago my illustrious ancestor Philip V thought fit to erase from the page of the liberties of our country." This startling proclamation failed to produce the hoped-for effect. The people had quite forgotten how their privileges had been lost in a gallant struggle against a foreign king. Those who were better taught in history doubted the opportunity and the legality of the measure. Mockers made merry over liberties granted by the stroke of a pen that must necessarily start at the approach of a French gendarme. Nevertheless, when Dorregaray's call to arms

rekindled the war in the Basque Provinces, Catalonia, too, again bestirred herself.

The call to arms was issued during Amadeo's reign, and contrary to the advice of Don Carlos' most far-seeing counsellor. Nocedal's plan of rendering government impossible until Spain in despair should throw herself at the feet of his master was working even better than he could have hoped. He saw the time approaching when the Republic would be proclaimed. The Republicans would then be called upon to fulfil their pledge of abolishing conscription; the army would disappear; and, left face to face with anarchy, "the shopkeepers of Madrid would call in their legitimate king to safeguard their tills." And indeed it seems not unlikely that such would have been the course of events if the Carlists had not given timely notice of danger. The order for a general rising was not at first obeyed with enthusiasm in the Basque Provinces. The elective bodies were, as has been said, hostile; arms were so scarce that the volunteers were drilled with sticks instead of rifles; the failure of the last year had had a chilling effect; many felt themselves in conscience bound by the terms of the Convention. Moreover, a more liberal spirit was spreading; the towns had proved that it was possible to be a good Spaniard, and a good Christian, nay a good Basque or a good Biscayan, without being a Carlist.

No very active measures were at first taken against the roving bands. The eyes of all were fixed on Madrid, where the King's abdication was imminent and its consequences incalculable. When it came and was immediately followed by the proclamation of the Republic, the army at Catalonia became a mutinous band of brigands. The army of the north hesitated a moment and then accepted Pavia as its commander. He kept down its discontent by leading it against the enemy and keeping it in perpetual movement; but its exertions were rendered almost useless by the superior mobility of the Carlists, and by lack of artillery and supplies. The Carlists on their side

strained every nerve to get money and arms and to increase their numbers. In defiance of the liberties of which they were the declared champions, they called out the whole male population of Guipúzcoa between the ages of eighteen and forty years (April, 1873). This usurpation of the powers vested in the Deputation was excused on the plea that the meeting of the Deputation was impossible, the Carlists having hitherto no fixed headquarters. But, in spite of infringements of jealously-guarded rights, in spite of ruthless exactions from friend and foe alike, in spite of the murders and forays of Santa Cruz, the numbers of the Carlists increased, and their armament and discipline improved. A victory was all that was needed to give confidence to the beves of grave, long-limbed mountain lads fighting for the cause of God, fatherland, and King, protected by the miraculous scapulary of the Sacred Heart, bearing the words, "Stop, bullet!" The success obtained by Dorregaray near Pamplona gave him the title of Marquis of Eraul, from the name of the village around which the action took place (May, 1873). Two months later the Carlists felt themselves sufficiently strong to defend their King. The enthusiasm re-awakened by his presence carried them forward in an irresistible rush; and after an unsuccessful attempt, heroically resisted, they captured Estella, a strategic point of the utmost importance and endeared to them by memories of failure and success during the former war (August 24). Then the small towns of Navarre, Guipúzcoa, and Biscay began to fall one by one, until only San Sebastian, Tolosa, and Bilbao, together with a few strategic points, were left to the Liberals. Though the formalities prescribed by the ancient ritual could not be fulfilled on account of the disturbed state of the country, Don Carlos provisionally swore, under the oak tree of Guernica, to observe the liberties of his lordship of Biscay.

In Catalonia, too, the cause was victorious. Here the war was cruel, confused, and tumultuary. Leaders like Santa Cruz were common and were not condemned by public opinion.

Don Alfonso spared no effort to suppress lawlessness and ferocity and to bring offenders to justice. But his task was rendered impossible by the unruly nature of the Catalans and by the provocations of the Liberals. The troops had indeed cast off all discipline ; respect for the rules of civilised warfare could not be expected from men who had murdered their officers and pillaged the towns they were sent to defend. Ripoll was surprised by the Carlists but was recaptured. Berga fell into their hands, giving them many prisoners and much of warlike stores. Puigcerdá, fiercely attacked, owed its safety to its valour. At Alpens the *guerrillero* Savalls captured 800 troops and the dead body of their commander, General Cabrinetti (July 9). In face of such a series of disasters the Liberal generals could do nothing. The chief commands and the Ministry for War, conferred too often for political rather than military reasons, changed hands several times during the first months of the Republic. General Nouvilas, Pavia's successor, found that officers dismissed as incapable returned promoted from Madrid, provided they were good Republicans. Receiving notification that a million pesetas wherewith to pay his half-starving troops were awaiting him at Vitoria, he hurried thither, only to find the pay-chests empty. He resigned in disgust.

The Carlists were now masters of the country between the French frontier and the Ebro. They had an army of 8000 well-trained and enthusiastic men, and they began to establish their lines along the right bank of the river as their fathers had done in the last war. Continual forays, sometimes into the heart of the rich kingdom of Valencia, sometimes far out on the plain of Castille, prevented the concentration of the troops of the Republic for a united effort. Moreover, Cartagena still held out ; and its reconquest rightly took precedence of all other military operations. In Castille itself, in La Mancha, Andalusia, and Leon, Carlists were sufficiently numerous to keep the local authorities in continual anxiety and to make the presence of troops, sorely needed elsewhere, necessary. No less serious



than lack of troops was lack of money. The Federalists refused taxation; the whole burden of supporting the State, like that of defending it, had to be borne by the loyal provinces. Ten months of the Republic saw six finance ministers succeed one another; each after a hasty glance at great deficiencies retired in dismay. The annual deficit exceeded the nominal revenue. The creditors of Spain trusted Castelar somewhat more than his predecessors, even though he made no pretence of paying the interest on the debt; but the help they gave was grudging and the interest demanded ruinous. Lowell, the wise and witty ambassador of the United States, wrote, "There exists in Paris a mysterious corporation, called the Bank of Paris, which conducts the financial operations of the Spanish Government. The process is said to be this: the Government, having obtained authorisation, applies to the Bank of Paris to place the loan. It deposits in the vaults of the Bank a sufficient quantity of its own bonds on hand to serve as security for the Bank in the operation. The Bank puts the loan on the market, and gets its commission. It rehypothecates the hypothecated bonds, and gets a commission. It buys the bonds on its own account and pays itself a commission for the sale. It sells them again to its own customers, being thus forced reluctantly to pocket another commission. To sustain the weight of the loan in a dull market it is forced to borrow money from itself at a high rate of interest; and every such ingenious operation results in... another commission. The sum that comes to the Government is profoundly unknown..."

The Liberal cause would indeed have been desperate had not the Carlists on their side blundered at the moment of their greatest advantage. They had succeeded in blockading the Liberal towns within their territory; the country folk were enthusiastic for the cause; they were strongly established in a central position, from which they could choose their point of attack or hurry to resist threatened invasion. The Provincial Deputation, though they could not raise large sums



of money, could and did find food for the volunteers. The lack of arms had been to a great extent supplied by the capture of Eybar and Plasencia, important manufactories of rifles. Large consignments also were landed on the coast by ships flying English and French flags. The foundries of Azpeitia produced rough but fairly satisfactory cannon. Hospitals, military schools, factories for uniforms, and military depôts had been established. Naturally adapted for self-government, the Basques never allowed their provinces to fall, as Catalonia fell, into anarchy. The Carlist authorities were the first to demand the punishment of Santa Cruz for attacks on the railway after declaration of its neutrality, and to resist his claim to impose a passport upon travellers. The Carlists were convinced that their cause was sacred; they were taught that a Liberal is one whose cynical indifference to religion, honour, and morality in this world will surely bring upon him damnation in the next. No fabled pacts between freemasons and devils were too grotesque for belief. The Carlists, on their side, were a religious brotherhood as well as a militant force. Neglect of confession was a symptom of contamination amid the pure flock; important operations were subordinated to observance of the great Church festivals; men and officers daily recited the rosary publicly and together. The cause was further sanctified by the solemn anointing of the prince at Loyola, the shrine of the greatest Basque saint (Nov. 7, 1873). All this had been so, or but little different, during the old war; but the belief had exercised no restraining influence; and the Carlists were taught neither to expect nor to exercise mercy. The new policy was to win over rather than to exterminate the enemy; quarter was freely given; and often, when small and isolated forces defended themselves bravely in hopeless positions, the Carlists drew off from the attack, saluted and passed upon their way.

But the cause was sorely hampered by local jealousies; the separatist tendency that appeared as cantonalism in the south

divided the northern provinces too. All were ready for the sacrifice, but eager to see that their neighbours underwent it first; each province became suspicious when troops other than native camped on its soil, and churlishly refused to the strangers the help due equally to all Carlists. The levies of each province lost enthusiasm as they passed out of sight of their native hills, and desertion was often the consequence of home-sickness. A series of small victories had been won; but no real leader like Zumalacárregui had come to the front.

When Don Carlos joined the volunteers (July, 1873), Pi y Margall, the most unwarlike of men, was at the head of a weak and divided Ministry; the Liberal army, hating Federalism, was wavering in its allegiance; a bold forward move might have carried the lately blessed banners to Madrid. Five months had passed, five months it is true of almost uninterrupted good fortune and of steady organisation. Estella had been taken; Moriones, driven back in a pitched battle at Monte Jurra (Nov. 9, 1873), with difficulty had succeeded in bringing relief to the hard-pressed town of Tolosa. The Carlists could move almost unhindered from western Biscay to Catalonia; their own success astonished them. But now Castelar had taken the place of Pi y Margall. The south had been won back; the fall of Cartagena set free a large body of veteran troops; the artillery had been reorganised; a fresh army was being formed. The Carlists had missed their chance. It was late when they decided upon their supreme effort; and they struck not at the heart of the country but at the outlying seaport of Bilbao. Traditionalists in everything, they went to wear out their enthusiasm and shatter their battalions against the barrier which had almost contemptuously withstood their fathers.

Whilst combating in arms the Carlists and Cantonalists, Castelar sought to check the extreme Republicans and to conciliate the Conservatives, or such part of them as was not wholly irreconcilable. Circumstances and sad experience drove him daily towards a more central position. He still

professed himself a Radical, but his acts would not have been different had his doctrines been moderately Conservative. He had never adopted the anti-religious cry of the violent Radicals, and he now entered into negotiations with the Vatican with a view to more cordial relations. In fulfilment of functions taken over from Catholic kings, he nominated one archbishop and two bishops; they were afterwards duly installed by Pius IX. Later in life he often smilingly called attention to the fact that the prelates who owed their mitres to so unholy an influence were by no means more unworthy than their fellows. Those who considered anti-clericalism essential to the Liberal creed were shocked; but they were not numerous in Spain. Many more were reassured on seeing that the denominations of a few secularists were not allowed to carry more weight than the convictions of the immense majority.

Castelar was successful too in reestablishing diplomatic relations with foreign Powers which had held back, failing to find amid the Federal confusion a responsible central authority. The United States of America had been the first to welcome the sister Republic; and it was with the United States that the only serious foreign complication of the Republican period befell. Rebellion in Cuba was now endemic; and the Americans had come to look upon the conveyance of arms and ammunition to the victims of bad government as meritorious. In any case, whether their filibustering expeditions obeyed philanthropy or profit as their motive, they looked to their Government for protection against the feeble and remote authority of Spain. Accordingly, when passengers and crew alike of the captured *Virginius* were treated as pirates by an angry Spanish captain, and what had been considered a venial matter was punished capitally, indignation in the Eastern States demanded immediate war. The Governments on both sides wisely adopted a more moderate tone. It is to the credit of the Americans that they did not make use of their opportunity to trample on Spanish weakness. It is to Castelar's credit that the righteous-

ness of his cause did not blind him to the madness of refusing the apology demanded ; amid his gathering difficulties he did not seek apotheosis by ruining his country in a hopeless war in defence of the point of honour.

Castelar's splendid effort to reestablish law and order, far from disarming, roused fierce antagonism, and nowhere fiercer than among those who called themselves Republicans. Under him the Republic had become unitarian, centralised, and Conservative ; it had in fact dropped half of its destructive programme. So Federals and Cantonalists, doctrinaires under Salmeron, and social democrats under Roque Barcia, determined to overthrow him. The monarchical Liberals (Alfonsists) on their side were not yet ready to take the field. For a moment when Spain seemed destined either to break up or to accept Don Carlos they hastily prepared to offer their way out of the dilemma. Negotiations were begun with Serrano and other generals of known Royalist opinions. At any rate the party could have paralysed the Government by an appeal to the army, where the Republic had few or no friends. But for the moment their candidate for the throne was too young ; and, when Castelar's dictatorship brought the assurance that the country no longer needed a forlorn hope to save it from the extreme parties, the Royalists were glad to be able to defer their schemes. They, no less than the Carlists, hoped to be welcomed by the exhausted country when the fantastic episode of the Republic should end, as it began, in confusion and bloodshed. Carefully disciplined by Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, they could bide their time whilst daily now the cunning trimmers of politics, the Francisco Silvelas and Romero Robledos, crept from the weather-beaten Republic eager to be among the first to welcome the Restoration.

But the Cortes were still Republican ; and, as the time for their meeting drew near, it was clear that Castelar would be betrayed by those who had left him to wrestle, as dictator, with a well-nigh desperate situation. Castelar gone, the powers he

had exercised would revert to the Radical and Federal majority, who bitterly resented the sharp lesson inflicted upon their friends in the south. Castelar would be made to pay dearly for having ventured to save his country; and the whole of his work would be undone. Aware of the danger that lay before him he determined to face it, disregarding advice either to prorogue further or boldly to dissolve the Cortes and obtain a bill of indemnity from a Chamber of his own nominees returned by a sham election. He had already sacrificed too many of his principles to expediency; he would not base his power even to do good on an unworthy trick, and he replied with pompous honesty, "I will not risk one tittle of legality. On the second of January I shall present myself before the Chamber. I shall explain my conduct, and, if beaten, shall retire in bitterness of soul to bewail in my home the misfortunes of my country."

But there was in Madrid one man determined, as he pleaded later, "to make use of a situation in which he alone had power to check another outburst of anarchy." Don Manuel Pavia was a confused thinker; he expressed his thoughts in language so involved that he was often misunderstood when most bent on making his meaning plain. His memoir, published in defence of his conduct, is rambling and perplexing to an extraordinary degree. But in action he was prompt and resolute. The means on which he relied for preventing the return to power of a party that had already proved itself incapable of commanding respect or obedience was the 3000 troops of the garrison of Madrid. Dissatisfied with the abrupt termination of his campaign against the Cantonalists (see p. 347), Pavia had at first refused the Captaincy-General of New Castille, but later had accepted it. When the time of danger approached, he solemnly promised Castelar the support of the army against the turbulent deputies. But Castelar was the last man to cast a sword into the scale. Indeed he attached little meaning to the vague words of the Captain-General, refused his offer of services, and mistook his



dark hints for mere expressions of good-will. Then Pavia determined to save him against his wish. The leaders of the Conservative party had promised in general terms to aid his endeavour to secure better government; but for the execution of his plan he depended on himself alone, taking nobody into his confidence.

The Cortes met on the fateful second of January, 1874. The Captain-General was waiting hard by and informed by messengers of events within the House; the troops were confined to quarters. As had been foreseen, a fierce and general attack was made upon Castelar. The "Great Tribune," as his compatriots loved to call him, frankly admitted the perilous and disastrous state of the country, but he defended his harsh remedial measures with all the energy and eloquence of which he was capable at his best moments. Nevertheless, it was clear from the first that the vote would go against him. By the time the resolution of want of confidence was put to the uproarious House, Pavia had occupied the strategic points of the capital in such a way as to be able to crush any interference on the part of the national militia and the mob. Excitement in the Congress was at its highest; bowing to the vote of censure, the President of the Republic was about to execute his threat of retiring to weep at home over the misfortunes of his country. Discussion raged as to his successor; peals of heated oratory rang over the heads of the stormy assembly; denunciations were thundered forth, but none heeded. As the votes for the election of a new President were being counted, in walked an aide-de-camp and asked to speak with Don Nicolas Salmeron, President of the Congress. His message was startling, and of a conciseness most unfamiliar in that House. "He begged to inform his Excellency that the Captain-General requests the deputies to evacuate their Chamber." He added that the Captain-General could allow only a short time for the fulfilment of his orders. When Salmeron communicated this message to the House, the fury of the deputies knew no bounds; they



betook themselves once more to their wordy warfare, but the direction of their denunciations was changed. A vote of thanks to Castelar and of confidence in his policy is said to have been carried by acclamation. Pavia was outlawed with such solemnity as men concerned for their personal safety could command. The deputies then resolved to die in their places rather than yield obedience to the insolent order. But the appearance of a few files of the Civil Guard and the echo of a shot or two through the lobbies brought them to a better mind. They hastily quitted the benches which they had a few minutes before determined to defend with their life-blood, and walked home unmolested through the chilly streets of the unconscious capital. Everything had been done with military exactitude. When the diplomatic body quitted the gallery from which they had witnessed the strange scene, they were escorted by a general and two aides-de-camp; the troops saluted and presented arms on their passage. There was none of the noise and babble which generally accompanied a Revolution; hardly a spectator, for the hour was late even for Madrid.

But Pavia's plan was not merely to overturn a Government that had not been lucky enough to please him. He proposed, as his memoir explains, to hand over the government "not to a party or flag of any kind but to a real coalition from which should spring a ministry of conciliation and public safety." He excluded from political consideration, that is to say from his strangely-planned coalition, only Carlists and Cantonalists. These, in his opinion, by their appeal to arms had forfeited their claim to be heard. In pursuance of this scheme he called a meeting of the heads of parties and the Captains-General present in Madrid to form a Government. At the same time he deigned to explain to the superior officers of the army and to the representatives of foreign Powers that his object in thus thrusting himself forward had been "the preservation of his country and of liberty." Then the "one day blossom" (*flor de un día*), as he was nicknamed, considered his duty at an end,

and withdrew well-satisfied to contemplate his patriotic work. He could have retained, at least for a time, the position of dictator, which he had so easily seized, but he refused to offer himself as a candidate for office. He hoped that wise men would approve his action, but he was aware "that in the eyes of the many, the fools, it amounted to political suicide."

In the simplicity of his heart, the high-handed and disinterested saviour of his country was shocked and disappointed to find that his unceremonious clearing of Congress was not immediately followed by a period of idyllic peace and concord. Nobody had been more taken by surprise than Castelar. Both feeling and policy compelled him to disavow the action of his champion, and to refuse his invitation to the conference from which a regenerated Spain was to spring. Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, too, in the name of the rapidly-growing Alfonsist party, declined to undertake government-making at the military word of command; the time for the Restoration had not yet come. Nevertheless, the Coalition Ministry was formed, though the abstention of Castelar and of Cánovas del Castillo left its base narrower than Pavia had hoped. The Royalists having refused to push their cause prematurely, the Republic, now become Unitarian and Conservative, continued. Francisco Serrano, Duke of la Torre, was elected President of the Republic as well as of the Council of Ministers. Zabala accepted the Ministry for War; Topete the Navy; Echegaray Finance; Martos Justice; and Sagasta, who represented the practical brains of the ill-assorted party, the Foreign Office. Under Republican forms, it was a transitional Government, a half-military and half-civil dictatorship.

Serrano had already failed once as a leader. When the Revolution of 1868 placed him at the head of affairs, he allowed Prim to take the whole direction out of his hands and proved merely a hindrance to his masterful coadjutor. The resolution which he ever showed in the field deserted him at once in politics.

Indeed, the state of the country was calculated to appal even a stronger intellect, and justified the first measures of the new Government—suspension of the Constitution, dissolution of the Constituent Cortes, and postponement of a general election until the country should be sufficiently pacified. In Cuba 80,000 Spaniards were carrying on the seemingly interminable struggle against the Separatists. At Cartagena the red flag of anarchy still floated. Two hundred thousand troops were under arms to oppose the Carlists, who nevertheless were now masters of three provinces. The Treasury was empty, commerce at a standstill. No taxes could be raised in the rebellious districts. Only with the greatest difficulty could inadequate supplies be raised for the army. Beyond the Ebro the towns that still held for the Liberals, Pamplona, San Sebastian, and Bilbao, were daily harder pressed. The stop-gap Government, Republican only in name, had no real friends. Throughout Spain the nobility, the clergy, and the richer classes, as well as the whole female population, were Royalist, either Carlist or Alfonsist. The latter party, by the Pact of Cannes (Jan. 15, 1872), had come to an understanding with the Duke of Montpensier, promising him the Regency if the young prince should come to the throne before attaining his eighteenth year. Their hope was that Carlists and Republicans would fight till their exhaustion left the moderate Royalists masters of the situation. But for this it was necessary that neither Republicans nor Carlists should gain a striking success in the field. Even far-sighted men believed that the reduction of the northern provinces might have given a new lease of life to the Republic; whilst the fall of Bilbao or a victory on the Ebro might have been followed by the immediate triumph of the Carlists.

Serrano's friends dreamed for him a position like that of Marshal Macmahon in France, the perpetual Presidency of a Government using Republican forms. But Serrano was neither cunning nor active enough to maintain the position into which lucky chances, and a refined demeanour coexisting with coarse

moral fibre, had thrust him. His tenure of office began brightly enough with military and diplomatic successes; his Government was recognised by the Powers as more promising of stability than its predecessors; Cartagena fell before the guns of his nephew, Lopez Dominguez, during the first fortnight of his presidency. But the reconciliation and reorganisation which were to have sprung from the coalition seemed as far off as ever. The Cortes were not sitting; the constitutional guarantees had been suspended; the Government had full powers to defend itself against obstructive opposition with the avowed object of prolonging an intolerable state of disorder and uncertainty. But its utter lack of energy encouraged the Royalists in their unpatriotic agitation. It was no longer necessary to plot in secret. The Alfonsists paraded their forces and conspired unchecked against Serrano's rule; their newspapers carried on an active propaganda; their agents walked the streets with officers in high command and whispered with sergeants and corporals. All men were persuaded that the Republic could not last—it was just one year old—and all were hastening to prepare for the coming change and to make friends with the party of the future.

The end of the Cantonalist revolt and of the riots in Barcelona had set free a large body of troops for employment against the Carlists. Serrano was jealously afraid that, while he lingered in Madrid, the glory of crushing the insurrection in the north would fall to one of his rivals. He was weary of watching without being able to prevent elusive danger, caused by the spread of Royalism. He nominated Zabala, Minister for War, to replace him in the Ministry; and, while the unstable coalition on which his power depended still held together, started northward to take over the command (February 27). General Moriones, commander of the Liberal forces, had under him about 45,000 men. With these he was obliged not only to hold the lines of the Ebro but also to garrison and keep open occasional communications with Irun, San Sebastian,

Tolosa, Vitoria, and Pamplona. These towns, though situated in the heart of the Carlist country, continually harried or blockaded, and ill-supported by successive Governments, repeated the history of the earlier war by holding out unflinchingly in the Liberal cause. Thus Moriones was never able to concentrate more than about a third of his troops for even the most necessary operations; he was continually outnumbered by the Carlists striking from the centre against his long, weak line of circumference.

In January, while Madrid was recovering from its astonishment at Pavia's single-handed *pronunciamiento*, the Carlists invested Bilbao. For some months before its communications with the sea at Portugalete had been threatened, while the Carlists were furbishing up old cannon and casting new ones for a siege. Nevertheless, nothing had been done to strengthen the feeble fortifications of the *invicta villa*; and General de Castillo, its commander, had only about 1800 regular troops when the seizure of the mouth of the river Nervion cut him off from the sea. At the same time a force of Carlists, outnumbering his own by nearly ten to one, appeared on the heights around the city. Though the bravery of its commander and the spirit of its Liberal volunteers were well known, the Madrid Government took alarm; for, strictly invested as it was, the fall of Bilbao could be only a matter of time. Moriones was ordered to start to the rescue in mid-winter from the important railway junction of Miranda. With difficulty he succeeded in getting together some 20,000 ill-provided troops; of these he was obliged to detach almost a third to guard communications. At Somorrostro he found himself face to face with a superior force occupying a position of great natural strength and carefully fortified. To attempt to outflank the position was useless, to break through nearly hopeless; but Moriones had been ordered to make the attempt. So on February 25 he led 11,000 men, well aware of the desperate nature of their undertaking, to assault the trenches of San



Pedro Abanto. The attempt cost 1200 men; the survivors withdrew dispirited but still formidable. Moriones telegraphed to the Government, "Send reinforcements and another general to take over the command....I keep my positions at Somorrostro and my communications with Castro." The latter part of the message was most important. Portugalete being in the hands of the enemy and communications of the Liberal army through Vitoria to the south threatened, Castro Urdiales, to the west of Portugalete, was the only way open for supplies to reach the now blockaded army, or for its embarkation, should that become necessary. But the Carlists, busy celebrating their victory, neglected to take full advantage of it; Moriones was allowed to entrench himself undisturbed. The commandant of Bilbao received without flinching the news of the failure of the force sent to his relief. It came in the form of a message from the Carlist general, the Marquis of Valdespina, with the hint that Bilbao must now hope for no help from the outside. General de Castillo replied, "As you are a gentleman, I trust your news; and, as I am the same, I go on fighting."

Such was the state of affairs in Biscay when Serrano arrived to take over the command. The extreme danger of Bilbao, and the disastrous results that must follow its loss, rendered instant action necessary; but Serrano had no wish to court the defeat to which he had sent Moriones open-eyed. The victory had roused Carlist activity all over Spain; the danger of another Federal outbreak was not yet past; so the garrisons of the interior and of the south could not be entirely depleted. But, when Serrano, a month after Moriones' failure, again renewed the attempt, his chances of success were much better. It was at the head of 27,000 men and 70 cannon that he attacked the Carlist lines. His forces were not sufficient to outflank the formidable positions of the Carlists; General Elio faced him with 17,000 men, and had left behind him sufficient troops to repel any attempt at a diversion on the part of the garrison of Bilbao. On March 25 and the following day



Serrano's attack was merely tentative; but it cost 900 killed and wounded. On the third day the whole forces on either side were hotly engaged. Serrano's plan was by a frontal attack to cut the Carlists in two, and to hold them between his army, Bilbao, and the warships blockading the mouth of the river Nervion. The battle was a stubborn one; positions were repeatedly stormed and retaken. At the end of the day the Liberals had lost 2000 men and their adversaries well-nigh as many; the two armies still occupied the positions from which they had fought three days before; and the Liberals were not in condition to renew the attack. It was in fact a great victory for the Carlists; and their hopes rose high of taking Bilbao before the Liberals could raise sufficient troops to relieve it.

Serrano's telegram, telling of his failure and pointing out that Bilbao was doomed unless another whole division of trustworthy troops could be sent, roused Madrid to the gravity of the situation. Then and not till then was made the effort that earlier would have sufficed to end the war. Zabala and Sagasta, the military and civil heads of the Government, saw that all other risks must be taken if only the present danger could be averted. In frantic haste the cities of the south were stripped of their already reduced garrisons. Untried battalions were equipped for active service; their ranks were stiffened with constabulary and frontier-guards, old and steady soldiers. The whole resources of the well-nigh exhausted country were placed at the disposal of the army in the north. Spain realised that her fate was about to be decided in a single cast.

The troops were sent by rail to Santander, thence by sea to Castro Urdiales, the port so prudently kept open by Moriones. From Castro they had but a short way to march to join the main body at Somorrostro. At the end of April Serrano's army numbered 33,000. He had also the skilled advice of the best soldiers; he had summoned to his aid even the generals whom he knew to be working for the restoration of monarchy, Concha, Echagüe, and Martinez Campos. By doing so he

knowingly put himself into their power; but it was no moment for circumspection, and he rightly trusted the untarnished honour of Concha and his great authority to delay the execution of their scheme. Nevertheless, the Liberal camp at Somorrostro was a nest of intrigue. General Echagüe even went so far as to propose that Concha should receive Martinez Campos with a deputation of officers to represent the necessity of at once proclaiming Alfonso XII. It was believed that such a proclamation would have the effect of attracting many old soldiers of Queen Isabel now serving in the Carlist army. But Concha would not listen to such treasonable sophistry. He held that the Restoration should be proclaimed by the civil authority, not by the army, and above all not by an army in face of the enemy. His first duty was to defeat the Carlists; after that he was prepared to insist upon a hearing for his political views. Thus he held in check the others who did not share his political scruples nor the delicacy of his military honour. It was Concha who (May 1, 1874), directing the operations of the third division, turned the left flank of the Carlist lines and obliged them, without striking a blow, to abandon the siege on which so many of their hopes were centred. They withdrew in perfect order, taking all the cannon they had used in the siege. But they were dispirited by their failure when on the point of success; and they distrusted their leaders, among whom jealousy and faction were hardly less rife than among the Liberals.

While the Carlists wrangled over the first principles of their cause, and the awful charge of sympathy with Liberal ideas drew forth the retort of "apostolic obscurantism," the Liberals had now nearly 40,000 troops sufficiently equipped and flushed with lightly-won success. All these could be employed against the retreating Carlists, for no disturbances had followed the depletion of the garrisons of the south. But Serrano did not follow up his advantage at once and put an end to the war. As usual when affairs seemed to be approach-

ing a crisis, occult influences were at work. The danger of Carlism is its elusiveness, its stronghold the hearts of women and of priests ; it appeals to feeling, not to reason, it is a religion, not a political formula. Those who fight against it seem ill at ease ; they are not sure they do not fight against a holy cause. Most thinking Spaniards are Carlists in certain moods, at certain ages. Over and above its open and avowed adherents, the cause has a host of secret sympathisers. Were it to triumph to-morrow, three-fourths of the nation would be ready to declare, not utterly untruthfully, that a long-cherished hope had been fulfilled. Welcoming martyrdom and strengthened by persecution, its spirit disarms those who are sent against it. The Carlists had a definite cause, an object, and a plain way to reach it. The Republican officers knew not but that their success might strengthen a party whose mottoes were far more alien than God, Country, and King.

The Carlists had twice beaten back their adversaries from Somorrostro, and had retired unbeaten. Their hopes began to revive, and they remade their shattered plans. At Madrid Sagasta was calling for Serrano to rally his friends. The coalition Cabinet, Pavia's rough handiwork, had held together only so long as the national danger was most pressing. General Concha took over the command of the Army of the North, while Serrano, President of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief, hurried to the capital. As deliverer of Bilbao he was received with some applause. He gave the credit for his success to the man who really deserved it, the Minister for War, Zabala, who had collected, armed, and sent forward the necessary troops. But the applause of the streets soon died away ; and Serrano was left face to face with the uncompromising Republicans, complaining that he had shown little vigour against the Carlists, still less against the Alfonsists. Deserted by these, he formed a Cabinet of men who had lost hope and faith in the Republic, but were patriotically willing to carry on the government until the expected change took place. Per-

suasion and pressure were necessary to induce the most capable to accept the invidious position. Only after long reluctance did General Zabala consent to form a ministry; only after failure did he succeed in doing so. Two well-known men became his colleagues—Alonso Martinez, Minister for Justice, and Sagasta, the clever wire-puller at the Ministry of the Interior. The weakness of the Republic was painfully evident; the Alfonsists became even bolder than before, certain now of speedy triumph. Serrano lacked character to play gracefully and skilfully a losing game. Still the new Ministry showed a bold front. Sagasta began the process euphemistically known as preparing the elections. His programme spoke of maintaining the conquests of the Revolution, and carrying on the great work of the reorganisation (May 13, 1874), while the press of almost every shade waged a furious campaign against the President. Sagasta's efforts at repression by means of fines and seizures only hastened the now inevitable catastrophe. The Republic had turned persecutor; the number of those who longed for a change increased.

Serrano, blundering heavily among his difficulties, allowed himself to be drawn into a controversy over his conduct. Least of all men could the ex-favourite of Queen Isabel claim merit as the means of his advancement or consistency as the badge of his public life. The words he used and the principles he invoked in his eagerness to defend his pre-republican career were ambiguous or inconsistent with the position of President. By declaring himself convinced of the right of the army to interfere in politics when its chiefs are convinced that the Government fails to represent the will of the people he sought to excuse his conduct in 1868, but succeeded only in leaving his actual position without moral defence when the now daily expected *pronunciamiento* should come.

It was to the Carlist arms that the Republic owed a six months' extension of its ebbing life. The real arbiter of the situation was General Concha, Marqués del Duero, commander

of the Army of the North. He at least could bring clean hands and an untarnished record to the service of the Royalist cause. His conduct whilst serving the Republic had merited the esteem in which he was held. He made no secret of his opinions, but he would not overthrow the Republic by means of an authority the Republic itself had conferred; the enemy against whom he had been sent must not profit by dissensions in his own camp. For these reasons he had refused to make a *pronunciamiento* before Bilbao, and had restrained less scrupulous officers who saw only the golden opportunity with its certainty of success. Serrano's return to Madrid left Concha free to choose his opportunity. His plan was to shatter the Carlists' power by the capture of their stronghold at Estella, and then at the head of his veterans to call upon Serrano to convoke the Cortes. The avowed Royalist sympathies of an army victorious over the Carlists would make the proclamation of Alfonso XII a certainty. It was a violent resolution; but the state of the country seemed to justify it. Serrano himself defended the right of the army to insist on fulfilment of the national will. It was not possible to maintain that the Republic, a year after its inception, represented the will of anything more than a small and daily narrowing minority.

Victory was a mere incident in Concha's plan, a necessary preliminary to the main action; but the whole was wrecked before Estella. With Serrano's departure the momentary energy of the Government died away. The necessary supplies and reinforcements were forwarded so slowly that at Madrid it was believed that the Ministry had no real wish to end the war. The hopes of the Carlists revived; and, although Concha left Bilbao sufficiently garrisoned and provisioned, they renewed their blockade as soon as he had quitted the neighbourhood. Bilbao, however, was no longer really in danger. Marching by way of Vitoria to the neighbourhood of Estella, Concha deployed his troops for the great surrounding movement intended to capture the Carlist army or to force it to undertake



a difficult and dangerous retreat through the passes. The Carlists awaited him steadily with 20,000 men. Their main position was the heights around the village of Abárzuza, the centre of Concha's half circle. Only great superiority of numbers, armament, or spirit could justify an attack on such a position. Concha's army had no advantage in any one of these respects. The convoys were stuck fast in the passes; the attack was made by half-starving men (June 25-27, 1874); and the battle was already lost when Concha was himself killed. The Liberals had lost nearly 1000 men; their discomfiture was complete. A storm covered their retreat. The Carlists did not grasp the extent of their victory. At Madrid the news of Concha's death and the failure of his gambler's venture produced consternation. The disaster affected the party that had prepared the Restoration even more than the Republican Government. All their plans hung on the assumption of a great victory; all had to be remade and postponed. The rout of Abárzuza weakened the Republic, but for the moment it shattered the Royalists, leaving their cause in the hands of meaner, more impatient, and more selfish men than the Marqués del Duero. Only a genius for command enabled Cánovas del Castillo to hold back intriguing generals, eager, regardless of the state of Spain, to win the reward due to him who should first proclaim the King.

It was thought that Serrano would again take command of the northern army and try to raise its spirits, dashed by undeserved defeat and the death of its most trusted general. But he remained in Madrid perplexed, fascinated, and helpless, among his gathering difficulties. Failing Serrano, Domingo Moriones would have been welcomed by the soldiers. Under Serrano, they were sure of supplies; under Moriones, of skilful and energetic leading. The Carlists had good reason to remember his rapid and unexpected movements, his forays, requisitions, and severities. But, as usual, politics took precedence of military considerations; Moriones was a Liberal



of too marked a type for the Government that continued to call itself Republican. He was maintained in his divisional command in Navarre, whilst the chief command was taken by General Zabala, Marquis of Sierra Bullones. As Minister for War in troubled times, and as President of the Council when nobody else dared occupy the post, Zabala had done invaluable service; but prudence was his characteristic; he was not the man to restore self-confidence to a discouraged army by a series of dashing, if small successes. Warned by Concha's fate, he devoted himself to organisation, concentration, and accumulation of supplies. The summer wore away; and, after three months, Zabala was superseded before he had completed the hoarding process preparatory to the forward movement. Moriones, on his side, led forays into the territory of the Carlists; but they retaliated with much more striking success. Four thousand of them broke through the lines of the Ebro and harried Catalonia on the right bank. Further down its course the Ebro was no longer a barrier to them. The Carlists had conceived an almost overweening confidence in their powers since they had won a pitched battle at Abárzuza. When their prince hurried from Guipúzcoa to congratulate the defenders of Estella, he received outside its walls 20,000 men ready for any enterprise, and inspected some hundred cannon. Besides, these Carlist forces held in check the garrisons of the Basque and Navarrese towns, and bombarded Guetaria and Hernani in the neighbourhood of San Sebastian. But for a time the chief centre of their activity was Catalonia. There Don Alfonso, brother of Don Carlos, held a nominal command over the fierce bands that burned, destroyed, and plundered, robbed and requisitioned in the name of the cause.

The news of Pavia's unceremonious dispersal of the Constituent Cortes had set the Liberals of Catalonia fighting among themselves; and, while the troops were employed against rioters, the Carlists seized Vich (January, 1874), and captured General Nouvilas and the whole of the force with which he was

hurrying to the relief of Olot (March). In the autumn they surprised Urgel, a cathedral city, occupying a strong position, backed by the Andorran valleys. In the provinces of Urgel and Gerona their supremacy was hardly disputed; they accepted battle in the open when offered and were generally successful. Encouraged by their success, they pushed on far beyond the Ebro. Teruel narrowly escaped falling into their hands. Almost unopposed they reached Cuenca, in the heart of Castille, and distant only twenty-two leagues from Madrid. The garrison was a weak one, but, knowing that small mercy was to be expected from the Catalans, it held out in hope of relief for forty-eight hours before surrendering (July 15). Don Alfonso was powerless to fulfil the terms of capitulation. Murders and looting, which even his wife's intervention could not prevent, warned other cities to look well to their defences, and other garrisons to hold out to the last. Spain lay open before the raiders; Madrid was panic-stricken; but they penetrated no further; they would not submit to discipline or even act together for long. Falling back as an armed mob towards the Ebro, they were overtaken and routed at Alcora and Teruel. After this experience, Alfonso despaired of making the Catalan Carlists obey the rules of civilised warfare. Dissatisfied, moreover, with his brother's decision to divide the command in the north-eastern provinces, he obtained permission to quit Spain (October, 1874). At the same time the command of the Liberal army in this district passed into the hands of General Jovellar, whose activity gave order and security to provinces worn out by lawlessness and plunder.

The frontier departments of France were to the Carlists an inexhaustible storehouse, and occasionally a refuge. Money or credit insured their welcome in all the towns from Bayonne to Montpellier. As buyers of arms, ammunition, food, and stores, they greatly enriched the traders. The French police and customs-house officials connived at their operations. It is hardly too much to say that the closing of the frontier would

have brought the war to an end in three months. But, when Serrano made bold to protest to the authorities of the neighbouring Republic against breaches of neutrality, MacMahon studied to make his rebuff the more harsh. He replied in effect that France could not undertake the whole police of the frontier, nor superintend successive swarms of Spanish immigrants. The Conservative French Republic had no sympathy for the Spanish democrats, uneasy neighbours, unable to keep order at home, and holding power by so precarious a tenure that it was useless to enter into any agreement with them; still less did they please MacMahon and his Cabinet, who were not Republicans at heart. It is now known that the Comte de Chambord was secretly in France, and endeavouring to interview MacMahon; but he was too honest to betray his trust. Serrano then approached Germany, whose friendship with Spain seems to be part of her permanent policy. Germany expressed sympathy, but was unable to help.

In Madrid the Royalists were rapidly recovering from the dislocation of their plans. Everybody was hastening to make his peace with the party of the future before it was too late. Zabala, the best servant of the Republic, quitted the Ministry to join its opponents. Alonso Martinez followed. Such men were not mere turncoats. They had believed the Republic possible—the loosely united provinces seemed to afford an unrivalled opportunity for Federal Government—but the experiment had proved disastrous, and they were not too proud to change their opinions. It is indeed hard to believe that in the autumn of 1874 any statesman hoped or wished for the continuance of the eighteen-month-old Republic. But some were so implicated in its fate, such earnest believers in that form of government, or so unwilling to admit their mistake, as to serve it to the last. Among these was Sagasta, whose best qualities showed out in adversity. Struggling bravely on, he accepted the Presidency of the Council (August 4), and formed a Ministry of his own and Serrano's personal friends. In Sep-

tember he sent General Laserna to take over from Zabala the command in the north. At this time Spain was supporting about 375,000 soldiers. Of these the Cuban war still employed 75,000 men. Fifty thousand were required to garrison the part of the Peninsula which was nominally at peace. The Army of the Centre, holding lines from Albacete to Valencia, and on as far as the frontier of Catalonia, numbered 40,000: the Army of Catalonia, 30,000: the army along the upper Ebro and the garrisons of the Liberal towns in the revolted provinces amounted to 80,000. The expense was £400,000 monthly. But besides all these, Spain supported some 100,000 Carlists in three bodies, established generally in the Maestrazgo or mountain district north of Valencia: in upper Catalonia, backed by the Pyrenees about Andorra: and in Navarre and the Basque Provinces. The latter was always the centre of their power. Estella served them as capital; Don Carlos had his headquarters at Tolosa, cutting the road and railway from Madrid to Bordeaux and Paris.

After Don Alfonso's retirement the chief interest of the war shifted to the little town of Irun, the frontier railway station of Guipúzcoa, Liberal in the midst of a fervidly Carlist country. Though the Carlists went and came as they would over the low passes into the department of the Basses-Pyrénées, the possession of the railway head would have been of great advantage to them, while its loss would have been a serious blow to their adversaries. Irun contained the principal customs-house of northern Spain. Once established there, the Carlists must necessarily come into direct relations with the French authorities; and their status as a Government must be recognised. The insignificance of the garrison seemed to insure success; artillery was brought up to the heights above the little town; and in October Don Carlos in person took command of the besieging force. But the Carlists have always failed when they have abandoned guerrilla tactics; and even Irun, little more than a village, proved too strong for them. Their operations were

carried on in a desultory manner, although success depended on promptitude, for Laserna was bringing a part of his forces from Santander by sea to San Sebastian to relieve the brave little garrison. Irun was never hard pressed. The Carlists made no attempt to hinder Laserna's march over the twelve miles of mountain country that separate San Sebastian from Irun. They withdrew (Nov. 11, 1874), discredited in the eyes of their French sympathisers, who had been witnesses of their powerlessness. So discouraged were they that they abandoned their foundry and stores at Vera, a few leagues above Irun.

But lack of provisions and bad weather hindered Laserna from following up his advantage. The Carlists retook possession of their abandoned stores, and shortly afterwards again became aggressive in the neighbourhood of Hernani, south of San Sebastian. In November, Don Alfonso, son of Queen Isabel, attained his sixteenth year and came of age; for at sixteen the Kings of Spain attain their majority. This event was of no small importance to the Royalist party, for it set them free from their pledge to make Montpensier Regent if the Restoration should take place while Alfonso was still a minor. Nothing would have been more unpopular than the Regency of a man distrusted as an intriguer, and after so many years still hated as a foreigner. On the occasion of his birthday Don Alfonso received an address from the majority of the *grandees*, acknowledging him as King. Organising committees or *juntas* worked for him in Madrid under Cánovas del Castillo, seconded now by the zealous neophyte Romero Robledo. Alfonsist clubs existed in all the towns, and carried on a successful propaganda among the middle class. The workmen's clubs, however, did not fulfil the hopes of their founders; the people were still Republican, Carlist, or indifferent. The existing Government was indeed Republican only in name; but the very name roused the fiercest animosity, particularly among the clergy; a Republic, they asserted, is the enemy of morality and religion.



The provincial governors sent in alarming reports of the spread of the movement, for plot it could not be called, seeing that it was carried on in the light of day and in the public press. The reports were ignored or treated with ridicule at the central offices in Madrid, where, however, many of the heads of departments had the best of reasons for knowing their truth. If at any time a little energy in repression was shown, it was directed solely against the Radical extremists. So sure were the Alfonsists now of their strength that they fretted at the tardiness of their leaders. But Cánovas held them back. He wished to see the comedy of the Republic played out; given a little more time, he thought, the experiment would end in a way that would serve as a warning for all ages. The Restoration, he insisted, should be the outcome of the will of the majority clearly expressed in Parliament; not of a *pronunciamiento* prolonging the bad traditions of the last forty years and leaving the country again at the mercy of the general or generals who set themselves up as its saviours. He hoped first for the end of the Carlist War, then for the disbandment of the huge armies that were eating up the land, and finally for Constituent Cortes to set aside quietly all that had been done since the frenzy of 1868. Perhaps Cánovas had forgotten the Programme of Manzanares and *The Bat* newspaper, his own most effectual contributions to the overthrow of the dynasty he was now labouring to restore. At least he must have believed that his countrymen had made vast strides in political discipline and self-control since those not very distant days.

The Restoration was waiting a final and decisive victory in the north; it seemed as though it would never come. After the relief of Irun, Laserna led the troops back by sea to Santander and thence to their old quarters on the Ebro. No attempt was made to break through by the main road and railway, cutting the discouraged Carlists in two. Orders were received to act only on the defensive. Some show was made of preparing to resist an invasion of Castille, which was never



threatened. Whilst men believed that Serrano was reserving for himself the glory of the final victory, the truth was that the Government, daily expecting an explosion, had neither men nor money to send to its hungry, tattered, and dissolving armies. Moriones stood sulkily to his Navarrese lines from Lodosa and Tudela on the Ebro northward, to Olite and Tafalla. The blockaded garrisons of Pamplona, Vitoria, Bilbao, and San Sebastian made no movement. The Carlists gathered heart. Again they called upon their exhausted land for fresh supplies of men and money; again they requisitioned and harried the Liberals who had the misfortune to be their neighbours. They gave out that Laserna had been obliged to retire from Irun by enormous losses inflicted on his forces.

The snow fell early in the mountains; and it seemed as if all military operations were at an end for the eventful year of 1874. Then suddenly Serrano woke up from lethargy into feverish activity. He would not allow the Republic to die of inanition without one more effort to end the civil war. Though he felt the ground mined beneath him, he ventured to banish a few well-known Royalists to the Canary Islands; others went into hiding. Serrano was not so blind as to believe that the Restoration could be hindered by the police, but he insisted upon respect for the truce until the common enemy should no longer be formidable. He did not, like Cánovas, anticipate the decision of the nation; he offered no solution, but he abandoned and surrendered the rags of the Republic. In a circular to the provincial governors (Nov. 26), he denounced not the Royalists as a whole, but “a fraction of the party called Alfonsist, which, neglecting the counsels of reason, deaf to the appeal of patriotism, though it sees its country bleeding to death in terrific civil strife, preferring its own particular and factious advantage to all considerations of unselfishness and public good, deserting the honourable paths in which some members of the party would have it walk, not only adheres to its plan of opposing the Ministry—for this

the Ministry itself would hold justified—but, blinded by passion, is agitating the country and hindering the generous and patriotic policy of a Government that imposes no solution, but demands only that political questions be deferred until the public enemy be defeated.”

The Army of Catalonia was under General Lopez Dominguez, Serrano's nephew; the Army of the Centre under General Jovellar, his creature and dependent. On December 8 Serrano himself declared his purpose of immediately taking command on the Ebro. Two days later he was at Logroño. He refused the hospitality of the little home where old Espartero was awaiting in middle-class comfort the end of his agitated life. Serrano was impatient to move on; and for a moment his eagerness seemed to communicate itself to the army, weary with long waiting. Oblivious of the lack of necessary supplies, it looked forward without dismay to a winter campaign among the mountains. But the snow continued to fall, blocking the passes and throwing up an impassable rampart in front of the Carlists. After an interview with Moriones at the junction of railways from Navarre to Castille and the Basque Provinces, Serrano reluctantly recognised that, sorely as his political situation needed immediate victory, it was unattainable until spring came and further reinforcements reached him. Furlough was granted until December 30 to a large number of officers and men desirous of spending Christmas in their homes. Serrano had postponed his final effort until it was too late; he had disarmed when the enemy was upon him.

Early in December the newspapers published a manifesto dated from Sandhurst, where Don Alfonso was receiving a military education. But, long before its issue, it had been known in Spain. In form it was the Prince's answer to a letter treating of the state of Spain and the prospects of the Royalist cause. But the hand of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo was shown in its studied moderation, its appeal for reconciliation, and its ideal of a Restoration brought about by civil rather

than military influences. "Only the establishment of constitutional monarchy," said Don Alfonso, the wise youth, "can put an end to oppression and uncertainty, and to the cruel disorders from which Spain is suffering. All men of good will, whatever their political antecedents, will soon be on my side, knowing that they have nothing to fear from a young and unprejudiced monarchy to which union and peace are the breath of life. I shall ever be a good Spaniard, a good Catholic like my ancestors, and like the men of my own day a Liberal." While publishing his challenge, the official leaders of the party continued to insist that none other than legal means of effecting their purpose would be used; and that the end of the civil war must be reached before the country could declare its will with regard to the questions raised. Serrano had appealed for a patriotic truce during his absence; and for a few days it was respected. That it was broken before the month was out was not the fault of the civilians working for the Restoration. They did their best, but failed to check the hot-headed and selfish military leaders of their party.

The soldiers were eager to take advantage of a military situation that they knew to be favourable to them. A victory might follow on a thaw; its result might be an access of popularity, prolonging Serrano's power for an indefinite time. Even now foreign diplomatists and financiers considered his position improved by his sudden resolve to end the war. A number of important commands were now in the hands of Royalists. Indeed, among the officers of high rank there was only one declared Republican, Domingo Moriones, and two, Lopez Dominguez and Loreca, whose opinions were doubtful. It only remained for one more unscrupulous than the rest to betray the trust of the Liberals and cover himself with glory by being the first to proclaim the King. The honour and profit accruing from a claim thus established were shared by two men. Martinez Campos lighted the carefully prepared train, without consulting Cánovas and the others who had been at pains to

lay it. The even less honourable part of traitor within the Government camp was played by Primo de Rivera. Still young, he had been wounded at Somorrostro and made lieutenant-general on the field of battle. His dashing courage and soldierly bearing attracted Serrano's attention. He himself had been a soldier of the same superficial type in his youth. Under Serrano's protection Primo de Rivera rose rapidly till he became Captain-General of New Castille. This position, including the military guardianship of the capital, often, in revolutionary times, made its holder arbiter of the fate of Government and Constitution.

Early in December, Sagasta, the civil head of the Ministry, and Bedoya, the Minister for War, received information that Martinez Campos, already signalised as an ardent Royalist, was preparing a *pronunciamiento* to be issued by the Armies of the North, the Centre, and Catalonia. Primo de Rivera, ordered to arrest him in Madrid, evaded compliance by pledging his honour to the implicated general's innocence. Martinez Campos left Madrid in disguise and betook himself to the Army of the Centre. Here everybody, including the General-in-Chief, Jovellar, were Royalists. But even those who were for immediate action were unwilling that the *pronunciamiento* should be made by any other than an officer in high command. Jovellar and Laserna, however, hesitated; and Quesada refused to teach treason or to appeal to the political passions of an army in face of the enemy. So Martinez Campos, himself a junior general, and a man of more boldness than wit, led the way. The prudent and patriotic schemes of Cánovas del Castillo were roughly broken by the hasty action of a tactless blunderer. A mile outside Murviedro, the Saguntum of the famous siege, Martinez Campos harangued the 2000 men holding the junction of the Roman coast-road with that running northward to Saragossa. The officers, prepared for the melodramatic scene, applauded him whilst he expounded to the astonished men the advantages of a restored monarchy, peace, continuation of

the traditions of glory, union, and a flag. Then they swore "to defend with the last drop of their blood the flag raised in face of the misfortunes of their country as a happy omen of redemption, peace, and greatness" (Dec. 24, 1874). Among them was one just man, an old captain, and a declared Royalist. He had the courage to rebuke the soldier politicians by refusing their ill-worded oath, denying that the regeneration of the state could spring from the corruption of the army.

Now that the mischief was out, those who would rather have delayed the *pronunciamiento* were forced to abide by it. Jovellar, the commander-in-chief, and Azcárraga, the chief of his staff, accepted the words of Martinez Campos as those of the army at large, and sent orders to divisional officers to declare for the King. The defender of Bilbao, now General del Castillo, had a more rigid sense of duty. He was ready to welcome the monarchy when its time should come, but he considered rebellion in the face of the enemy a bad beginning. As commander of Valencia, a day's march from Murviedro, Castillo prepared to resist the *pronunciamiento*. But his protest was disregarded by his own officers; and his superior, Jovellar, entering the city at the head of the revolted troops, ordered him off to Madrid.

When news of the revolt at Murviedro reached the capital, Sagasta, in Serrano's absence, again took into the Cabinet's confidence the Captain-General. Primo de Rivera expressed himself utterly astonished at the action of Martinez Campos; he declared that he considered himself bound to make good the defection of the man whose loyalty he had guaranteed. Taking such comfort as they could from his assurances, the ministers telegraphed to Serrano, urging him to return at once to the capital with troops for the northern army. At the same time they sent to Logroño to fetch the soldiers. Serrano promised to send troops to restore order, and expressed confidence in the trustworthiness of the army under his command; but he did not return. On December 30 the Madrid *Gazette*



announced that "some troops of the Army of the Centre, obeying Martinez Campos and Jovellar, had raised in the face of the enemy the factious banner of Alfonso of Bourbon." "It is the sacred duty of the Government," the notice continued, "to punish with all possible rigour a rebellion...which can but serve the ends of Carlism and mob rule, and would moreover disgrace us in the eyes of the civilised world." The preoccupation expressed in the last clause as to the judgment of expectant Europe continually appears in the appeals of Spanish statesmen; the world's approval is guaranteed or at least invoked at times on strange vagaries. The provincial governors throughout Spain were ordered to report on the feeling of their districts; their answers were carefully worded, so as not to compromise the writers, whatever the issue of events; many were properly delayed in order that political trimmers might have time to gauge the set of public opinion. But, on the whole, the belief of the Government in its ability to check the revolt seemed justified. It had still two armies to oppose to that of the centre: the northern under Serrano and Moriones, and that of Catalonia under Lopez Dominguez. Madrid, under Primo de Rivera, was believed to be quite safe; indeed, since the fall of Isabel, the capital had distinguished itself as the pattern of order and good behaviour. The dissentient Liberals rallied round the Ministry; Castelar, on behalf of the Unitarian Republicans, offered help, as did also Ruiz Zorrilla and Echegaray on behalf of the Radicals. So Sagasta showed a bold front. The Royalists expressed astonishment at Martinez Campos' precipitate action; their newspapers for the most part blamed and disavowed him. Those which approved were suspended. The editor of the *Época*, the mouthpiece of the central committee, and Cánovas del Castillo, its acknowledged chief, were arrested.

But any illusions that Sagasta and his fellow-ministers entertained were dispelled by the defection of the man whose



fidelity was most necessary to them. Presenting himself at the Ministry for War at five o'clock on the morning of December 30, General Primo de Rivera, in his uniform of Captain-General, informed his official superior that the garrison of the capital had declared for the *pronunciamiento*, and that resistance by the civil power was useless. The Minister for War was sent to visit the barracks and ascertain the temper of the troops. He repeated that "the officers were resolved to maintain order and discipline, but were not disposed to combat the movement begun by Martinez and Jovellar." At nightfall, when the Cabinet met to discuss the news, a further development had taken place; and Bedoya announced that the Captain-General was "determined no longer to delay his public and solemn adhesion to the cause of Don Alfonso." The Ministry, obliged to negotiate with a declared rebel, called upon Primo de Rivera either to make his *pronunciamiento* and take the Government forcibly into his own hands, or to restrain the garrison under his command until the arrival of Serrano, the titular head of the State. Primo de Rivera guaranteed their good behaviour, provided no regiments from the north accompanied Serrano.

But Serrano contemptuously refused to put himself under the protection, or rather into the power, of a traitor. He bade the Ministry fight if they could do so with any chance of success, but if not, to hand their resignation to the Captain-General. Again, they expressed their readiness to strike a blow if Serrano could come at once to their assistance. But by this time rebellion was working in the Army of the North. Serrano was obliged to confess his powerlessness, and the long series of telegraphic messages between Madrid and Logroño ended with the farewells of his Cabinet to Marshal Serrano, Duke of la Torre, last President of the not yet two-years-old Spanish Republic.

Meanwhile the Captain-General was becoming more peremptory. Under plea that the police was being concen-

trated and arms distributed to Liberal volunteers he threatened to seize Madrid. Sagasta sent a dignified answer to his insolent message, and at nine o'clock at night held a last Cabinet council at the Ministry for War. Troops surrounded the building ; the Captain-General announced a deputation of officers seeking audience of the ministers. He himself entered the council chamber at its head, announced that the garrison had declared for the King, and that a new Government was on the point of being nominated. Sagasta, protesting, resigned and withdrew.

In the north the Republic had employed officers of Royalist sympathies, partly because Republicans were rare in the army, and partly in the delusive hope that the Royalist officers might still be won over. One Republican officer there was, and he an able one, holding high command. It was Moriones that Serrano chose to command the division which he purposed to send to Madrid. For himself he decided to stay with the army, so as to prevent, if possible, its defection, and to hinder the Carlists from taking advantage of conflict among their opponents. But, though Serrano was popular with the rank and file, his authority ceased as soon as the news of the revolt in the south spread through the camp. The staff, the junior and the non-commissioned officers, united in their determination not to march against Madrid, flatly refused to obey orders. The artillery officers, now used to playing a part in politics, led the way. A deputation of them waited upon General Laserna and informed him that the corps was desirous for the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty in the person of Don Alfonso. Laserna held a meeting of the senior officers. The decision was quickly reached and communicated to the Commander-in-Chief and President of the Republic. It ran as follows : "The officers of the northern army, like their comrades at Madrid, declare that they will maintain order and discipline, but refuse to march against

their fellow-soldiers." Serrano replied, somewhat gratuitously, that he would not try to compel them. He telegraphed to Primo de Rivera that he would stay at his post until relieved. Laserna took over his authority, and on December 31, 1874, Alfonso XII, "the pledge of liberty, order, and regeneration," was proclaimed to the Army of the North. Six years and three months, perhaps the most troubled in Spain's history, had passed since Isabel quitted San Sebastian.

## CHAPTER XV.

ALFONSO XII. (1874—1885.)

THE *pronunciamiento* that brought about the Restoration was the last of the century. The people, as usual, acquiesced in its results. Revolutions indeed and counter-revolutions had been so many during the past sixty years, that the most violent political upheavals did not extinguish the hopes of those whom they momentarily overwhelmed. The indifferent, the ignorant, and the religious accepted results in a fatalistic spirit, seeing in political convulsions the work of unknown forces or punishment for the backslidings of their once Catholic nation.

This time, however, it chanced that Revolution afforded a solution acceptable to the majority. A moderate Constitutional Monarchy afforded a kind of central position amid the bewilderingly diverse aspirations of contending parties. The Republicans, most of them sincere and able men, were ashamed and discouraged by the events of their brief and stormy experiment. Whilst continuing to cherish their ideal, they admitted the impossibility of its realisation: one by one they joined the Liberal wing of the monarchical party. Their influence had been all-important in moderating the policy of the Crown and saving it from the domination of its self-styled best friends, the retrograde absolutist and ultramontane party.

After its violent oscillation towards Republicanism it might have been expected that the political pendulum would have reached its antithesis, Carlism. That it did not do so was

due perhaps to Don Carlos' over-eagerness to enter into possession of his kingdom. Nocedal's policy of offering the dilemma of intolerant and anti-clerical Liberalism and moderate Carlism, whilst making all compromise impossible, must have been successful if adhered to. The very shopkeepers of Madrid needing protection would have bowed to authority rather than suffer anarchy, and Spain would have cast herself at the feet of her legitimate King. But Don Carlos had not been content to await events; at the time of the nation's trial he had added to its burdens that of a civil war. His appeal was addressed to a faction only; his cause was identified with the unfair privileges and exemptions of certain provinces. His proclamations were sources of dissension. He now disavowed reactionary aims, and thus offended many of his adherents, whilst Liberals refused to accept assurances from such a source. His attitude was condemned as selfish and unpatriotic. One of Spain's reasons for welcoming Don Alfonso was the wish for a Government strong enough to drive out Don Carlos.

Cánovas' tolerant policy welcomed all without insisting upon formal recantation. He chose to consider as friends all who would accept constitutional monarchy or use only legal means to combat it. He had no wish to divide Spaniards again into victors and vanquished; he invited the cooperation even of those who looked upon Don Alfonso's throne as a merely temporary and provisional structure. The Republican, whilst helping to defeat the Carlist and restore the shattered basis of civil life, might still remain a Republican. Cánovas himself had good reason to desire that the past and its methods might be forgotten in the present and its results. An echo of the turgid violence of the Programme of Manzanares would have spoiled the harmonies of his plea for moderation; behind the figure of Cánovas protecting the throne of the stripling prince might arise the figure of Cánovas hounding on the Revolution against the dynasty.

So soon as the news of Martinez Campos' *pronunciamiento*

reached Madrid, a provisional council was formed with Cánovas at its head. It comprised Primo de Rivera, Count de Cheste, Quesada, and Romero Robledo, three soldiers and two civilians. Its authority was derived from a commission given by Prince Alfonso in the previous August. A meeting of Alfonsists held on the night of Dec. 30 was attended not only by recognised members of the party but by a host of well-known men eager to make their peace in time. Whilst some urged long and faithful service, others could point to an opportune turn of coat as a claim to consideration. The *Gazette* overflowed with protestations of loyalty to the new King from those who forty-eight hours earlier had telegraphed their determination to uphold the Republic with their last breath.

First of all results must be secured and services rewarded. The Revolution had the inestimable advantage over former ones that it left the Government with a civil instead of a military head. Martinez Campos was merely a blunderer who had fired a train laid by skilled hands. He was set aside; the Captaincy-General of Catalonia overpaid his services. Serrano's nephew Lopez Dominguez, of whom the Royalists were somewhat afraid, was superseded in the command of the Army of the Centre by Quesada. The Army of the North under General Laserna had telegraphed acceptance of the new *régime* (Dec. 31). On the same day a Ministry of Regency was formed, to govern until the King's arrival. Cánovas was its President, Francisco de Cárdenas its Minister of Justice; their colleagues were Castro, Jovellar, Molins, and the violent and factious Romero Robledo. The King on arrival confirmed its powers. But whatever the list of the Cabinet, Cánovas, whether he presided over it or not, ruled Spain as he would for six years. During the first two he held extraordinary powers under a suspended Constitution; he used them only against conspiracy and armed rebellion.

When Alfonso reached Barcelona (Jan. 9, 1875), the world had already recognised that the latest *pronunciamiento* had



increased the stability of the nation ; and the funds had risen four per cent. Catalonia smiled upon him ; so glad was Valencia to see the King that she fancied a "natural innate majesty" in the stunted, plain, and underbred-looking youth. The people of Madrid took but little part in the elaborate official welcome (Jan. 14). Notification was sent to the Powers of the accession of Alfonso, by the grace of God and the will of the nation King of Spain. By the end of February all had recognised him, though Protestant Governments hesitated a little, fearing for the principle of religious liberty. Castelar indeed prophesied that, just as his own party owed its downfall to its extreme and irreconcilable Left, so Cánovas must either become the slave of the extreme Right or undermine his position by forfeiting its support. But Cánovas was fully prepared to meet the difficulties of the situation. He allowed nobody to outbid him for the support of the Church ; and he showed the possibility of reconciling ardent Catholicism with the reforms of 1848. Don Alfonso had obtained the blessing of the Pope on his accession, and had solemnly undertaken all the obligations of the State entailed by the confiscation of the estates of the Church. At the same time he announced that freedom of worship would be secured, "as in the most civilised lands." It was manifestly inconsistent to guarantee at the same time religious liberty and faithful observance of the Concordat that specially provided against it ; but, in its laudable desire for reconciliation, the Government of the Restoration was lavish of promises. When sufficiently strongly established, it could disown such as it should be unable or unwilling to fulfil. The Vatican was induced by the pledges given to prefer the tangible guarantee of Don Alfonso's Government to vague and vast promises dependent upon a problematical Legitimist Restoration. Accordingly, to the dismay of the Carlists, the Pope followed the example of the Powers and recognised Queen Isabel's son (May 3, 1875).

The work of reconciliation was meanwhile proceeding

apace. Within three months of the Restoration, Serrano was received in special audience by the King. Even before this, Cánovas and Sagasta had met and arranged for benevolent opposition if not for cooperation. The one thing wanted was victory in the north; and even this was not long in coming. The Carlists, numbering about twenty-four thousand, were opposed by double their number. In spite of hesitation and divided counsels, Castelar's efforts and Serrano's campaigns had told. The provinces were becoming exhausted. The Carlist juntas supplied food only with difficulty; the pay of the soldiers was no longer forthcoming. Dissension and the failure of the chief plea under which the war had been undertaken did more to bring it to a close than lack of supplies or defeat. The Carlist contention was that a numerically insignificant faction had imposed on Spain a series of atheistical and anarchical Governments, beginning with the Cortes of 1810 and ending with the Republic of 1873. But, now that Don Alfonso had been welcomed, had given pledges of his religious convictions, and had been blessed by the Pope, only the strictest school of legitimists could contend that it was their duty to fight for Don Carlos.

There remained from the Carlist motto *Dios! Patria! Rey!*, the question of country, or the *Fueros*, gradually detaching itself from the cause of a particular branch of the Bourbon family, and from the never-ending controversy between Church and State. With this too Don Alfonso dealt in his proclamation to the revolted provinces and colonies at the beginning of his reign. "If you are fighting in the cause of Royalism, I am the representative of the dynasty to which your fathers swore fidelity. If you are fighting for the Catholic Faith, I am a Catholic King, and will right the wrong done to the Church. You yourselves love liberty; you cannot deprive Spaniards of it. Lay down your arms, and you shall see the prosperity of Cuba revived, and shall forthwith enjoy the advantages that were yours during thirty years under my mother's sceptre. Before begin-

ning battle I offer you peace" (Jan. 22, 1875). The offer then made was in fact that of renewal of the Convention of Vergara, complete amnesty, and confirmation of the local privileges. This proclamation assumed that many Carlists were fighting only against Revolution or Republic, and would gladly take service with the son of their former Queen. But nobody took advantage of its offer. The Carlists could neither be persuaded nor bribed; they remained sulky and defiant. Even the offer of compensation for losses during the war caused no wavering in their impoverished and half-devastated country. It was perhaps better for Spain that the fight should be fought out and the *Fueros* finally abolished, than that further compromise should contain the germs of future wars.

His attempted reconciliation having failed, Don Alfonso joined the army on the Ebro, and reviewed a fine veteran army of 40,000 men. He accompanied Moriones when (Feb. 6, 1875) he raised the long blockade of Pamplona and captured Puente la Reina. The hopes of the young King might have been fulfilled, and the war ended in a single brilliant campaign, had not Laserna been heavily defeated on his way to join a combined attack on Estella. The war had still a few months to run before the King could be led in triumph by his victorious army through the submitted provinces. In the meantime his presence and the responsibility for the guard of his person amid the hazards of a guerrilla campaign were hindrances to his generals. After a fortnight with the army, he returned to Madrid; and bullets from ambushed Carlists sang over his train as it steamed southward. Passing Logroño he stopped to pay his respects to the aged Duke of the Victory. The old soldier gave him a warm welcome and a lecture upon the duties of constitutional kings. The visit was considered of good augury, it showed that no narrow and jealous policy was intended; constitutionalists had not been taught to expect so much politeness from the throne.

When the King quitted the army, the effort that freed Pamplona died away. The strength which had made the effort possible had been furnished by Castelar; the monarchy was subsisting on the hoarded stores of the Republic. Castelar had indeed bettered in every respect the position of the army; but now its magazines were again empty, its ammunition shot away, and its uniforms worn out. Many of the soldiers, too, had earned their discharge; a new army in fact was needed to end the war. On the other hand, discouraged and weary, and attributing their late defeats to treachery, the Carlists were beginning to desert. But Don Carlos answered Don Alfonso's proclamation with expressions of contemptuous pity for his misguided cousin. To show his well-founded reliance on his men, he published in his own *Gazette* the advantageous terms of surrender offered from Madrid. Nevertheless, among the Carlists the process of disintegration was going on during the lull in the fighting. The most startling symptom was the recantation of Cabrera. Grown more humane and more tolerant by experience of a gentler civilisation, he acknowledged Don Alfonso and urged his former comrades to make the peace. The most dreaded and able of the Carlists since Zumalacárregui, the last to yield during the former war, opened on the French frontier a kind of conciliation office. His example failed to bring over any large body of those in arms; but his action spread alarm and suspicion. If Cabrera despaired of the cause and deserted it, who could be trusted?

During the summer the last Carlist strongholds south of the Ebro fell; and Martinez Campos captured La Seo de Urgel with a thousand of its brave defenders. While the chief part of his army took refuge in France or melted away, Dorregaray, the district commander, joined the Navarrese Carlists. The war was becoming localised in the Basque Provinces and at the same time more bitter. The army of the Ebro continued its traditional practice of raids and skirmishing with a battle twice a year, after which the victors

always failed to follow up their advantage. The Carlists confiscated the goods of their enemies; the Alfonsists retaliated by banishing thirteen thousand families whose head or son served the Pretender. They ruinously fined private persons as well as corporations suspected of Carlist sympathies; they burnt the crops, and allowed their troops to forage over the rich plains of Álava and the Rioja. Don Carlos protested vehemently; but the conduct of his own men was no longer beyond reproach. While the Carlists threatened San Sebastian and besieged Guetaria and Hernani, the Madrid Government inflicted useless suffering by bombarding from the sea the little Catalan ports that held out against it. The threats uttered by either side were still more fierce than the acts committed.

General Quesada, now commander-in-chief, had restricted the movements of the Carlists and cut off the Navarrese from easy communication with the Biscayans and Guipúzcoans by occupying the line of railway from Vitoria to Pamplona. But with the force at his command he would be unable to hold it for long; and one hundred thousand conscripts between the ages of eighteen and twenty were called out (Aug., 1875) to end the war.

By this time the former Republicans had for the most part changed their name in order to indicate their changed policy or opinions. They were now Constitutional Monarchists. With Sagasta at their head, they confirmed their acceptance of Don Alfonso's rule by attending in a body a banquet at the Palace (June 17, 1875); it was one revolutionary party the less. The Alfonsists were not strong enough to legalise their position by obtaining the recognition of the Cortes; but the matter was full of difficulty. At the outset, the question of suffrage, restricted or universal, arose. The leaders desired to bring back the Constitution of 1845 with its restricted suffrage; but it could be formally reenacted only by the Cortes. The Constitution formally valid for the moment was the Republican one of



1870; and, if pretence of legality were to be maintained, the Cortes must be summoned in accordance with its provision for universal suffrage. Cánovas chose boldness as the best policy, feeling confident of his power to induce the Cortes thus elected to submit to such modifications as he thought fit. Three of his ministers held that suffrage should be restricted until the Cortes should decide, thus denying the legality of the Governments since the fall of Queen Isabel. Cánovas now resorted to what became his favourite expedient. He resigned (Oct., 1875) and put in a stop-gap Ministry to carry out his policy, whilst he proudly announced that he would not head a party Government after being at the head of a coalition of all right-thinking men. The effect was that Cánovas from the outside was able to criticise his own work in the light of events, claiming any measures he thought worth attributing to himself; a model of judicious fairness, unwilling to decide debated questions by the weight of his authority, and ready at the least hint to lay down power.

The stop-gap on this occasion was General Jovellar. On him fell the duty of repudiating the pledges given by Cánovas to the clerical party at the crisis of the Restoration. Cánovas had indeed bought the favour of the Holy See for his King by informally promising a great increase in the budget of public worship, payment of arrears, and repeal of the law recognising the right of private exercise of religion other than the Roman Catholic—in fact the virtual restoration of the Concordat of 1851. This was impossible of fulfilment in the existing state of public feeling; and Cánovas manfully supported his catspaw Jovellar in rejecting the exaggerated claims of the clericals. Thanks to his aid, the more Liberal opinion in the Ministry triumphed with regard to the suffrage question also. The crisis had been a dangerous one. The Ultramontane leader, Alejandro Pidal, denied Cánovas' right to the name of Conservative. The Nuncio wrote to the bishops citing the clauses of the Concordat that established the Roman Catholic to the



exclusion of all other religions, and guaranteed the Church against the "malignity of men" and "attempts to pervert the faith." He protested that both the spirit and the letter of this Concordat had been violated; and he called upon the faithful to secure its fulfilment. It was a bold attempt to take advantage of the weakness of the lately restored throne to give effect to an agreement that from the first had been a dead letter. Jovellar refused to be bound by the Nuncio's version of Cánovas' informal promises or to accept the Ultramontane's interpretation of the disputed clauses of the Concordat.

After supporting the more Liberal wing of the monarchical party in the matters of suffrage and ecclesiastical encroachment, Cánovas once more found himself ranged against the Conservative Right, which Castelar had prophesied would either enslave or dispense with him. The Liberals looked upon the Carlists as public enemies with whom no compromise was possible, and to whom not even terms of surrender might be offered. The Conservatives and Ultramontanes or Neo-Catholics, on the other hand, had ever Carlist leanings. Catholic and Royalist themselves, they regarded the old Catholics of the historic type and Legitimists as much nearer akin to themselves than the ex-Republicans with whom they were now associated. They were sincerely desirous of finding a basis for agreement with those who in troubled times had defended the principles they held in common. That Cánovas shared their admiration for the steadfastness of the northerners is abundantly evident from his writings and speeches; but he knew that Spain could not be safe until Carlism was crushed; and this could be only when its brave adherents were obliged to admit defeat. That the Carlists would have accepted any compromise is unlikely; that none was offered is due to Cánovas. It was the Alfonsists who refused the armistice proposed by Don Carlos in order that Spain might be able to meet with united front the threat of foreign intervention in Cuba.

In November, 1875, the Government of the United States complained in a note to the Powers of the continual anarchy of the island, and attributed its revolt to misrule, slavery, official corruption, and unscrupulous use of Cuban resources to supply the deficit of the Spanish treasury. Spain did not deny the charges; indeed they had all been set forth by the "Centro Hispano-Ultramarino," an association formed (1872) for the purpose of preserving union with the colonies by eliminating grievances. Jovellar's Government rejected Don Carlos' proffered armistice and refused further communications with him. It accepted the remonstrances of the United States in a friendly spirit; it attributed the length of the war to topographical difficulties and promised its speedy conclusion, to be followed by grant of all liberties and inauguration of reforms. Here again, though Jovellar was the ostensible head of the Government, the reply was obviously made by Cánovas, who now defined his policy of exacting submission as a preliminary to redress. This policy he maintained unflinchingly. He now reminded the United States of the strict neutrality of Spain during their great civil war; he denied that Spain had given any pretext for recognition of the Cuban insurgents as belligerents; and he promised redress to American citizens injured by the war. President Grant, accepting his explanations, declared (Dec. 7, 1875) that "he failed to find in the insurrection conditions that would take it out of the category of mere rebellion....To accord belligerent rights would therefore be unwise, premature and indefensible as a matter of right." The end of his message, however, contained a definite threat: "I shall feel it my duty, should the hope of a satisfactory adjustment, an early restoration of peace, and the removal of further causes of complaint be disappointed, to recommend to Congress at some not remote period during the present session what may then seem necessary."

At the end of the year 1875, Cánovas formally reassumed

the power which he had chosen nominally to renounce during three eventful months. His faithful henchman Jovellar, ready, like Don Quixote's servant, to use to the best of his ability any tool that might be thrust into his hand, went to join the Army of the North. On November 21, 1875, a public thanksgiving in the cathedral of Barcelona marked the freedom of Catalonian soil from Carlists in arms. A large body of troops hitherto employed in the north-eastern provinces were now poured into the Basque Provinces and Navarre, where the war was localised. The Armies of Catalonia and the Centre were united under Martinez Campos, and became the Army of the Right. It marched westward along the Pyrenees to cooperate with the Army of the Left, formerly of the North, under Quesada. The two together outnumbered the Carlists by four to one; 150,000 soldiers were narrowing the half circle that forced them upon the sea and the frontier. Both sides were now assured that the decisive moment had come; but the Carlist leader still maintained a hopeful tone. Writing to General Elio from Estella on Jan. 16, 1876, Don Carlos said: "the critical moment which your experience had foreseen, and for which my heart longed, has arrived." Six weeks later the writer was a refugee in France. The final campaign was planned by Martinez Campos. He himself invaded the revolted provinces through eastern Navarre; Quesada marched to meet him through Álava and Biscay; whilst at the third angle of the triangle was Moriones with the garrison of San Sebastian, ready to give a hand to either. Despite the efforts made to shut him in, Moriones turned the blockading Carlist lines, thanks to his command of the sea, and relieved Guetaria (Feb. 6).

The simultaneous movements of Martinez Campos and Quesada began on Feb. 15. Don Alfonso went north to be compensated for his disappointment of the year before, and nominally took over the supreme command. When, in charge of Quesada, his chief of the staff, he reached Tolosa (Feb. 21),

the campaign was virtually at an end. What little fighting there was had fallen to the lot of Martinez Campos' army. So hopelessly outnumbered were the Carlists that they were obliged to abandon each position on the approach of the enemy or submit to be cut off. Seeing the situation to be desperate, the representatives of Guipúzcoa withheld further supplies. Desertions set in and ruined the bold plan of the Carlist commander, Count Caserta, for making one great struggle to break through the narrowing lines of the invaders before it was too late. On February 19 Primo de Rivera captured Monte Jurra after a mere skirmish and entered Estella, since August, 1873, the stronghold of the Carlists. On the same day Martinez Campos, pushing along the frontier, took Peña Plata above Elizondo and joined hands with Moriones at Vera. On the last day of February, 1876, Don Carlos, accompanied by a Castilian battalion only, crossed the frontier by St Jean Pied de Port. An amnesty was proclaimed to all who would lay down their arms before March 15; its benefits were afterwards prolonged. The Carlist War was at an end; but the Carlists had suffered no great military disaster. They still believed themselves equal to the struggle against the rest of Spain; and a whole generation passed away before their provinces became resigned to equality with their neighbours south of the Ebro.

Thirteen months after Don Alfonso's accession his first Cortes met and gave legal sanction to his rule. Cánovas' bold resolution to allow election by universal suffrage had proved fully successful. Castelar, recognising a wish to act fairly and to keep all good Spaniards within the State, had prevented the Republicans and Radicals from revolutionary abstention. But in the new Cortes Castelar himself and one other found themselves the only Republicans. On the other hand Cánovas' conciliatory policy was proved to be working favourably by the reelection of 170 deputies who had served in the Cortes of the Republic and the Interregnum.

The whole Opposition did not number more than about forty ; the legislative body pronounced with virtual unanimity in favour of the restored monarchy. Many disputed questions, however, were left for settlement by the Cortes, notably the new Constitution, including the religious question, the status of the Carlist provinces on the termination of the war, the affairs of Cuba, and, most pressing of all, the financial problem. Spain was indeed insolvent when the Cortes met and had two ruinous wars on hand. One at least was soon ended. March 19 saw the King's triumphal entry into his capital after his short and easy campaign. It seemed as if happier days were at hand. Deputies from Cuba and Puerto Rico took their seats in the Cortes ; an announcement that the liberation of 76,000 slaves would mark the end of the war now rapidly drawing to a close in Cuba gave promise of rest in the unhappy island.

On March 27 (1876) Cánovas introduced his proposed Constitution. It was a skilful attempt to restore the fundamental laws of 1845 whilst preserving, as far as possible, the Radical forms of 1870. Having gracefully conceded a point by allowing the first election of the new reign to be carried out by universal suffrage, he had now no difficulty in imposing a property qualification on electors. He abolished, too, the jury system, which formed part of every Radical programme, but for which Spain was still manifestly unfit. He carefully limited the rights of public meeting and association and the powers of municipal and provincial councils. The result, of course, was centralisation ; but the Liberals, with their experiment in cantonalism still before their eyes, uttered no protest. Parties both in and out of the Cortes joined issue on clause 11 of the Constitution—that about religion. This attempt at compromise with clerical leanings runs as follows : "The Roman Catholic religion is the religion of the State and shall be exclusively maintained by it ; within the limits of Christian morality freedom of worship shall be lawful ; but no public



manifestations other than those of the Church shall be allowed." It might have been expected that the Liberals, anxious to punish the clergy for their share in the Carlist War, would have opposed this clause; but the Cortes accepted it by a majority of 221 over 33. It was the clerical party that felt aggrieved by a relaxation of the intolerance clause. Cánovas, seeing that to govern against the will of the clergy was impossible, had made the utmost concession he could; yet Pidal, the leader of the Catholic party in the Senate, denounced his arrangement as "a crime against the nation, morality, and religion." In answer to such invective Cánovas could only cite the toleration accorded by Catholic kings to Moslems at the time of the reconquest, and the disastrous effects that followed the repeal of the Edict of Nantes.

The Pope wrote to the Archbishop of Toledo with regard to the disputed clause, that it violated every obligation of truth and of the Catholic Faith. "It annuls illegally the Concordat between the Holy See and the Spanish nation, exposes the State to the charge of wrong, and opens a door to error, error which is but a precursor to a long succession of ruinous evils to the nation so long and true a lover of Catholic unity." This letter was published by the newspapers without the consent of the Government. It was a direct challenge, for the rulers of Spain had ever maintained their right to supervise papal messages before permitting their publication. The Pope also wrote to congratulate the ladies of Madrid who had petitioned against toleration. These incitements to a *Jehad* were repeated from every pulpit. The work of pacification was almost undone by those who should have been Cánovas' most active helpers. The Nuncio withdrew; threats of religious penalties caused the retirement of one member of the Cabinet. Castelar's prophecy seemed near fulfilment; but Cánovas withstood the clerical dictation. Congress voted the tolerance clause (May 12, 1876) by a majority of almost three to one; and four days later the Senate, after receiving assurance



that with this exception the Concordat would be fulfilled, accepted it by an equally decisive majority. But while formally resisting the extreme claims of the Church, Cánovas was ready to give up the substantial fact for which the Liberals contended. The law-courts took back what the legislature had conceded. The clause was so interpreted that an advertisement of Protestant schools became a "public manifestation" against the State religion. Excommunication was incurred by all who ate with heretics, "looked kindly upon them, or dared to say or write a word in their defence."

The other provisions of Cánovas' Constitution—still operative with some modifications and known as the Constitution of June 30, 1876—aimed at compromise. Spain was declared a Constitutional Monarchy. Legislation was vested in "the Cortes with the King." The legislative Chambers were of equal authority. The Senate was a mixed one, made up of eighty senators in their own right, princes of the blood royal, grandees, presidents of the great councils, archbishops, and captains-general. To these were added one hundred senators nominated by the Crown, and one hundred and eighty elected by the municipal and provincial assemblies, the universities, and taxpayers of the highest class. One half of the elective senators are renewed every fifth year. Congress is elected by districts of 50,000 souls; the franchise was restricted (until 1890) to taxpayers of certain classes. The whole number of deputies amounts to 431. Provision is made for the representation of minorities by list-voting in the larger towns. Dissolution must be followed by the assembly of a new Chamber within three months. The King summons, prorogues, and dissolves the Cortes. Both Houses meet every year. Congress names its own President; the Senate is presided over by a nominee of the Crown. Ministers can be impeached by Congress before the Senate. The King is irresponsible; but his decrees must be countersigned by a responsible minister. Local government is carried on by

*Ayuntamientos* or municipal councils of from five to thirty-five members in each commune, and by provincial deputations like the French *Conseils Généraux*. The powers of the local elective bodies over taxation and administration are considerable. The *Ayuntamientos* elect their *alcalde* or mayor, except in Madrid and a few other large towns, where the nomination belongs to the Crown.

The new Constitution was applied to the Basque Provinces equally with the rest; and their privileges and exemptions were swept away. Cánovas has left it on record that he would have preferred to extend local liberties to other provinces rather than to abolish them. But the injustice of their existence in certain provinces only, and these provinces rebellious, was intolerable. The offer rejected by the Basques in January, 1875 (see p. 393), was not renewed. At the end of the war King Alfonso announced from his camp at Somorrostro (March, 1876) the abolition of the *Fueros*. The law of October, 1839, made shortly after the Convention of Vergara, gave to the Cortes the power, after consulting with the representatives of the provinces concerned, to alter the *Fueros* in so far as they were inconsistent with national unity. This law had remained a dead letter until Cánovas revived it in order to avoid legislation involving discussion of highly controversial matter. In the Senate only twenty-four members were found to vote for the total abolition of the *Fueros*. But Cánovas took the complete union of the provinces to the Crown for granted. He refused to discuss, either in the Cortes or in his conference with the commissioners of Biscay, Guipúzcoa, and Álava, anything more than certain shreds of fiscal and administrative authority to be ceded, subject to the good behaviour of the provinces. The alterations made were embodied in the law of July 21, 1876. The Basques became liable to the "service of arms when the law summons, and to contribute in proportion to their wealth to the costs of the State." To this arrangement the Basques refused their assent. On this subject they were

united, the Liberals of the towns being hardly less attached to the privileges under which they enjoyed a government greatly superior to that of the rest of Spain than were the Carlist agriculturists.

The delegates summoned to discuss the question (May, 1876) met Cánovas' abolitionist proposals by a *non possumus* and were dismissed. When the law was passed, the local governments refused to cooperate with the newly constituted authorities in making it effective. The provinces were violently agitated; but the presence of an army of occupation made resistance hopeless. Extraordinary juntas and conferences between delegates of the three sister provinces were forbidden. The Foral Deputations were abolished; and their place was supplied by Provincial Deputations nominated in the first instance by the civil governors (April—Dec., 1877)<sup>1</sup>. These proved less stubborn, and negotiated with the central Government to preserve the freedom of their country from the dreaded presence of the alien taxgatherer. Subject to good behaviour, they were allowed to raise their taxes in the form best suited to them and through their own officers. The provinces are now periodically assessed at amounts supposed to represent their fair contribution to the State, under the headings of agricultural, industrial and mining dues, salt dues, stamp dues, octroi, &c. Their "agreements" with the central Government are made for ten years. They raise also their own contingent to the army, and have the right of redeeming their conscripts with the public money at such rates as may be fixed for the whole kingdom. These slight privileges the Basques jealously retain, not without hope of extending them at some future time. They chose to give in the old form as a "free donation" the extra taxation made necessary by the American war. The cost of levying taxes in their provinces is one-tenth of the cost

<sup>1</sup> The Provincial Deputations are recognised public bodies, established by law, with considerable powers as to financial administration. [J.F.-K.]

elsewhere in Spain. The ancient civil codes of the provinces were preserved. The men of the generation that fought for Don Carlos are passing away; but their sons still keep before their eyes the ideal of the *Fueros*. Meanwhile their efforts are restricted to making the administration of their provinces a model for the rest of Spain.

Spain at the Restoration was ruined. Since 1868 two hundred and sixty millions sterling had been added to her debt. The reduced three per cent. loan stood at 11½; no interest had been paid since 1874. The army alone, costing twenty-six millions, annually absorbed within one million pounds the whole revenue. Mr Phipps, the British Commissioner, reported (1877) that fully one-third of the property liable to taxation was fraudulently concealed, whilst "a few English, French, and Spanish bankers advance money to Spain on conditions as disastrous to the Treasury as they are discreditable to themselves." Unable to meet the claims of the creditors, Salvatierra, the Minister of Finance, proposed an arrangement. He promised payment in full from 1877, and offered in the meanwhile to those who would accept it in full discharge of their claims one-third of the interest due, without reducing their nominal capital. The creditors, glad to receive something, however slight, more than promises, accepted; but so often had the future been pledged that no confidence was created. In order to meet even the reduced interest of the first year the greatest sacrifices had to be made. The war tax remained; land tax and octroi dues were increased; and the salaries of all officials, including the clergy, were taxed to a quarter their amount.

All the men and money that could be mustered were now devoted to ending the war in Cuba. At the opening of his first Cortes, Don Alfonso stated that since his accession 32,000 soldiers had been poured into the island. Shortly afterwards £600,000 were raised on the security of the Cuban customs; and in October, 1877, Martinez Campos set out with fourteen

thousand troops to end the wearisome campaign, against rebels only eight or ten thousand strong. It was known that the new commander believed that ample liberties, administrative reforms, a lower tariff, and a considerable degree of self-government must be granted if Cuba were to be saved for the Spanish Crown. Accordingly he was welcomed by the Liberal loyalists, and found no difficulty in entering upon negotiations with the insurgents. Within a year he proudly announced that the war was at an end, and Spain, after many years, at peace. But in Cuba at least the peace was a hollow one, bought and not imposed. So eager was Martinez Campos to obtain the formal submission of the rebels that, using flattery instead of force, he had forfeited their respect. He had by his concessions, and by total disregard of their views, roused the bitter resentment of the Loyalists. By agreeing to recognise the freedom of escaped slaves serving with the rebels he rendered imperative the liberation of those who had remained true to their masters and to the Government. The Loyalists and United-Liberals complained that the result of their sacrifices on behalf of the mother-country was their abandonment and ruin. Cánovas, daily more dependent upon the Conservatives, was forced to accept their views and to declare against the concessions of Martinez Campos. When Cánovas disavowed engagements entered into by his emissary, another and a great grievance was added to the Cuban list; and the separatists increased in number and influence. Neither were the rebels beaten nor the Loyalists satisfied. The struggle that had cost Spain 100,000 lives was ready to break out as soon as the Peacemaker turned his back. The Peace of El Zanjón (Feb. 28, 1878) was no peace.

When the Cortes reassembled (Nov., 1876), the constitutional guarantees were restored in all the provinces except those of Catalonia. Indeed so strongly was the Government established that it could make light of threats of revolution. It actually allowed the publication of the Republican-Socialist



manifesto issued in Paris by Ruiz Zorrilla and Salmeron (Aug., 1876). Cánovas' wise policy of leaving the door open to the leaders of the Revolution of 1868 was producing excellent results. Though autocratic with his followers, he was, so long as not provoked beyond endurance, forbearing towards opponents. Sagasta, Vega de Armijo, Alonso Martinez, and Camacho now headed the Monarchical Radicals, whose aim was to bring back by constitutional means a great part of the Constitution of 1869. They were ready to alternate with Cánovas in office when the time should come to practise his plans for a make-believe of party government. A year or two only were wanted to confirm these ex-Republicans in their monarchical faith and to fit them for "the orderly succession of parties." Occasionally, as in April, 1877, the irritation of the Opposition mounted high; they struggled in their gentle bonds, resented Cánovas' half-contemptuous toleration, and complained to the King of his high-handedness. They threatened to withdraw and to expose the sham of the Constitutional parties; but usually they were content to pursue not over eagerly their ideal of religious freedom, universal suffrage, liberty of the press, and unhindered discussion of all political opinions. They made great victories out of small mercies, and triumphed noisily when the King was induced to censure an *alcalde* who had compelled Protestants to accept Roman Catholic baptism (Oct., 1877).

For a time public opinion was occupied by reported dissensions in the Palace. Queen Isabel had hardly seen her son safely seated on the throne when she began to interfere. Returning to Madrid (Oct., 1876), she was soon engrossed in a wrangle with the Treasury over items and arrears in her pension. Had her activities been restricted to her private interests, no harm would have been done; but her connexions and her associates induced her to take up a strong attitude with regard to the religious question. While Cánovas was nearly overwhelmed by the dangerous power of the Ultramontanes,



Isabel wrote to assure the Pope that all her influence with her son should be used to bring about a settlement satisfactory to his Holiness. Cánovas ventured to remonstrate with the ex-Queen on her interference. Queen Isabel published part of her correspondence with her son's Prime Minister in the Paris *Figaro*; whereupon the whole was given by the Ministry to the Spanish press, and the nation put into a position to judge the controversy. Identity of religious aspirations had brought Queen Isabel into relation with the wife of Don Carlos; she was cultivating the friendship of certain generals conspicuous for their activity in the Restoration. Don Alfonso's marriage disturbed his mother's schemes for alliance with the Carlist branch of the Bourbon family, while it revived an ancient feud between the two daughters of Ferdinand VII. In December, 1877, the nation learnt that the King was betrothed to his first cousin, Mercedes, the second daughter of the Duke of Montpensier. The marriage was recognised as one of affection and not of policy. Spaniards rejoiced that they would have a Queen born and bred in Spain. Congress approved the marriage by a majority of three hundred and nine against four. Only one man, Moyano, chose to utter in Parliament the terrible charges brought by public opinion against the bride's father. Cánovas replied only by invoking the strange statute of moral limitations conveyed in the phrase "Let bygones be bygones."

Rejoicings over the royal wedding and the pacification of Cuba opened the year 1878. With peace, reviving prosperity, and confidence, a moderate Government, and a still popular King, Spain promised herself a brighter future. The rejoicings had hardly ended when Queen Mercedes died of fever at Madrid (June 27), before entering her nineteenth year. The King was overwhelmed with grief. He never in fact seemed to recover his interest in life. For the rest of his reign he did his duty, nobly on great occasions, perfunctorily on common ones, but he was restless; his conduct was irregular;

his high spirits gave place to a hard, dry, half-cynical humour. Queen Mercedes was followed to the grave by two of the great figures of the preceding generation. Her grandmother, Queen Cristina, died in retirement at Havre, her public services of half-a-century before utterly forgotten. Forgotten too, though he received the honours of a public funeral, was the Duke of the Victory, Prince of Vergara, Baldomero Espartero, who troubled Spain for so many of his eighty-six years of life.

Except a few irreconcilable Carlists and Republicans, hardly anyone now refused to recognise that Spain at present could hope for no better government than that of the Restoration. Castelar, betaking himself to paradox, had announced that "Liberal ends must be sought by Conservative methods," and that "revolution was anti-Liberal." Statesmen could now assume a certain degree of independence, assured that the fate of the dynasty was no longer bound up with that of a particular Cabinet. The time was approaching when a change of Ministry must take place in order that the nakedness of dictatorship might retain the decent rag of Constitutional pretence. Early in 1878 Cánovas' Ministry was slightly shaken by the refusal of some of its supporters to vote its candidate for the Presidency of Congress. But the crisis was tided over, and the session was taken up with the discussion of non-party questions, such as agriculture and commerce, before almost empty benches. It was proved that Spanish exports were decreasing, and that of what was left more than five-sixths were carried in foreign ships. Barcelona, pleading poverty, begged for time to pay her taxes and for permission to raise a huge loan to be spent on public works. Nothing came of the Parliamentary discussion beyond the suggestion that efforts should be made to bring about friendly and profitable relations with South America. Meanwhile a neighbour's loss was to prove Spain's temporary gain.

Phylloxera was devastating the vineyards of France. At

first no cure was found; and, when later it was proved that American vine-stocks could resist the disease, years were needed to uproot and replant the vines and bring the vineyards to their former productiveness. In the meantime the exporters of Bordeaux were obliged to find a substitute for their own vintages in order to prevent their trade from deserting them. The Spanish wines, that hitherto had been used by them only in small quantities for mixing, now became all-important. Prices doubled and trebled; and the development of the supply gave a powerful stimulus to agriculture. Emboldened by increasing exports, Spain concluded a treaty of commerce with her neighbour; but she failed to take advantage of her opportunity to supplant France as the world's wine-merchant. The Spanish wines were retailed under French names.

The spring session of 1879 showed further disintegration of the majority. The Centre, hitherto Ministerial, was fusing with the Left. The question of the duration of the Cortes arose. The Liberals maintained that, the existing Cortes having been elected previous to the new Constitution, their mandate would terminate at the end of three years, as directed by the Constitution of 1869. The Ministerialists contended that five years was the legal term; and the King ruled in their favour. It was decided, however, not to delay much longer a general election, which would afford opportunity for consulting the chiefs of all parties. The Cortes of the Restoration were indeed worn out. Cánovas loved to keep burning questions in the background and to employ his oratory on the non-contentious or the obvious; but even he lamented that the Cortes discussed a new and restrictive Press Law rather with the impartial languor befitting academic debate than as a question of actuality.

In March (1879) Cánovas again thought fit to get rid for a time of his responsibilities. He had two good reasons for retirement; his party was breaking up by reason of his inability to meet the claims of individual rapacity; and Martinez Campos

had come back from Cuba. Some said that Cánovas was jealous of the blundering soldier who had thrust himself into the first place at the Restoration, and now returned acclaimed by a certain party as the Pacificator of Cuba. But Cánovas had excellent reasons other than jealousy for wishing to dissociate himself from the action of his subordinate. He saw how easily the Cuban Loyalists would show that the vaunted agreement of El Zanjón was a capitulation in the disguise of a convention, giving to rebels in arms representation in Cortes, full local and municipal liberties, and administrative and fiscal reform. Moreover, Martinez Campos had recognised on his own authority a Cuban debt of £4,000,000. Such a surrender was sure to be unpopular as soon as its import was understood; so Cánovas left its author to defend it before the Cortes, promising to give support as a private member. He advised the King to call to power a Liberal-Conservative ministry under Martinez Campos. Martinez Campos, in turn, urged the King not to withdraw his confidence from Cánovas, but he took office (March 7, 1879). The Ministers of Marine, Commerce, and Finance carried over their portfolios from the preceding Cabinet. Martinez Campos himself took the War Ministry, Silvela the Home, and Molins the Foreign Office.

The new ministers declared themselves the continuers of Cánovas' policy. They sent a circular to the provincial governors directing them to allow full liberty of public meeting in view of the general election of April, and the free expression of all opinions except such as attacked the King or the army. Only the Federal Republicans withdrew from the poll. Castelar's little band of *posibilistas* joined Sagasta's Liberals. The result was the election of 170 ministerialists, 150 followers of Cánovas and Romero Robledo, and an Opposition numbering about 110, but broken up into many groups. In the Senate the ministerial majority was six to one. Martinez Campos' Cabinet was left, so far as Congress was concerned, at the mercy of Cánovas, who now graciously renewed his

promise to support its so-called Liberal-Conservative policy of retrenchment and reduction of the army. Continuing the overplayed farce, Martinez Campos declared himself a loyal follower of Cánovas, but he notably failed to make him accept responsibility for his convention. During the first session (June 1—July 26, 1879) measures were carried by large majorities; but Sagasta's attack on the "disgraceful and accursed peace" reached Cánovas through Martinez Campos. The latter in his florid style defended a transaction which had stopped the wound from which Spain was bleeding to death. He denied the obvious truth that, sent abroad by the party that insisted on submission as a preliminary to negotiation, he had allowed to be extorted from him all that the rebels had hoped from victory.

Martinez Campos had recommended immediate and unconditional emancipation of slaves. A Commission appointed to examine the matter advised the gradual extinction of slavery and the immediate abolition of corporal punishment for slaves. Their owners were to be obliged to clothe, feed, teach, and pay the slaves for four years, after which one-fourth of their number would be freed each year. But the question that really agitated the Loyalists of Cuba was not emancipation so much as compensation; and, to secure this, Martinez Campos' law for immediate emancipation must be defeated. Accordingly the recommendations of the Commission were accepted by the Senate and sent down to the Lower House. Campos failed also to secure the economic and administrative reforms which he had promised to the Cubans. Here again he was supported by the Liberal wing of his party and opposed by the Conservative Centre. The Finance Minister declared that the proposed modification in the colonial tariff would involve a deficit which he was unwilling to face. His resignation was followed by that of others; his colleagues and Martinez Campos quitted office (Dec. 7, 1879). Acting, as always, on Cánovas' advice, the King called in Posada Herrera; but he



declined, giving as his reason his inability to secure the support of the Constitutionals under Sagasta and Serrano. Lopez de Ayala, President of Congress, likewise declined. Indeed the offer made to them was a hollow one; had they accepted it, they would have been in the hands of Cánovas. The history of the Parliamentary alliances and battles since the Restoration is suspect throughout by reason of their insincerity. The victory was often arranged beforehand between the rival leaders; the apparent and avowed object of the struggle was not the real one. Instead of great principles, narrow party or personal interests guided policy; the Parliamentary show was kept up in order to conceal from the simple the rule of a dictator; those were indeed deluded who fancied that Governments were made and unmade by the results of debates in Congress.

Having disavowed Martinez Campos' concessions and forced his opponents to admit their impotence by challenging them to undertake the government, Cánovas again formed a Cabinet. He chose to keep the Cuban question before the nation. The Reform Bill that had been the ostensible cause of the fall of Martinez Campos' Ministry had, he said, been badly drawn up. Its failure was due to its faulty form. He himself approved its principles, and would carry out in a less invidious manner its provisions for putting Cubans and Spaniards on the same footing with regard to public burdens. This was intended as a sop to the Catalan manufacturers; but, if it meant that the Cuban market was to be closed as before, it amounted in fact to a rejection of the principles which Cánovas professed to adopt. He pronounced, too, in favour of gradual emancipation of slaves.

How much more importance was attached to forms and manners in debate than to its subject-matter was shown when Cánovas failed to give a polite reply to a searching question asked in Congress with regard to the late crisis. Immediately the Opposition was in an uproar, claiming apology as for



in such. The President failed to rule them. Canovas could demand that his animals had been bewitched. On December 12, 124 members voted to amend the *Blasque*, and justified their withdrawal as 2 members to their consciences. The following November gave a vote of confidence to the Government, and for once public opinion condemned the course on account of the weakness of its prompt. The change from Republic to Monarchy had caused no such result.

Queen Isabella married Marquis Cameros August 21, 1874. King Alfonso married Maria Cristina, daughter of the Archduke Maximilian of Austria Nov. 20, 1874. The wedding took place amid the glare of a great national festival, and the funds at home for public rejoicings were spent to relieve suffering from floods which in Murcia and Catalonia destroyed more than two hundred lives and many million pounds' worth of property. The King visited the scene of the disaster and, as ever on such occasions, showed such courage and self-sacrifice for suffering.

In January 1875 the ministers returned to their places in Congress. Canovas having given an assurance that he had no intention of leaving them. In spite of the optimistic view taken by the military authorities, the news from Cuba was again threatening. The rebels had told each other arms only because their demands had been granted by Spain's army. Now Canovas refused to ratify the convention and renounced the separation with *delegados*. Answering a Cortes senator he said, "Face to face with traitors, the Government can follow only one line of conduct. If they wish for war they shall have it. I have nothing to add." So looking still to revive Marquis Cameros' conciliatory policy that the breach between the two became complete. Marquis Cameros alleged to all who cared to listen that he had been tricked and betrayed. He took up the attitude of the brave and honest soldier, the tool of the despising nation. Seceding with his following from the Centre, the Liberal dynamic party, he joined on the Left

the Opposition groups under Sagasta and Posada Herrera. It should be noticed that Cánovas, in refusing Campos' reforms, pitted his own *à priori* views against those of most who had experience of the island. Concha and Pavia believed reform to afford the only hope of preserving the union. But Cánovas feared Catalan manufacturers and rich slave-owners in Spain more than distant insurgents. The Finance Minister, by accusing the Opposition of refusing the funds necessary to crush the rebellion, roused so much indignation that he had to resign (March 15, 1880). The fact that a new Cuban loan of ten millions sterling at eight per cent. was covered three times over in Spain and rose at once to 102 proved that confidence in the future was still strong.

The Liberals were trying to bring back the party struggle from Colonial to Spanish ground and to political as opposed to personal aims. A programme, signed by 274 public men, set forth the Democratic and Progressive view. It advocated a liberal interpretation of the Constitution of 1876, freedom of worship, of the press, of public meeting and teaching, universal suffrage, decentralisation, universal military service, retrenchment and financial reform, an irremovable judicature, and assimilation of Cuba to the home provinces. This manifesto was followed by fusion of the groups led by Martinez Campos and Posada Herrera with the Dynastic Liberals. The meeting of the united party, presided over by Sagasta, was attended by forty-five senators, one hundred and thirty deputies, and, perhaps equally important, four captains-general, and sixteen generals. For Spain this was a most formidable Opposition. Dangerous, too, was its contention that its policy was thwarted by the King, the creature and mouthpiece of Cánovas, and that the Ministry lived on the crown "like ivy on an oak." It called on the King to adopt a more Liberal policy. Cánovas shrewdly twitted the coalition or *fusionists* with addressing to the King arguments that had failed to persuade the electorate. Before the Cortes adjourned (June 23, 1880) he received an

overwhelming vote of confidence. Martinez Campos' thundering attack was too obviously inspired by personal resentment to succeed. In many provinces the Liberals took no part in the autumn municipal elections. They were the first held under the new law; and the Carlist Provinces had returned Opposition candidates. This result from a Conservative district was interpreted as a challenge, though it may well have represented the fact that only the Liberal townsfolk exercised their right to vote. The policy of conciliation hitherto pursued with regard to the former privileged provinces was dropped by Romero Robledo, the rash and hot-tempered occupant of the Home Office. He withdrew by decree (Oct., 1880) the agreement on which the no longer dangerous but highly-valued remains of autonomy depended, and forbade the use of the Basque language in the pulpit. Fortunately for the provinces and for Spain, the ill-judged decree assimilating the Basque Provinces in every respect to the rest of Spain was never carried out.

As the moment drew near when it would become necessary to call the Liberals to office, the Liberals themselves became less pronounced in their Radicalism. Castelar, in a flowery address to imaginary followers, had told the world that Canovas' obstinacy in holding office was the one provocation to revolution left. The *posibilist* leader took his stand upon "the extreme Right of Democracy, and from his latest position refused the fellowship of Communists and Federals." His programme, differing little from the Sagasta-Campos one, ended with a condescending tender of the olive branch to the Church. "It would be no small matter," he said, "if we succeeded in allaying certain religious anxieties and attracting to our side the most enlightened of the clergy....In any case I cannot imagine a more inopportune moment than the present for a quarrel with the Church....Only by living amid advanced democracies can one understand to what a degree religious faith can consolidate true liberty." A month or two later

Castelar, in a letter to Emile de Gérardin, assumed the credit for having changed Spanish democracy from revolutionary to legal and pacific.

The activity of the Opposition increased as the session drew near (Dec. 30, 1880). But, as soon as they tried to define their line of action, they fell to wrangling over their differences; and the *fusion* was nearly dissolved. The King's speech was full of confidence except when it touched upon finance. It called upon the country for fresh sacrifices, but was silent as to the corruption and unfairness that made them necessary. The taxation fell most hardly upon the poor, whilst those who had wealth or influence escaped it partially or wholly. It was reported to Congress (April, 1880) that 173,000 landed properties were seized for arrears of taxes. These were all small peasant holdings which bore the public burden, whilst fraudulent classification exempted large estates. Every form of peculation and abuse flourished, and still flourishes. The President of the Supreme Court declared before the Senate (June, 1876) that the expense of raising the taxes absorbed more than a third of their amount. This is because the taxes must be wrung from the needy and defenceless, whilst the collector is glad to pass over the rich man to whom he perhaps owes his place or to come to an arrangement advantageous to taxer and taxed but ruinous to the State. The people of the south were driven to emigrate in yearly increasing numbers to Algiers and Tunis, and those of the north to America, leaving wide tracts of Spanish soil untilled. Industries and manufactures such as are carried on are for the most part in the hands of foreigners. All except the simple and rough articles of daily use are imported, for the Spanish potter, weaver, and smith have lost their skill.

Except for two short periods, during which he chose to escape responsibility and to criticise the work of his agents from an independent position, Cánovas had held office uninterruptedly for six years, or ever since the Restoration.

It was time that a change should be made; but neither Cánovas himself nor the Cortes seemed disposed to make it. The Address was voted in the spring session of 1881 by a majority of 144 in a House of 274; it was noted, however, that many former supporters of the Ministry did not vote. Cánovas' foreign policy, and his leanings to German friendship rather than French, were sharply criticised. More threatening was the speech of Alonso Martinez accusing the Crown of inherited prejudice against the Liberals, the rebels against the thrones of Fernando VII and Isabel II. He hinted that Cánovas' overbearing attitude might again provoke revolution. Both attacks, however, failed. When a vote of censure was proposed for unnecessary and unjustified prohibition of a democratic banquet, it was lost by nearly four to one. It was the King who at last turned out the Cabinet, despite its majority in the Cortes. Whether it was done by the advice or with the consent of Cánovas belongs to the yet unwritten secret history of the time. A further classification of the debt as privileged and deferred was proposed. Cánovas announced that, in order to undertake it, he must continue in office eighteen months longer. But, in view of the growing irritation of the Liberals, this would be unsafe; the President of the Council must be taught to play the Parliamentary game according to the rules he himself had laid down. The King called in Sagasta, who took office with Vega de Armijo (Foreign Affairs), Camacho (Finance), Alonso Martinez (Justice), Martinez Campos (War), and four other *fusionists*.

Whatever may be thought of Cánovas' methods, there can be no doubt that the state of Spain improved greatly under his rule. The two great problems he had to face were the interference of the army in politics, the bad tradition coming down from Riego's successful mutiny, and the irreconcilable attitude of the Church towards all Governments that ventured on independence. Six years had brought the conviction that the era of *pronunciamientos* was closed; and in that time



a working agreement between Church and State had been attained.

When the Liberals published their programme, it was found to differ so little from that of their predecessors as to justify the suspicion that the object of their impatience had been rather place than reform. Absolute freedom of election; maintenance of existing taxation with greater economy in expenditure; commercial and industrial development; liberty so far as consistent with monarchy—none of these were items that would have been out of place in a Conservative manifesto. The “orderly succession of parties” devised by Cánovas had now in fact begun. Each in turn enjoyed power and patronage under the tacit understanding that it should when the time came make room for the other. Neither seriously criticised the other’s administration, for were they not all honourable men? Burning questions were kept as much as might be in the background. When Liberals were in office, names differed; but things went on much the same. The Liberalism of the Ministry of 1881 was shown by amnesty to a few political exiles, pardon for press offences, and the reinstatement of some university professors, despite clerical protest, in the chairs which they had lost through doubtful orthodoxy. Still the change was welcomed. When the municipal elections took place (April, 1881), the ministerial majority was as large as usual, though the pressure exercised had been distinctly less. The Carlists and Republicans had increased their representation at the expense of the Conservatives. The Cortes stood adjourned until new functionaries could be appointed to manage an election. They were dissolved (June 26), and in September the new Chambers met. Sagasta’s majority was three to one in Congress, and even more in the Senate. But the lot of the Ministry was not an easy one. The Left wing of their party was continually claiming fulfilment of Liberal pledges, while, on the other hand, Cánovas stood ready to accuse his opponents of anti-



monarchical views. This accusation it was difficult for ex-Republicans to rebut. The Radicals split on the question. A small party, under Ruiz Zorrilla, frankly accepted the charge and aimed openly at revolution; but the majority, under Castelar and Martos, calling themselves Dynastic Democrats, supported Sagasta, urging the while reform and a democratic policy on the Crown.

The first Liberal budget brought in by Camacho proved a success; it actually showed a small surplus. This was devoted to further conversion of the debt. Interest on the three per cent. and six per cent. loans was reduced to one and two per cent. respectively; but, now that it seemed likely that the reduced interest would really be paid, they rose respectively to 22 and 42. Camacho's financial proposals included gradual reduction of customs-dues to fifteen per cent. *ad valorem*.

Freed from the responsibilities of office, Cánovas sought to regain the confidence of the religious party. He supported an amendment to the Address, wherein Pidal proposed to censure the Government for failing to defend the independence of the Holy See. The Government, however, made bold to declare that it would disregard Papal interference, should any occur, with regard to the proposed legalisation of civil marriage. The bishops were again doing their utmost to provoke a rupture between the Liberals and Rome.

Pan-Iberianism, or at any rate very close union with the kindred nation to the west, had always formed part of the aspirations of Spanish Liberals, and had always brought danger and discredit upon its advocates. The opening of the Madrid-Cáceres-Lisbon Railway (Oct., 1881) was made the occasion for a meeting of the Kings of Spain and Portugal. Speeches were uttered advocating customs union and political alliance, and joint action abroad. The union of the two dynasties by marriage was hinted at. As neither *La Iberia*, Sagasta's newspaper, nor the Portuguese official organs denied these inten-

tions, the meeting was perhaps arranged so that a feeler might be put forward. If so, the feeler had speedily to be withdrawn. Spain remained indifferent; but Portuguese susceptibility, ever resentful of the nearer approach of her neighbour, was roused; and the Portuguese ministry that had advocated closer political relations fell.

The return of a nominally Liberal Government to power had roused fresh hopes in the Radicals in accordance with promises given by Sagasta's party whilst still in opposition. But, after the Ministry had held power for three months and done nothing to redeem its promises, it became clear that Sagasta's inclinations now led him to depend upon the more Conservative wing of his party. After breaking with his more Radical supporters, he held office for a year and a half; but Romero Robledo maliciously pointed out that the Liberal Ministry had been obliged to suspend or prosecute no less than 1500 municipalities in 27 provinces. The situation was not without danger. The Constitutional Republicans and Dynastic Radicals joined Serrano and united to oppose the Government which had so bitterly disappointed them. The real Democrats were on the point of revolt. The authority of the Government rested upon compulsion only. The Catalans were rendered furious by its insistence on pushing through a new commercial agreement with France in the face of continued opposition of the Conservatives and the Radical Protectionists. The bill authorising gradual reduction of tariffs spread alarm still further; and a state of siege was imposed in Catalonia. Madrid was hardly less discontented. The tradesmen refused to pay the new industrial and commercial tax. Finally their submission was brought about by Sagasta's conciliatory attitude and a careful playing upon the rival interests and jealousies of Madrid and Barcelona, consumers against producers.

A secret society known as the *Mano Negra*, and bent on securing its socialistic ends by murder and arson, was

spreading in the agricultural southern provinces. On the other hand, the Clericals had organised for the summer a pilgrimage to Rome, which was in reality a Carlist and Ultramontane demonstration. With difficulty did the Government obtain a declaration from Rome of its political insignificance and the substitution of the Bishop of Teruel for the Carlist Nocedal as its leader. Luckily for the peace of Don Alfonso's reign, the Carlists fell to quarrelling among themselves. On the name-day of their Prince (Nov. 5) the two divisions sent separate congratulations, and one actually spoke of rescuing the lawful King from "his shameful captivity in the hands of Nocedal's faction."

When the Cortes adjourned (July 10, 1882), it was clear that the Ministry was much weakened. The Liberal Opposition, headed by Serrano in the Senate and Moret in Congress, had become bolder. There seemed to be reason in its plea that there was room within the monarchy for a more Liberal policy than that of Sagasta. This combination of Radicalism and loyalty won the King's approval; and he openly favoured the new party, whilst the Conservatives promised it their help, at least in so far as should be necessary to overthrow the Ministry. It had been hoped that the Republicans too would join; but the hope was not fulfilled. Calling itself the Dynastic Left, the new coalition adopted Sagasta's unfulfilled programme and sought to restore the Constitution of 1869 with the modifications indispensable to fit it to a monarchy. Twice the Dynastic Left was beaten, once when it opposed Posada Herrera, the ministerial candidate for the Presidency of Congress, and took as its candidate General Lopez Dominguez, and again by a still larger majority on a motion for revision of the Constitution. But Sagasta won the second of these victories only by accepting the reforms proposed by Serrano in the Senate—civil marriage, reduction of taxation, and freedom of the press and of worship. The attacks of the Liberal dissentients were driving Sagasta to a more definitely

monarchical policy. His objection to the Constitution of 1869 now was that it failed to afford adequate protection to the throne.

On Sagasta fell the weight of the reaction and disappointment that necessarily followed the excitement and high hopes of the Restoration. It has often been pointed out that during this and the following period it was generally the Liberals and not the Conservatives who were obliged to resort to unusual measures of police and martial law in order to check riot or revolt. But to attribute this necessity, as some do, to the encouragement given by the Liberals to disorder or to their harshness in repression is unfair. Cánovas ruled as long as he deemed prudent or could do so with credit; he resigned only when the situation became dangerous and difficult, and discontent was about to break bounds. Then and not till then was Sagasta or some other called in to pacify those whom his opponents chose to call his political followers. But by this time Sagasta was hardly more akin to the extreme Radicals than was Cánovas himself. He was in fact called by the Radicals the fated destroyer (*hombre funeste*) of the Liberal party.

A difference having arisen between two of his colleagues, Sagasta reconstructed his Cabinet (Jan. 7, 1883), losing in the process the services of his able Finance Minister, Camacho. During the following month he was obliged to put down with a high hand the *Mano Negra* and *Tribunal Popular*. These anarchical secret societies preached the doctrine that no man can acquire a claim to the labour of another, and enforced their condemnation of individuals by murder and arson. They were spread over Andalusia, but flourished chiefly in the neighbourhood of Cadiz and Jerez de la Frontera. Rumour exaggerated the number of their adherents and the criminality of their methods. The rich landowners fled to the great towns for safety, babbling of fifty thousand sworn conspirators against society directed from Geneva. The Government acted

with vigour; and the arrest of some three hundred persons broke up the associations. It was proved before the law-courts that their aims were social and not political. Sagasta's energy in defence of menaced property won for him the confidence of the wealthier classes.

A more serious matter than that of the *Mano Negra* was an attempted *pronunciamiento* at Badajoz (Aug. 5, 1883). Led by a colonel, one infantry and one cavalry regiment declared for the Republic, the Constitution of 1869, and abolition of conscription and octroi. They seized the civil governor and other magistrates; but when no reinforcements joined them they lost heart, and, to the number of about one thousand, crossed the Portuguese frontier. Already a strong force had been sent against them by the very man on whom they called to lead the revolution they had begun. It is not clear how they got the belief that Martinez Campos would favour a Radical revolt. The movement was not an isolated one. The garrison of Badajoz, when it mutinied, believed that the north and Valencia as well as the rest of Andalusia had already taken arms. Simultaneous agitation was apparent from Biscay to Catalonia and south as far as Cadiz. Ruiz Zorrilla's emissaries had been working in the army. The leaders of all the Liberal groups publicly condemned the appeal to violence and revolt; and Castelar, alluding to the fact that the cry of the Republic had been raised, announced that the Federal Constitution had perished in the flames at Cartagena. About one hundred and forty officers implicated in the attempt were cashiered. The King visited the fortified places of the northern provinces in order to restore confidence. Ruiz Zorrilla's expulsion from France was obtained.

In the Cortes an attempt was made to divide parties on religious lines. The point raised was the form of oath administered to the deputies. It was resolved that conscientious objectors to religious forms should be allowed to make affirmation; but the feeling shown during the discussion was



so strong that the Government, after consultation with the Nuncio, dropped its Civil Marriage Bill in order to avoid further cause of offence. On religious as well as secular questions Sagasta's attitude was no longer such as to satisfy the new school of Radicals and the Dynastic Left. Lopez Dominguez, Balaguer, Moret, Martos, and Montero Rios fiercely disavowed him as a renegade.

In the summer of 1883 an unimportant commercial agreement with Germany was concluded. Ever since the Restoration, both political parties had sought the friendship of Germany rather than that of France; and France, brooding over her defeat, was deeply resentful. When the German Emperor invited King Alfonso to the autumn manœuvres of 1883 he accepted, in spite of Cánovas' warning of the danger incurred. The King had a passion for soldiering, and was flattered by the tone of the invitation. Paris gave him a cold official reception as he passed through; and the magnificence and warmth of his welcome at Homburg increased his admiration and liking for Germany and his inclination towards the Triple Alliance. He hoped by its aid to obtain the recognition of Spain as a first-class Power, and to take a lead in the Mediterranean and North Africa. The French press had long been girding at Spain's attitude towards Germany; it chose to suppose that the commercial agreement was a preliminary to political alliance. When news arrived that the King of Spain had accepted the colonelcy of a Uhlan regiment quartered at Strassburg and had worn its uniform, the irritation became fiercer than ever. It was carefully fostered by agitators, in order to stir up difficulties for the Republic and particularly for Jules Ferry. When, on his return from Germany, Alfonso reached the Northern Station at Paris, he was met with an organised hostile demonstration (Sept. 29, 1883). It was renewed when he went in the evening to dine with President Grévy at the Elysée. The King behaved throughout with great coolness and dignity. He resolved, however, to quit



Paris at once. But next day (Sunday) the President called and begged him to distinguish between the French nation and a part of the Parisian mob. Alfonso was induced to delay his departure till the Monday morning. His return to his capital was a triumph. Spaniards forgot their differences, and all alike resented the slight put upon the King. Carlists and Republicans joined in the spontaneous welcome. There followed some talk of a diplomatic rupture, but wiser counsels prevailed; and the incident closed when France agreed to the publication of an attenuated version of Grévy's personal explanation in the *Madrid Gazette*.

The Liberal Ministry seized the opportunity to resign. Vega de Armijo, to whose policy with regard to Germany the question was largely due, pronounced the French apology insufficient. Martinez Campos supported him; and Sagasta made way (Oct. 10, 1883) for the Dynastic Left led by Posada Herrera. The best-known members of the new Cabinet were Lopez Dominguez (War Office) and Moret (Home Office). This change of Ministry was perhaps, as has been represented, the result of a plot to show the impotence of the Dynastic Left for government. The Cortes were not dissolved; so the Cabinet was at the mercy of Sagasta's majority or what remained of the Fusionists. Posada Herrera adopted a meek attitude; he begged the place-holders not to resign as was usual on such occasions. Thereby he disappointed his own swarm of office-seekers without gaining the gratitude of those who profited. At Sagasta's bidding he withdrew his ambitious programme of universal suffrage, constitutional revision, civil marriage, and Habeas Corpus; and nothing further was heard of the Constitution of 1869. Its elective Senate and its Cortes, with power to choose or depose the head of the State, were still considered dangerous; but, as for universal suffrage, even Cánovas had withdrawn his objection to it, cynically alleging that he had never commanded so docile a majority as that elected by universal suffrage after the

Restoration. Before the Cortes opened (Dec. 15), it was agreed that no contentious measures should be proposed. When Sagasta became President of Congress, all knew where the real power was situated. So Conservative was his opening speech, that even the Right applauded it. Meanwhile in the Senate, Serrano, its President, was making a Liberal speech. Despite his care to avoid offence, given or taken, it became impossible for Posada Herrera to remain in office when Sagasta and his Fusionists carried an alternative reply to the Address by a majority of 221 against 126. Whilst the Ministry prated of constitutional reform and universal suffrage, Sagasta in mere wantonness carried an amendment that neither the circumstances of the country nor public opinion demanded the one or the other. Posada Herrera resigned (Jan. 17, 1884). The Cortes were resolved into their native elements; the impossibility of fourth parties had been demonstrated; and the Dynastic Left returned piecemeal to Sagasta's fold.

To such a situation there was but one issue; Cánovas was again called to office. So well prepared was he that he submitted at once a full list of his Cabinet to the King. All were experienced politicians. Elduayen took the Foreign Office, Quesada the War Office, Romero Robledo the Home Office, Pidal Public Works and Commerce (*Fomento*), and Silvela Justice. But, in spite of the reputation of its members, Cánovas' last Cabinet under Don Alfonso was not successful. Cánovas' temper was becoming even more imperious. He was daily less regardful of the shams which he himself had set up; his management of elections was to the highest degree shameless and cynical; his finance was full of mistakes and scandals; the atmosphere was heavy with corruption. The Catalans, by whose favour he held office, insisted upon rigorous protection. A dispute with Germany led to a dangerous diplomatic quarrel, from which could come neither credit nor profit. The shadow of the King's failing health drew ever nearer.

On taking office, Cánovas closed the Cortes. Instead of the usual elaborate programme, he issued a mere note indicating Liberal measures together with enforcement of order and of respect for institutions. The press was rigorously pruned by the Censor. Nevertheless the Liberals decided to adopt the half-benevolent attitude known in Spanish politics as moderate opposition. Perhaps a pact was already made in view of the coming crisis; in any case public opinion supported the Government in suppressing wanton incitement to revolt.

The general election (April 27, 1884) gave the Ministry 295 deputies, leaving to Sagasta and his Fusionist-Constitutionalists 45, to Serrano's Dynastic Left or Reformers 26, to the Ultramontane group 11, and to Castelar three faithful followers. The Carlists and the Republican groups, under Pi y Margall and Ruiz Zorrilla, had abstained from voting, avowedly in order to protest against illicit pressure, but probably in order to conceal their weakness. The means whereby the unusually clean sweep had been made at the election were indeed familiar, but they had been awkwardly employed. In places where the Opposition was strongest, Ministerial candidates had been brought out at the head of the poll; where hardly anybody voted, the urns were found to be full of voting-papers. An unusual amount of resentment was aroused; and Cánovas, sure of his position, allowed it free expression. Addressing the Conservative deputies on the eve of the opening of the Cortes, he advocated toleration of all non-revolutionary parties. Criticism of the Ministry, however harsh, would be allowed; but a hedge of respect must surround the throne. He ended with a stern threat against breakers of the peace.

The warning was not unneeded. Several small mutinies had taken place, and their instigators had generally escaped unpunished, thanks to an ill-directed mercy, when Cánovas resolved to make examples of two officers whose case showed peculiar recklessness. It happened that both were Catalans;

and immediately all local influence was brought to bear in order to save them; not because they deserved pity, but because they were natives of a particular province. Alfonso was ever disposed to mercy, and perhaps he saw on this occasion a prospect of winning for himself a little sorely-needed popularity. He would gladly have gratified his petitioners, among whom was Victor Hugo; but Cánovas insisted upon the death-penalty. Assuming to himself all responsibility, he retorted on the petitioners with splendid effect. "The Ministry over which I have the honour to preside has respectfully pointed out to His Majesty that it cannot continue to govern if the principle is established that only sergeants, corporals, and private soldiers are subject to the full rigour of the Military Code. The obligations of generals and officers are greater than those of private soldiers; and, though it is natural that those who make light of army discipline and public order should claim indulgence for them, I confess that to do so seems to me not to become peaceful folk who so easily take alarm at the least disturbance."

Agitation in Catalonia was increased by a proposal to change the civil code of the province. The Government, whilst professing all respect for ancient and deeply-rooted institutions, declared that the codification of local usages was necessary, particularly in the matters of inheritance and land transfer, "lest a humble registrar should take upon himself the function of legislator." But the Catalans knew that the proposed interference was part of a wide scheme of unification of civil codes and further centralisation. They sent a commission under a Conservative President (March 10, 1885) to protest to the King against the charges of separatism and disloyalty so often brought against them. They had, they said, no desire to weaken the bonds of national union, but they held that the best way to invigorate national life was to encourage the spontaneous activity of the provinces. Catalonia's admirable local administration had been taken

away, to be replaced first by administration on a Castilian model and then by a copy of the French system. The language had been suppressed; judges and witnesses now spoke different tongues. The Civil Law, the foundation of the robust and moral Catalan family life, was now threatened. By forty years of untold labour Catalonia had founded national industries; and now the central Government proposed to strangle them by commercial treaties. The King pronounced in favour of local institutions and of protection. The proposed commercial agreement with Great Britain, in which the Catalans foresaw their ruin, was dropped when Spain insisted that wines up to thirty degrees of alcoholic strength should be admitted on payment of one shilling a gallon.

Party politics now bulked less largely than before. Sagasta still spoke of "bringing into the Constitution of 1876 the principles of 1869"; but the attention of the House was divided between alternate banter and recrimination. In the Senate the Count of Casa Valencia summed up the position of the divided Liberal party (May, 1884). Its two branches, he said, had a common father: one sprang from the union of Serrano with Sagasta; the other from the union of Serrano with Martos. So long as both mothers lived union was impossible. Spain contained too many pretty women for the peace of domestic life, and too many eminent statesmen for the peace of public life. When the Marquis de Novaliches congratulated Serrano, his conqueror at Alcolea, on serving Isabel's son, Serrano retorted that of all who figured in public life there was none but had rebelled some time or other.

The presence of Pidal in the Ministry was a perpetual challenge to the anti-clerical party. His speech in favour of the Pope's claim to temporal power was censured at home, and provoked a diplomatic protest from the Italian Government. Spain sent assurances that the speech had been badly reported. Even by these exertions Pidal did not escape the goad of the



extremists on his own side. Whilst the Liberal Opposition fretted against his retrograde tendencies, the bishops attacked him for his unfriendly attitude towards the Holy See (Jan., 1885). The Pope himself checked the attempt to stir up discord and provoke a diplomatic rupture. At the request of the Spanish Government he ordered his champions to moderate their zeal on his behalf.

During the winter, earthquakes devastated large districts of the south. In the province of Granáda alone 5400 dwellings were destroyed and nearly 700 lives lost. The King visited the afflicted districts, and distributed relief funds (Jan., 1885) in fearful weather. In the summer, cholera fell upon the central and southern provinces, and deaths numbered 1400 daily; over 100,000 persons perished. Again King Alfonso braved the danger. He appealed to the Ministry to sanction his journey to the plague centres. But Cánovas, fearing for the King's life, refused to consent to his danger, and threatened resignation. Not to be turned from his charitable purpose, Alfonso proposed to replace Cánovas by Sagasta or Serrano; but they too tried to dissuade him. His journey at last took the form of an escapade. Rising early and leaving a note to explain his absence to the Queen, he drove with one attendant to the station and took the train to Aranjuez (July 2). His act was greeted with the applause it deserved; but it failed to revive, except momentarily, the King's popularity.

In September, whilst cholera still raged, Spain found herself dangerously near a war with the Power on which both parties had fawned ever since the Restoration. The commander of a German gun-boat hoisted his flag on the Caroline Island of Yap, in the presence of a Spanish squadron. Spain's traditional claim to the whole group had never been rendered effective by occupation, whereas Germany owned a long-established factory in the island. The matter was of no commercial or strategic importance to Spain, but the press held the national honour too dear to let such an opportunity



slip. Public opinion exacted that the Spanish sailors who had been present should be tried by court-martial for neglecting to resist. An indignation meeting of 150,000 people was held in the Prado. On Sept. 4, 1885, the mob attacked the German Legation, tore down its flagstaff and escutcheon, and burnt them in the Puerta del Sol. The Emperor William seems to have had a liking for King Alfonso, and his attitude was most forbearing. Germany accepted Spain's apology for the insult to her Minister; she proposed the Pope as mediator, and allowed the Spanish flag to be hoisted at Yap pending his sentence. Cánovas wisely accepted the offer, disregarding the castigations of mischief-makers in France and Italy; and the difference was settled by a compromise. For a moment the danger had been great. Failure to defend the national honour would have certainly brought about the downfall of the dynasty. Castelar's newspaper called the arrangement "a shameful rout for Catholic Spain."

The municipal elections of May, 1885, showed that Liberalism still ruled in the capital; but the united effort to which the party owed its local victory soon died away. Sagasta, Moret, Lopez Dominguez, Pi y Margall, and Salmeron could work momentarily together when inspired by hatred of Romero Robledo. So strong was the popular hatred against his insolent high-handedness, that the whole Ministry in which he held the Home Office was endangered. Romero offered to resign in order to save his colleagues; but Cánovas knew that the heterogeneous forces momentarily united in attack would soon split up. The Ministry decided to stand or fall together. By the end of June the Liberal leaders were again seeking the programme which should disunite them least. Romero Robledo quitted the Cabinet for private reasons.

The end of the reign was at hand. On Nov. 24, 1885, the King's illness was officially announced: next morning he was dead. He was aged twenty-eight, and had reigned eleven years. The real state of his health had been carefully kept

secret, though suspicions had been entertained in Madrid since he withdrew to the suburban palace of El Pardo on the last day of October. Few people, however, knew that the end was so near. The announcement of the King's death caused a fall of 13 in the Spanish funds. It is said that persons in high position, who had received timely warning, profited largely by dealings in state-guaranteed loans.

Though the two great parties had tacitly agreed to take all blame to themselves and to give all praise to the King, his popularity had utterly failed some years before he died. Yet he was active, brave, unassuming, and generous; he really loved Spain, and he seized every chance of making himself loved. But he never developed any individuality; at times he was stubborn, at others flippant or cynical. He believed neither in himself nor in his office. He had an adventurer's bringing-up, and was never firmly seated on his throne. His culture gave him a certain superiority over the young men of his country; but his foreign education and mean appearance were heavy disadvantages. He had imbibed in Austria a Teutonic love of soldiering; he set the fashion towards English in preference to the equally manly and more picturesque Spanish sports. After his first wife's death his life became irregular. He tried to unite a life of duty with one of pleasure; and his weak constitution soon wore out. During eight and a half years of his reign Cánovas was in power; it was because the King never became strong enough to stand alone.

## CHAPTER XVI.

### THE REGENCY OF QUEEN CRISTINA. (1885—1898.)

KING ALFONSO left a widow, the Austrian Archduchess Maria Cristina, and two infant daughters; the Queen was about to give birth to another child. To her courage and tact, and to the no less admirable self-suppression of the counsellors of her late husband, are to be attributed the peaceful beginnings of the Regency. At the outset a kind of Truce of God was agreed upon, pending the birth of the child. The leaders of all parties had been summoned to El Pardo to discuss the situation by the deathbed of the King, and to save the dynasty if possible. The ministers, the Presidents of Senate and Congress, the ex-Queen Isabel, and her daughter, the Infanta Isabel, Martinez Campos, Novaliches, and, in fact, all who could influence public opinion, were present. The generals guaranteed the good behaviour of the army. An immediate change of Ministry was decided upon with new Cortes to support Sagasta. This done, the excitement of further elections was as far as possible to be avoided, while a Liberal, tolerant, and conciliatory policy would attach the people to the throne. In the meantime topics calculated to rouse hot feelings should be avoided, while the Parliamentary show was to be kept up. The agreement amounted in fact to this, that to sham measures a sham opposition should be made, while Cánovas and Sagasta alternated in a limited dictatorship.

The Cortes accepted the bargain and agreed to support Sagasta's Ministry till after the general election. Sagasta's

Cabinet contained Moret, Gamazo, Camacho, Alonso Martinez, and Montero Rios. With a little patching it lasted five years. Lopez Dominguez refused a portfolio, but promised help from outside. Cánovas was elected President of Congress unopposed. An amnesty was granted to political offenders; and seven hundred sentences against the press were annulled. One man only refused to be bound by the truce. Romero Robledo sought to turn Cánovas' renunciation to his own advantage. Declaring that Cánovas, by resignation, had forfeited the leadership of the Conservative party, he led away into secession about a third of it (Dec., 1855). Instigated by interested persons, the ex-Queen Isabel and her eldest daughter seemed for a moment disposed to push their claims to the Regency; but Alfonso's widow took the oath peaceably (Dec. 30, 1885).

Romero Robledo's disloyalty to his party hastened the necessity for the general election. The Cortes were closed (Jan. 5, 1886), and dissolved two months later. The results of the election were actually given by a newspaper in the confidence of the Government before the election itself took place; and, needless to say, the official forecast was accurately fulfilled. In Congress Sagasta had 310 supporters, of whom about a quarter belonged to Democratic or other groups; the Opposition of 121 deputies fell roughly under six headings. Half belonged to Cánovas; the rest ranged from Republican to Carlist. The Republicans were broken into four sections, following respectively the opinions of Castelar, Salmeron, Pi y Margall, or Ruiz Zorrilla. Castelar refused to join a provisional scheme for common action; his latest definition of a *posibilista* was "one who desires a Republic not made up of Radicals, but as a bar to Radicalism." The Carlists, on the King's death, had shown signs of restlessness; but these had died away in face of the strong support given to the Regency by the Powers and the Vatican. For, though Sagasta had promptly dropped Pidal's reactionary educational policy, it was impossible to

pretend that the Church was in danger. Queen Cristina's devotion to religion was obvious. In fact, a great religious and Ultramontane revival was following the active propaganda of Jesuit refugees settled on Spanish soil. The only revolutionary opposition besides the Carlist came from the little group under Ruiz Zorrilla; the most troublesome was that under Romero Robledo, who, refusing to recognise the scruples that held back the best of his contemporaries, carried on a fierce campaign in his newly-started paper. He found for a time allies in Lopez Dominguez and the Dynastic Left, discontented with the number of seats allotted to them at the election. So long, however, as Cánovas and Sagasta agreed, it mattered little how the subdivisions plotted or grouped themselves.

The Cortes met on May 10; and the debate on the Address, a useful safety-valve, was kept open until July 3. The session lasted till July 30. Pregnant with dire results was the rejection by a majority of 227 against 17 of a proposal brought forward by Cuban deputies recommending the immediate adoption of reforms for the island. No party can evade responsibility for this almost unanimous decision; even Castelar's *posibilistas* voted with the majority (June 30, 1886). A month later a commercial *modus vivendi* with Great Britain was concluded. It provided that Spanish wines under thirty degrees of alcoholic strength should be admitted on payment of a duty of one shilling a gallon. The vinegrowers were delighted; but the manufacturers overwhelmed the Ministry with protests against the slight concessions made. In view of dangers at home, and in deference to the advice of the Powers, the active foreign policy whereby King Alfonso had sought to raise the status of Spain was abandoned. Meanwhile all cause for the dread of revolt that had momentarily united the dynastic parties seemed to have passed away after a series of small outbreaks. A small band of civilian Republicans had seized a fort at Cartagena (Jan. 11, 1886), and, after killing General Fajardo, who called upon them to surrender, had made their escape by sea. This

revolt was part of a large plan extending to several seaports, Cadiz and Ferrol among them ; but, except at Cartagena, the conspirators were overawed by the preparations of the Government.

The next revolt, also Republican in character, was more formidable, in that its scene was the capital and its leader an officer in high command. General Villacampa had persuaded one infantry and one cavalry regiment to acclaim the Republic in the San Gil Barracks (Sept. 19, 1886). The main part of the garrison, however, refused to join him ; the men were disarmed, the leaders fled ; by the next morning the danger was over. Villacampa and six subordinates were condemned to death, eighty-three rank and file to imprisonment for life. The whole nation clamoured for mercy ; and the Queen Regent, although the mutiny had cost the lives of a general and a colonel, gladly yielded, and secured the good-will of her subjects by exercising her prerogative of pardon. She was undoubtedly well-advised. The execution of General Ortega had done more than anything else to undermine Queen Isabel's popularity. But the Minister for War, Jovellar, could not be expected to feel the humanitarian motives that momentarily united the Republican leaders, or to tolerate a practice so subversive of discipline. Two other ministers followed his resignation ; and Sagasta, after abolishing the last vestige of slavery in Cuba, took the opportunity of reconstructing his Ministry (Oct. 9, 1886). His new one contained four of his former colleagues ; but its tendency was less markedly Liberal than before ; only three places in it were held by Democrats. The influence of Alonso Martinez had increased ; the majority in Cortes was shaken. Some talked of a new Liberal party formed by a coalition of the malcontents with Lopez Dominguez' Dynastic Left. But the Dynastic Left was coquetting with Romero Robledo's Liberal-Conservatives ; and the negotiations failed.

Warned by the two attempts of the past year, the Ministry took steps to lessen the danger of a military *pronunciamiento*.



The most important of these was the abolition of the rank of *primero sargento* (cf. p. 294). Placed midway between officers and men, the sergeants had too often sought promotion by means of mutiny. Even now the Government was half afraid of them. In order to prevent the danger of combined resistance by 1800 bold men of great influence with the rank and file, the proposed step was kept secret until the last moment; and the decree was telegraphed suddenly and simultaneously to every garrison in Spain (Oct. 28, 1886). At the opening of the next session (Nov., 1886), Sagasta again announced the millennium of reform, a jury system, and civil marriage, but did nothing to bring party questions to an issue. The King had been born six months before (May 17); but the truce of the two great parties still held good; indeed it was actually extending its influence. Castelar, by a thoroughly deserved eulogy of the Queen Regent, showed that he had no longer the will—he had certainly not the power—to overthrow her Government. He promised his support to Sagasta. The central committee of the Republican party could no longer shut its ears to his palinode. The common organisation was dissolved; and the party became divided into Conservative, or merely theoretical; and advanced, or revolutionary and practical Republicans. For the moment the latter had the majority. To them belonged, formally at least, the small group of philosophic Republicans, chief among whom stood Azcárate and Costa, whose high-minded action and reasoned enthusiasm leavened the lump of Spanish Republicanism, and saved it from the charge of noisy vulgarity and self-seeking. Any party in any land might be proud of such adherents. They have defied and disproved the old taunt, *noscitur a sociis*.

The frequent changes made in the Cabinet during Sagasta's long ministry were made rather in order that personal claims might be recognised and services rewarded than in obedience to political exigencies. Sometimes a more democratic element was introduced; and the scheme for civil marriage or universal

suffrage was revived or advanced a stage. The law instituting universal suffrage, indeed, was actually passed just before Sagasta's resignation (July 4, 1890). A year before it had been included in the ministerial programme; but in January (1890) Sagasta, being in one of his periodical difficulties with his own party, resigned. The only alternative was Cánovas; but Cánovas was unwilling either to promote or to oppose universal suffrage, or to take office while the question was undecided. He aided Sagasta to reconstruct his Cabinet, and succeeded to power only when the affair was settled. The suffrage was granted to all Spaniards aged 24, after two years' residence in an electoral division. Cánovas had prophesied that universal suffrage would change neither the well-known political methods nor their results.

When her husband died, Queen Cristina was utterly unknown to the Spaniards. She had taken no part in public life; she had formed few friendships. It was whispered that she was frigid and haughty; incredible tales were told of her erudition; she was known to hate the bull-fight. Her widowhood, the cares of her delicate infant son, and her exercise of the Regency, showed her devoted unselfishness, her excellent heart, her calm wisdom, her strong convictions, and her tolerant spirit. For a sovereign to be popular in Spain is difficult since Isabel betrayed the hopes of the nation; for a foreigner to be popular is perhaps impossible; but Cristina won everywhere respectful admiration, and, from the finer class of minds, loyal devotion. Men who had thought to use her as their tool became her servants; men whose guiding principle had been hatred of kings were attracted to her Court. When the sudden and severe illness of the baby King threatened Queen and mother alike, all Spain shared her anguish; and all Spain rejoiced in her son's recovery. Parties had united to save the dynasty for the country's sake; they now desired to save it for its own. With the exception of Ruiz Zorrilla's small and fanatical following, the Radicals had ceased to rail. Only from the royal

family did the Regent experience steady opposition. Well kept as are the secrets of Courts, it seems that at least one conspiracy was made to drive her from the country. Early in 1888 the ex-Queen Isabel quitted Spain by request; she had been the catspaw of the ambitious about her. The Duke of Montpensier was sufficiently strong to disregard an order to remain abroad. A year earlier the Duke of Seville, a cousin of the late King, had been sentenced to eight years' confinement for insulting the Regent. He aggravated his offence by writing an outrageous letter from his prison in the Balearic Islands, whence he made his escape and published his democratic aspirations in a Gascon provincial newspaper.

Spain's prosperity was increasing. Her vintages were abundant during the years of phylloxera in France; and the profits of the vinegrowers were very large. Finance ministers sought to equalise their budget and to meet the huge debt left by civil and colonial wars. Oppressive as was the taxation, it was increased instead of being more fairly and evenly distributed; and Spain showed a power of bearing her financial burden that astonished even those who knew her best. Granted peace, though seemingly starving, she grows rich. Budgets formed to conceal rather than to explain the situation always resulted in a deficit acknowledged or unacknowledged. For the year 1885-6 it was three millions sterling. The following year it threatened to be more; and a great effort was made. A stamp tax of one per cent. was imposed upon the coupons of the Exterior Debt; the tobacco monopoly was farmed for a large sum. Every call for money brought the Protectionists and Free Traders into collision, the former urging that still heavier port dues should take the place of taxes and octroi. In 1889 an attempt was made to separate urban from rural interests, and to win the latter for the Conservative and Protectionist party by taxing imported corn.

During the same year, whilst the popularity of Sagasta's ministry was at a low ebb, a rumour spread that Cuba was to be

sold. No such intention was acknowledged by the Government; but indignation was allayed only when a pompous announcement was made that no amount of wealth could purchase the smallest parcel of Spanish territory. Before the end of Sagasta's long ministry, revenue and expenditure were not indeed equalised; but the deficit was much reduced; the interest payable on the debt had been slightly lowered; and its capital had been reduced one-half by conversion of loans long unpaid. The arrears due to public servants and pensioners, which had once amounted to eleven millions sterling, had now been reduced to a million and a half. Economy and good government alike demanded that the army should be decreased and made aware of its subordination to the civil power. All efforts in this direction were insolently resisted by the generals. Flaunting their services to the dynasty, men like Primo de Rivera, Daban, and Martinez Campos, "the Spanish Cæsar," sought to make it the plaything of the army. When guilty of acts of insubordination, if their high command was insufficient to protect them, they took refuge in their inviolability as senators. The quarrel broke out over the proposals made by a new and energetic Minister for War (June, 1887). Cassola wished, whilst abolishing the system of pecuniary redemption and enforcing conscription even on priests, to break the military spirit. The generals' opposition found a fitting spokesman in Primo de Rivera. He criticised in the Senate the minister's scheme, and practically defied the civil power to remove him from his position of Inspector-General of Infantry. Sagasta, rising to the occasion, announced to the House his supersession.

This was a preliminary skirmish only. That Cassola's scheme was unwelcome to the army generally may be inferred from Lopez Dominguez' opposition to it. To carry it through in its entirety would be dangerous, if not impossible. Already something had been done to secure subordination, when Sagasta seized the opportunity afforded by a Cabinet crisis (June 14, 1888) to rid himself of both the reformer Cassola

and of Martinez Campos, who united the leadership of the military opposition with the military governorship of the capital. Sagasta, whilst shaking off its author, still professed his intention of carrying out Cassola's scheme. The soldiers, on the other hand, were demanding that cases in which the army and press were involved should be tried by court-martial. A dangerous spirit was shown when staff-officers assaulted in public the editor of a military newspaper that had dared to differ from their opinions (Nov., 1888). For a moment the proposed changes were dropped; but two months later, at the opening of a new session, when the agitation had calmed down, Sagasta announced his intention of reducing the army and the war estimates. The generals retaliated by blocking proposals for Cuban reforms; but Sagasta had his way (March, 1889). The Revolution that made Brazil a Republic found a faint echo in Spain; and soldier-politicians sought to frighten the Regent into calling them to power and entrusting them with the task of precautionary repression. Luckily Cánovas, no less than Sagasta, was hostile to the power that had desolated Spain for half-a-century, and aided in crushing the dangerous intrigue. The irritation of the generals now seized upon the most flimsy excuses for its exhibition. When a resolution in favour of arbitration with regard to Cuba was proposed, they chose to interpret it as an attack on the army. The soldier deputies and senators talked loudly of the necessity for restoring the army to its former political influence. One general declared that the Government encouraged the foreign press to speak disrespectfully of Spanish generals; another sent a challenge to Sagasta.

A gratifying symptom of the confidence now felt by the Powers in Spain's stability was afforded by her admission to their counsels with regard to Morocco. In March, 1887, Spanish susceptibility had been wounded by the action of the French and her suspicions roused by a proposal for rectification of the frontier in North-west Africa. Moret, the Minister for



Foreign Affairs, showed himself awake to the importance of the matter, and prepared to push the Spanish claim to a voice in any decision that might be reached. The press, French and Spanish, was doing its best to inflame the warlike spirit; but the Spaniards were soothed by the friendly reception accorded by the Sultan to their mission. In the autumn of the same year Spain notified to the Powers her intention of increasing her African garrisons in view of the troubles that might arise should the Sultan's illness end in death. She had collected an expeditionary army on her southern coast. Great Britain had sent ships to Morocco, and had urged the other Powers to do likewise, when the Sultan's recovery and a conciliatory message from France dispelled the gathering danger. It was the Moors who appealed to Spain to reassemble the Conference which, in 1880, had fixed the political relation of their country. Moret's invitation to a Conference in order to secure better government beyond the Straits was accepted by all the Powers, including the United States. They showed their satisfaction by numbering Spain among themselves; whereupon her legations in London, Vienna, Berlin, and Rome were raised to the status of embassies.

The small groups into which the Liberal party was split up sold their allegiance for place; but Sagasta could not find means to satisfy so many mercenaries. His followers, too, were cross-divided on the question of Protection or Free Trade. After forming a new Cabinet in January, he resigned (July, 1890), partly in order to avoid defeat and partly in fulfilment of his understanding with Cánovas. The great crisis of the vacant throne had been passed; the orderly succession of parties now again demanded a change of ministry. There was, moreover, now another force to be reckoned with. The Queen Regent had grown used to her position, and showed herself fully capable of wielding the powers granted to her by the Constitution; her sense of right and duty were strong, and her political instinct was keen; it was she who recalled Cánovas



to power. With him returned some well-known figures to the ministerial bench—Villaverde (Justice), Azcárraga (War), and Silvela (Interior). Romero Robledo's secession had not yet put him into a position to impose himself upon his former colleagues; his mischief-making was for the present to be carried on outside the Cabinet.

The two monarchical parties were daily becoming more nearly akin in principle; and a change of ministry entailed but little change of policy. Sagasta, when in office, dropped that part of his opposition programme which had been addressed specially to the Radicals. Cánovas, though he professedly took office to check the overhasty Liberal march of the last four and a half years, was much less arbitrary and dictatorial in his methods than before, and less submissive to the exigencies of the Conservative wing of his supporters. The licence he had to combat was not political so much as military and social. The soldiers who had turbulently defied Sagasta thought perhaps to have their way, now that their former fellow-conspirator in the cause of royalty was in power. But Cánovas gave them only assurances of sympathy with their aims, while withdrawing all real power from hands so rash as those of Martínez Campos.

Sagasta, shortly before his resignation, had established universal suffrage (May, 1890). To Cánovas, who had always opposed the measure, fell the duty of setting in motion the ponderous engine. The commission nominated to superintend its working contained many Liberals; and these took umbrage at the rough and ready way in which Cánovas' provincial governors proposed to carry out the impending election. They appealed to the Ministry to restrain its agents, and, receiving little satisfaction, became an Opposition organisation. Meanwhile Sagasta was away in the north declaiming against his successor's evident determination to work the new law by the old methods. In spite of this special agitation, results showed how right had been Cánovas' forecast that universal suffrage

would not bring any Radical or dangerous change. The election gave to the Ministry 289, to Sagasta 70, and to the Republicans 30, out of a total of 433 seats, or about the same proportion as had been considered decent under the old system. The Opposition in the Senate did not exceed 20. The Carlists, offended by the friendly attitude of the Nuncio towards the Government, had held aloof from the polls. Sagasta was rewarded with the Golden Fleece (Jan. 22, 1891) for refusing to create a real danger by allying himself with the groups of the extreme Left, Socialist, Democratic, Federalist, and Republican, dwelling outside the constitutional border.

It was in this direction that the danger lay. Now that universal suffrage was won, political questions had almost ceased to agitate the country; but socialism and communism of a militant type were spreading in the industrial centres; and there still remained a small group of real Republicans. Cánovas tried to entice back these groups within the law. He offered an amnesty to Ruiz Zorrilla and his associates; but they proudly refused it unless accompanied by restitution of rank and honours. Fears of a communistic rising checked the activity of the more moderate Liberals; and the two extremes of the party drifted further asunder. A small revolt and attempt to seize Jerez was repressed by the civil guard (Jan. 9, 1892); and four executions followed. Bilbao, in the midst of a miners' strike, afforded a hotbed for extreme socialism; but General Loma by skilful negotiation succeeded in dividing the strikers. Riots took place in Cadiz; but the headquarters of Radical agitation was Barcelona. February, 1892, saw the first case of the bomb-throwing which later gave the city so evil a notoriety. The Cortes took alarm, and increased the severity of the laws with regard to anarchist outrages and the doctrines that provoke them (March, 1892). In April the discovery of a plot to blow up the Congress gave the Ministry a pretext for locking up agitators in the capital until Labour Day, May 1, should be past. The agitation and resentment were increased by the

ruthless and barbarous methods employed at Barcelona. Persons to whom rumour attributed advanced opinions were arrested and imprisoned without trial. It has been repeatedly stated on oath that tortures were applied to wring confessions from prisoners in Montjuich, and on the hulks at sea. In the autumn of 1893 Martinez Campos was wounded at Barcelona by an anarchist bomb; and another thrown in a theatre to avenge an execution killed twenty persons.

The stimulus given to Spanish production and exportation of wine by the failure of the French vineyards died away, as the immunity of American vines from the disease was established and French vineyards again became productive. When Cánovas revoked by decree all Sagasta's measures lowering tariffs, and denounced all treaties of commerce containing a most-favoured-nation clause, the Protectionist majority of the Cortes of 1891 heartily approved. Spain imports about one-third of her necessary supply of corn. Cánovas hoped by imposing a duty on imported corn to give a new impulse to agriculture and to win the support of the Conservative country districts, now suffering severely from the altered conditions of the wine trade. In the autumn of 1891 France raised the import duties. A huge quantity of Spanish wine was hurried across the frontier just before the new regulation took effect; but the common wine left in Spain became almost worthless; and Spain's total exports of wine suddenly shrank to a quarter. The consumption of high-priced sherries fell off in England. The long-established cattle trade between Corunna and the south-western English ports was killed by American competition; and the grazing districts of Galicia and Asturias suffered no less than the wine-growing south. Since the end of the eighteenth century, Spain, in spite of her undeveloped soil, has imported corn in increasing quantities. So inferior is the quality of her olive-oil that it sells for less than half the market price of the better-manufactured oils of Italy and France. While its quantity is insufficient to supply the home market, mineral, palm, and

cocoa-nut oils are imported. Even the mining industry failed to add as it ought to the national prosperity, for its profits went at that time entirely, and still go largely, into the pockets of foreign capitalists. Agriculturists, gladly adopting Cánovas' suggestion, clamorously demanded protection to recoup them for a bad harvest. Owing to unrest in Cuba, exports had fallen off in other trades also ; prices began to rise ; the currency was choked with paper ; and gold was at a premium of nine per cent.

Cánovas was face to face with a most difficult political and economic problem. So early as November, 1891, Romero Robledo had succeeded in bringing his former chief to terms. The successful free-lance, as well as Cánovas' rich friend Elduayen, were included in the reconstructed Cabinet, whilst Silvela, Romero's rival, was thrust out. The Cabinet lost heavily in public esteem by the change, which Cánovas explained (Jan. 11, 1892) as the result of Conservative concentration. After casting this most transparent dust in the eyes of the envious, he proceeded to throw open the abyss of bankruptcy that yawned before the country, admitting that the neatly-balanced budgets had been framed to deceive, and that for the last fifteen years, or ever since the Restoration, the annual deficit had amounted to about two and a half millions sterling. All this had gone to swell the floating debt. Expenditure had been consistently and grossly underestimated ; almost everything saleable had been sold. Cánovas had nothing better to propose than the reduction of the expenses of his own department by fifteen per cent. He invited his colleagues to follow his example to the extent of ten per cent. It was rumoured abroad that the Exterior Debt was about to be taxed ; but Cánovas refused to cut himself off from all help from abroad by breaking faith with the bond-holders. In such circumstances it proved impossible to find anybody willing to take over the Ministry of Finance. Villaverde having refused, it was put into commission of the whole Cabinet. The budget was thrust through by ministerial pressure in all-night sittings ;

not even the fallacious quoting of a gold loan in terms of the depreciated paper currency balanced it. The President of the Congress called upon the Opposition to discuss the financial situation in a friendly spirit; but both Sagasta and Pi y Margall refused to help to hush up the matter or to consent to a further loan (July, 1892). A debate on the position of the Spanish Transatlantic Company, the creation of Cánovas' friend and colleague, Elduayen, and its relations with the Government, was pressed till Romero Robledo's temper, naturally short and violent, gave way; his chief was obliged to apologise to the House for his behaviour. Shortly before, the railway companies had been allowed to raise their fares contrary to the undertaking contained in their concessions. Everybody was asking who gained by the change. The worst feature of Cánovas' Ministries was the atmosphere of stock-jobbing that ever hung about them.

At the municipal elections held in the autumn (1892) the Government had the usual huge majority; not one elector in four had voted. The Ministry had in fact entirely lost the popularity and authority with which it started. The army was still restless; a project for giving the Regency to the Infanta Isabel was being advocated by interested persons; riots made the proclamation of a state of siege necessary in the capital and in several large towns. Cánovas, failing to keep discipline among his own party, was attacked by Sagasta for the feebleness of his administration. When ugly facts were brought to light with regard to the municipality of Madrid, Cánovas could neither sacrifice the persons involved in the seemingly well-founded charge of peculation, nor take the responsibility for smothering the loudly demanded enquiry. Silvela, fighting as ever against corruption, his country's worst enemy, opposed the Ministry, with the result that Cánovas resigned (Dec. 8, 1892). Sagasta returned to power with a Cabinet that made up in parliamentary experience what it lacked in unanimity. Montero Rios, Lopez Dominguez, Moret, and Gamazo were among his



colleagues. Castelar's little following had promised neutrality. The most successful event of the year was the commemoration of the discovery of the New World by a splendid exhibition of Spanish art, and of records and memorials more or less closely connected with the discovery. The occasion evoked a good deal of kindly feeling between the mother-country and her former colonies; but nobody wise enough to turn it to their mutual profit was at hand. The King of Portugal visited Madrid; and the press discussed Pan-Iberianism.

The new Ministry required new Cortes; and Sagasta's Minister of the Interior took at the general election 250 out of 456 seats. The handsome allowance of 135 was made to the Opposition of all shades. The remaining seats were divided among the neutral or independent groups, the undecided, or those that awaited a bidder. But the electorate of the capital at least was now too well educated to submit to be the plaything of the administration. The Republicans, jealously watching the spoils, captured six out of the eight seats of Madrid. Pi y Margall, Salmeron, and even Ruiz Zorrilla were returned to Congress. So unusual a symptom of insubordination alarmed the Government; and they decided (May 1, 1893) to postpone the forthcoming municipal elections until after such revision of the voters' list as would render a Republican majority in Madrid impossible. Radical feeling inflamed by the municipal scandals was running high. The Socialist deputies, twenty-one in number, betook themselves to obstruction. The sittings of Congress were declared permanent; and the debate on the proposal was closed only after eleven amendments had been disposed of in fifty-four hours (May 12, 1903). Finally the Ministry had its way; and the elections were carried out under new lists. The Republicans held noisy meetings of protest, and passed resolutions expressing their determination to withdraw from participation in the election; but the Government could now afford to disregard them.

This danger was followed by another. When Gamazo, the



Minister of Finance, brought in an honest budget, it nearly provoked a revolution. His proposals to impose fresh taxation and to reduce the sums allotted to the several ministries were equally unpopular. The northern provinces were thrown into a ferment of indignation by a scheme to increase their annual contribution by eighty thousand pounds; and riots took place at San Sebastian, the summer residence of the Court. In such matters the utmost prudence was required; and the scheme of retrenchment had to be dropped by consent of the Opposition in view of the uproar it had occasioned. Permission was granted to the Government to issue bonds to the amount of thirty millions sterling in order to consolidate the floating debt (July, 1893); the Bank of Spain, which guaranteed the loan, took the excellent security of the tobacco monopoly.

Attention was diverted from the unsatisfactory and even dangerous situation at home by aggressions of the Riff Moors at Melilla (Oct., 1893). Instantly the crusading spirit was roused; all Spain fell into fervid agreement; and £3,500,000 were raised to fit out an army of 25,000 men under 29 generals, among whom Martinez Campos took supreme command. Cowed doubtless by these preparations the Sultan submissively disavowed his unruly subjects, promised an indemnity, and consented to a frontier commission. A treaty was signed by Martinez Campos (May 4, 1894). Little real satisfaction had been given, but national honour was satisfied. When the Moorish envoys came to Madrid to ratify the agreement, their chief on his way to the Palace was struck in the face by a Spanish general unable to contain himself in beholding the traditional foe on Spanish soil. For this quixotic outrage Spain paid by an apology and by important concessions with regard to the indemnity and frontier agreement (Jan., 1895).

When the Cortes opened (April 4, 1894), Sagasta appealed to the Opposition for moderation in accordance with the tacit agreement between the parties that only under great provocation should matters calculated to rouse real feeling be approached.

Criticism of the political methods common to both were a breach of the understanding. Cánovas promised indulgence on condition that financial reform were seriously undertaken. Yet in this matter the Liberals had been less to blame since the Restoration than the Conservatives. As soon as any relaxation of the import dues that burdened trade was proposed, Cánovas, with his eye on Catalonia, fiercely opposed it. He was now (June, 1894) obstructing a commercial agreement with Germany. As Spain refused to receive foreign manufactured goods in exchange for her produce, her trade remained undeveloped: dependent on France, England, and Germany for all but the simplest and coarsest articles, she was forced to pay for them in gold, and the premium rose to 21½ per cent. A Commission of twelve Ministerialists, six Conservatives, and six members of the Producers' Union was nominated to devise the tariff most advantageous to Spain: but, while it deliberated, the Conservatives introduced a Protectionist resolution and defeated the Government upon it in Congress. The Minister of Finance resigned. Sagasta's appeal for at least a working agreement was disregarded: the country suffered from uncertainty: and commerce was harassed by varying and vexatious regulations.

So confident was the Government that danger was no longer to be apprehended from the Carlists that it shut its eyes to the presence of Don Jaime de Bourbon, son and heir of Don Carlos, on Spanish soil. Travelling hastily and *incognito* in the autumn of 1894, he visited some of the most famous cities of the kingdom of his fathers, and became acquainted with the most faithful followers of the cause. No public demonstration, of course, was possible: but there were no signs that the discontent provoked in the northern provinces by additional taxation was likely to redound to the advantage of the Carlist cause. On the other hand, the capital and great industrial centres were terrified by rumours of anarchist activity. The Government caught the scare; and the repressive laws were made still harsher

than before. Holders of advanced opinions, though peaceable citizens, might if they fell into the hands of the police be treated like wild beasts. Professing to rally round him a "Monarchical" party pledged to a definite colonial and economic policy, and absorbing the groups captained by free-lances, Cánovas was in reality making ready to oust Sagasta and to take his place as a rigid Protectionist and opponent of all concessions to Cuba. On both of these questions Cánovas had the country with him; and Sagasta, already surrounded by difficulties and unwilling to abandon his principles of colonial reform and partial commercial freedom, resigned. His immediate reason was the attitude of the army. A Republican newspaper having published some outspoken criticism of military affairs, its office was broken into and its editor maltreated. So strongly did their comrades side with the offending officers that they made a fair trial of the case impossible. The question became a party one; it was brought before the Cortes; and many politicians sought to win the favour of the soldiers by abusing the press. Finally the matter was referred to a court-martial instead of to a civil tribunal with a jury, as the law directed. The hopes founded on Martinez Campos, the soldier-Liberal, were disappointed; he, like his fellows, blew hot and cold. Sagasta resigned because the leaders of the army refused to insist upon the maintenance of discipline.

Cánovas took office (March 22, 1895) and held it till the time of his death (Aug., 1897). During this period all other interests were swallowed up in that of Cuba. In the thirty last years of Spanish rule one hundred and fifty thousand Spanish lives, and one hundred and thirty millions sterling of Spanish money, were wasted in the cruel struggle. The pledges given by Martinez Campos in 1879 had been openly disregarded. The Vote of Congress in 1886 (p. 439) had proved to the world how vain was Cuba's hope to obtain redress by legal means. Cuba was still a protected market for dear and bad Catalan goods, ruthlessly plundered by a corrupt adminis-

tration. Its large, half-caste, and negro population fiercely resented their social and political disabilities. Alternate policies of bullying and cajolery had made the reformers into separatists, and the separatists into patriots. The sympathies of the citizens of the United States were with them. The responsibility for refusing reform cannot be laid wholly at the door of the Conservative party in Spain. The vast majority of Liberals were indifferent or hostile to Cuba's claims. The loss of her immense possessions on the mainland of America had failed to teach Spain that colonies must be governed, firstly for their own good, and then for the good of the nation at large, and not for the selfish ends of a corrupt ruling class. Honourably distinguished from the rest are Gamazo and Maura, who, in 1893 and 1894, had earnestly advocated reform. But the wealthy and highly-organised Spanish and United-Liberal party in the island had the ear of the Government; and the nation unhesitatingly believed those who called themselves Loyalists and their adversaries rebels and traitors. When Sagasta found the repeated warnings of his reforming colleagues irksome, he threw them over. Abárzuza replaced Maura at the Colonial Office (Nov., 1894); and it was decided that something must be done. Faith in the efficacy of words was not yet lost. Maura's bill, eviscerated and useless with the essential clauses left out, was brought in and contemptuously passed; and it was thought that enough had been done. Any matter nearer home, the attitude of the army towards the Radical press, the squabble with Morocco, and the fate of the vanished battleship, *Reina Regente* (March, 1895), were enough to call off attention from Cuba. But the news from the island was more and more threatening; and Sagasta, just before laying down office (March, 1895), had decided to send reinforcements to the garrison.

Cánovas gave Cuba the first place in his programme. His policy never varied; he insisted that the colony must first submit, and that then, and not till then, would reforms consistent with Spain's sovereignty be granted. In pursuance of

the first item in this programme an army of thirty thousand men was ready to start. The command was offered to Martinez Campos, who had at the last crisis refused to take office. Self-confident as ever, and forgetful how his actions had been disavowed and his concessions branded as surrenders six years before, he crossed the Atlantic once more (April, 1895). His plan was to keep the rebels employed in the bush and open country, while he introduced such reforms as would, he hoped, backed by military pressure, induce gradual submission.

To support him and provide reinforcements, 25,000 additional troops were mobilised in Spain, and a battalion added to each regiment. But Spain was becoming weary of the continual drain of men and money to Cuba; such soldiers as returned told dreadful tales of privations and hardship; high prices fostered the widespread discontent and unrest. Their focus was, as usual, Barcelona. Order was restored and all manifestations of opposition ruthlessly crushed by General Weyler, a Narvaez of a smaller growth, who made his name a terror not so much to evil-doers as to all whom the suspicions of the police might connect with revolutionary ideas. Again arrests were made wholesale; and again the tales of torture in Montjuich were readily believed.

Concurrent with the agitation of Barcelona was that caused at Madrid by the revelations of municipal peculation. Silvela joined Sagasta in assailing Cánovas' policy of sheltering persons convicted of embezzlement. A party, headed by the Marquis of Cabriñana, was resolved not to let the matter be hushed up in the usual way. After a monster demonstration in Madrid (Dec. 9, 1895) the Ministry resigned, but only in order to get rid of an unpopular mayor, and of its cynical Minister of Justice, Romero Robledo. Cabriñana's fate is a warning to patriots and would-be reformers. Despite a plain case and popular feeling on his behalf, he was condemned (Jan., 1897) for libel on the Mayor of Madrid. Refusing to recognise

public spirit as his motive, his own class repudiated him as a dangerous busybody.

Martinez Campos remained in Cuba only eight months, long enough, however, to convince him that he could not conquer the island. He was not allowed to negotiate with the insurgents. Accused of misrepresenting the real state of affairs in the island, and hooted in the streets of Madrid, he in turn tried to throw the responsibility for his failure on those who had sent him with tied hands on a hopeless quest. In the appointment of his successor, the redoubtable General Weyler, the Government showed that it had resolved to be done with half-measures. Full of energy, Weyler sailed within ten days of his appointment (Jan., 1896), eager to put in practice his plan of reducing the insurgents to submission, strictly blockading the coast against filibusters, and ravaging all the country he could not control. He obliged all the Cubans to declare for or against him, and concentrated the Loyalists within his lines. The rest of the inhabitants he drove into the bush and continually harried until only a third of the island was left to them. But Weyler's ruthless measures only roused the deep-seated resentment of the United States. The Committee on Foreign Affairs allowed a motion to be submitted to Congress calling upon the Government of the Republic to mediate. The American minister at Madrid protested against Weyler's cruelty.

The Spanish Government began to weaken, to seek to evade responsibility for its general's methods, and to promise reform. Since the previous summer Spain had begun to prepare for war, borrowing money at exorbitant rates and overhauling her rusty armaments. The matter rested with Cánovas; the Regent and the majority of the nation trusted him implicitly; and his political opponents put no hindrance in his way. The general election of April, 1896, had been carried out even more arbitrarily than usual. No great question of home policy sharply defined the two parties; Conservatives and Liberals were cross-



divided by the Cuban question; the Republicans were at war with the Socialists. Cánovas had a submissive majority sufficient to allow him a free hand in the colonies. He can have cherished no illusions as to the result of war with the great Republic, yet he kept deliberately upon a course that must sooner or later infallibly lead to war. He refused, however, to hasten it by submitting to the exigencies of General Weyler. A Spanish court-martial had condemned certain filibusters, American citizens, to death. Weyler sent them to Spain with the threat to resign his command unless the sentence were carried out. Cánovas, as well as Weyler, knew that the execution would have brought down upon them the Republic in arms. The filibusters were imprisoned and afterwards pardoned.

All the energies of the Government were turned to finding money to meet the cost of the present and the impending wars. An informal and emergency budget was brought in (Aug., 1896). The Government proposed to obtain funds by sale of monopolies, by increasing the octroi dues, and by mortgaging the quicksilver mines of Almaden, the most valuable national asset. The opposition made to these proposals was merely formal; permission was given to pledge the national credit and mortgage taxes not yet due. Amid an outburst of patriotic feeling a loan of twelve millions sterling at five per cent. with the guarantee of the customs was subscribed three times over in the country.

The end of the year brought news of the death of the insurgent leader, Antonio Maceo, and reports of the warning uttered by President Cleveland in his message to Congress (Dec. 7, 1896). The President pointed out that the money interest of the United States in Cuba had doubled since the so-called pacification of the island by Martinez Campos in 1878: Spain had refused the good offices of the Republic; but the American people would not stand by for ever to see Cuba ruined in a cruel and hopeless struggle. Cánovas rejoined by

challenging the right of foreigners to interfere between Spain and her colony, but he published in the *Gazette* (Feb. 6, 1897) a substantial list of reforms for Cuba, including an autonomous representative assembly. Unfortunately the submission of the insurgents was made the condition of the grant. The Spanish Liberals, now at length awake to the gravity of the situation, demanded in vain that the grant should be made unconditionally. Romero Robledo, on the other hand, condemned what he called a surrender to rebellion.

The insurrection in Cuba was echoed by insurrection in the Philippine Islands, the one remnant of Spain's empire in the Pacific. Whereas in Cuba it was due to corrupt administration, in the Philippines it arose from the preponderance of the Church and its interference in secular affairs. The friars had set up an unauthorised Government; their "paternal authority" had reduced the natives to a condition of serfdom intolerable to those subjected to it, now that education had spread, and travelled Filipinos were able to contrast the condition of their islands with that of other lands. A most difficult campaign against the brave half-breeds and natives had produced no satisfactory result. General Polavieja<sup>1</sup> was superseded by General Primo de Rivera, who claimed brilliant successes and reported the immediately forthcoming pacification of the archipelago. A loan of two millions sterling, secured on the customs of the Philippines, was raised to finance so good a general. Apart from these colonial loans, the extraordinary war expenditure now amounted to more than four million pounds. To meet it an increase of all indirect taxation by one-tenth, a monopoly of alcohol, and a first claim on colonial revenues were suggested; but no formal decision was reached. The Government had permission to impose taxes by decree, that is to say, to raise money by any means that might suggest themselves.

<sup>1</sup> An amazing personage who has never won a battle and never failed to lose one; but still a favourite at Court. [J. F.-K.]

In June Cánovas suddenly resigned on the question of confidence. The Liberals, who now advocated conciliation and the grant of necessary reforms in Cuba, thought that the time had come for trial of their policy. But Cánovas believed to the end that he could evade the impending war with the United States, and save at the same time the dynasty, the colonies, and Spain's honour. Whatever his plan was, he persuaded the Queen Regent of its efficacy; and she recalled him to power. Some indignation was shown by the Liberals, who considered themselves tricked and slighted; but a patriotic compromise was reached in a conference between Cánovas and Sagasta. Cánovas' plan died with him. On Aug. 8, 1897, he was assassinated at Santa Agueda, a little watering-place in the Basque Provinces, by an Italian anarchist. The deed was done in revenge for the cruel treatment of the Barcelona anarchists. A series of outrages had culminated in June, 1896, when bombs thrown at a religious procession killed eight persons. Again terror and vengeance appeared where stern justice was needed. A law making the propagation of anarchist doctrines and concealment of plots punishable by death was hurriedly enacted. Montjuich was filled again with prisoners and confessions were extorted by the police. Five executions had been carried out in May; but still the bombs exploded, and the Italian was sent on the easy mission to assassinate the man whom the anarchists held chiefly responsible for their sufferings, merited and unmerited. Not until more than two months after Cánovas' murder were the suspected anarchists who were languishing untried in Montjuich set free.

It would be unfair to try Cánovas by the principles of his Radical youth. His most brilliant period was when, after Isabel's fall, he led the party of the Restoration through the Interregnum, the reign of Don Amadeo, and the Republic, to final triumph. The defects of his character came out in power. He was sceptical in the general outlook, cynical in method, and at times flippant. Brought up in the worst of political schools, he

seemed incapable of conceiving political morality. Insensible himself to the temptations of smaller minds, he made weakness and venality his means of government. He organised corruption, hoping by it to attain the public good. The atmosphere of bribery, self-seeking, and stock-jobbing hung over his Ministry; in five years he distributed 1276 titles and orders. The representative system, as worked by him, was merely part of a whole system of deception and make-believe; he contrived that the Chambers should have no real control over the Ministry. Amid the quagmire of politics he found the one firm spot, and founded his power on the Conservative and Catholic class. To rule Spain against the will of the clergy had been proved impossible; it is to Cánovas' credit that he saved the monarchy from falling entirely into their hands. It was not his fault that the monarchy was not strong enough to stand alone. His avowed creed was that "Politics is the art of applying in every epoch of history that part of the ideal that circumstances render possible." Thus he was an opportunist, really supple, though affecting inflexibility. Abroad he aimed at alliance with Portugal, recovery of Gibraltar by exchange or purchase, expansion in north-western Africa. But Spain under his rule was too distracted to pursue such a policy. He maintained the independence of Spain, whilst the Triple Alliance on the one hand and France on the other sought to entice her into a one-sided agreement. Cánovas deserved the gratitude of his country in that he put an end to the epoch of *pronunciamientos*, restored a dynasty that seems now again well-rooted, and ended the Carlist War without allowing any one general to attain a position above the law. The Spain of to-day owes much to his large-minded and statesmanlike treatment of political opponents. He smoothed the path for all who would support the monarchy, and welcomed where a smaller man would have been jealous of their cooperation. His obstinacy with regard to Cuba left a disastrous heritage to Spain. But perhaps he was right in supposing that surrender would have

thrown power into the hands of the self-styled patriots, the self-constituted guardians of the national honour; and that they would have hastened to avenge Spain's impotence abroad on the dynasty, thus destroying the work indissolubly associated with the name of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo.

When Cánovas died, war with the United States was well-nigh certain; but still one more effort was made to avert it. For a while General Azcárraga took the power that dropped from the murdered man's hand, and used it to check disorderly faction during the first moment of uncertainty. But Romero Robledo and Silvela, the deputy leaders of the Conservatives, were irreconcilable; and Sagasta returned to office (Oct. 4, 1897). Already the new American minister at Madrid, General Woodford, had secured the recall of General Weyler and the discontinuance of his system of pacification by devastation and famine. He had given notice to the Spanish Government that the war must cease. As soon as Sagasta's Cabinet was formed, General Woodford demanded a statement of its intentions with regard to Cuba. The answer was given in friendly terms; a complete reversal of policy was promised. General Blanco was about to be sent out to take General Weyler's place, with full powers to grant autonomy under the Spanish flag. The Cuban exiles were allowed to return. Spain called upon the United States to aid her to put an end to filibustering; she alleged the impossibility of fixing a date for the complete pacification of the island.

In fulfilment of the promise thus made, Moret's bill, granting autonomy to Cuba and Puerto Rico, was passed by the Cortes at their autumn session (Nov. 25, 1897). It was to take effect from the beginning of the new year; but it came too late to conciliate either the Cuban insurgents or the United States. Loyalists and rebels alike rejected its provisions; the former received General Blanco with hostile demonstrations at Havana (Jan., 1898). Meanwhile Weyler, whom Blanco had replaced, was trying to avenge his recall upon the Government.



In virtue of his efforts to retain the close market of Cuba for the Catalan manufacturers, he posed as the champion of national industry. Refusing to quit the ship that brought him home at Corunna, where she first touched Spanish shores, he went round to Barcelona, where interest in the retention of the colonies was strongest. Thanks partly to precautions enforced under a rigorous state of siege, his reception was disappointing to him; and he betook himself to another form of agitation. He sent to the Queen Regent and published in the newspapers a protest against President MacKinley's reflections upon the conduct of the war. For this breach of discipline he was tried, but acquitted, the court-martial finding that he was guilty of no offence specified in the military code (Jan. 7, 1898).

For a moment it looked as if General Weyler could carry the army with him; and so uncertain were his political principles that fears were felt lest he should declare himself a Carlist or a Republican, after making *pronunciamiento* against the Government that had deprived him of his command. Romero Robledo, his civilian ally, had declared himself and Weyler to be the only two men capable of handling the Cuban difficulty in a manner worthy of Spain. Luckily, the Conservatives rejected them both, and, making Pidal leader of the party, sought to bring about the reunion of Silvela and his following with the main body. But Weyler's affairs were soon forgotten among more weighty matters. President MacKinley's message to Congress (Dec. 6, 1897) announced that the time had not yet come for intervention or for recognition of the belligerent rights of the Cubans. But the American people was being lashed to fury by the lying exaggerations of the yellow press. It took the mobilisation of the Spanish fleet as a threat. Any story of Spanish cruelty, venality, or cowardice was believed. A private letter from the Spanish minister was stolen in the post; its contents, adverse and slighting remarks upon the Government of the Republic and its President, were given to the press. Far from apologising for this diplomatic



outrage, the Americans demanded that the Spanish minister should be recalled, and satisfaction made in the official *Gazette* for his private opinions. The Spanish Government made excuses; and the incident was declared closed (Feb. 14, 1898).

On the following night the United States cruiser, *Maine*, which, under plea of protecting American citizens, had been watching events in Cuba since January 25, was destroyed by an explosion in the port of Havana, and 266 of her crew perished. The American consul reported that the explosion was due to a submarine mine; the Spaniards denied it, and offered to assist enquiry into its causes. The United States refused their help; and its commission reported that the explosion took place outside the ship. A Spanish commission reported that it took place inside through ignition of the *Maine's* ammunition.

On both sides of the Atlantic the contrary reports provoked the greatest excitement. Spain demanded the verdict of an impartial tribunal upon the causes of the explosion. The United States refused to question the judgment of its experts. A conference between General Woodford and Sagasta led to no result. The affair was now in the hands of the "patriots" on either side; and war was inevitable. Since the beginning of the year the Americans had been making ready for it. Congress had voted ten million pounds for national defence. The French Republic and the Pope offered mediation in vain. The Queen Regent of Spain, by seeking direct communication with General Woodford, showed that she was willing to risk even the throne of her son for the sake of her adopted country. On April 1 the President reported that Spain had sent an unsatisfactory reply to his message demanding an armistice in Cuba, abandonment of the system of concentration, and proper distribution of relief funds subscribed in the United States. On April 11 he asked Congress for permission to use the army and navy to put an end to the war in Cuba for the sake of humanity, peace,

and American interests. Nine days later Congress granted the desired powers, declared the Cubans a free people, and called upon Spain to evacuate the island. At the same time it disclaimed all intention of acquiring territorial rights. General Woodford had already received his passports when this declaration of war was delivered. A state of war existed virtually from the 21st of April. Hostilities lasted less than four months. They proved an unbroken series of disasters for Spanish arms. The Powers had urgently sought to avert war; all, with the exception of Great Britain, showed sympathy with Spain's misfortunes.

The Spanish Cortes, elected in March, were summoned to provide funds for a war, the issue of which was hidden only from the ignorant or wilfully blind. A national subscription had been opened by the Queen Regent with a gift of a million pesetas; it never reached half-a-million sterling, and at least forty millions were needed. Fresh taxation was imposed; railway concessions were sold; and the mines of Almaden again mortgaged. On the proposal of General Martínez Campos, a bill was passed indemnifying the Government for anything it might do for the national cause. Don Carlos issued a manifesto promising that, should Spain be in danger of humiliation, he would pluck the arms from hands unworthy to wield them and would put himself at her head.

A large but ill-provided and disorganised Spanish army was already in Cuba, a considerable force in the Philippine Islands; and three Spanish squadrons were on the sea. Admiral Cámara commanded the reserve squadron at home, Admiral Cervera the Atlantic squadron off the Cape de Verde Islands, and Admiral Montojo the Pacific squadron off the Philippine Islands. Montojo's squadron, hopelessly outmatched, was destroyed in Manila Bay (May 1, 1898) by the American Pacific squadron under Admiral Dewey. The victors lost only seven men wounded; they landed, captured the arsenal at Cavite, and blockaded Manila, while Aguinaldo, leader of the

native insurgents, attacked on the land side. When the disastrous news reached Spain, Admiral Cámara set out to the rescue with the reserve fleet, but he was recalled from the mouth of the Suez Canal. The situation in the Philippines was recognised as hopeless for the Spanish arms; the squadron might be wanted nearer home; and, moreover, Spain had no coaling station between her coast and the islands. The two American Atlantic squadrons, under Admirals Samson and Sebley, began the blockade of the Cuban coast at the outset of the war and bombarded the defences of Matanzas. On April 27 Admiral Cervera, Spain's main hope, sailed against them from the Cape de Verde Islands. Admiral Samson, believing that the Spaniards were making for Puerto Rico, advanced to meet them, but, failing to find them, put back to Havana, after bombarding San Juan.

Meanwhile Cervera had coaled at Curaçao, and reached Santiago de Cuba on May 19. For more than a week he lay hid, but on June 1 he was blockaded by the united American squadrons. Their attempt to imprison him by sinking a collier in the narrow channel failed, but they watched him day and night, whilst American troops to the number of about 22,000 landed at Guantamo, 40 miles east of Santiago, and put themselves in communication with the insurgents. In the two small land battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill (July 1), both sides showed great gallantry. The Americans were victorious and drove back the Spaniards, but they lost about 1500 men. Their army was small and their position most precarious. Fever had broken out among them; their supplies were running short; but, showing a bold front, they began to bombard Santiago. Cervera could now no longer remain inactive in the harbour. Well knowing the fate that awaited him, he steamed suddenly out and turned westward, running the gauntlet of the American fire (July 3). All his ships were sunk, burned, run ashore, or captured. The Americans lost one man; their Spanish prisoners numbered sixteen hundred. A fortnight later General

Toral surrendered Santiago to an inferior force, stipulating for the repatriation of himself and his 23,000 troops<sup>1</sup>.

Some outcry for peace had already been heard in Spain when the Cortes were closed, June 25. News of Cervera's fate, and the fall of Santiago, together with a report that an American squadron was about to visit the Spanish coast, opened the eyes of such as still cherished illusions as to the military situation. The Americans had already gained possession of a great part of Puerto Rico, when, after consulting the leaders of the Constitutional political parties, Sagasta, through the good offices of France, made overtures for peace (July 22, 1898). He proposed as its basis an agreement as to the political status of Cuba; but President MacKinley refused to accept the limitation of the points at issue. He claimed that the difference with regard to Spain's treatment of her colony "had become transformed and enlarged into a general conflict between two great peoples." He demanded the immediate evacuation of Cuba; surrender of Puerto Rico and other small West Indian Islands to the United States in lieu of war indemnity; possession of Manila, pending settlement of the status of the Philippine Islands. To the last clause Spain demurred, but she was forced to accept it; and the preliminary agreement was signed, August 12. Romero Robledo and General Weyler protested against what they called the unpatriotic surrender, and would have made their country's position still worse by obstinacy in a hopeless struggle.

When the American and Spanish Commissioners met in Paris to arrange the Treaty of Peace (Oct. 1, 1898), the two contested points were the sovereignty of the Philippine Islands and the Cuban debt. The Spaniards contended that the debt was attached to the island, and that its change of government did not affect its liability. The Americans insisted that the

<sup>1</sup> The Spaniards were alleged to have 250,000 troops in Cuba; but this was evidently a gross exaggeration. [J. F. K.]

debt had not been contracted by Cubans, but wrongfully and forcibly imposed by Spain and spent for the most part in fighting against Cuba's legitimate aspiration for freedom. The Spaniards were forced to submit and to take over the debt. Manila had been captured by the Americans two days after the preliminaries of peace had been agreed upon and in ignorance of their terms. The Spaniards demanded possession of the city and the archipelago. But a strong feeling for annexation had shown itself in the United States; the people refused to resign their conquest; and accordingly their President announced that "he could see but one plain path of duty, the acceptance of the archipelago." The Spanish commissioners demurred on the ground of the provisional treaty, and the fact of the capture after its signature. They were met by an ultimatum or final proposal which they were bound to accept or to face a renewal of the war. The United States paid four millions sterling for the Philippine, Sules, and Marianne Islands. The treaty signed Nov. 28 was ratified Dec. 10, 1898. The United States bought later Spain's only remaining possessions in the Pacific, the Caroline Islands, for £800,000.

To Spain the chief immediate result of the war was an enormous increase of her debt. Under Canalejas' scheme the Exterior Debt had been reduced since 1882 from 78 to 41 millions sterling. But, by consolidation of a yearly deficit of about three millions, the Interior Debt had swelled enormously. Spain was now obliged to take over more than 100 millions of colonial and war loans; and her Interior Debt rose to 270 millions of four per cents. and sixty millions of five per cents. Her note issue had increased from thirty to fifty millions during the war. Gold had risen to a premium of one hundred per cent. But Spain valiantly resolved to avoid bankruptcy at any cost. She taxed the coupons of her interior loan twenty per cent., whilst letting the exterior go free for the sake of her credit. She paid her native creditors in depreciated currency, and mulcted the salaries of officials and clergy. Little by



little her efforts were recognised; and her credit is improving.

The loss of the last remnant of her great colonial empire did not really weaken or impoverish Spain; but the ridiculous ease with which her navy was overwhelmed humiliated her. She knows now that many years of discipline, recuperation, and reform must pass before she can aspire to be counted among the Powers. Her thoughts and resources, instead of being dissipated abroad, are concentrated upon development within her narrowed borders. The rising generation breathes freely, relieved of the dread of enforced military service in fever-stricken Cuba, and from further additions to the burden imposed by the never-ending war. The Catalan manufacturers lost the close market which they had believed to be essential to their existence; but enough employment was still left to their industry in supplying a home-market fenced round with protective regulations of the most stringent kind. For many years Spain's colonies had been a drag on the nation, a benefit only to a corrupt official class. Stripped of troops and armaments, the country had been left apparently at the mercy of Carlists and Republicans; but none took advantage of the common misfortune. Castelar, indeed, sacrificed a reputation for fine feeling by attacking the Queen Regent in a foreign review. His article was suppressed in Spain; but its author was left unmolested by special request of the injured lady. The great disaster that had been expected to endanger the dynasty did not even cause the downfall of the ministry. But Sagasta, on whom had fallen the expiation of years of misgovernment, and chiefly the faults of his political opponents, resigned. He had faced the inevitable—for Spain would never have admitted her weakness unless defeated—open-eyed and unshrinking; he was unpopular because associated with painful memories. The calm and impeccable Francisco Silvela gathered together the remnants of Cánovas' party, and started his country on the painful path of reconstruction and reform.



Spain's hope of peace and prosperity depends on the purification of her administration, on the limitation of the activities of the Church to their proper sphere, on the creation of a feeling of confidence which shall allow better terms to be made with the national creditors, and shall set free for agricultural, industrial, and commercial enterprise the huge capital now absorbed by state loans. Then, and not till then, will the most profitable Spanish enterprises be worked by Spanish capital and to Spain's advantage; then will Spain's most essential industry, agriculture, turn its energies to supplying the permanent home-market, selling Spanish goods under Spanish names, instead of looking to the adventitious needs of its neighbours as its mainstay, and sending out wines and oils that are the raw material for skilled manufacture. Then will labour turn to its task, undiscouraged by the knowledge that a hungry and corrupt governing class has ever an eye to its slender profits. Spain will be able to laugh at those who, standing on either hand, urge upon her a theocracy or a commune. But many things are still to be done before honest Republicans cease to rail, and honest Carlists to hope.

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